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It's Not Cricket! |
Some quotes from Bloomberg followed by (AA) comments.
Bloomberg
Stressed assets -- made up of bad loans, restructured debt and advances to companies that can’t meet servicing requirements -- have risen to about 16.6 percent of total loans in India, the highest level among major economies, data compiled by the nation’s Finance Ministry show.
AA is puzzled.
I would think that “advances to companies that can’t meet servicing
requirements” would qualify as “bad” loans.
And that restructured debt that was performing, i.e., meeting servicing
requirements would not be bad debt. On
the other hand if restructurings were “cosmetic” in nature, then they are
indeed bad loans. If loans aren’t
performing, they’re “bad” loans. If
loans are restructured at lower rates perhaps even below market rates but are
performing, shouldn’t banks bear this cost?
Bloomberg
Ratings companies including Fitch Ratings Ltd have come out in favor of setting up a state-backed “bad bank” to tackle India’s ballooning stressed assets problem, a move resisted by Raghuram Rajan, the former governor of the Reserve Bank of India.
Seems to AA if banks’ “bad” loans are
ballooning, the country probably already has more than one “bad” bank,
particularly when one factors in the comments in the article about “hiding” bad
loans, failing to take tough decisions.
Bloomberg
The RBI completed its audit of the nation’s 50 lenders last year, forcing them to lay bare previously hidden non-performing loans.
That sounds like rather “bad” behavior to AA.
Bloomberg
Banks had been reluctant to offer discounts to offload bad loans even where they are clearly worth much less than their book value because such sales “invite the attention of anti-corruption agencies making bank officials reluctant to sign off on them,” Fitch analysts including Guha wrote in a Feb. 23 note.
AA wonders if the anti-corruption agencies should
look earlier in the loan cycle, e.g., at initial underwriting and subsequent
“hiding” stages? Also are bankers
looking for the “bad” bank to make “bad” pricing decisions and buy the duff
loans at prices higher than their fair value?
Thus, bailing out the banks’ previous bad behavior? Perhaps this explains former Governor Rajan’s
reluctance.
Bloomberg
Bankers selling bad loans to a national bad bank won’t be questioned, as this institution will be empowered by the government to take tough decisions,” said Rajesh Mokashi, managing director at CARE Ratings Ltd. in an interview. A bad bank will also bring to an end to fear of “witch-hunting” of lenders, if any, by anti-graft agencies, he said.
Is this an admission by bankers that they are
restricted from taking “tough” decisions?
Or that they are incapable or unwilling to take “tough” decisions? If either, then a sale to a bad bank does
nothing to change this “bad” behavior and is likely to lead to a repeat of bad
loan creation by these same banks that can’t or won’t take “tough” decisions.
Bloomberg
With more than $180 billion in stressed assets, the government and regulators have to evaluate all avenues including a bad bank to drive better recovery rates,” said Nikhil Shah, managing director at Alvarez and Marsal, a firm that specializes in turnarounds.
AA wonders how selling duff assets to an asset manager--or
“bad” bank, if you prefer--improves recovery rates. Does this mean that banks are unwilling to
take hard decisions or aren’t allowed to?
If so, what guarantee is there that the “bad” bank will? If the fundamental problem is a slow moving
erratic legal process, will the fact that the plaintiff is now a “bad” bank really
speed up the legal process? Or is the
idea to buy the duff loans from the banks above market, thus improving their
“recovery” rates and stick the “bad” bank with the losses?
All in all not a very pretty picture. Subdued indeed.
But every situation has
both positive and negative possibilities. As this post about comments from the head
of a distinguished bank in a neighboring country shows, attitude can play a
key role