Qatar Banking Sector: How "Grim" is Grim?

Sure Sounds Much Scarier Than Subdued

AA was in grave danger of slipping further into his monomania on Dana Gas, until Gulf News (Dubai) rode to his rescue with this timely 8 August article:  “Qatar banking system faces grim outlook as sanctions bite”.

“Grim outlook” sure sounds serious.  If Indian banks are facing “subdued” prospects, then Qatar has to be in even worse shape.   

The article’s argument appears based on the following: 

1. Moody’s has placed Qatar’s banking sector on ratings watch negative, a change from stable.  The other rating agencies have taken steps as well.  S&P bumped Qatar’s sovereign rating to AA-.  Fitch has placed Qatar’s AA sovereign rating on its watch list.  In case you don’t know, investment grade extends all the way to BBB- or Baa3. Qatar banks are more dependent on external funding than earlier. 

2. External funding may be withdrawn and the Qatar government’s ability to support its banks has weakened.

3. Qatar’s banks have a “lot” of cross border assets in the GCC and MENA.  AA isn't sure if this is a credit warning about these borrowers ability to repay or about government action to prevent payment.

4. Moody’s expects non-performing assets to increase from 1.7 % at FYE 2016 to 2.2% by FYE 2018. Moody’s also expects ROA to decline from 1.7% for fiscal 2016 to 1.4% for fiscal 2017.

GN’s assessment seems to be based on two things.

1. First, some negative things might occur, e.g., external funding withdrawal, ratings drop, etc. At its current rating Qatar could drop a notch or two and still comfortably be investment grade.  More importantly, things that might occur do not necessarily occur.  Or when they do, there may be solutions. Those with long memories or mentors who lived in exciting times will remember that when international banks cut off funding for the Kuwaiti-owned banks in Bahrain following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the KIA rode to the rescue.   

2. Second, there is negative trend in two metrics:  ROA and ROE. It’s not clear to AA if GN believes that the change in NPA (a 30% increase) or ROA (an 18% decrease) is driving Qatar banks to “grim” territory or whether it is the absolute levels of these figures. 

Let’s put those metrics—ROA and NPLs— into context with a chart drawn from  pages 10-11 in the KPMG report on GCC 2016 banking performance. 

Two things to note about that report. 

• It covers listed banks and not all banks.  Despite the sample composition, the report should provide a directional idea about relative performance. 

• That presumably explains much if not all of the difference between KPMG’s figures and Moody’s who are including unlisted banks in their calculations. 

GCC Banking Performance
	ROA		NPL
Country	2015	2016	2015	2016
Bahrain	1.0%	1.1%	10.7%	9.8%
Kuwait	0.9%	1.1%	2.1%	2.1%
Oman	0.5%	0.8%	1.9%	2.0%
Qatar	1.8%	1.5%	1.7%	1.9%
Saudi	2.0%	1.7%	1.1%	1.3%
UAE	1.4%	1.3%	4.1%	4.0%

Based on the above data, it would seem that using GN’s definition things are at least somewhat grim in the UAE and even more so in Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. 

Perhaps, this is Qatar’s way of re-integrating itself into the GCC?

But there’s more. 

Notice that the chart in the GN’s story shows a decline in ROA since 2011 well before sanctions on Qatar had been “born” or had molars to bite, though this may be a testimony to the wise leadership's ability to position for necessary future action.

A January GN article quotes Moody's projections for GCC aggregated banking performance in 2017.  Using that projection as a baseline, it would appear that the "grim" Qatar banking sector will outperform the average GCC bank. 

As to the health of GCC country finances in a low energy price environment and thus their ability to support their local banking sector and economy, there’s a Fitch 5 April report that provides some insights. 

Based on its forecasts for the average 2017 oil price and country projected spending, among the GCC states only Kuwait (USD 45) and Qatar (USD 51) have a break-even price below Fitch’s estimated USD 52.50 barrel price for oil.  Kuwait’s break-even price was influenced by its “high investment income”. 

Bahrain is at USD 84, Oman at USD 75, KSA at USD 74, and Abu Dhabi at USD 60.   Details here. 

Mark AA as skeptical on GN’s assessment which seems more like foreign policy advocacy in search of a “victory” than hard analysis. 

It's a bit early to make a call on the effectiveness of sanctions or of Qatar's workarounds.

A grim scenario may occur, but Qatar has abundant resources to fight sanctions and at present retains access to world financial markets.  One could the case of other sanctioned countries with less financial resources or access to financial markets to draw some conclusions about ability to weather a storm.  Hufbauer et al "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered" may be a useful entry point to such a review.

There is is a more nuanced less alarmist view on Moody's report--as appears to be the usual case--at Abu Dhabi’s The National. No “biting” no scenarios of doom.

Indian Banks: Sadly Things are Looking More “Subdued”

It's Not Cricket!

Bloomberg reported 3 March that “India Needs `Bad Bank' to Clean Up Soured Debt, Rating Firms Say”

Things are looking mighty “subdued” as careful observers might say.

Some quotes from Bloomberg followed by (AA) comments.

Bloomberg

Stressed assets -- made up of bad loans, restructured debt and advances to companies that can’t meet servicing requirements -- have risen to about 16.6 percent of total loans in India, the highest level among major economies, data compiled by the nation’s Finance Ministry show.

AA is puzzled.  I would think that “advances to companies that can’t meet servicing requirements” would qualify as “bad” loans.  And that restructured debt that was performing, i.e., meeting servicing requirements would not be bad debt.  On the other hand if restructurings were “cosmetic” in nature, then they are indeed bad loans.  If loans aren’t performing, they’re “bad” loans.  If loans are restructured at lower rates perhaps even below market rates but are performing, shouldn’t banks bear this cost? 

Bloomberg

Ratings companies including Fitch Ratings Ltd have come out in favor of setting up a state-backed “bad bank” to tackle India’s ballooning stressed assets problem, a move resisted by Raghuram Rajan, the former governor of the Reserve Bank of India.

Seems to AA if banks’ “bad” loans are ballooning, the country probably already has more than one “bad” bank, particularly when one factors in the comments in the article about “hiding” bad loans, failing to take tough decisions.   

Bloomberg

The RBI completed its audit of the nation’s 50 lenders last year, forcing them to lay bare previously hidden non-performing loans.

That sounds like rather “bad” behavior to AA.

Bloomberg

Banks had been reluctant to offer discounts to offload bad loans even where they are clearly worth much less than their book value because such sales “invite the attention of anti-corruption agencies making bank officials reluctant to sign off on them,” Fitch analysts including Guha wrote in a Feb. 23 note.

AA wonders if the anti-corruption agencies should look earlier in the loan cycle, e.g., at initial underwriting and subsequent “hiding” stages?  Also are bankers looking for the “bad” bank to make “bad” pricing decisions and buy the duff loans at prices higher than their fair value?  Thus, bailing out the banks’ previous bad behavior?  Perhaps this explains former Governor Rajan’s reluctance.

Bloomberg

Bankers selling bad loans to a national bad bank won’t be questioned, as this institution will be empowered by the government to take tough decisions,” said Rajesh Mokashi, managing director at CARE Ratings Ltd. in an interview. A bad bank will also bring to an end to fear of “witch-hunting” of lenders, if any, by anti-graft agencies, he said.

Is this an admission by bankers that they are restricted from taking “tough” decisions?  Or that they are incapable or unwilling to take “tough” decisions?  If either, then a sale to a bad bank does nothing to change this “bad” behavior and is likely to lead to a repeat of bad loan creation by these same banks that can’t or won’t take “tough” decisions.

Bloomberg

With more than $180 billion in stressed assets, the government and regulators have to evaluate all avenues including a bad bank to drive better recovery rates,” said Nikhil Shah, managing director at Alvarez and Marsal, a firm that specializes in turnarounds.

AA wonders how selling duff assets to an asset manager--or “bad” bank, if you prefer--improves recovery rates.  Does this mean that banks are unwilling to take hard decisions or aren’t allowed to?  If so, what guarantee is there that the “bad” bank will?   If the fundamental problem is a slow moving erratic legal process, will the fact that the plaintiff is now a “bad” bank really speed up the legal process?  Or is the idea to buy the duff loans from the banks above market, thus improving their “recovery” rates and stick the “bad” bank with the losses?

All in all not a very pretty picture.  Subdued indeed.

But every situation has both positive and negative possibilities.  As this post about comments from the head of a distinguished bank in a  neighboring country shows, attitude can play a key role

India: Moody’s and ICRA See “Subdued” Prospects for India’s Banks

Sometimes Even When You See Something Clearly, You Think It Wise to be Indirect

Just when I was recovering from The National Bank of Ukraine’s festival of euphemisms about PrivatBank, along come Moody’s and its Indian affiliate ICRA to once again remind AA that his attempts are easily upstaged. 

In a report released on 9 January, Moody’s and ICRA summarize their conclusions about the country’s banking sector with the phrase “see subdued prospects for India's banks“.

Why is AA “skeptical” and inclined to a stronger term than “subdued”?  Perhaps “dismal”?

Three factors.

First, Indian banks—particularly public sector banks or PSBs—have a reputation for under-reporting NPAs.    Favorite techniques were refusal to recognize NPAs, disguising bad loans via restructuring and/or making new loans to pay interest on past due loans.   Former RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan launched a “crackdown” in 2015 to curb under-reporting of NPAs. 

Performance suffered.  The decline was chiefly due to increased provisioning in 2016 and the related impact on net interest margin.   According to RBI’s Report on Trends and Progress of Banking in India,  Operations and Performance of Scheduled Commercial Banks Table 2.1, banking sector return on assets for 2015/2016  was 31 bp and ROE 3.59% compared to 2014/2015’s ROA of 81 bp and ROE of 10.42%.   Public Sector Banks—some 70% of banking assets--fared even worse with negative ROA and ROE in 2015/2016.  

Second, Indian banks have also traditionally under-reserved their declared NPAs with provisions averaging roughly 40% of total NPAs.   According to RBI Handbook of Statistics of the Indian Economy Table 65, 2015 reserving levels were at 46%.   Unreserved NPAs were some 20% of 2015 capital (Table 64). 

It’s hard to tell what happened in 2016.  Much higher provisions were taken, but more loans were recognized as NPAs and restructured loans are now to be included in that figure.  What’s the net effect?   

Sadly, RBI data on NPAs is available with a roughly 12 month lag.   See Table 65 in the RBI’s “Handbook of Statistics”.  Latest figures are from September 2016.  Other RBI reporting has detailed bank-by-bank analysis but the latest data appears to be March 2016. 

Without RBI statistics on both NPAs and provisions, it’s not possible to determine if the provision coverage has increased because both NPAs and provisions have increased.  

Third, low provisioning levels are particularly important because NPA recovery is traditionally very low in India.  According to RBI’s Report on Trends and Progress of Banking in India,  Operations and Performance of Scheduled Commercial Banks, Table 2.2,  in 2016 Indian banks recovered roughly 10% of NPAs versus 12% for the previous year.  

What this means is that recoveries are unlikely to make up provisioning shortfalls to any meaningful extent.   Provisions then are more critical than in jurisdictions where average recoveries are in the 40 to 50% range. 

It’s hard for AA to imagine that during 2016 Indian banks cured decades of bad practice and bad underwriting.  Trump Tower like Rome wasn’t built in a day, though it is by some Twitter accounts better.  And banking sector cleanups generally take more than a single year. 

Moody’s/ ICRA seem to agree. In their press release, they project single digit ROE for 2017 and 2018 and note large capital needs particularly among PSBs. 

A case of JPMorgan “Jakarta” fever?  Or euphemism?  

And finally a tip of AA’s enormous tarbush to ICRA SVP Karthik Srinivasan for combining “dent” with “profitability matrices”.  See link to Moody’s / ICRA press release. Shabash!

Department of No Surprises: Leaked Results of Booz Study - One Bank is Strong the Rest at Lower Levels

5 October's  Al Qabas contains a supposed "leak" of the study Booz did for the Central Bank of Kuwait.  The results one bank is strong and the remainder satisfactory and partially satisfactory.

Since no names were given, I suppose it's a big mystery who the one strong bank is.  That is, of course, if you don't know anything about Kuwait and Kuwaiti banking history.  

Al Qabas' sources tell it the report was given to the Central Bank last week and that the CBK is studying Booz's conclusions to determine which banks need to raise additional equity and which can strengthen their balance sheets by issuing bonds.

HSBC: “No Provision Relief for Kuwaiti Banks Until 2012”

AlQabas published a summary of a recent HSBC research report in its Sunday issue.

Here's a quick summary of the main points:

1. HSBC notes the dramatic growth in distressed loans at Kuwaiti banks – from 5.3% in 2008 to 9.7% in 2009. 
2. And predicts that the banks will continue to make substantial provisions this year and next only reaching a normal level of provisions in 2012. 
3. That being said, there should be a recovery in ROE for 2010.
4. Banks in Abu Dhabi and Kuwait were the worst affected among GCC banks. However, Kuwait has average provisions equal to 10% of total loans while Abu Dhabi only 4%. 
5. A concentration on loans to real estate, construction, and investment companies is responsible for the decline in the value of Kuwaiti bank assets. 
6. Real estate exposure:  Given the absence of Kuwaiti government spending on infrastructure or development projects during the boom years (2005-2008) credit was to the private sector largely to individuals and unlisted companies. The focus was on commercial, residential and investment real estate. Listed real estate companies only account for 13% of the total of such loans. 
7. Investment firm exposure:  Loans to investment companies were KD2.8 billion with KD1.2 billion to conventional firms and KD1.5 billion to "Islamic" firms.  The loans granted were largely used to fund investments in real estate and regional stock markets (thus increasing the lenders' total exposure to these sectors). 85% of investment companies' assets are in the GCC as per the IMF. Since the crisis hit, banks have seen their loan security drop by at least 50% as per HSBC's estimates, though it does note that in the absence of transparency the true impact is not known. 
8. Consumer loans:  These extensions of credit are believed to be of better quality because  they are secured by rentals and salaries. HSBC notes that most Kuwaitis are employed by the Government, the implicit presumption being that their incomes are secure.
   

There were two interesting tables accompanying the article, which I've reproduced below.

First, Kuwaiti bank exposure to real estate as a percentage of shareholders' equity.

Amounts in KD millions.

Bank	Real Estate & Construction ("REE")	Shareholders Equity	REE % of Equity
NBK	1,450	1,871	78%
CBK	733	440	167%
Burgan	976	422	232%
KFH	1,591	1,537	194%
Gulf	1,495	391	382%

Second, Kuwaiti bank exposure to investment companies.

Amounts in KD millions.

Bank	Exposure	% of Total	Shareholders' Equity	Exposure as % of Equity
Gulf	486	18%	391	80%
Burgan	190	7%	422	45%
CBK	269	10%	440	61%
NBK	216	5%	1,871	12%
KFH	944	34%	1,537	61%
Others	658	26%	----	----
Total	2,763	100%	----	----

 

From the above one can draw some conclusions on relative business models and underwriting standards.  

Of course without knowing the details of the loans and in particular the security obtained, these can be only preliminary. 


As usual, the pattern seems to be repeating itself.  One bank is distinguished by its prudence.  And some of the same names seem to be pushing the envelope. 

Gulf Bank to De-Emphasize Investments and Focus on Core Banking Business

Issa Abdul Salaam at Al Qabas quotes informed sources that Gulf Bank is exiting several funds and reducing its share in others during the rest of the year.

GB reportedly withdrew from one fund it had invested in the "past months" with a view to realizing profits in 3Q and 4Q this year and that it intends to exit from several foreign funds.

This represents a change in strategy from that approved by the previous board.  The new board's strategy calls for the bank to focus on its core (banking) business.

Three comments:

1. Sticking to one's core competence is a sensible strategy.
2. Many a change in strategy is motivated more by the need for cash than  long range planning.  The number of lines of business that suddenly become "non core"  are in direct proportion to the cashflow deficit.  Gulf Bank certainly has some serious challenges in its loan portfolio.
3. When picking the "core" business to focus on, it's good to pick one that one has a future.  Whenever I read PR from some firm announcing that it  has made a strategic decision to focus on its core business, I wonder why it wasn't in the first place.  I also recall two business school cases.  In the first,  Pan American Airlines, the company divested itself of Intercontinental Hotels to focus on its airline franchise.  By contrast, in the second, Greyhound/Dial Corp, the dogs were (largely) sold.  One positive thing in this case, the core commercial banking business is a protected one in Kuwait.  And there's probably more of a long range future in commercial banking in Kuwait, if one can get credit underwriting right.

Burgan Bank 2Q10 Financials: A Closer Look

Let's take a closer look at Burgan's 2Q10 financials.  Press release here.

Income Statement

Net interest income for 1H10 at KD50 million was in line with 1H09's 48.6 million – no doubt some of the increase resulting from the consolidation of Tunis International Bank ("TIB") and Bank of Baghdad ("BoB") which BB acquired from United Gulf Bank, a related party (common KIPCO ownership). Earlier post on the asset sale here.

A similar case with Fees and Commissions: KD16.5 million in 1H10 versus KD15.9 million in 1H09.

Other Income (FX, Investment Income, Share in Associates Results, Dividends and Other) was KD17.1 million versus KD14.6 the half year earlier. As Burgan states in Note 5 referring to the acquisition of banks from UGB, "The business combination was achieved in stages. The Bank re-measured its previously held equity interest in BoB and TIB at the acquisition-date fair value and recognized a resulting gain of KD10,909 thousand , net of acquisition related expenses of KD43 thousand in the interim condensed income statement as part of "Net investment income" (note 10)."  Proving I guess, if one needed any proof, of just how wise and profitable these acquisitions were and are!

Operating Profit before provisions was KD53.8 million versus KD55.9 in 1H09.

Provisions were KD51.1 million versus KD27.8 million in 2009. 

As per Note 13, Provision for Impairment of Loans and Advances is split among BB's three LOBs as follows: 

1. Banking KD53.4 million charge 
2. Treasury and Investment Banking KD6.8 million "recovery" and 
3. International KD4.6 million charge.
   

As per BB's press release, with its specific provisions plus KD33 million of unallocated general provision, its Non Performing Loans are covered at 58%. 

Let's go back to FYE 2009 financials. At that point as per Note 5: 

1. Non Performing Loans totaled KD236.7 million.
2. KD5 million of which are "pre 1990 invasion" loans fully provided for. 
3. Specific Provisions were KD98.4 million.
4. General Provisions 80.8 million.
   

Since then it has added KD51.1 million in Specific Provisions. The language of the press release is not clear. It states that "In addition KD33 million in unallocated precautionary general provisions is available in the bank's books which resulted in a 58% provision coverage ratio". 

Either this means that only KD33 million of the KD80.8 million in General Provisions have been allocated to cover NPLs. Or that during 1H10, BB transferred some KD47.8 million in General Provisions to Specific Provisions. 

Because Burgan's regulator doesn't think this sort of information is useful it has not mandated that it be disclosed. Nor has it required the movement in the Provisions Account to be disclosed (write offs, FX movements, recoveries, etc). Apparently the KIPCO Group's legendary Shafafiyah Program doesn't call for this disclosure. Or perhaps Burgan may not deviate from the Central Bank's mandated form. Whatever the case, the lack of information affects the precision of the calculation below.

If we assume that only KD33 million of General Provisions are being counted for the 58% ratio, then Burgan's non performing loans are roughly KD314.7 million =(KD98.4 +KD51.1 +KD33)/.58. If on the other hand, Burgan made the KD47.8 million transfer from General to Specific, then NPLs are KD397.1 million. = (KD98.4 +KD47.8 +KD51.1 +KD33)/.58.

Those equate respectively to 13.3% and 16.6% of the gross Loans and Advances Portfolio (L&A as stated on the balance sheet plus the Provisions). One can assume that the 1H10 capital increase was motivated primarily by a need to shore up the Bank's defenses against troubled credits. And so these sort of levels make sense.

Balance Sheet

I didn't see any significant changes on the face of the balance sheet.

Looking at Note 3, Burgan has redirected some of its Cash and Banks from current accounts to time accounts (due within 30 days). At 1H09, the ratio of current deposits to total Cash and Banks was roughly 40%, falling to 35% at FYE09, and 19.7% at 1H10. No doubt motivated by Burgan'sTreasury's desire to wring a few more bps into interest income.

From Note 14, we see that KD168.8 million of Burgan's liquidity  (=Cash and Banks)  -- roughly 32.5% -- is placed with related parties. Sadly, it seems that United Gulf Bank has not bothered to publish the notes to either its 1Q10 or 2Q10 interim financials on its website. Without related party disclosures, it's not possible to say how much of UGB's US$401.9 million in interbanks taken at 1H10 were from related parties like Burgan. However, we do have data for FYE09 when US$333.2 (72.7%) of UGB's US$458.3 million in Due to Banks was from "Associates" (in which category Burgan should fall, though it may not be responsible for all of UGB's related party deposits. It is a big Family after all!). At FYE09 (Note 18), Burgan has KD172 million with Other Related Parties (US$602 million).

Finally from Note 13, we see that Burgan allocates its assets: KD1.1 billion to Banking KD1.4 billion to Treasury and Investment Banking and KD1.0 billion to International.

Cashflow

Operating Profit before Changes in Operating Assets and Liabilities is pretty much the same: KD46.8 million in 1H10 versus KD54.9 million the comparable period in 2009. 

Change in Operating Assets and Liabilities are a net source of funds of KD207 million in 2010 versus a rough balance in 2009 – a source of KD0.8 million. 

A substantial portion of the funds were used to acquire new subsidiaries – some KD92.7 million – which as Note 5 discloses were those involving UGB. 

During 1H10, Burgan paid down some KD72.8 million in Other Borrowed Funds, including KD48.1 million in a subordinated debt from a related party after obtaining "the approval from the regulatory authorities". (Note 14). The Bank also raised KD100.8 million in capital during the period.

After considering all the various items in cashflow, Burgan's cash decline is KD83.3  million (almost spot on equal to the payment to UGB for the acquisitions and the repayment of the related party subordinated loan).

Since AA is not only a strong believer in but also a strong supporter of Family Values, I am positive this is just a coincidence.

You Said What?: Tomalin Reveals Why There Will Always Be Banking Crisis

Taking a leaf from Charlie Prince's notebook, Michael Tomalin, CEO, of NBAD revealed why there will always be bad loans and banking crises in this article from The National:

“The problem if every bank is name lending and you are not is that it puts you in an awkward position,” Mr Tomalin said.

Dance to the music.  And pay the piper later.

Or perhaps, "But, Mom, all the kids were doing it".

Booz and Company to Assist Central Bank of Kuwait with Bank Stress Tests

AlQabas reports that the CBK has engaged Booz and Company to assist it with stress tests for the banking sector.

The article states that the CBK has taken the stress tests prepared by the banks at face value with no follow-up or consultations.  You might find it suprising but the banks apparently did quite well on their self administered test.  An "A" for all in the middle (or medium) case.  And only a few "remarks" on a bank or two for the worst or severe test.  ! مبروك

Booz and Company will review the banks' financials and the information they provided to the CBK and then design neutral (perhaps a better translation is "unbiased") half yearly and annual tests.   It sounds as though this may be an ongoing program).   Booz's "neutral" (unbiased) test will be a decisive factor in determining whether a bank needs to augment its capital or reserves.

Gulf Bank: How "Improved" Are Their Financials?

One of our newest readers  raised two interesting questions via our contact page:  

1. He's heard rumors that GB is engaged in restructuring of several large exposures and wondered if I had any insights.
2. Indirectly he asked about the seeming improvement in GB's financials.

Gulf Bank Loan Restructuring

I have no special insight into what's going on at GB.   Perhaps some of our regular readers/commenters - Laocowboy2, The Rageful Cynic, Advocatus, or anyone else out there - may.  If so, please post a comment.

In the interim some speculation. 

Banks restructure loans for a variety of reasons:

1. To agree a repayment schedule with a distressed borrower that provides a reasonable probability of repayment.  The rationale here is to avoid legal proceedings unless absolutely necessary as these generally result in "wastage" of the debtor's estate, particularly in those jurisdictions where creditors' rights are weak.
2. As a pre-emptive strike to keep a loan from falling into the NPL category. 
3. To surgically remove NPLs from the distressed column and transfer them to "restructured" and eventually "performing" loans.  This lowers the total of NPLs and improves the provisions/NPLs ratio.  At FYE09, GB's Specific Provisions covered 43% of NPLs versus 63% a year earlier.  Between FYE08 and FYE09, GB's NPLs increased 138% from KD482.5 million to KD1,148.6 million.  2009 Annual Report here.

The last two can be largely cosmetic - to "manage" problems or at least the appearance of problems.  

Certainly, GB has a sufficient stock of NPLs that it should be busily restructuring away for the substantive first reason mentioned above.  Whether it is engaged in any cosmetic restructuring is not known.

Gulf Bank's Financials - Improved or Not?

Many have noted that for 1H10, GB reported  KD2.1 million in net income versus a loss of KD7.5 million for 1H09.   That certainly looks like an improvement.  But is it?

Two factors were responsible for this apparent improvement:  an increase in the net interest margin of KD11.2 million and an increase of KD22.7 million increase in Operating Income (excluding interest).  Let's take a look at each of them to see where the improvement arises - and if it is due to improvement in the business or to other factors.

The improvement in the net interest margin can I think be explained by three factors.  

1. First, interest expense in 1H09 driven by the aftermath of GB declaring a KD359.5 million loss for FY2008.  If you look at FY2009, GB had total interest expense of some KD119.4 million for the year.  From the comparatives in the 1H10 report, we see that interest expense for the 1H09 was KD72.1 million - 60.4% of the full year total.   Once GB had successfully recapitalized itself, its cost of funds declined in 3Q and 4Q09.  So is the improvement here an improvement in market sentiment due to the raising of KD376 million in new equity? And not a fundamental improvement in the underlying business.
2. Second, pricing increases.  There was an interview with Michel Accad in which he mentioned that GB had repriced (upwards) its facilities.  For some reason, GB no longer breaks out interest income by LOB which would allow an approximation of the gross yield on its loan portfolio.  It stopped with its FYE2009 Annual Report.  Wonder why the change?  With this info we could attempt to quantify the impact of any pricing change between 1H09 and 1H10. to see if indeed  margins had improved.  Using that method for 1H09, we get a gross annualized yield of about 5.6%.  Using this method through 3Q09, the yield is about 5.4%.   If we use the same split between Commercial Banking and Treasury interest as in 2009 (83% as of 1H09 or 84%  for the first nine months of the year 2009) for 1H10,  the 1H10 yield on the loan portfolio is actually lower:  4.9% (1H09 interest split) or 5.0% (Full 3Q09 split).  But that may be an incorrect assumption.  Note to Regulator:  More transparency rather than less is highly desirable.  Note to GB:  Unless you've got something you'd like to hide disclosing this information would be very helpful. Final Note:  This analysis is not conclusive.  The missing step is to see what happened at other Kuwaiti banks'  gross yields to get an idea about the macro environment.
3. Third, as GB continues to aggressively provision for loans (some KD108.5 million so far this year) it reduces its funding cost.  One would expect that the NPLs were already on non accrual so that the provisioning would affect interest expense primarily. One might say that provisioning is inversely related to problems.  On that score, there really doesn't seem to be a fundamental improvement in  the business.

The improvement in Operating Income (excluding Net Interest Margin) is largely explained by "Realised Gains on Disposal of Available for Sale Investments" of KD22 million roughly KD18.2 million over 1H09's earnings for the same category.  A decrease in "Impairment Losses on AFS Investments" of 3.8 million accounts for the rest.

Some observations.

1. Without the AFS asset sale (not a core constituent of GB's commercial banking franchise but a Treasury activity), GB would have recorded an Income Statement loss of KD20 million for 1H10 as compared to the KD7.5 million loss it recorded for the comparable period in 2009.
2. But there's more.  Since GB had already recognized KD20 million of profit on these assets in its fair value reserve (Statement of Comprehensive Income), its Comprehensive Income  for 1H10 was  a KD18.5 million loss versus a KD11.4 million gain for 1H09.  Looking at the Balance Sheet, you'll notice that Shareholders Equity declined KD21 million between FYE09 and 1H10.   And that's the bottom line on financial health - growing equity.  If you're wondering, the extra bit (KD2,5 million) is movement in GB's Treasury Share Reserve.

On a segmental basis, GB's commercial banking division did not make a profit in 2008, 2009, or 1H10.  And I'd note that GB was unable to allocate KD246 million of its 2008 "expenses" to either segment.  Perhaps, they properly belonged as "management overhead"?  

So at this point taking all these factors into consideration, I'd suggest a pause before speaking about "improved" financials.  

There's still a way to go.  To determine when real progress has been made keep your eye focused on:

1. Comprehensive income, looking for a positive number and an increase in Shareholders' Equity from "income" from one period to the next.
2. NPLs and provisions, looking for both to decline.  For provision coverage ratios to increase.
3. Meaningfully positive results in GB's core commercial banking franchise.  As Michel Accad said in part in the 2009 Annual Report in discussing GB's strategy:  "We have redefined our Vision; we seek to dominate the local retail and commercial banking space ..." If commercial banking/retail banking is the key, then GB will be healthy when those businesses are healthy.  Today they're not.