Bahrain Middle East Bank - 2020 Financials and 1Q2021 Financials Still in "Limbo"

24 March BMB announced that no date had been set by its Board of Directors to review and approve the bank’s financial statements for the period ending 30 June 2020, 30 September 2020, or 31 December 2020. 

As well it announced no date had been set for Board review and approval of its 31 March 2021 financials. These cannot be approved until 2020 financials are “set”.

Clearly, there is no “good” news to report. Which suggests that the news is bad.

Not a big surprise the bank is in dire straits.

But the continued delay on the financials probably indicates that things are heading further "south".

GFH Bahrain - Less to 3Q2020 Reported Income than Meets the Eye

For the first nine months of 2020, GFH reported net income of roughly USD 30.3 million down roughly 50% from the comparable period last year.

That’s not surprising. COVID-19 is casting a pall over many firms’ financial results.

But, neither is the full story.

That’s why one has to read the entire financial report and not just the Income Statement.

By my calculation the true economic performance of GFH over the period was a loss of roughly USD 66 million.PPA “swing” of some USD 96 million from the reported number!

Where does AA’s performance number come from?

The Consolidated Statement of Changes in Owners’ Equity page 4 in GFH’s Third Quarter 2020 interim financials.

The Retained Earnings column is the appropriate locus of focus for our attention.

Why?

Because it’s where economic gains and losses that are not required to be included in the Income Statement appear.

Despite their being excluded from the Income Statement, they are as real a loss as the charges that appear in the Income Statement. And, at times, gains are recorded here that are not included in the Income Statement.

To be very clear there is nothing inherently wrong with these entries.

Equally at times company management may use the discretion allowed under accounting principles to shift a “loss” from the Income Statement to the Statement of Changes in Shareholders’ Equity in order to present a “better” picture of performance.

Motives might be the desire to pay dividends, particularly for a regulated firm like a bank. Management bonus. Share price.

That’s why looking a comprehensive income or loss over a period is a better measure of the firm’s performance. 

Let’s review the pertinent charges to Retained Earnings.

There are three significant “losses” disclosed here.

First up is a USD 59.9 million charge arising from GFH’s underwriting of the entire BD 72 million (equivalent to USD 191 million) AT1 capital increase at Khaleeji Commercial bank. Note 1 on page 9 contains a detailed explanation if you’re interested.  GFH's carrying value of equity in KHCB is based on its share in the net assets of KHCB.  Not the purchase price.     

Next USD 13.9 million arising from “modification of terms” of financiing GFH has provided. That is, an easement of repayment terms on the debtor which decreases the amount GFH will ultimately receive (assuming the debtor pays) and thus the value of the related asset. Think of this as the recognition of a likely loss on the related financing.

Following that USD 22 million which represents the difference between the cost of Treasury Shares GFH sold (USD 108.7 million) and the amount it received (USD 86.7 million).

I’ve heard of “buy low sell high”, but not the opposite. Perhaps, an alternative investment strategy?

These transactions result from what GFH calls “market making” and AA calls a failed attempt to prop up its share price.

Not much evidence of a positive prop for the price of GFH’s shares. They began the year at USD 0.23 per share and were at USD 16.0 as of end of 3Q. As of 16 November trading at USD 14.9.

Of course, COVID has depressed markets.

But a look at previous posts analyzing this activity over several years suggest that GFH shareholders receive scant benefit from these “market making” activities.  

You'll find these using the search tool on the right hand side of the page and the words "treasury shares".

As noted above, if we adjust GFH’s reported Net Income for these three items, GFH had an economic loss for the period of some USD 66 million.

The Even More Curious Case of Bahrain Middle East Bank - Who Owns the Bank?

Another curiosity regarding BMB.

According to the information at the Bahrain Bourse, BMB has two major shareholders:

1. AN Investment WLL Bahrain (ANI) holding some 80.77%
2. Al Fawares Construction and Development Kuwait (ALF) holding some 14.48%

According to the online commercial register of Bahrain’s Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (www.sijilat.bh), BMB is owned 100% by a “group of shareholders” who are all Bahraini.

You can look this up at Sijilat using BMB’s CR 12266-1.

Even more curious, according to Sijilat, ANI (CR 86835-1) was struck from the Commercial Register with the notation “deleted by law” on 15 September 2019. That is, by AA’s reckoning over one year ago.  

So here is the conundrum. 

1. Assuming that the MOICT information is correct and that ALF has not acquired “Bahraini corporate citizenship” which Bahraini entity or Bahraini individuals own the shares previously owned by ALF?
2. Assuming that the Bahrain Bourse information is correct, how can AN Investments WLL be a shareholder in BMB, if it no longer has a valid commercial registry? If ANI is no longer the shareholder, then who or which Bahraini entity holds the 80.77% of BMB’s shares previously owned by it?
3. Given that over one year has passed since ANI’s forced de-registration, it would seem there would be sufficient time for the MOICT and Bahrain Bourse to agree and “conform” their data.
4. Beyond that, surely BMB itself has an obligation to advise the Central Bank of Bahrain and the Bahrain Bourse of changes in its shareholding.

Is this a failure of communication? 

Or something else?  For example, a change in ownership due to a legal proceeding?

BMB Wins Judgment in BCDR: Financial Impact, if any, Likely to be Negligible

A First Step May be Important Even if It is Small

11 October BMB announced that the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution (BCDR) had ruled in its favor in a case the Bank brought against 3 of its former executive officers. English version of press release here. 

The BCDR ordered the three unnamed defendants to pay BMB USD 13,198,309 plus BHD 100 for attorney’s fees.

As per the October press release, BMB initially brought the case in 2014 but suspended it while Bahraini authorities pursued a criminal case which resulted in a November 2018 judgment of prison terms of 3 years for the defendants.

From the original date of the case, we know this case related to the 2013 scandal previously discussed here.

Recall that BMB has another BCDR case relating to its 2018-2019 scandal discussed here (suit) and here (scandal). Interestingly, in this latter case the Bank indirectly confirmed the defendants’ names by confirming the accuracy of an AlAyyam press report.

As to this case (2013 scandal), we don’t have the names of the defendants However, in early discussion of the 2013 scandal, the Bank said that it had fired the then CEO, CFO, and other senior officers. 

From a July press release dated 20 July but published on the Bahrain Bourse 21 July we know that the Bank originally filed suit at the BCDR against seven individuals including some of its former officers. The fate of the remaining four is unknown.

How do we know this? Or think that we do?

Because the October press release cited above references a 20 July 2020 disclosure.

Note that BMB also issued a press release dated 20 July published that day regarding BCDR case related to the 2018-2019 scandal.

As noted by the Bank, none of the 2013 scandal defendants currently lives in Bahrain and that uncertainly relating to enforcement of this judgment by a foreign court means the Bank is unable to estimate the ultimate financial effect.

Three comments.

First, given the “hole” that BMB is in, 100% collection is not going to materially change the Bank’s dire position. Nor would 100% of the other case. Together both total roughly 10% of BMB’s negative equity. 

But the directors are to be commended for pursuing this action. Rather then let it languish as the earlier board appears to have because every dollar does count and fraud cases need to be pursued with vigour. 

One--well at least AA--might wonder if there were reasons why some directors would have preferred to let sleeping dogs lie. 

Second, the defendants have had ample time to arrange their financial affairs to limit the Bank’s ability to collect even if a foreign court enforces the BCDR judgment.

Third, also unless the defendants were guests of the Bahrain state during the criminal proceeding with “time served” counted against their three year sentences, it’s likely they did not serve any time.

Bahrain Middle East Bank - Successful AGM, No EGM = Future Remains Bleak

At the Third AGM, a Quorum Can Be Rather Small

BMB “successfully” held its FY 2019 AGM on 9 April after two previous unsuccessful tries. Minutes here.

But just barely.

Only one shareholder holding one share was in attendance.

That’s 0.00000025% of outstanding shares according to the AGM Minutes.

As per Bahrain’s Commercial Companies Law, there is no required minimum quorum for a third meeting.

All AGM agenda items were approved.

The EGM – which is needed to address the critical issue of continuity of BMB – failed for lack of a quorum. 

See below for the main focus of the AGM:  a discussion of the implications of failure to hold an EGM on BMB's ability to legally continue as a "going concern".

As noted in an earlier post, because AN Investments was excluded from voting in the EGM, if their shares are excluded from the total number of BMB shares, only 4.81% of shares would constitute a quorum for the EGM.

As also noted in that post, that would require AlFawares (ALF) to be present to vote its shares because in the event that AN Investments' shares are excluded a minimum of 4.81% of total outstanding BMB shares would have to be present and all other shareholders own only 4.51% of BMB. 

ALF was not in attendance for the EGM.

It’s unclear what the reason is for their failure to participate.

Earlier the Board noted that certain members of senior management and the Vice Chairman were under investigation for an alleged fraud. None of these individuals were directly associated with ALF.

Also, ALF’s two directors on the Board resigned "just before" the CBB ordered that the Board resign.

I have interpreted the timing of these events as an early warning from the CBB to the ALF directors to exit before being forced to resign.

In which case ALF should have nothing to fear from attending the EGM unless it fears (a) other legal exposure of some sort, (b) being forced to participate with new equity, or (c) the "sting" of unpleasant comments from other shareholders.

Re the first point, it would seem that the CBB’s actions—if my assessment is correct—indicate that ALF’s hands are “clean”, though see the potentially troubling reference to the difficult situation with “majority shareholders” below.

What might be the "sticking point" is ALF's own obligation to the Bank for the Installment Sale Receivable (ISR) loan which BMB has provisioned in full.

Re the second point, I don’t think Bahraini law gives the CBB or another Bahraini authority the power to compel a shareholder to invest additional equity. Participation in rights issues is voluntary and rights entitlements may be waived and in some cases traded.

And if the good sheikhs at ALF are sensitive to criticism, they can always give a party with thicker skin their proxy. The proxy holder can turn away questions regarding new capital or any other matter, including the ISR, with a simple “I don’t know”.

Given ALF’s own financial “difficulties”, their absence seems strange as restoring value to BMB increases the assets they need to meet their own obligations.

Given that the CBB appears to have given ALF's directors advance warning so they could keep their "thoubs" clean, it seems downright ungrateful of ALF not to cooperate.

Beyond that, Kuwaiti investors often use OPM to fund their investments as a tried and true method of limiting their downside risk.

If the investment goes bad, they hand the "keys" to the investment to the lender with a smile.

One might therefore expect there could well be a lender holding the BMB shares as collateral. 

An institution one would hope would be motivated to see the value of those shares preserved, or, in this case, increased from zero.

In such a case it would seem that at a minimum that lender would demand that ALF give it a proxy,  assuming it does not already “own” the shares through realization of its collateral.

The main focus of the meeting was a discussion of the implications of the failure to hold the EGM this year, following a similar failure earlier.

Mr. Yusuf Taqi a member of the Board asked the “regulators to provide directive on this issue {continuity of the bank} given that it may not be possible to hold at EGM in the future”.

BMB’s counsel opined that failure to convene an EGM and take the legal steps to maintain continuity of the Bank could lead to the bank being wound up or placed under administration.

Mr. Isa al-Motawaj, Director of Wholesale Banking at the CBB, noted that the CBB understands that BMB is in an “abnormal situation’ vis-a-vis its majority shareholders. (Note the plural in the minutes).

Is ALF included in the phrase “majority shareholders”? 

And, if so, is their inclusion a reference to their own significant financial difficulties? 

Or is there something more here?

Or is it an inadvertent slip? A reference to the fact that AN Investments is owned by the three Turkish “amigos”?

Mr. al-Motawaj stated that the CBB had evaluated that directing the bank to liquidate or be put under administration “would not be in the best interest of the stakeholders” particularly as there are other financial institutions exposed to the same defaulted parties as BMB is trying to recover funds from.

He also went on to assure the Board that they were duly constituted and operating in line with legal requirements, noting the importance of the asset recovery efforts underway.

He also responded to a board question about the legality of the AGM, noting that the representative of the MOIC&T had vouched for compliance wiht Bahrain's Commercial Companies Law, even though only one share was in attendance.

The CBB has gone on the record that it is willing to give BMB some leeway given its unique situation.

That being said, even with a successful EGM, BMB’s future is bleak.  

Recovery is highly unlikely to be in full.  

Additional capital will be required.  

Hard to see investors rushing to commit equity.

As a wholesale bank, BMB is unlikely to benefit from rescues afforded retail banks in the Kingdom.

Finally, kudos to the one shareholder who apparently believes in exercising his or her corporate governance responsibilities.

All markets, not just those in the GCC, need more shareholders like this individual.

Bahrain Middle East Bank - Apparent Way Forward to Hold EGM

A while back I wrote that it was highly likely that ANI (BMB's Turkish-owned) major shareholder would not attend Extraordinary General Meetings (EGMs) and that given their roughly 81% shareholding there could not be a quorum for the EGM. 

This would frustrate the ability of BMB to comply with the Commercial Companies Law (CCL) requirements to enable it to continue as a “going concern” given the bank’s negative capital.

It seems that a “solution” has been found in the CCL Section 203 as outlined in BMB’s announcement on the Bahrain Bourse of its upcoming AGM and EGM.

For the purposes of discussing and passing this Resolution, AN Investment W.L.L. shall not be entitled to count in the quorum or to vote on said Resolution, on the basis that the Bank’s total outstanding exposures which has caused the said loss of capital are to one or more related parties of AN Investment W.L.L. Such shall be in accordance with Article (203) of the Commercial Companies Law No. 21 of 2001, as amended.

This appears to be based on a broad reading of the last sentence in Section 203.

No member may vote for himself or on behalf of whoever he represents on issues in which he has personal interest or on a dispute existing between him and the company.

As outlined here, the minimum acceptable quorum for a BMB EGM (third meeting) is 25% of shareholders.

Eliminating ANI’s 80.77% from the base, means that to get a quorum at a third meeting, shareholders with 4.81% of BMB’s shares would have to attend. 

AlFawares is the registered owner of 14.48%.

If AA has done his sums right, always a concern, then unless ALF participates, an EGM cannot proceed.

Why?

Netting out ALF’s shareholding, all other shareholders comprise 4.75% short of the 4.81% required.

It’s almost certain that all of them will not attend as attested by past history. As well the substantial unclaimed dividends indicate many are sleeping, perhaps eternally. Note 27 in BMB’s FY2019 Audited Report.

If ALF or its proxy participates, then it’s likely the call for the first EGM will be successful because ALF’s 14.48% would be over 75% of BMB outstanding shareholding after exclusion of ANI’s shares.

What this means is that it is likely BMB will cross one hurdle to remain a going concern.

One step forward.

However, the key issue is finding new capital. And that will be a journey of more than 999 li.

Probably at least 200 million li.

The proverb cited above gives no guidance on the success of so long a journey.

Goldilocks and the 3 Bears - A Financial Fairy Tale - Part 1 GFH

Only One Bear Had the Right Meal for Goldilocks

In an earlier post I noted that the disappointing FY 2019 performance of the Goldilocks Fund—a loss of 7% for the year—didn’t explain the rather large drop in cumulative performance since inception (July 2015) from 219% for the first ten months of 2018 to 134% for 2019.

And promised to take a closer look at what happened with a series of three posts on Goldilocks and the Three Bears.

The three bears in this tale are: GFH Financial Group, Noble Group, and Dana Gas.

We’ll start with the first.

Before we do, a few words on methodology. I’ll begin by reviewing the history of Goldilocks investment in each “bear”.

Then I’ll compute the return to actual exit or if the fund still holds the asset until a current date.

Afterwards I’ll look to allocate the loss or gain over fiscal years.

On 8 January 2018, Goldilocks announced it had taken an approximate 4.99% stake in GFH a Bahrain-based Islamic financial institution that has been struggling for some years. An appropriate target for Goldilocks to work its constructionist magic as abundant posts on this blog indicate.

As of 31 December 2017, GFH had 3,681,650,441 shares issued and outstanding. Goldilocks actually appears to have acquired a 4.987% stake or 183,612,310 shares.

At a rough estimate of trading prices around that time of USD 0.42 per share that’s USD 77,117,170.

But how did it acquire these shares?

With GFH’s trading volumes a purchase of this sort even over a prolonged period would likely increase the entry price.

Situations like this are what friends are for!

From an analysis of disclosures in the equity notes in GFH’s annual financial reports, it appears that Goldilocks bought its shares from ADFG/IC.

According to GFH’s 2016 audited annual report, at year end, Integrated Capital held some 13.38% of GFH’s shares. One year in GFH’s 2017 audited annual report, it held 8.01%. 

Supporting a purchase from ADFG/IC is a record of an insider trade on Mubasher by Integrated Capital on 7 January selling 243,377,750 shares at USD 0.40 per share. 

Using that price, Goldilocks’ entry cost would be USD 73,444,924.

We’ll use this as the assumed entry price.

There’s no explanation who bought the 59,765,440 in additional shares sold. Sold to ADFG or “sold” to a lender to secure financing?

So how did GFH make out on its investment? GFH basically exited GFH in 2020.

On 22 January 2020, as part of a clarification regarding AlHilal Bank’s 5.3% shareholding, GFH revealed that Goldilocks held only 0.39% of its shares. It also noted that the ADFG/IC group and related parties held 9.69% of GFH’s shares. 

For those who follow AFDG/IC note that Reem Finance is listed as a related party in the announcement.

So Goldilocks must have sold its shares to a party or parties considered to be outside the ADFG/IC “group”. 

Assuming that GFH is not tardy in reporting significant changes in major shareholders’ and related parties’ holding of its shares, we can assume that purchase took place in December 2019 and early January 2020.

Let’s assume 1 December 2019 through 22 January 2020.

Looking over daily trading records at the DFM for GFH, this sale does not appear to have taken place on the DFM.

That’s also supported by the fact that the total value of GFH stock traded during the period was some USD 78.4 million equivalent over 3,622 trades.

Why look at the DFM?

Because roughly 74% of GFH’s shares are held and traded there.

What that probably means is that the shares were sold to another investor or investors “off the market” in a single or several “large ticket” transactions. 

AA will be looking at disclosures in GFH’s FY 2019 audited financials to see what information we can glean on who the new shareholder(s) are. Distribution of share ownership in the equity note and any disclosures about major shareholders.

Not by any means an easy task. In conformity with local regulations GFH only reports details on shareholders with 5% or more.

Because Goldilocks sold roughly 4.6% of GFH’s shares unless that shareholder already had holdings of 0.4% we’re not likely to learn its identity.

Let’s turn to the more important question, How did Goldilocks fare on its investment in GFH?

First, let’s estimate Goldilocks exit price.

The average price of GFH stock on the DFM between 1 December 2019 and 22 January was USD 0.2332 (based on DFM closing price data during the period). 

2017 and 2018 cash dividends (paid in 2018 and 2019) add another USD 0.0311 per share so total realized is USD 0.2633.

Based on AA’s assumptions (note that word), Goldilocks bought at USD 0.40 a share and sold at USD 0.263 a share. On its original investment of 183,612,310 shares, it lost USD 0.137 per share or USD 25.2 million. That includes the unrealized loss on shares it didn’t sell (the 0.39%).

Also during 2019 Goldilocks received roughly 10,373,577 in bonus shares which at current values are worth some USD 2.4 million.

That means its loss on the GFH investment is about USD 23 million. Or roughly 31%

This assumes that the above price assumptions are reasonably correct. It also assumes that Goldilocks did not have a price guarantee or favorable put option from IC.

Let’s now allocate that performance over FY 2018 and 2019. Essentially that consists of two allocations: one for dividends (cash and stock) and another for mark-to-market.

As you’ll see from the chart below, the loss was essentially booked in FY 2018 with dividends offsetting further mark-to-market losses.

Goldilocks Investment Returns in GFH
Millions of US Dollars (except share price)
			Dividends
Date	Price	MTM	Cash	Stock	TOTAL
08Jan18	$0.40
31Dec18	$0.25	-$27.5	$4.2	$0.0	-$23.3
31Dec19	$0.23	-$3.7	$1.5	$2.4	$0.2
20Jan20	$0.23	$0.0	$0.0	$0.0	$0.0
TOTAL		-$31.2	$5.7	$2.4	-$23.1