Market Commentary: Manifest Absurdity

 

Greensill

Today’s FT reported on Lex Greensill’s testimony to Parliament’s “Treasury Committee” as follows:

He insisted that his company’s lending was supported by real assets, although he admitted that up to 20 per cent of the group’s lending last year was based on “future receivables”.

If you’re like me, you probably had to stifle a guffaw on the conflation of “future receivables” with “real assets”.

But if you think a bit more, perhaps in the current environment it’s not so far fetched.

Even sober financial analysts and commentators, including some at the FT, have identified crypto currencies as a new “investable asset class”.

In terms of “real assets” are future receivables any less real than Bitcoin, Dogecoin, or their like? 

I think not.

If that isn’t a sign of irrational exuberance, I’m not sure if there is any sign.

Fairness impels me--note the choice of that verb—to mention that today Jemima Kelly did opine in those very same salmon-colored pages that crypto currencies were a “joke” and shouldn’t be taken “seriously”.

Ark Innovation – Springs a Leak

The FT reported that Ark had lost one-third of its value since its February “high”.

I’d make the same comment I did regarding Tesla’s loss of value.

More accurately, the price is down by one-third.

Value is intrinsic. Price is a market phenomenon.

Also a shout out to Lex, for noting that:

Data from Morningstar illustrate the pitfalls. More than two-thirds of thematic funds outperformed the broad MSCI ACWI index in the year to end March. But go back five years and that drops to below a third. One-fifth of thematic funds did not even survive. Over a decade, just 4 per cent outperformed. As themes go, this one does not inspire much confidence.

Middle Eastern Democracy – Kurdistan Style

Today’s FT “Long Read”--as its actual length discloses it is apparently designed for those with ADD--discussed authoritarianism in Kurdistan.

Not only was I was surprised and deeply shocked to learn that Jeffersonian democracy was not flourishing in Kurdistan. 

But also that corruption was rampant indeed.

Who would ever have thought?

As pointed out in the article, much of the silence on these two topics has to do with geopolitical “considerations”.

So much for making the world safe for democracy or fighting corruption.

At least I suppose one can take comfort that no one has proposed Kuridstan for NATO membership. 

 At least not yet!

GFG Alliance King & King More Questions

 

Some additional investigation on King & King via another electronic visit to Companies House.  A closer look at two GFG Alliance companies audited by K&K.

SUMMARY

Findings

1. K&K and its associates received at least GBP 124,111 in audit fees for three years audit work between 2018-2020. (this post)

2. As noted in my earlier post, of the K&K companies I was able to identify two were dormant and one had net assets of GBP 685. (previous post)

3. A related company, Relans, had a larger balance sheet. (previous post)

Unanswered Questions

1. Is there another K&K entity that received the fees? If so, what is it?

2. Who are the “associates” who receive a part of the audit fees?

3. What was their role? Did K&K employ outside personnel to conduct the audits? Or subcontract some of its work to another firm?

DETAILS

LIBERTY STEEL GROUP HOLDINGS UK LTD Company number 10702565

40 Grosvenor Place, 2nd Floor, London, United Kingdom, SW1X 7GG

Here’s the link to LSGH’s filings with Companies House, including its financial statements. Please refer to that link for copies of the financials.

King and King acted as statutory auditor on the LSGH’s annual reports for 31 March 2020 (auditor signed 26 February 2021) and 2019 (auditor signed 12 September 2019)

HW Fisher and Company acted as auditor on the 31 March 2018 annual reports.

According to Note 3 to the 2020 financials, the auditors fees of GBP 17,600 for 2020 and GBP 16,000 for 2019 “is borne by a subsidiary of the company.”

Also note it states that the “audit fees were paid to the auditors and associates”.

Unclear what that means.

Who are the associates? What was their role? How much did they get?

Looking at the 31 March 2018 audited financials (signed by HW Fisher on 30 November 2018), note #3 says that “audit costs were borne by Liberty Pipes Hartpool”. No amount disclosed.

That leads us to a look at:

LIBERTY PIPES (HARTLEPOOL) LIMITED Company number 09931472

40 Grosvenor Place, 2nd Floor, London, United Kingdom, SW1X 7GG

Here’s the link to LPH’s filings at Companies House.

K&K has been the auditor for this company since 2018. 

Prior to that the company filed micro accounts for 2016 and extended its 2017 fiscal year to 31 March 2018.

For fiscal 2018 (auditor’s report dated 8 Feb 2019) and 2019 (auditor’s report dated 22 Nov 2019) , the company paid its auditor King & King GBP 24,500 (each year). In these two years, the term “auditor and its associates” is used.

For fiscal 2020 (auditor’s report dated 18 Dec 2020), it paid GBP 75,111 (note #4). No mention of associates of auditor.

If we assume that LPH has continued to pay the audit fee for LSGH (and therefore those fees are included in the amounts in LPH’s financials), King & King and “associates” has received at least audit fees of GBP 124,111.

The question is what K&K entity received payment.

A few other items from the financials.

1. LSGH has a recurring loss of GBP 60,000 a year for the past two fiscal years.

2. LSGH has 15 subsidiaries.

3. LPH eked out a modest GP 395,995 profit in FYE 2020 following total losses of some GBP 5,159,917 the prior two fiscal years.

Freeport LNG Marketing LLC Financing: Did US Eximbank and PEFCO Flub Due Diligence on Greensill?

There was an article in the FT today calling into question US Eximbank's and PEFCO's due diligence in connection with an approval of a supplier credit transaction for Freeport LNG involving Greensill as lender.

The timing raises questions about the due diligence that the Exim Bank and Pefco, its funding partner on the deal, conducted on Greensill, whose German banking subsidiary was under investigation by regulators last year.

I think the questions raised can be answered: no.

Summary:

Eximbank and PEFCO have no financial exposure (credit risk) to Greensill in this transaction. As such, their due diligence was appropriate at the time it was conducted.

Eximbank’s primary focus in this transaction and others is (a) the promotion of US exports and (b) creation of US jobs.

Or in other words, Eximbank's customer here is Freeport.  Greensill is a service provider.

At this point, the ability of Greensill to fulfill its obligations under the transaction are in question. Eximbank is no doubt looking for a replacement.

That raises two issues: (a) finding an FI able to handle the supply chain invoice processing and (b) one willing to take risk (10%) on Freeport.

Detailed Argument

Now to the details that support those contentions.

At its 29 September 2020 Board of Directors Meeting ,US Eximbank approved a 90% guarantee under its Supply Chain Finance Program for transactions involving Freeport LNG Marketing LLC as the obligor. (Eximbank reference AP089370XX).

Note that date. Eximbank issued its commitment in September 2020.

At this point concrete news about Greensill’s situation was much different than in January 2021. So if there is an issue with Eximbank’s due diligence, it has to be focused on the period before 29 September 2020.

Eximbank lending is highly rules based. Procedures for approval are more complex and thus more time consuming than in a typical financial institution.

The board approval package would have been prepared, reviewed, and finalized well before the board meeting. 

You can well expect that as well preparation and approval of transaction documentation is similar. That explains the time taken to finalization.

Some key points about this transaction.

1. Freeport is the obligor on the loan. Eximbank's credit risk lies squarely here.

2. US Eximbank guarantees to pay the lender 90% of principal if Freeport doesn’t pay.

3. The lender bears the risk of the unguaranteed 10%.

4. US Eximbank is providing a guarantee not funding.

5. If the lender does not or can not lend, then Eximbank has no exposure to either the obligor (in this case Freeport) or any obligation to the lender (Greensill).

6. Eximbank reviews the documentation for each transaction under an approval for compliance with (a) the terms and conditions of its approval and (b) US content requirements. Then and only then it issues a “guarantee” for that transaction.

Clearly, then the primary focus of Eximbank’s due diligence would be on Freeport.

Due diligence on the lender would focus on its ability to handle a supply chain transaction both in terms of systems and experience as well as no "blocking" issues.  

Those would include legal prohibitions, e.g., US sanctions, etc.

Greensill passed those tests at the time of due diligence.

If the bar were set to exclude those FIs that engaged in reckless banking practices (imprudent lending, over concentration of risks, market manipulation) or illegal behaviour, then the set of "acceptable" banks for US Eximbank would appear to be fairly limited.  And exclude a large number of the G-SIBs.  

PEFCO is a specialist private sector owned lender that provides primary and secondary funding for loans guaranteed by US Eximbank. It also does a very minuscule business in other sovereign guaranteed loans. Roughly 1.4% of total loans.

Eximbank exercises “oversight” on PEFCO’s operations beyond that it does with other financial institutions to which it may give a guarantee.

Given the nature of its business, PEFCO is able to access both fixed and floating rate funding at very attractive rates.

In the Freeport transaction, PEFCO reportedly acquired a 100% “participation interest” in the Eximbank guaranteed portion of the Freeport loan.

That would mean that Greensill remained at risk of non payment on the unguaranteed 10%.

For the same reasons as above, PEFCO has no credit risk exposure to Greensill.

Given the Eximbank guarantee, it has none to Freeport.

Its decision to enter the transaction was almost certainly based on the US Eximbank guarantee.

PEFCO’s s role in the transaction would be to provide competitively priced funding in the form of a lower discount rate than Greensill could obtain in the market

That is, when Greensill presented PEFCO an Eximbank approved (guaranteed) supplier invoice, it would buy the invoice from Greensill at an agreed discount rate.

To reiterate: Eximbank's guarantee is evidenced by its issuance of a document after it examines the invoice and any supporting documents to ensure that (a) US content and other requirements have been met and (b) the transaction complies with the conditions of that approval.

PEFCO would make sure to confirm the guarantee.

Greenill’s compensation would be potentially a mixture of (a) the difference between its discount rate and PEFCO’s (b) any upfront fee it charged Freeport, and (c) any fees it charges Freeport for the processing of the supplier invoices.

What is to be done now?

Now there is a question as to what Eximbank “should” do now that Greensill has crashed or when the probability of its crash became apparent.

As noted above, Eximbank’s mission is to promote US exports and US jobs. 

So it would be rather reluctant to throw the Freeport "baby" (its customer) out with the Greensill "bathwater" (a service provider).  

As a general rule, Eximbank tends to very "high church" in honoring commitments/approvals it has given.  

Part of this is institutionally motivated to maintain market confidence in its "word".  

Part is concern that its customer may have made financial commitments and would therefore incur a loss, if Eximbank were to walk away. 

Eximbank and Freeport are no doubt looking for a replacement institution with the capacity to process supply chain finance.

And the willingness to hold 10% of the risk of any outstandings within the US$ 50 million.  

Two other key considerations for Eximbank.

The SCF program has been in existence for a few years. Frankly, usage has been disappointing. 

Eximbank has also domestic political considerations given its recent close encounter with the grim reaper.

GFG's "Tiny" Auditor = Rather "Large" Credit Red Flags

Even He Probably Couldn't Perform
Audits on 60 Companies

An introductory note to what follows.

Credit “red flags” in themselves do not conclusively prove there is a problem with an entity. Rather they identify areas for enhanced due diligence to determine if there is a problem.

According to research by the FT, one apparently very small English Chartered Accountancy firm, King & King, audited over 60 companies in Mr. Gupta’s Group. Companies with a combined Sterling 2.5 billion in revenues!

It is one of the long standing—but often ignored—rules of due diligence to scrutinize not only audited financial reports but also the auditor.

1. Is it a known firm? What is its reputation and track record?

2. Does it have the skills and resources to conduct an audit of the particular company? Horses for courses.

3. Is there an imbalance in the relationship between the company and the auditor that might make the auditor subject to undue influence on its work?

For example, if the auditor is dependent on the company for the bulk of its revenues, it might well find it hard to say “no” to the company.

I’d hasten to add that this is not a conclusive test.

There are more than a few cases where the “biggest” auditing firms appear to have failed in conducting sufficiently probing audits.

After reading the FT’s excellent article, I decided to do a bit of digging myself.

What better place to start than an electronic visit to the UK’s Companies House?

There I searched for the name King & King and the address 273-287 Regent St, London W1B 2HA, United Kingdom. This search returned three entities that appear directly related:

1. KING & KING LTD Company number 04871854. Listed as dormant. Last Financial Statements 20 August 2019. Net assets GBP 1.

2. KING & KING (ACCOUNTING & ADVISORY) LTD Company number 07597296. Listed as dormant. Last Financial Statements 30 April 2019. Net assets GBP 1.

3. KING & KING WILLS LTD Company number 07533423 Last Financial Statements 28 February 2020. Net assets GBP 685.

There is no doubt a reasonable explanation for what would appear at face value to be a discrepancy here. How could a dormant firm with so modest financials audit 60 companies.

However, what that explanation is eludes me.

I suppose it may be that the firm that does the audits is registered under another name. 

I did take the obvious step of using Companies House to search on the names of officers and directors at the above companies on the assumption that one or more of these might be at the firm with "with another name".  

However, I came up with a blank.

To make sure I covered as many bases as possible,  I then searched Companies House for the address alone.

To my surprise there were 20 pages of entities.

Companies House told me to refine my search as there were many many more.

So it may be that I missed that new name.

No results for K&K’s Middlesex Office at Companies House using both its name and the address.

But using Google, I quickly turned up at least 51 companies at the Middlesex address.

I did however find a related company at that address which shares a director with King & King.

RELANS LIMITED Company number 07317670. Latest Financial Statements 30 April 2020. GBP 127,284 in total equity.

While the income statement was not included, comparative figures would suggest it was a good year indeed for Relans as its retained earnings increased approximately GBP 120,000 year on year. Quite a remarkable change from previous years!

As to the numerous parties at both of K&K’s listed addresses, at first glance it would appear that both buildings are “rather large”.

Or perhaps more likely the address is that of virtual office or a corporate registration service.

Perhaps, K&K are “working from home” as part of a Covid inspired remote work initiative.

Turning back to the FT article, the FT asked chartered accountants at other firms what K&K’s reputation was. The answer they received seems to be “who?”.

According to the FT, K&K is registered at the ICAEW as having one CA and one professional staff.

On its face, that might make some question the “depth of its bench” in terms of ability to perform audits of large firms.

It would also suggest that GFG was the “father of the feast” at K&K. Loss of this relationship would be likely to dramatically reduce revenues.

Typically, scrutiny is focused on the auditor of the obligor or the counterparty to a transaction.

And that absent guarantees or other support from related parties, focus on those parties’ auditors would be minimal at best.

However, even with a limited one company focus, there are enough red flags to suggest weakness. That would include the questions posed by my Companies House search.

And those threads when pulled might well have revealed other issues. Or resulted in a clean bill of health for K&K.

For those with exposure to GFGroup, a wider focus would be appropriate.

Discovering that one very small CA firm was auditing a large number of GFG companies should have been a gigantic red flag, prompting further investigation..

It’s not just the three questions above, but the fact that K&K was auditing 60 companies but it had a staff of one CA and one other professional. Companies with Sterling 2.5 billion in revenues.

If we assume that one-quarter of these firms had their fiscal year at each quarter’s end as opposed to all at 31 December, it boggles the mind to think that K&K would be able to do the intensive work required for an audit even on “just” 15 firms.

The ability to repeat this intensive process quarter on quarter would have required probably more than a singe Stakhanovite.

More importantly one might reasonably struggle to understand how a firm this size could perform a proper audit on even one company each quarter.

If, as is more likely, 31 December was the FYE for all or the majority of the 60 companies,, then the improbable becomes the impossible.

One caveat K&K notes on their website they are affiliated with IRGlobal a network of accountancy, advisory, and tax firms and so would appear to have access to additional knowledge resources.

Somehow the extent of K&K’s audit work (and prowess) was missed.

The FT was able to discover this interesting issue apparently without undue or time-consuming exertion.

Admittedly, they benefited from hindsight: GFG’s woes were public knowledge

Also admittedly, the FT has a cadre of very savvy financial reporters who have been responsible for uncovering financial frauds. By their own skill, not just via whistleblower tips.

Bondhack and Cynthia O’Murchu made a significant pre-crash discovery regarding the weak state of NMC’s finances by the clever use of credit bureau information.

One-at least this one-would expect that financial institutions with money at stake would have at least as competent staff.

And perhaps because they were doing this for a living, or were supposed to be doing this, would have additional resources and experience.

Sadly, hope is not necessarily accompanied by change. 

Or so I have been told.

Market Commentary: Greensill -- The Critical Difference between Insurance and a Guarantee and Why It Matters

 

An Unhappy Outcome

Since I haven’t seen anything on this topic in re Greensill, I thought I’d offer a few thoughts on how the fundamental difference between (1) a guarantee of payment and (2) an insurance policy affects the Greensill “situation”. 

And how it might motivate actions by participants in this unhappy event.

The difference between these two instruments is frequently misunderstood, including by supposed finance professionals. Hopefully, this post will fill in any extant knowledge gaps.

A guarantee of payment (as opposed to a guarantee of collection) is a legally binding obligation by the guarantor to make payment to the guaranteed party if the debtor does not make a scheduled payment. Proof of the debtor’s non payment is generally fairly “easy” to make. Usually then the guarantor makes payment without undue delay.

An insurance contract is a legally binding obligation by the insurance company to pay the policyholder if the policyholder submits a valid claim.

Keep those last two words in mind. 

The insurance company reviews the policy conditions, the insured’s (or policyholder’s) actions, and makes the initial determination of the validity of the claim. Some policyholders have been known to complain that such assessments seem to move at a glacial pace.

As that should imply, the insurance company has more legal defenses against payment than a guarantor. And its payment is not as fast given the time to review the claim.

The insurance policy spells out the conditions for validity.

For example, in obtaining the policy, did the policyholder make a material misrepresentation or fail to disclose material information that would reasonably have caused the insurance company to refuse to write the policy? In such a case the entire policy is invalid.

Did the policyholder fail to take reasonable steps to prevent the loss?

For example, if he left his Maybach unlocked with the key in the ignition and his insurance company knew this fact, they would likely decline the claim for theft.

If she routinely stored gasoline in her villa and filed a claim for fire damage and the insurance company knew this fact, the result would be the same.

Did the policyholder take reasonable steps to mitigate damages?

When the fire broke out, did she call the fire department? Or just let the villa burn down?

If his trade counterparty was in financial difficulty and he should have been aware, did he shorten payment terms, ask for collateral, lower his credit limit for aggregate outstandings?

There may also be other specific policy exclusions: strike, riot, civil commotion, actions of political entities, foreign exchange controls, etc.

We can therefore expect that Tokio Marine and other insurance companies will be carefully reviewing their obligations under any outstanding policies on Greensill related debt. 

I saw in today's FT (23 March) that Tokio Marine had opined that the policies might not be valid. 

Today (2 April) the FT reported that Grant Thorton acting as administrator for Greensill had been unable to verify certain invoices underpinning loans to Liberty Commodities - part of Mr. Gupta's group.  

Actually, the article says that several firms whose names appeared on invoices denied any commercial relationship with Liberty.  You can guess that this means that any "insurance" on these invoices is invalid.

One would of course have to review the actual policies and the respective governing laws to determine the defenses the insurance companies might have.

But I wonder if it’s possible that policies issued in excess of underwriting limits might be one? 

Part of that might turn on whether Mr. Brereton was working for Greensill (as an insurance broker) or for Tokio Marine (as its employed underwriter).

As well one can imagine Credit Suisse fund managers' angst over the difference between insurance and a guarantee as well as potential liabilities that might arise from potential "defects" in disclosures in selling documents vis-a-vis disgruntled clients whose attorneys will be going over said documents carefully.

Keep up to date on developments.  

The FT continues to follow the Greensill saga with an interesting article on Mr. Brereton earlier this week.