"Tie your camel first, then trust in God."
SRA
(Jami'y al-Tirmidhi)
Given the anniversary, a belated postmortem of the AED 1.5 billion convertible bond deal beween Dubai Banking Group ("DBG") and Shuaa Capital ("SC") and DBG's resulting AED 1.016 billion (US$277 million) loss - slightly more than the cost of the average camel.
On 31 October 2007, DBG and SC sign an agreement for a one-year convertible bond. The bond has a quarterly 6% coupon and is convertible into 250 million SC shares. The stated conversion price is AED 6.000 per share. However, since as part of the deal DBG advanced SC another AED 176 million (so SC could terminate its stock option program), the effective strike price per share is AED 6.704 - approximately SC's market price at signing.
Fast forward to the maturity date one year later. SC shares are trading at AED 2.71.
Not surprisingly, DBG has no interest in converting. To do so would result in an immediate loss of AED 998.50 (US$272 million) - roughly 60% of the initial investment.
However, SC issues a conversion notice, advising DBG that the bond has been converted to shares.
What? How could that happen?
Clause 6 in the Note Certificate allows both parties - SC and DBG - the right to force conversion.
DBG refuses, threatens litigation to force repayment. The parties embark on a very public drawn out dispute.
On 25 June 2009 they announce a settlement: the bond will be converted into 515 million SC shares. The resulting strike price is billed at AED 2.91 per share - though when the extra AED 176 million is factored in, the strike price is actually AED 3.25 per share. At this point SC's shares are trading at AED 1.28.
Using market value, DBG has just paid AED 1.676 billion for AED 659 million in shares - a loss of AED 1.017 billion (US$277 million) - 60% of its initial investment. One heck of a "control" premium. DBG's one consolation is that it owns a lot more of SC than it would have under the original conversion terms. Somehow I'm suspecting that may be cold comfort.
Of course, markets move. Anyone with a stock portfolio in October 2007 has seen some wide and painful movements.
But the whole point of a convertible bond is the structure is designed to give downside protection. To combine the "safety" of a bond with an option to capture potential price appreciation. One only converts if the stock price is favorable. If not, one cashes in the bond.
But for this to work, one can't give the issuer of the bond the right to convert because as shown by the above example, the issuer has an incentive to convert when the market price of its stock is below the strike price.
But for this to work, one can't give the issuer of the bond the right to convert because as shown by the above example, the issuer has an incentive to convert when the market price of its stock is below the strike price.
I'm at a loss to explain this transaction from any banking or finance principle I know.
If anyone out there can, please post.
To rephrase the hadith quote above: "First, tie down you deal terms firmly, then trust in God".
For those interested in more background, additional documents and information can be found here as part of shareholder information for SC's March 2009 EGM.
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