Showing posts with label Central Bank of Bahrain. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Central Bank of Bahrain. Show all posts

Wednesday, 15 April 2020

Bahrain Middle East Bank - Successful AGM, No EGM = Future Remains Bleak

At the Third AGM, a Quorum Can Be Rather Small

BMB “successfully” held its FY 2019 AGM on 9 April after two previous unsuccessful tries. Minutes here.

But just barely.

Only one shareholder holding one share was in attendance.

That’s 0.00000025% of outstanding shares according to the AGM Minutes.

As per Bahrain’s Commercial Companies Law, there is no required minimum quorum for a third meeting.

All AGM agenda items were approved.

The EGM – which is needed to address the critical issue of continuity of BMB – failed for lack of a quorum. 

See below for the main focus of the AGM:  a discussion of the implications of failure to hold an EGM on BMB's ability to legally continue as a "going concern".

As noted in an earlier post, because AN Investments was excluded from voting in the EGM, if their shares are excluded from the total number of BMB shares, only 4.81% of shares would constitute a quorum for the EGM.

As also noted in that post, that would require AlFawares (ALF) to be present to vote its shares because in the event that AN Investments' shares are excluded a minimum of 4.81% of total outstanding BMB shares would have to be present and all other shareholders own only 4.51% of BMB. 

ALF was not in attendance for the EGM.

It’s unclear what the reason is for their failure to participate.

Earlier the Board noted that certain members of senior management and the Vice Chairman were under investigation for an alleged fraud. None of these individuals were directly associated with ALF.

Also, ALF’s two directors on the Board resigned "just before" the CBB ordered that the Board resign.

I have interpreted the timing of these events as an early warning from the CBB to the ALF directors to exit before being forced to resign.

In which case ALF should have nothing to fear from attending the EGM unless it fears (a) other legal exposure of some sort, (b) being forced to participate with new equity, or (c) the "sting" of unpleasant comments from other shareholders.

Re the first point, it would seem that the CBB’s actions—if my assessment is correct—indicate that ALF’s hands are “clean”, though see the potentially troubling reference to the difficult situation with “majority shareholders” below.

What might be the "sticking point" is ALF's own obligation to the Bank for the Installment Sale Receivable (ISR) loan which BMB has provisioned in full.

Re the second point, I don’t think Bahraini law gives the CBB or another Bahraini authority the power to compel a shareholder to invest additional equity. Participation in rights issues is voluntary and rights entitlements may be waived and in some cases traded.

And if the good sheikhs at ALF are sensitive to criticism, they can always give a party with thicker skin their proxy. The proxy holder can turn away questions regarding new capital or any other matter, including the ISR, with a simple “I don’t know”.

Given ALF’s own financial “difficulties”, their absence seems strange as restoring value to BMB increases the assets they need to meet their own obligations.

Given that the CBB appears to have given ALF's directors advance warning so they could keep their "thoubs" clean, it seems downright ungrateful of ALF not to cooperate.

Beyond that, Kuwaiti investors often use OPM to fund their investments as a tried and true method of limiting their downside risk.

If the investment goes bad, they hand the "keys" to the investment to the lender with a smile.

One might therefore expect there could well be a lender holding the BMB shares as collateral. 

An institution one would hope would be motivated to see the value of those shares preserved, or, in this case, increased from zero.

In such a case it would seem that at a minimum that lender would demand that ALF give it a proxy,  assuming it does not already “own” the shares through realization of its collateral.

The main focus of the meeting was a discussion of the implications of the failure to hold the EGM this year, following a similar failure earlier.

Mr. Yusuf Taqi a member of the Board asked the “regulators to provide directive on this issue {continuity of the bank} given that it may not be possible to hold at EGM in the future”.

BMB’s counsel opined that failure to convene an EGM and take the legal steps to maintain continuity of the Bank could lead to the bank being wound up or placed under administration.

Mr. Isa al-Motawaj, Director of Wholesale Banking at the CBB, noted that the CBB understands that BMB is in an “abnormal situation’ vis-a-vis its majority shareholders. (Note the plural in the minutes).

Is ALF included in the phrase “majority shareholders”? 

And, if so, is their inclusion a reference to their own significant financial difficulties? 

Or is there something more here?

Or is it an inadvertent slip? A reference to the fact that AN Investments is owned by the three Turkish “amigos”?

Mr. al-Motawaj stated that the CBB had evaluated that directing the bank to liquidate or be put under administration “would not be in the best interest of the stakeholders” particularly as there are other financial institutions exposed to the same defaulted parties as BMB is trying to recover funds from.

He also went on to assure the Board that they were duly constituted and operating in line with legal requirements, noting the importance of the asset recovery efforts underway.

He also responded to a board question about the legality of the AGM, noting that the representative of the MOIC&T had vouched for compliance wiht Bahrain's Commercial Companies Law, even though only one share was in attendance.

The CBB has gone on the record that it is willing to give BMB some leeway given its unique situation.

That being said, even with a successful EGM, BMB’s future is bleak.  

Recovery is highly unlikely to be in full.  

Additional capital will be required.  

Hard to see investors rushing to commit equity.

As a wholesale bank, BMB is unlikely to benefit from rescues afforded retail banks in the Kingdom.

Finally, kudos to the one shareholder who apparently believes in exercising his or her corporate governance responsibilities.

All markets, not just those in the GCC, need more shareholders like this individual.

Saturday, 8 June 2019

Gulf Finance House –2018 and 1Q19 Treasury Share Transactions Cost GFH Shareholders More than USD 37 Million

Satellite View of GFH Statement of Changes in Shareholders' Equity 
Update  12 June below in red.

The sad story of wasted shareholder money continues here.

First, a technical note to ground the analysis that follows.  In line with accounting standards, gains and losses on sales of treasury shares don’t pass through GFH’s income statement so technically they are not “income”.   But since this decline in value is the result of deliberate actions by GFH, it’s hard for AA not to consider this the equivalent of an income statement “loss”.  And I shall use the term “loss” in that sense in this post.  
Now to the analysis.  
In his Shareholders Report in the 2018 audited consolidated financial statements, GFH’s Chairman stated: “Also of note during the year, GFH took active steps to support its share price and market capitalisation, acquiring treasury shares up to 7% of the Group’s total issued shares.”  
Indeed, it did!  
But perhaps the results weren’t so good for GFH’s shareholders.  
In short (1) a lot of money was spent and lost and (2) the impact seems to have been minimal.  
As per AA’s analysis, it appears that the net result of GFH’s buying and selling of its own shares in FY 2018 was a reduction in equity of some USD 27.9 million.   If you’ll look at Statement of Changes in Shareholders’ Equity in GFH’s 1Q19 interim unaudited report, you see that GFH admits to losses of USD 24. 8 million on treasury share transactions in 2018.  
AA believes the roughly USD 3 million difference between AA and GFH relates to the USD 3,058 million 2018 charge to the share premium account which zeroed it out.  It appears that GFH considers that “loss” to be covered by earlier years’ gains.   
You will also note in the 1Q19 report that GFH has continued its treasury share transactions in 1Q19 for an additional USD 9.6 million “loss”.  And three more quarters left this year.  That's a time reference not a monetary one.
So a total of USD 34 million by GFH’s accounting and USD 37 million by AA’s.  
But you might ask AA:  Yes, but what about the impact on the share price? Surely, this was a small price to pay for “supporting GFH’s share price and capitalization”.  
GFH’s closing share price on 2 January 2018 was AED 1.520 and on 31 December 2018 was AED 0.902, according to investing.com.  Looking at share price performance only, that’s a decline of approximately 41%.  The share price at the end of March and May this year was in a similar range to the FYE 2018 price. 
I suppose in defense of GFH one might argue that absent their efforts the price would be even lower.  AA will not.  
The central question is why GFH is spending shareholders’ money to prop up the stock price?   
And perhaps whether regulators think that the method employed is “sound practice”?  
We don’t really know what is motivating GFH’s board and management. 
But what we can do is take a detailed look at their actions and try to guess (note that word) what is going on.  
In the recent past, GFH had minimal treasury share transactions.  It was only in FY 2017 that break was made with past moderate efforts.  FY 2018 saw a real break with the past as this chart demonstrates.  
GFH Financial Group Holding of Treasury Shares
FYE Number of TS Total Issued Shares TS as % TIS
2013 5,283,272 3,161,889,967 0.17%
2014 5,204,536 4,730,665,467 0.11%
2015 24,503,697 2,256,583,403 1.09%
2016 2,211,891 2,256,583,403 0.10%
2017 106,467,804 3,681,450,441 2.89%
2018 255,455,953 3,681,450,441 6.94%

Source:  GFH Annual Reports  
  1. Clearly, FY 2017 was a transitional year from the pattern of the previous four years.  
  2. FY 2018 saw an “explosion” of Treasury Share transactions.  
Let’s look a bit closer at FY 2018.   

GFH Financial Group Treasury Share Transactions 
by Quarter for FY 2018 -Millions of US Dollars
TS BOP Buy Sell Net = B-S TS EOP G/(L)
Q1 $58.4 $5.4 $3.2 $2.2 $60.6 ($0.9)
Q2 $60.6 $10.8 $20.6 ($9.8) $50.8 ($5.2)
Q3 $50.8 $56.1 $17.9 $38.2 $89.0 $0.0
Q4 $89.0 $88.7 $92.3 ($3.6) $85.4 ($21.8)
FY TOTAL $161.0 $134.0 $27.0 ($27.9)
 Source:  GFH 2018 Quarterly Financials, Amounts in Thousands of US Dollars

  1. TS= Treasury Shares BOP = Beginning of Period, EOP End of Period.  G/(L) = Gains/Losses.  
  2. Buys in 4Q18 were 55% of the FY’s total and 69% of sales.  
  3. It appears that these (4Q) sales were undertaken to either fund new purchases or because of imposed limits on the amount of Treasury Shares GFH was allowed to hold either from its regulator (CBB) or the GFH Board itself.  Or perhaps some combination of both.  
  4. 78% of FY 2018’s loss on Treasury Share transactions occurred in 4Q.  
  5. That suggests, but does not prove, that GFH was frantically trying to stave off a decline in share price for the “all-important” FYE 31 December reporting date.  
Just how frantic that activity was can be seen from the next two charts.  
First, let’s look at 4Q18 transactions in GFH shares on the BSE, KSE, and DFM.

Trading in GFH Financial Group Shares 4Q2018







Local Currency

USD Equivalent
BSE

BHD 6,379,970

USD 16,906,921





KSE




Oct

KWD 1,013,881.569

USD 3,335,137
Nov

KWD 311,267.257

USD 1,023,905
Dec

KWD 4,119,336.652

USD 13,550,450





DFM

AED 1,363,936,328.99

USD 371,644,776





TOTAL



USD 406,461,188


  1. With the DFM, you’ll have to do a bit of manual tinkering to select the time period.  Click on the orange box on the upper left hand side of the Bulletins Page.  Select 2018 and then Q4.  
  2. What emphasizes the “frantic” nature of GFH’s efforts is the percentage of their Treasury Share transactions of the above total as detailed in the chart below.

GFH Financial Group Treasury Share Transactions 4Q18




Amount

% Total 4Q18
Transactions
Buys
$88,662,000

22%




Sales
$92,267,000


Loss on Sales
-$21,780,000


Net Sales
$70,487,000

17%




Total Transactions
$159,149,000

39%

Sources:  Previous Two Charts.

  1. Percentages are calculated using the Total Transaction from the previous chart, i.e., USD 406,461,188.  
  2. Net sales transactions are estimates of cash proceeds = Cost – Loss = Cash.  
  3. Chart is based on the assumption that all of GFH’s Treasury Share transactions took place on a stock exchange.  
  4. If the above analysis is correct—and AA invites readers to point out any mistakes—then GFH had an outsized share of transactions.   Does AA dare use the phrase حوت الخليج“ ?   
What are we to make of all of this? 
Here are some thoughts of what might be going on.  Not proofs, but rather conjectures.  
Some of you out there may have other thoughts.  Please post a comment. Share your views.   Point out AA's mistakes.
If we assume limits on GFH’s holding of Treasury Shares (as a percentage of shares rather than a USD amount), then it would seem likely that GFH’s management would be aware that attempting to continue to prop up the share price in 4Q18 would require selling some of the existing Treasury Shares to make room for new purchases.     
And that selling those shares would lead to losses.  
If one looks at the average Buy/Sell ratio by quarter (adjusted for the cash losses on existing Treasury Shares), it’s 1.7 in Q1, 0.7 in Q2, 3.1 in Q3, and 1.3 in Q4. 
Clearly, the “bang for the buck” in Q4 is rather limited.  Each USD 1 of existing Treasury Shares sold only increases demand by USD 1.3.   Hard to see that having a material effect on the price.  
Perhaps that explains GFH’s whale-sized share of total trades in 4Q.  Trying to use volume to move the price in a favorable direction.
But taking on that volume of transaction caused substantial losses. 
AA is at a loss to understand why GFH did not stop trading in its shares when the losses began to mount.  If this were FX or other trading, a stop loss limit would have been triggered.  
GFH’s shareholders were bleeding substantial cash.  And consequences of continuing in 4Q18 are highly likely responsible for some of the pain in 1Q19. Overall a loss to the tune of USD 37 million for FY 2018 and 1Q19.  
We don’t know what GFH’s reason for continuing Treasury Share transaction but they certainly evidenced determination to proceed David Farragut style at a level that AA interprets as “frantic”.  
All this leads AA to conjecture that there seems more to this behavior than merely propping up the share price because it appears management accepted the large amount of losses incurred.  
What could motivate this behavior?  
As noted above we don’t know. 
But if we want to conjecture, what could be possible motives?  
Was GFH propping up the shares to “help” those investors who financed their share purchases using the shares as collateral?  And were exposed to lenders calling in the loans or asking for more collateral?  If so, who might those shareholders be?  

If Homer can nod, surely AA can.   In early August 2018 as reported by Gulf News, GFH advised the market "that on Thursday that its shareholders Abu Dhabi Financial Company (ADFG) and Integrated Capital (IC) have transferred 102,094,573 and 79,905,427 of GFH’s shares respectively from their NINs to Al Hilal Bank for a financing facility."   Coincidence?
Or perhaps to help investment funds who bought GFH’s shares “high” and would have to report a loss to their investors based on FYE 2018’s much lower price?  Who might those funds be?
Well, according to press accounts, Goldilocks acquired a 4.9% stake in GFH in January 2018.  At that time shares were trading around AED 1.5 per share.   As noted above with the share price at AED 0.902 at year end, Goldilocks would have to have reported a 41% loss on the investment considering only movement in the stock price over the year. 

AA in the Press Again as Usual with Similar Effects, Sadly
Reporting “Rant” Questions 
In previous years, GFH’s Statement of Changes in Consolidated Equity clearly labeled the results of Treasury Sales transactions which resulted in a Loss or a Gain by using those exact words.  That changed with the 2018 FYE report.  The loss amounts appear but there is no descriptor.  
Those who know their IAS/IFRS would understand that there was a loss in 2018.  But AA believes that certainly not all of GFH’s shareholders are accounting experts.  And it’s highly likely that only a handful are.   And how many of the accounting experts are reading GFH's financials?  
2018 was coincidentally a year in which the loss was quite large.  
Questions for GFH:
  1. Was this change designed to avoid drawing attention to the loss?  
  2. Or a simple oversight?  If this is the case, what caused the change in the existing template?  Or in other words, why change the tried and true? 
Interestingly, the term “loss” to describe 2018 was used in a footnote to the 1Q19 interim financial Statement of Changes to Consolidated Equity.  But in the same note on page 4 in the 1Q19 financials, the 1Q19 "loss" was again not used as it had been in past as part of the main text?   Why is this?  
Questions for external auditors,
  1. Did they “miss” this rather important change in 2018 AR?   
  2. Or did they approve it?  
  3. Additionally, when a bank loses an amount this size (some 20% of net income) is this not a material piece of information that needs to be highlighted?  And not buried in a note?  Which is unclear except to accountants? 
  4. Would auditors consider this level of "trading" in a firm's Treasury Shares as constituting "material information" as well? 
More posts to come on GFH’s 2018 results.