Further to my earlier post, in which I discussed primarily the auditors' report on TID's financials, here are some additional comments.
Treasury Shares
The Consolidated Statement of Changes in Equity and Note 18 (Page 30) shows that TID and its associates owned 60,708,612 in Treasury Shares with a cost of KD45.224 million and a market value of KD6.192 million (13.7% of cost!).
This is significantly larger than the holdings disclosed in TID's 3Q08 financials of KD9.820 million or 14,097,720 shares.
Two reasons for the change.
- First, the inclusion of holdings of associates.
- Second, some minor 4Q08 buying by TID itself.
- As at 31 December 2007, they held 35,019,092 shares at a cost of KD21.630 million and at 31 December 2008, 45,135,892 shares at a cost of KD34.993 million.
- As of the end of 2008, TID itself held "only" 15,572,720 shares.
Let's take a look at trading activity. Unfortunately, TID has not restated its interim financial reports for 2008 so we cannot determine quarterly trading patterns for the associates.
Investments at Fair Value through Profit or Loss
In Note 5, Page 19 we learn that "Unquoted local funds with a fair value of KD55,575,647 as of 31 December 2008 (200&7: KD60,710,023) are in funds managed by the Group. Approximately, 52% of the assets of these funds of KD65,287,835 are held by the Group under Murabaha and Wakala payables."
Murabaha and Wakala Placements
Note 7 Page 20. A couple of points here.
First, as you'll see M&WP with non financial institutions jumped from KD12.7 million in 2007 (7.3% of all M&WP) to KD43.3 million in 2008 (37.6%). From the Note these do not appear to be with related parties. However, TID has some KD51.2 million placed with a related party as of FYE2008.
We also learn that as of 31 December 2008, it did not hold any collateral on these placements but subsequently acquired KD33.9 million of collateral (exact nature unspecified).
KD51.2 million represents 44.4% of M&WP which seems a "bit" excessive in terms of risk concentration, especially since collateral seems to have been an afterthought. This amount is roughly 25.4% of FYE08 equity, though year end equity has been depressed by losses and fair value declines so it may be fairer to look at 30 September 2008 equity when the ratio was 11.3%. This analysis assumes of course that TID had no other exposure to this same related counterparty.
Financing Receivables
Note 8 Page 21. TID advises that subsequent to 31 December 2008, it acquired 8.7% of the equity in Bahrain Islamic Bank (an associated company) as settlement of a finance receivable of KD21,237,253. The market value of the shares was KD12,256,833.
Somehow TID determined that it should recognize KD10,706,237 in goodwill on the transaction.
And somehow TID's auditors signed off on this. When AA learned his accounting, a transaction was valued by the "boot" received. When there was a market price, that was the "boot" (value). So it's unclear what the basis was for recognizing this rather substantial amount of goodwill. I guess it's a stark lesson of the need to stay current. Back to the books for AA!
Note 10 Page 22. TID advises the subsequent to 31 December 2008, it settled an outstanding Murabaha of KD16,763,386 by transferring property worth KD15,797,730. As a result it recognized a profit of KD965,656 on the transaction! The identity of the "wise" lender in this exchange was not disclosed. Perhaps, the "discount" was the price of an early exit and an excuse from the restructuring. It's unclear how the property was valued.
Note 12 Pages 23 -26.
Stehwaz Holding and Rehal Logistics
Page 23. During the year, TID reclassified investments in Rehal Logistics and Stehwaz Holding from investments available for sale to investments in associates where it could use the equity method of accounting instead of the previously used fair value (market price in this case). This reclassification magically created provision goodwill of some KD73.5 million which TID notes it wrote down to KD23.0 million. You may recall from an earlier post of mine that 47 shareholders in Stehwaz had raised some serious charges against TID and the management/board of Stehwaz. Related to, if I remember correctly, allegations of manipulation of fair values. Allegations I'd hasten to note are not judicially proven. Also if I haven't mentioned it before Mr. AlRabah - the peripatetic director at Commercial Bank of Kuwait elected in what was portrayed at the time as a successful campaign to enhance corporate governance was Chairman at Stehwaz during this period.
Page 24. During 2008, TID exercised an option to acquire 40% of Prodrive for KD11.2 million of which KD7.1 million is payable and the remaining KD4.1 million is a liability. TID has provisionally recognized some KD8.7 million in goodwill on the transaction. It's unclear what the timing is for TID's payment of these amounts is. Presumably, failure to pay might affect its ownership rights or the acquisition price.
Various "Investment Properties"
Page 25. Again another quote from TID.
Note 16 Page 28-29. This note is interesting for what it tells us about The Investment Dar Bank Bahrain (in which TID has roughly 79% shareholding and so therefore effective control). It seems TIDBB placed some KD253 million with TID on an unsecured basis. This seems a rather large amount / risk concentration by TIDBB with TID.
Earlier press reports suggest to me (but don't prove) that some of these funds may have been customer investment accounts – in effect Islamic "trust" accounts either RIA (Restricted Investment Accounts where the client designates the investment) or URIA (Unrestricted Investment Account the client does not).
If I'm not mistaken the Central Bank of Bahrain amended one of its regulations for Islamic Banks to limit exposure to a single counterparty of the Islamic Banks own funds, RIA and URIA to 35% of regulatory capital. Often (but not always) when a Central Bank amends a regulation it is dealing with a problem that has occurred. No way to know for sure here. Post hoc does not necessarily mean propter hoc.
After reading TID's 2008 financials, I have some questions about he valuation of some assets. As later financials are released, this topic will hopefully become clearer.
- In 4Q08 TID purchased net KD0.411 million. And for the entire year actually sold some KD1.2 million worth of Treasury Shares.
- For all of 2008, TID's associates purchased 10,296,800 shares for KD13.363 million. That would mean an average purchase price of KD1.321 per share. When I look at the KSE records for 2008, it seems that March 16 and 17 are the only two trading days with a price of KD1.320 when some 12 million or so shares traded.
Assuming that TID's associates bought their 2008 shares at market and looking at TID's own trading position, it seems there were no significant 4Q08 share transactions by the Group to influence its price – a time when one might have expected an effort to prop up the market value.
Notable high volume days were 25, 26, and 27 November when 31.4 million, 14.4 million and 15.2 million shares traded roughly in the KD0.220 range. And then again on 17 December when 31.4 million shares traded at KD0.203. And finally on 23 December when 42.3 million shares traded at KD0.157.
Notable high volume days were 25, 26, and 27 November when 31.4 million, 14.4 million and 15.2 million shares traded roughly in the KD0.220 range. And then again on 17 December when 31.4 million shares traded at KD0.203. And finally on 23 December when 42.3 million shares traded at KD0.157.
Investments at Fair Value through Profit or Loss
In Note 5, Page 19 we learn that "Unquoted local funds with a fair value of KD55,575,647 as of 31 December 2008 (200&7: KD60,710,023) are in funds managed by the Group. Approximately, 52% of the assets of these funds of KD65,287,835 are held by the Group under Murabaha and Wakala payables."
Murabaha and Wakala Placements
Note 7 Page 20. A couple of points here.
First, as you'll see M&WP with non financial institutions jumped from KD12.7 million in 2007 (7.3% of all M&WP) to KD43.3 million in 2008 (37.6%). From the Note these do not appear to be with related parties. However, TID has some KD51.2 million placed with a related party as of FYE2008.
We also learn that as of 31 December 2008, it did not hold any collateral on these placements but subsequently acquired KD33.9 million of collateral (exact nature unspecified).
KD51.2 million represents 44.4% of M&WP which seems a "bit" excessive in terms of risk concentration, especially since collateral seems to have been an afterthought. This amount is roughly 25.4% of FYE08 equity, though year end equity has been depressed by losses and fair value declines so it may be fairer to look at 30 September 2008 equity when the ratio was 11.3%. This analysis assumes of course that TID had no other exposure to this same related counterparty.
Financing Receivables
Note 8 Page 21. TID advises that subsequent to 31 December 2008, it acquired 8.7% of the equity in Bahrain Islamic Bank (an associated company) as settlement of a finance receivable of KD21,237,253. The market value of the shares was KD12,256,833.
Somehow TID determined that it should recognize KD10,706,237 in goodwill on the transaction.
And somehow TID's auditors signed off on this. When AA learned his accounting, a transaction was valued by the "boot" received. When there was a market price, that was the "boot" (value). So it's unclear what the basis was for recognizing this rather substantial amount of goodwill. I guess it's a stark lesson of the need to stay current. Back to the books for AA!
Investment Properties
Note 10 Page 22. TID advises the subsequent to 31 December 2008, it settled an outstanding Murabaha of KD16,763,386 by transferring property worth KD15,797,730. As a result it recognized a profit of KD965,656 on the transaction! The identity of the "wise" lender in this exchange was not disclosed. Perhaps, the "discount" was the price of an early exit and an excuse from the restructuring. It's unclear how the property was valued.
Investments in Associates
Note 12 Pages 23 -26.
Stehwaz Holding and Rehal Logistics
Page 23. During the year, TID reclassified investments in Rehal Logistics and Stehwaz Holding from investments available for sale to investments in associates where it could use the equity method of accounting instead of the previously used fair value (market price in this case). This reclassification magically created provision goodwill of some KD73.5 million which TID notes it wrote down to KD23.0 million. You may recall from an earlier post of mine that 47 shareholders in Stehwaz had raised some serious charges against TID and the management/board of Stehwaz. Related to, if I remember correctly, allegations of manipulation of fair values. Allegations I'd hasten to note are not judicially proven. Also if I haven't mentioned it before Mr. AlRabah - the peripatetic director at Commercial Bank of Kuwait elected in what was portrayed at the time as a successful campaign to enhance corporate governance was Chairman at Stehwaz during this period.
Boubyan Bank Shares
Page 24. The Note also contains TID's side of the Boubyan Bank share dispute with Commercial Bank of Kuwait.
Let's let TID speak for itself here.
Let's let TID speak for itself here.
"The Group's investment in Boubyan Bank (KSC) was transferred to a local bank under a repurchase agreement as part of an agreement with that bank to act as an advisor for restructuring of the Group's debts. The Group revoked the repo agreement when the local bank terminates the advisory agreement. However, the bank did not transfer title of these shares back to the Group but set off its value of KD94,103,965 against amounts due from the Parent Company of KD74,616,098 which is included in Murabaha and Wakala Payables as of 31 December 2008. The Group is pursuing legal action for recovering ownership of these equity shares. The Group carries the investment at its adjusted acquisition cost under equity method of accounting. The fair value of this investment as of 31 December 2008 was KD88,311,406. Subsequently, the Group ceased to have significant influence over Boubyan Bank since it is no longer represented on its Board of Directors when it was reconstituted in April 2009, and has reclassified it as investment available for sale from that date. On 16 June 2009 the court issued a verdict to suspend dealing on those shares temporarily, pending a ruling on the dispute."
This particular disclosure is intriguing, though its wording is obscure. My understanding was that that repo was a new transaction. In 4Q08 CBK bought the shares and gave TID some US$250 million. TID was supposed to buy the shares back in early 2009. On that basis, it's unclear to me how this transaction is related to the restructuring assignment. TID could retrieve the shares (at least theoretically) by giving CBK the cash on maturity. It did not. To be fair, it could not due to lack of funds.
One other potential reading of this paragraph is that TID gave the shares to CBK in a non cash transaction. That is, it made CBK a secured creditor so it would lead the restructuring. That would seem to be what I'd call a preference (though careful readers aware from my above comment that I lack familiarity with the intricacies of Kuwaiti accounting standards may have drawn a similar conclusion about my knowledge of Kuwaiti laws). Since this has not mentioned in anything I've seen, I am discounting this second explanation and not as TID did using a 3% perpetual growth rate in my valuation.
One other potential reading of this paragraph is that TID gave the shares to CBK in a non cash transaction. That is, it made CBK a secured creditor so it would lead the restructuring. That would seem to be what I'd call a preference (though careful readers aware from my above comment that I lack familiarity with the intricacies of Kuwaiti accounting standards may have drawn a similar conclusion about my knowledge of Kuwaiti laws). Since this has not mentioned in anything I've seen, I am discounting this second explanation and not as TID did using a 3% perpetual growth rate in my valuation.
Taking the relative share prices of BB at 31 December 2008 of KD0.400 per share and the current price of KD0.540, the shares should be worth roughly KD127 million. If we assume CBK and TID settle for CBK's principal plus additional interest since the setoff, TID should get roughly KD49 million or so in return.
Prodrive
Page 24. During 2008, TID exercised an option to acquire 40% of Prodrive for KD11.2 million of which KD7.1 million is payable and the remaining KD4.1 million is a liability. TID has provisionally recognized some KD8.7 million in goodwill on the transaction. It's unclear what the timing is for TID's payment of these amounts is. Presumably, failure to pay might affect its ownership rights or the acquisition price.
Various "Investment Properties"
Page 25. Again another quote from TID.
"The underlying assets of certain associates carried at KD237,502,699 in these consolidated financial statements are investment properties in Bahrain and Dubai carried at fair value. The Group's share in associates' results, includes gains on revaluation of these investment properties of KD60,657,096 based on the average of the range of values of independent valuation experts. Subsequent to the balance sheet date, these associates have reported a significant decline in the carrying value of these investment properties. Consequently, the carrying value of the investment in these associates has declined by KD60,622,492 as of 30 September 2009. The associates have not yet determined the impact of change in market values after that date and up to the date of these financial statements."
Impairment Testing
TID has recognized some KD61,560,335 for impairment in associates. It is unclear to me if this amount includes the KD60.6 million related to Various Investment Properties referred to above. Or whether it is before this number? Meaning that additional fair value decreases may be required.
Murabaha and Wakala Payables
Note 16 Page 28-29. This note is interesting for what it tells us about The Investment Dar Bank Bahrain (in which TID has roughly 79% shareholding and so therefore effective control). It seems TIDBB placed some KD253 million with TID on an unsecured basis. This seems a rather large amount / risk concentration by TIDBB with TID.
Earlier press reports suggest to me (but don't prove) that some of these funds may have been customer investment accounts – in effect Islamic "trust" accounts either RIA (Restricted Investment Accounts where the client designates the investment) or URIA (Unrestricted Investment Account the client does not).
If I'm not mistaken the Central Bank of Bahrain amended one of its regulations for Islamic Banks to limit exposure to a single counterparty of the Islamic Banks own funds, RIA and URIA to 35% of regulatory capital. Often (but not always) when a Central Bank amends a regulation it is dealing with a problem that has occurred. No way to know for sure here. Post hoc does not necessarily mean propter hoc.
Final Comments
After reading TID's 2008 financials, I have some questions about he valuation of some assets. As later financials are released, this topic will hopefully become clearer.
2 comments:
My I say : Isalmic Investment Banking!!!!!???
Great Analysis.
Or perhaps "Islamic" investment banking?
Post a Comment