Update on CIPS China – Impressive Progress But .

 

Back some four years ago there was a great deal of ideologically-driven hysteria from the usual sources that the creation of China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) sounded the death knell for the US dollar.

I wrote a post then that “put a finger in that optic”.

Four years later it’s time for an update.

Summary

CIPS has come a long way since 2015, but still lags US dollar cross-border payment systems. Also it lags the existing cross border RMB payment system CHATS in Hong Kong, as a forthcoming post will demonstrate.

Analysis

From 2016 through 2019 CIPS has grown remarkably both in terms of value (648%) and number (678%) of transactions.

In 1Q2020, CIPS processed 444,000 payments equivalent to US$ 1.37 trillion. It seems poised to post a 12% increase over 2019.

Over its “life” there has been an equally impressive growth in number of participants.

There are two types of participants: Direct and Indirect.

What is a Direct Participant (DP)?

It is a bank located with Mainland China that has an account with CIPS and the Chinese National Payment System (CNAPS) aka HVPS. Think of HVPS as the Chinese equivalent of the US Fedwire. These are the only banks that may directly input payments into and receive payments the CIPS system.

The DPs include foreign owned banks in the PRC. These are called "FMIs" in the CIPS “literature”

What is an Indirect Participant (IDP)?

It is a bank located in Mainland China or overseas that has a correspondent account with one of more of the Direct Participants. Note that an IDP is not restricted to working with a single DP.

The IDP sends its payment orders to its Direct Participant correspondent for input into CIPS. The DP sends the payment order into CIPS, the DP's account with CIPS is debited for the payment.  The DP debits the IDP's account on its books. 

Any CIPS credits in favor of the IDP are credited to the DP's account with CIPS. The DP then credits the account of the IDP on its books. In this respect this is a mirror of CHIPS in New York City.

What are the benefits of CIPS?

1. CNAPS/HVPS operates in the Chinese language only. CIPS allows a bank to send in an English language instruction which CIPS then “translates” into Chinese.
2. It speeds up payments. CIPS participants send their payments direct to a DP in the PRC. They do not have to work through a bank in their time zone that first processes their payment, then relays it to one or more banks for payment in the PRC.
3. CIPS is open 24 hours five days a week plus an additional four hours providing coverage in all time zones.

As of 31 December 2015, CIPS had 19 Direct Participant Banks and 185 Indirect Participant Banks with 50 countries in the world covered according to the Peoples Bank of China “2015 China Payment System Development Report” page 116.

As of 31 July 2020, CIPS has 33 Direct Participants (list here).and some 951 Indirect Participants in 97 countries, according to CIPS Participants’ Announcement #55. 

Among the Indirect Participants were 421 banks in Mainland China, 310 in the rest of Asia, 124 in Europe 37 in Africa, 26 in North America, 18 in Oceania, and 15 in South America, according to the same CIPS information.

Again an impressive change from its beginnings in October 2015.

If you’re interested in following this topic or checking AA’s math, data on CIPS performance is available in PBC quarterly and annual payment reports. You can access them here. 

Growth is very impressive. Trillions of US Dollars in payments per year sounds very impressive.

But let’s take a look at comparatives.

Based in New York, CHIPS bills itself as the “largest private sector USD clearing system in the world”. A claim supported by the average daily value of the transactions it processes.

CHIPS says that it processes some USD 1.5 trillion per day.

According to the BIS CPMI Payment Statistics for 2018, that would seem to be an understatement. Dividing the aggregate amount shown there (USD 418 trillion) by 252, the average is more like USD 1.7 trillion per working day.

Whatever the amount CHIPS processes the equivalent of CIPS yearly volumes in roughly 3 business days.

Per the same CPMI report (Table 8), CHIPS processed 115 million messages in 2018 or 82 times the messages processed by CIPS.

CIPS has made remarkable progress but still lags in US Dollar cross-border payments. And lags the HK RMB CHATS payment system.

That is not surprising.

It is relatively “early days” for the RMB as a global currency.

CIPS is a "youngster" compared to HK RMB CHATS –founded in 2007.

The US Dollar, Euro, and Sterling still dominate cross-border financial transactions with roughly a 75% to 77% share of all payment orders transmitted through SWIFT.

(SWIFT does not process payments but is a secure communication service for the transmission of financial information).

Per SWIFT the RMB generally has around a 2% share in global cross-border payment traffic.

You can see the statistics here in SWIFT’s RMB Tracker for July.

Sign up for the RMB Tracker here.

China CIPS - How is It Likely to Operate?

March 2016: CIPS and SWIFT Sign the MOU

Introduction:

If you read my previous post, then hopefully you’ve accepted the argument that CIPS is designed as a payment utility (analogous to CHIPS) not as a replacement for SWIFT (a global secure messaging utility).

Thus, if CIPS is an alternative to anything, it is an alternative to currently existing cumbersome methods for parties outside of Mainland China to make and receive RMB payments.

By way of fleshing out this analogy, let’s look a bit closer at CHIPS and how it fits into the domestic US payment system.  CHIPS processes US dollar payments –largely those related to cross border transactions.  FEDWIRE and ACH (for smaller payments that are made in very large numbers, e.g., salaries) handle the bulk of domestic (US) oriented dollar payments. 

Similarly CIPS will handle internationally oriented RMB denominated payments, while CNAPS2--the local equivalent of FEDWIRE-- (primarily) will process domestic oriented RMB payments in the PRC.

Key Results of CIPS Likely Method of Operations

There are four key likely effects:  

1. Requirement that CIPS member banks be located in the PRC.  Banks around the world are not going to be connected to CIPS as they currently are to SWIFT.
2. Reliance by foreign banks wishing to use CIPS on Chinese correspondent banks. 
3. Use of SWIFT means that perceived risks associated with the use of SWIFT are not mitigated. 
4. Negative impact on existing RMB clearing banks and centers, with Hong Kong potentially hard hit.

Domestic Membership:  Like CHIPS, CIPS almost certainly will require that its members (the institutions who can directly enter payment orders into the system and who directly receive payments from the system) be in the PRC (not offshore) and have accounts with the (local) central bank (the PBOC) to settle transactions.  Credit concerns over settlement of transactions, including minimizing systemic risks to the national payment system and economy, and operational needs motivate this requirement.

Reliance on Correspondent Banks: Offshore banks that want to send payments via CIPS will have to maintain RMB accounts with Chinese correspondent banks who are direct CIPS members or with other banks who themselves maintain such accounts.  This latter option is more operationally complex and not one that many banks are likely to take -- unless they have credit concerns about maintaining large balances in accounts subject to PRC jurisdiction.   Offshore banks who want to send USD payments through CHIPS or Sterling payments through London-based CHAPS have a similar reliance on correspondents. 

Use of SWIFT by Foreign Banks: What this means then is those offshore banks are very likely going to use SWIFT to send messages to the correspondents (CIPS direct members) and receive information from CIPS members about transactions via SWIFT just as they do with CHIPS USD transactions. 

If as it  seems, foreign banks will send their payment instructions to CIPS members via SWIFT, then if sanctions or other pressure forces SWIFT to deny a Chinese bank access to SWIFT, that bank will no longer be able to receive SWIFT payment messages from foreign banks or send them messages.  

Potential Use of SWIFT by CIPS:  If CIPS direct participants use SWIFT to send payment instructions to CIPS, then a denial of SWIFT services to Chinese banks could “shut down” CIPS. 

Impact on Perceived Risks Associated with SWIFT Usage:  As I hope is evident, to the extent that SWIFT is used with CIPS, concerns about “spying” or sanctions-induced denial of SWIFT access—assuming that these really exist--are not eliminated.

But note, at this point it’s not clear –at least to AA—if CIPS will 

• rely on SWIFT for such “internal” communications or 
• operate a separate secure communication system of its own.   
• Target, the Europe-based payment system that makes euro denominated payments, uses SWIFT for this purpose.  
• CHIPS has a different model.  It relies on its own secure communication system to send payment instructions to CHIPS.   

Of the two options, I expect that China will adopt the CHIPS model, if not immediately, as soon as it can. 

Problems that both Iran and Russia faced no doubt have been noticed by PRC decision makers.   Iran’s SWIFT access was suspended --now restored in the wake of the nuclear agreement.  US sanctions restricted Russian domestic debit and credit card processing almost all of which was offshore and thus outside of Russian authorities’ control until that processing was subsequently brought onshore.  Calls by the then British PM and other EU entities for Russia to “de-SWIFTed”  threatened the potential shutdown of the country’s SWIFT-based domestic payment system with potentially devastating economic effects, causing the Central Bank of Russia to  introduce a replacement non-SWIFT-based payment national payment system.  

But I think that the Chinese need little “education” on this topic. 

Well before Iran’s or Russia’s problems, the PRC required that domestic credit and debit card transactions be processed by a domestic system. Some of this was likely motivated by a desire to promote local business as well as to limit the risks of reliance on foreigners.

Impact on Clearing Banks and Centers –Particularly Hong Kong: Finally, another often overlooked result of CIPS is the impact on offshore clearing banks. Under the current “clearing bank” arrangement designated banks outside the Mainland handle offshore and cross-border RMB transfers.  Hong Kong is particularly vulnerable as it handles roughly 70% of all offshore RMB transactions.  (Page 7)

Once CIPS is successful, Hong Kong banks (particularly Bank of China Hong Kong) are likely to experience a dramatic fall in transaction volume and fees. Customer RMB deposits are also likely to decline as deposits are shifted to CIPS member correspondent banks on the Mainland. 

Factors that could mitigate that fall are

1. the utility of offshore accounts for “workarounders’” and “investors’” currency exfiltration and infiltration transactions with the mainland, a lot of HK – Mainland trade is actually composed of regulatory avoidance transactions dressed up as trade, 
2. more “legitimate” regulatory planning reasons for maintaining offshore RMB deposits similar to those for offshore US dollar deposits, and 
3. a possible depositor preference for banks and jurisdictions perceived to be more creditworthy and offering more legal protection to depositors than those on the Mainland.