Showing posts with label Alicia McElhaney. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Alicia McElhaney. Show all posts

Friday 11 June 2021

Games Fund Managers and Investment Advisors Play and How to Avoid Getting Played

Sometimes the Best Way to Avoid Being Played
Is Not to Play

Among other things, Alicia McElhaney at II keeps a close eye on academic research on the “investment space”.

She’s had quite a run with outlining the games fund managers play.

Here are just two examples.

  • 27 May - VC Firms ‘Inflate’ Portfolio Valuations Ahead of Fundraising, Study Shows 
  • 9 February - Private Equity Firms ‘Try to Manipulate Their Performance’ When Raising Money

Anyone who is sentient on the buyside has experienced this. 

But it is nice to see academics confirm what we've learned.

So how does one minimize getting “played”?

The first thing to understand is that similar to other sellers of goods fund managers are looking to make a sale and a profit. Sales pitches run from “puffery” to outright misrepresentation.

The second is that these PE and VC and similar products are sold to “sophisticated” investors--the so-called “big boys”. 

Regulators make the laughable presumption that the “big boys” don’t need the usual protections given retail investors.

That means disclosures and sales materials are allowed to be less robust and less detailed. One example relates to presentation of past returns, modelling, etc.

Professional standards of care are also lesser because the imaginary big boys are imagined to be able to take care of themselves. 

Careful investors will draw the following conclusions from those “facts”.

Healthy skepticism is warranted.

Verify first, then give provisional trust, but keep verifying.

If it seems to be too good to be true, you're probably right. 

Begin by carefully reading the prospectus/offering memorandum.

I have had representatives of major firms misrepresent products to me.

During one pitch, I commented that apparently their prospectus was wrong and cited “chapter and verse” from the prospectus to contradict the statement an earnest sales rep had just made.

Whenever I’m given a 1,000 page offering memorandum for all the seller’s products with a central definitions section separate from the product description so that the reader has to jump from here to there to make sense of a product, my antennae get more sensitive.  

Complexity is not the friend of the investor.

Be sure you understand the product.

That means you need to do your own research if this is your first "rodeo" with a product.

But also ask the sales rep to explain the product.  

Be wary of excessive use of jargon which is sometimes designed to deflect questions.  Who wants to admit that they don't really understand "vol" or the "greeks" on derivatives?

As well be wary of vague phrases,  waving of hands, and then the implication that a miracle occurs and you get rich.

The risk section and product/transaction description in the prospectus/offering memorandum can provide a good source of questions. And a check on the what is said in the "pitch".

Presentation of results that do not comply with CFA Institute GIPS (Global Investment Performance Standards) should not be relied on.

Non GIPS results can generally be managed to show whatever the seller wants.

GIPS also requires certain disclosures and prohibits certain practices.

Make sure benchmarks and historic performance make sense.

No one beats the market consistently.

Benchmark selection can affect relative performance.

See my earlier post on Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund.

If you do not understand how financial models may be “gamed”, you really should NOT invest in Level 2 and Level 3 assets.

This isn’t just about growth and discount rates, but also how “multiples” that are used to “determine” terminal value can disguise unrealistic assumption about those two previous factors.

If return is tied to or dependent on derivatives, you would be well advised to make certain you understand the downside risks.  

Ask the utilities in Texas who found derivatives a rather costly tuition.  

Or you could ask the good folks at JBS Spain about the derivatives they purchased.

Upward revisions of valuation should be examined carefully.

If one is being pitched, a very simple question is when the last revaluation took place and what the direction and impact was.

Amounts, timing, and the basis for the upgrade.

New funding provided by the fund manager at a higher valuation should not be considered as definitive proof the value has actually risen.

Sales of investments from one of the fund manager’s investment vehicles to another should be questioned, especially when the sale results in increasing the IRR of the selling fund. 

Or sloughing off a dog into a fund that can bear a subsequent loss of value.

Yes this occurs.

Watch out for debt financing tricks that drive IRRs and presumed value. Oh and just incidentally affect the fund manager’s compensation.

On the “outgoing” cash flow from LPs: funding LP drawdowns with debt to delay capital calls.

On the “incoming” cash flows to LPs: refinancing equity with debt to generate a “return of capital” without any realisation of the investment, e.g., trade sale or IPO.

Be sure you understand the skill set of the fund manager and how deals are accessed.

When the fund manager's primary skill seems to be the use of leverage, you may want to consider fund managers with skills in developing the underlying business. 

If the fund manager is buying assets from other funds or via auctions, ask whether he or she is getting a good price?  

If the fund manager is buying an investment from another fund, why does he or she think they can turn another fund manager's "cast off" into gold?  And is it credible?

Be sensitive to offers of preferential treatment.

Once we had a major fund management firm tell us that they were poised to revalue (upwards) investments in their existing fund. 

We could invest in that fund now and take advantage of the lower current (entry) price before mark-up.  Thus, earning a "guaranteed" return.

Needless to say, we not only declined the invitation for this investment opportunity but put them on our “blacklist” on the basis that if they were going to “screw” their existing LPs, we would be better off not becoming one.

Sometime later that fund had what might be charitably described as “disappointing” returns.