Gulf Finance House - Capital Reorganization and Raising - A Look "Behind the Curtain"

"Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain"

GFH published the agenda for its shareholders' general meeting on the capital reorganization/raising to be held 31 October.  So far only in Arabic on the DFM and on the KSE (copy below so you can follow along).  Strangely not yet on the BSE.

As the picture above suggests, by looking behind curtain we can get a real understanding of what's going on.

In brief the key points are:

1. The capital reorganization and US$500 murabaha are being structured to make them as attractive as possible to new investors.  That means that existing shareholders are being substantially diluted through a variety of clever means - which might not be apparent to most readers of the agenda for the shareholders' meeting. 
2. A share swap transaction between Mr. Janahi and GFH which seems designed to strengthen GFH's creditworthiness as well as provide some much needed "relief" on the CAR both in terms of risk weighted assets and potentially equity.

First, let's look at what's immediately visible:  the agenda for the shareholders meeting.   Shareholders are being asked to:

1. Approve a share swap between GFH and its Chairman/Executive CEO, Mr. Esam Janahi.  In return for his 104,923,734 shares in Khaleeji Commercial Bank ("KHCB"), GFH will give him 100% of its shares in AlAreen Company for Leisure and Tourism (whose main asset is the Lost Paradise of Dilmun Water Park in Bahrain) plus US$3 million.  The latter either in cash or Treasury Shares of GFH. 
2. Reduce the number of GFH's issued shares from 1,896,332,565 to 474,083,141 in a reverse 4:1 share split.
3. Reduce the paid in capital from US$625,789,746.45 to US$142,224,942.375.  A difference of US$483,564,804.075. 
4. Reduce the par value of shares to US$0.3075 from US$1.32.
5. Approve the issuance of up to US$500 million in a privately placed convertible murabaha through a special purpose company set up by the bank or established at its request.  (That is, the SPV will lend to GFH.  It will obtain its funding from various investors.)
6. The profit rate ("interest rate") on the murabaha to be the "market rate" according to the rate and formula established by the Board of Directors shortly before issuance.  Such profit rate to be payable in cash or additional GFH shares.
7. The conversion price to be between US$0.31 and US$0.40 per share - with the rate of discount not less than 20% to 40% of the market price of the shares - but not below the nominal share price.  The conversion price to be set by the Board shortly before issuance.
8. A tenor of 3.5 years.
9. Conversion at investors' option with right of Board to offer an early conversion "incentive" according to conditions the Board will set.  Note that means that the murabaha does not count as equity for either regulatory (CAR) or accounting purposes until it is converted.  For the latter, only the embedded equity option is counted as equity under IFRS.
10. Waiver of pre-emptive right of shareholders to new equity.
11. Authorization for Board or whoever it appoints to take necessary legal steps to implement and for Chairman or whoever he appoints to sign the necessary legal documents.
12. Conversion of GFH's share register to electronic form according to the rules of the Central Bank of Bahrain and the BSE.

Now a look behind the curtain via some hopefully informed analysis:

A.  Share Swap - KHCB for GFH

1. GFH gets several benefits from this transaction.
2. Immediate strengthening of GFH's creditstanding.  KHCB is a better asset than the Water Park, which is why the West LB syndicate asked for the former.  Probably better earnings and better future.  The Water Park like the Riffa Golf Course, no doubt, looked like a very "wise" idea on paper.  In the real world, it's probably not.
3. Regulatory relief on the CAR - a matter of great importance to GFH who sit right on the edge.  The first way this comes is by moving this "puppy" (the water park, which is risk weighted in the GFH's CAR calculation) to someone else's kennel (balance sheet).  In return GFH gets KHCB, increasing ts holding from 36.99% to 46.99%.  Currently, GFH partially consolidates  KHBC, and, thus,  it doesn't have to worry for CAR purposes about fluctuations in KHCB's share price - which has dropped by roughly 50% since last year this time.  Since KHCB's CAR is roughly 31% as at 30 June 2010, the impact on GFH's Risk Weighted Assets and thus its CAR should be positive.
4. As you'll notice, the US$3 million owed to Mr. Janahi can be paid in cash or GFH shares.  So there's a potential boost to equity if the latter can be used to settle this amount.  Treasury Shares are deducted from Shareholders' Equity at their cost. What this means is that if GFH gets more than zero in proceeds from the sale or conversion of Treasury Shares, the amount of its Shareholders' Equity will go up by the amount of the proceeds received.  This happened in 2Q10 where GFH sold US$29.1 million (original cost) of Treasury Shares for US$7.6 million and recognized a US$7.6 million consequent increase in Shareholders' Equity.  While admittedly a small card in the scheme of things, this could be just the thing that helps GFH keeps its head about the 12% threshold in a close situation.   As I suspect the 2Q10 Treasury Share sale was.
5. And, to round things out, a footnote on KHCB.  Without qualifying my opinion about the  credit benefit of acquiring KHCB, I call your attention to Note 3.4 in KHCB's Basel II Pillar 3 Disclosures as of 30 June 2010, which shows that some 24% of its Islamic Financing Assets are past due.  According to that information, some 42% of the past dues (BD47,385 - which is the total amount of the past due loans not just the past due installments which  are BD10,487) are up to 30 days late.  Proceeding cumulatively, 51% up to 60 days, and 72% up to 90 days.  According to KHCB's risk classification system, some 59% of the past dues are rated Credit Grades 1-6.  Personally, I would have thought a past due loan  would automatically go on the "watch list" (Credit Grades 7-8) but then I don't have the details of KHCB's loan portfolio including collateral.  In any  case those concerned with KHCB should keep an eye on this area to see if there is deterioration or improvement in the future.

B.  Capital Reorganization

1. Under the Bahraini Commercial Companies Law of 2001, GFH is obliged to take action now that accumulated losses are 75% or more of paid in capital. Approved methods for rectifying this situation are:  (a) reducing paid in capital by an amount sufficient to offset the losses and/or using other equity reserves (share premium, statutory or voluntary reserves), (b) raising additional capital and (c) a combination of (a) and (b).  Generally, financial institutions use Method (c).  In some cases a bank might get away with merely offsetting the losses against existing capital - assuming its pre-reorganization CAR were robust.  GFH's is not so it must do both.
2. As you'll notice, GFH is not using its reserves.  Why? Very simply put:  the path it has chosen is designed to make the murabaha more attractive to investors.  Under GFH's plan, they will get more of the total shareholding of the Bank for each dollar they contribute.  
3. 1H10 financials  provide the details of the components of GFH's capital.   If GFH were to use its US$206 million share premium and US$85 million statutory reserve  (total US$291 million), it would only have to "use" US$192 million of paid-in-capital.  Thus, leaving original shareholders holding US$433 million in common equity instead of US$142 million. 
4. To take control, the new money would have to put in US$433 million plus $1.  Under GFH's reorganization plan it only needs to put in US$142 million plus $1. 
5. Similarly, if the new investors put in the full US$500 million, under GFH's plan they get 78% of the total equity.  If the reserves were used as outlined above, they would only get 54%.
6. Clearly, there is a conflict here.  Existing shareholders want to be diluted as little as possible.  New shareholders want the most value for their new dollar.  Sadly for the existing shareholders, including the even "wiser" ones who invested in late 2009, their money is already spent.  The new and presumably much wiser investors need to be persuaded to part with their money.  GFH has set  the reorganization and the terms of the murabaha to make it as easy as possible to get the money that it desperately needs.

C.  US$500 Million Murabaha

1. Use of an SPV as the lender can be quite a useful device in shielding the identity of the new lenders/shareholders, particularly if the SPV is not incorporated in Bahrain.  It will depend on how much transparency the CBB wants to demand here and how far it can push this Bank which has an important and powerful friend in Bahrain.
2. One would expect the market rate for unsecured GFH debt to be rather hefty.  And the value ascribed to the option on GFH shares much less so.  The Board will price "at market" - which will mean in effect what investors demand. 
3. The approval also provides for a discount from market price of between 20% to 40%.   This is where the reverse split comes to play.  There is nothing in the Bahrain CCL that requires this as part of the capital reorganization.  I suspect GFH is hoping that  the reverse split will work a bit of magic on their market price.  Over the past two weeks, GFH has traded at KD0.033 (roughly US$0.11) per share.  A 4:1 reverse split should bring the price to say US$0.44 per share - allowing the Board to discount the conversion price to say just a whisker over par to make the transaction even more attractive. 
4. "But wait there's more" as they say on the late night TV ads for the ShamWOW!  The Board is allowed to offer an incentive (terms unspecified in the approval) for an early exercise.  That allows an even greater discount to attract new investors.  So, if the conversion price is set at a whisker over par, can the Board issue shares below par through this device? 
5. You ask about the hapless existing shareholders?  Well, GFH already has their money and needs more.  So they are out of luck.

KSE announcement below.

[12:17:53]  ِ.اجتماع الجمعية العمومية العادية و غير العادية لبيت التمويل الخليجي
يعلن سوق الكويت للأوراق الماليه بأن بيت التمويل الخليجي أفاده بأنه
سوف يتم عقد جمعية عمومية عادية و غير عادية للبنك في الساعه 9 من
صباح يوم الاحد الموافق 31-10-2010 في فندق منتجع و قصر العرين
وقد طلب البنك ايقاف التداول على اسهمه في السوق اعتبارا من اليوم
الاحد الموافق 17-10-2010 وحتى اشعار اخر حيث حصل على موافقة ‏
مصرف البحرين المركزي على ذلك .‏
هذا وسوف يتم خلال الجمعية العمومية مناقشة ما يلي
أولا : جدول اعمال الجمعية العامة العادية
ِ1- المصادقة على محضر الاجتماع السابق .‏
ِ2- المصادقه على معاملة استبدال الاسهم بين بيت التمويل الخليجي و رئيس
مجلس ادارته السيد /عصام جناحي و التى سيتم بموجبها تحويل حصته في المصرف
الخليجي التجاري ش.م.ب بالكامل (104.923.734 سهم ) الى بيت التمويل الخليجي
مقابل الحصول على حصه البنك في شركة العرين للترفيه و السياحه ش.غ.خ و ‏
البالغه 100% (جنة دلمون المفقودة) بالاضافه الى مبلغ 3 ملايين دولار تدفع
اما نقدا و / او بواسطة اسهم خزانه بيت التمويل الخليجي .‏
ِ3- الموافقة على تغيير سجل مساهمي البنك من سجل عادي الى الكتروني ‏
وفقا لاحكام مصرف البحرين المركزي و سوق البحرين للأوراق الماليه .‏
ثانيا : جدول اعمال الجمعيه العامه الغير عاديه ‏
ِ1- المصادقه على محضر الاجتماع السابق .‏
ِ2- التباحث في والمصادقه على دمج الاسهم الصادرة لبيت التمويل الخليجي ‏
بمعدل 4:1 لينتج عن ذلك تخفيض عدد الاسهم الصادرة من 1.896.332.565 سهم
الى 474.083.141 سهم .‏
ِ3- التباحث في والمصادقه على تخفيض راس المال المدفوع من 625,789,746.45 ‏
دولار امريكي الى 142,224,942.375 دولار امريكي بسبب الخسائر المتراكمه ‏
ِ(سيقدم المدقق الخارجي السادة كي بي ام جي بيانا مستقلا يتعلق بتاييدهم لهذا
التخفيض ) .‏
ِ4- التباحث في والمصادقه على خفض القيمة الاسمية الجديدة للاسهم والتي ‏
ستبلغ 1.32 دولار امريكي بعد الدمج و تخفيض راس المال المدفوع المشار اليه
في البندين 2 و 3 من بنود جدول الاعمال الى 0.3075 دولار امريكي .‏
ِ5- التباحث والمصادقه على قيام بيت التمويل الخليجي من خلال اية شركة
غرض خاص يؤسسها البنك او تؤسس بناء على طلبه لاقتراض ما يصل ‏
الى 500,000,000 دولار امريكي من خلال مرابحة تمويليه قابلة للتحويل
الى اسهم بناء على البنود و الشروط التاليه :‏
ِ- معدل ارباح يحدد وفقا لسعرالسوق ووفقا للمعدل والصيغه المحددة من قبل مجلس
الادارة قبل وقت قصير من تاريخ السحب . يمكن دفع  هذا الربح نقدا او في صورة
اسهم عينية في بيت التمويل الخليجي .‏
ِ- سعر تحويل يتراوح من (0.31 دولار امريكي الى 0.40 دولار امريكي) ‏
ِ(بمعدل خصم لا يقل عن 20% الى 40% من القيمة السوقيه في اعقاب
الدمج بحيث لا تقل عن القيمة الاسمية للسهم) فيما سيتم تحديد السعر النهائي ‏
من قبل مجلس الادارة قبل فترة قصيره من تاريخ السحب .‏
ِ- مدة تصل الى ثلاثة سنوات و نصف .‏
ِ- غير مضمونه و لكن قابله للتحويل بمحض خيار المستثمر الى اسهم في بيت
التمويل الخليجي قبل انتهاء المدة ووفقا للشروط التى يحددها مجلس الادارة.‏
ِ- حافز التحويل المبكر لتشجيع المستثمرين على التحويل الى اسهم قبل
نهاية المدة وفقا للشروط التى يحددها مجلس الادارة .‏
ِ6- منح التنازل عن حق الاولوية الخاص بمساهمي بيت التمويل الخليجي ‏
فيما يتعلق باصدار اسهم عادية جديده سيتم اصدارها عند تحويل تمويل المرابحه
وفقا لبنود الفقرة 5 من جدول الاعمال .‏
ِ7- تخويل مجلس الادارة و/او من ينوب عنه للقيام بجميع الاجرءات الرسمية ‏
المطلوبه و الصحيحه لتفعيل تمويل المرابحه بما في ذلك دون حصر تحديد و/او
تعديل شروط المرابحه والمستندات الاخرى ذات العلاقه .‏
ِ8- تخويل رئيس مجلس الادارة او من ينوب عنه بالتوقيع على تعديل عقد
التأسيس و النظام الاساسي نيابة عن المساهمين امام كاتب العدل فيما يتعلق ‏
بالتغييرات في راس المال لتعكس ما تقدم .‏
علما بأنه في حالة عدم اكتمال النصاب القانوني لهذه الجمعية سيكون الاجتماع ‏
الثاني يوم الاحد الموافق7-11-2010 في نفس الزمان والمكان وفي هذه الحاله ‏
ستسري احكام الماده 57 من النظام الاساسي للبنك. وفي حالة عدم اكتمال النصاب
القانوني في الاجتماع الثاني ، سيتم عقد اجتماع ثالث يوم الاحد الموافق ‏
ِ14-نوفمبر-2010 في نفس المكان و ذلك بسريان احكام المادة 57 من النظام
الاساسي للبنك . ‏

Kuwait FSSA: Snapshot of the Investment Company Sector

This post uses the data in the recent IMF update to its Financial Sector Stability Assessment to look at the Investment Company Sector in Kuwait. Building on that information, we'll do a bit of "back of the envelope" analysis on what distress in that sector means for the economies of other GCC countries.

You can find the earlier post on the Kuwaiti Banking Sector here.

Page 13 of the update gives a breakdown of the assets of Investment Companies in percentage terms.

Asset Category	Percent Total Assets
Cash	7%
Stocks	35%
Bonds	1%
Real Estate	20%
Private Equity	6%
Other	31%

That's somewhat useful. However, the large "Other" category at 31%  hides a lot of details.  

For a more detailed picture, let's turn to the Central Bank of Kuwait's Quarterly Bulletin for March 2010. Figures below are in KD millions and are from Tables 19-1 and 19-4 as of 4Q09.

Asset Category	Conventional	Shari'ah	Total
Cash & Banks	403.3	401.5	804.8
Domestic Loans	808.9	622.6	1,431.5
Domestic Financial Assets	1,925.2	1,753.6	3,678.8
Domestic Non Financial Assets	143.3	376.8	520.1
Foreign Assets	3,821.0	2,675.6	6,496.6
Other	823.0	1,374.4	2,197.4
Total	7,924.7	7,204.5	15,129.2

 

Some observations. 

1. First, you'll notice that the percentages derived from this table don't agree to that from the FSSA. There's no explanation for this.  Presumably, some reclassification of items.  Perhaps, Global's blocked deposit at NBUQ reallocated back from Other Assets to Cash? Plus of course some other assets - domestic and foreign loans to Other etc.
2. Second, foreign assets are 43% of total assets. At a rough exchange rate of KD1=US$3.50, that equates to US$22.7 billion dollars.   Clearly, the activity of Kuwaiti Investment Companies is not just important in Kuwait but elsewhere.
   

Where are those foreign assets?  Are they concentrated? 

The FSSA update has some answers.

1. Stocks, Bonds and Real Estate: 43% Kuwait, 43% Other GCC, Rest of World 14%. 
2. Stocks: 47% Kuwait, 36% Other GCC, Rest of World 17% (7% Emerging Markets, 10% US/Canada, Europe, UK, Asia). 
3. Bonds: 15% Kuwait, 72%  Other GCC, 13% Emerging Markets. 
4. Real Estate: 38% Kuwait, 53% Other GCC, Rest of World 7%.

As the above indicates, Kuwaiti Investment firms have significant exposure to Other GCC markets.  This suggests is that distress in Kuwaiti investment firms will have a direct impact on those markets.  If we use the 43% in stocks, bonds, and real estate (as per the FSSA) as an overall proxy for GCC investment, then very roughly some US$10 billion of demand for assets will be affected  -- primarily in equities and real estate.  Note: Since as mentioned earlier the data in the CBK's Quarterly Bulletin doesn't appear to exactly tally with the FSSA's, there is a bit of approximation in these numbers.  But I'd argue close enough for a directional analysis.   

The impact  - both in Kuwait and other GCC states - will come from distressed companies:

1. Selling assets putting pressure on prices. 
2. Scaling back or abandoning existing projects. 
3. Reducing or eliminating new projects and investments thus constraining future investment flows in these asset classes.

Now to the IMF's conclusions about the Kuwaiti Investment Sector:

1. In its Risk Assessment Matrix (Page 7), the IMF notes the Sector suffers from (a) high leverage, (b) significant dependence on foreign funding, (c) maturity mismatches – long term often illiquid assets financed with short term funds, (d) large exposure to equity and real estate, (e) weak disclosure, and (f) fragmentation of industry. Negligible exposure to European assets.  No real big surprises here.
2. In terms of a severe realization of threats in the next three years, the IMF assigns a high probability (PD) and a medium impact (LGD).  But note this is in terms of impact on the Banking Sector.  The impact on the Investment Sector is much more dire and outlined in the stress test results.  Again this is no surprise.
   

On that latter topic, as it did with the Banks, the IMF stress-tested the Investment Companies.  However, it only tested an 11 member cohort out of the 100 Investment Firms.    It used three scenarios (which differ from those used in the Bank stress tests) outlined in Appendix Table 6 (page 40): a mild case, a moderate case, and a severe case. 

Let's take a look at the results using Table 7 (page 41) and not the summary on Page 22:

1. In the mild case, 3 firms had capital adequacy less than 10%. 
2. In the moderate case, 3 firms had negative capital and 3 more had capital adequacy under 10%. 
3. In the severe case, 7 firms had negative capital and 3 additional firms had capital adequacy below 10%. Recapitalization of these firms (note the 11) would require an outlay equivalent to 2% of GDP.  
4. You'll recall that for the Banks the recap required from the "Severe" scenario was 3.8% of GDP.  However, that was for the entire Bank "universe".  Here the 2% is for 11 out of 100 Investment Companies!
5. Given the distress in the Investment Sector, one expects that the results using the entire universe would be much worse.  And the total recap much much higher.

The Curious Case of UAE Banks

Roula Khalaf at the Financial Times:

What’s going on at the banks in the United Arab Emirates? It is an open secret that the deterioration in their asset quality is worse than suggested by the size of problem loans, which credit rating agency Moody’s puts at 4.9 per cent of total loans at the end of last year.

Some accounting magic keeps the amount of reported troubled credits lower than actual.  Renegotiation of troubled credits another way that numbers are managed.   More distress on the way in terms of the full knock-on effects of the crisis.  

But fundamental support for the banking system posited.

No doubt.  

But weakness in the banks will lead to lower loan growth.  Those loans granted will have stricter terms.  And thus there will be an economic price to pay.

GCC Refuses to Revive Free Trade Agreement Talks With EU

AlQabas reports that the GCC has rejected recent European attempts to revive the trade talks.  The key issue is the right of states to impose export duties.  And the key focus is the petrochemical industry where the GCC have a cost advantage - not only in terms of low feedstock costs but also newer technology.

The GCC has rejected the latest European proposals stating that while both sides recognize the right to impose export duties, the GCC wants that right constrained by WTO regulations and agreements.

Free trade negotiations have been going on for some 20 years and were suspended late 2008 over this issue.

The GCC did sign a free trade agreement with the much smaller four member European Free Trade  Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland)  in 2009.

DIFC Investments Reports US$562.1 Million Loss

The National carries an article today about DIFC Investments loss.  

Beyond the details, this is another sign that the economic distress in the Emirate is not limited to Nakheel and Dubai World. 

Rather the impact from the crisis is broad.  With new funding constrained, the Emirate  is now in a very difficult position.  It simply cannot devote all of its limited cash to triage. - salvaging those bits with the most commercial promise. Substantial funds have to be devoted to paying Nahkeel's creditors to prevent a complete implosion of the economy.  And to be clear, I'm not focused so much on banks and other financial creditors as much as on trade creditors and investors/purchasers in the projects.

Markaz Report on Dubai and Dubai Real Estate

Markaz has published another of its excellent research reports.

This one's on Dubai Real Estate and the prospects through 2012.

Here's the link.

Essentially, they see

1. Dubai's economy marking time in 2010 and 2011 with a moderate uptick in 2012.  
2. Trade will be up all three years.  
3. Tourism down in 2010, marking time in 2011, and up beginning in 2012. 
4. Real estate down in 2010 and 2011 and marking time in 2012,

GCC China Economic Forum - Inaugural Meeting Bahrain 23-24 March

 

The GCC-China Economic Forum will hold its inaugural meeting this March 23-24 in Bahrain under the patronage of Bahrain's Prime Minister, HH Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa.  Among the topics for discussion is the finalization of Free Trade Pact talks.

Trade and economic relations between the PRC and the GCC states are increasing.   Something that is in the political and economic interests of both sides.  Something that gives both sides greater options vis-a-vis certain other powers in the Western end of the Eur-Asian continent and in the Americas.  An earlier observation here. 

IMF Study on Spillover of Global Crisis on MENA Emerging Markets and GCC

The study finds that most of the slowdown in MENA Emerging Markets (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia) and the GCC is due to the Global Crisis.  Or, as those of us who are less politically correct refer to it, the "Western" Financial Crisis.  

There is a logic here beyond the equations:  MENA is a samak saghir in terms of the world economy.  And in a variety of ways is linked to the Western/World economy. And so likely to be buffeted by storms in the West.

What I think is interesting about this study is what it says about the impact of the GCC in MENA Emerging  Markets.

Using the Financial Stability Index for his study, Moriyama-san finds that it increased from -0.3 (22005 through 3Q08) to 4.0 (4Q08 through 1Q09).

His analysis (Table 2) decomposes the latter FSI:

1. "Advanced" Economies Direct:  1.8
2. "Advanced" Economies Indirect through the GCC:  1.1
3. GCC Other than Advanced Economies:  0.3
4. Other Factors:  0.8   

No big surprise that Moriyama-san found that "Advanced" Economies were responsible for about 75% of the effect.  But, what's remarkable is that the GCC's role was about 35% - as the "Advanced" Economies fallout on its economy was transmitted to the MENA Emerging Markets countires as well as a lower amount for GCC factors not related to the "Advanced" Economies.  

Explaining in part Patrick Seale's comment about the center of political gravity in the Arab World shifting to the East, though one would also have to recognize the impact of the financial arrangements surrounding the Camp David Accords which have re-directed Egyptian foreign and economic policy.

Markaz Analysis of GCC Banks

 Markaz has published another of its insightful research pieces.  This one is on the GCC banking sector in 2009.

Here's sample paragraph.

The year 2009 can truly be declared as a year of provisioning. The 61 banks in the GCC region are estimated to provide a whopping USD9.4 bn in provisions during 2009, a 40% jump from 2008 and a 5-fold increase from the modest level of USD 1.8 bn for 2007. As a percentage to loans, we forecast provisioning to hit 1.3% in 2010 as compared to 0.8% seen between 2003-2009.

Markaz provides a macro GCC analysis and then individual country and bank details looking at provisions, loan growth, and the loans to deposits ratio.

A very good review.

RTA Denies Work Stoppage on Dubai Metro

Here's the news item from WAM.

Two major points.

1. Work has not stopped.  AA:  The Reuters story mentioned a slow down in work, not a stoppage.
   
2. RTA also reiterates its contractual commitments to the flow of payments in accordance with the progress of work made in the project.  AA: It's unclear what precisely this means.  Does it mean payments are being made in accordance with progress?  But if this is the case why are the Japanese firms slowing down?  And why are they involved in negotiations with the project owner?  Is it over the work change orders?  Those who know their regional history will remember that contractors in Saudi had a big problem with payment for change orders in the 1980's.  Redec being a prime example, though at the time the Saudi Government claimed that the  the change orders were not properly documented.  Of course, at that time the Saudi Government also was having cashflow problems.  It's an often observed phenomenon that payments on contracts get scrutinized very very carefully and often rejected for technical reasons when cashflow is tight.  That way one technically isn't in default on the payment.  And of course the door is then open to negotiate, which often leads to negotiations on price.
   

Unpaid Japanese Firms to Halt Work on Dubai Metro

Rupert Bumfrey has a post on this.   Here's another from Reuters.

Some comments.

1. It's not unexpected that construction costs would increase from the original estimate.  As per the article costs have doubled.  Culprits are cost inflation in materials and change orders.
2. Also not unexpectedly despite the announcement that contractors would be paid, it does take time for money to move through the system.  While the unnamed company official has denied that they have a receivable of US$5.3 billion, even half that amount is serious money.

The problem may be that there isn't enough available cash.

The Emirate owes substantial unpaid amounts.  Dubai Metro is just one of the Emirate's projects.

New financing seems unlikely.   Government revenues are insufficient.  Shaykh Khalifa hasn't written another check.

This coupled with Shaykh Mohammed's waiving of fines for late CR renewals suggests that more economic pain is on the way in Dubai.  Despite this week's festivities for Burj Khalifa, there is a lot more pain in store for Dubai.

More Signs of Distress in Dubai? HH Shaykh Mohammed Lifts Penalties for Non Payment of CR Registration

Today WAM carried an announcement that HH Shaykh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum had issued "a decree exempting companies operating in Dubai from all fines imposed on them for not renewing their licences of practicing the profession on time".

The press release notes that:  "The move is part of Sheikh Mohammed's sustained support for the business community in Dubai. It underlines his keenness to find effective alternatives and solutions to spur activities of businesses in a positive approach."

But ever the contrarian AA believes that if this is a significant enough problem that HH is getting involved  then it must be fairly widespread.

And, if so, is that a sign of corporate distress?  Or just that entities who are able to pay are refusing?

GCC Real Estate Projects - A Survey

With all the discussion about the fall out from real estate  in Dubai and the declines in real estate elsewhere in the GCC, I thought it would be useful to provide a bit of macro context. 

Luckily, Global Investment House has recently issued a report on the GCC real estate sector. You'll have to register to get the full text.  Click here to do so.

Based on information from MEED Projects, they've compiled a comparable table across the six members of the GCC.

Amounts in Billions of US Dollars

Country	Nov 2009	Nov 2008	% Change	Held Projects	% Held
Bahrain	$ 68.3	$ 57.7	+18.3%	$ 9.1	11.8%
Kuwait	$ 271.5	$ 298.7	- 9.1%	$ 41.0	13.1%
Oman	$ 104.6	$ 106.4	- 1.7%	$ 6.7	6.0%
Qatar	$ 204.8	$ 216.9	- 5.6%	$ 7.9	3.7%
Saudi Arabia	$ 609.4	$ 606.5	+ 0.5%	$ 39.2	6.0%
UAE	$ 915.9	$1,228.2	-25.4%	$368.2	28.7%
TOTAL	$2,174.5	$2,514.5	-13.5%	$472.1	17.8%

At 42.1% the Emirates' share of real estate projects seems outsized relative to their population as a percentage of the GCC total or to their economy as a percentage of GDP total. When the held projects are factored in, their share goes to 48.5%.

That level of activity could be the sign of several things:

1. Severe underdevelopment relative to the rest of the GCC.  I think we can rule that out.
2. A speculative boom.  From the nature of the projects, this is the leading candidate.
3. The development of needed infrastructure.  For anyone who has endured the traffic jams in Dubai or elsewhere in the GCC,  the Dubai Metro seems a worthwhile project.  But this does not seem to me to the major driver of the activity.
   

I suppose an argument related to #3 above is that they are developing the next London or Manhattan.   To paraphrase  "Field of Dreams":  If you build it, they will come.  

Not sure I buy that there is a need for a major financial center between Hong Kong and London.   Nor that there is any "natural" location for any such additional center.  Capital is highly mobile these days.  There are few to no impediments to cross border flows.  And the state of today's communications has eroded whatever earlier benefit there was from having a physical presence in a specific location.  If the new center must have a "seaside" location, Shanghai or Mumbai could serve as well as Dubai.

It's more likely that a regional center will arise in the GCC, but I doubt that at present it would need to be as large or as elaborate as London or Manhattan. 

The critical work that needs to be done is building another form of infrastructure:

1. The creation of a set of appropriate laws and regulations
2. The development of a cadre of trained judges and lawyers to implement them
3. Enhancements and actual implementation of accounting standards and regulations
4. Establishment of a sovereign bond curve as a benchmark for pricing other issues in the debt markets
5. Greater institutional participation in local stock markets 
6. More liquidity in both debt and equity markets - not only in terms of demand but also on the supply side. 
   
7. On the debt side many of the issues are not traded, particularly the Islamic structures.  Or to be more precise not traded in local markets.
   
8. The free float on many equity issues is rather shallow.   Relatively small transactions can move the price disproportionately. 
   
9. And in certain markets there are sadly issues with brokers and market makers - who seem more focused on making a market for themselves than for their customers.  Though to be fair this is not just a GCC phenomenon.  
10. Finally, there is the "silo" nature of the GCC.  At this point, countries by and large stick to their own national business.  There isn't a lot of cross border investment. 
    

Governments in the area are not oblivious to these issues as evidenced by the initiatives launched QFC, DIFC, the Saudi CMA and in Bahrain. 

There is also another issue and that is the nature of the market.  Is the market intended to be one that  primarily mobilizes capital for local use?  Or one that provides funding to other geographic regions?  

For the first alternative, Saudi Arabia would seem the natural site given its population and major share in GCC GDP.  One could I suppose argue that as happened with commercial lending in the 1980's, a nimble neighbor with a more congenial regulatory regime and living conditions could play this role.  There are two major differences between then and now.  First, GCC nationals have the primary role in financial firms - at all levels.  There is less need for Western experts to be parachuted in.  And thus less need for concern about their life style preferences.  Second, the Kingdom is not sitting on the sidelines watching others develop an offshore center to serve the Kingdom.  New regulations - particularly those from the Capital Markets Authority are designed not only to foster the development of the market  but also to "encourage" foreign firms to open offices in the Kingdom. 

Is there a role for a regional Hong Kong?  Perhaps.  And several contenders as well.

CNPC Replaces Total in Pars 11

The Peoples Republic of China continues its economic penetration of the region.

Back in Washington, minds are focused on what are imagined to be more urgent foreign policy matters.

In the final analysis, economics is the basis of all sustainable political power. 

Countries and elites that ignore this very simple, very basic rule of life find their own power gradually slipping away and the standard of living of their people eroded.

This Is Getting Serious - Dubai Police Intervene For Those Who Have Not Yet Gotten The "Message"

Well, I guess some people are hard to educate (not a real surprise when the intended audience is bankers and journalists  - their past and most likely future behavior indicates a need for more than one lesson).  The sight of a badge may focus some unfocused finds.

In an official press statement carried on WAM, Lt. General Dahi Khalfan Tamim, Dubai Police Commander and Head of the Dubai Government's Budget Committee (I guess there's a logical connection there somewhere between these two positions) noted that:

1. "... in the whole region, real estate continue to be the top earning sector and that reality investors were still safe from the global slow down."
2. "Only speculative real estate investors have been affected by the slow down in the sector," he added.
3. Speaking of the budget process for next year, he remarked:  "The department heads showed remarkable efficiency in setting financial and administrative strategies that will ensure Dubai's continuous excellence," he said.
4. "Dahi Khalfan pointed out that Dubai has more than a single landmark to be proud of.  'Usually, each of the world's countries has an icon to be proud of. Dubai has many, such as Burj Dubai, Burj Al Arab, Dubai Mall, as well as Dubai International Airport and the Emirates Airlines which are seen as major drivers for tourism.' Dahi Khalfan, who also heads Dubai's Crisis management Team, stated that Dubai government had no debts issue.
5. "Dubai has rather an issue of unfair competition by some circles which seek to undermine the successful emirates and to unseat it as a global centre for finance and business and a magnet for foreign investments that thrived and succeeded in Dubai." "I noticed that Gulf and foreign media, as well as a large segment of general public, confuse between debts of Dubai government, which are almost non-existent, and the debts of local companies. This confusion should be corrected and the public should be made aware that to separate between the two types of debts." 
6. "As for the real estate sector, Dahi Khalfan said it should be referred to as a "recovering sector" for the investors who are in the market for medium and long term gains."  AA: Admittedly, I may need another lesson.  I am having trouble reconciling statements #1 and #2 above with this one.  How precisely does the market differentiate in setting a price for a "speculator" from the apparently much higher one it sets for an "investor"?

In any case it's a tradition in some of the "sophisticated" Western countries that when the sheriff speaks up, he has the last word.   As was said a little more than two weeks ago, it is time to be "quiet".  Nothing to see here.  Move along.

More Dubai Fallout - GCC and MENA

Dubai dropped the first shoe - its request for a debt repayment standstill.  And what a big shoe it was.  Still causing shockwaves.

Not only have Dubai and the region been affected but there have been knock-on effects.  European banks - who reportedly hold some US$35-45 billion of Dubai debt - have seen their shares fall.  As have European companies where Dubai and other GCC countries are shareholders.

Real estate investors in major centers are reportedly licking their lips thinking about  potential fire sales of assets - the Adelphi Building in London and so on.

Let's take a look at some repercussions closer to home.

Following Dubai's real estate boom, everyone who was anyone in the real estate game had to have at least a $1billion dollar project.  And like Dubai, the more adventurous ventured from their home markets.  Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and so on.  Dubai even has a sky scraper building in Doha. Salam Resorts in Bahrain and Oman.  Sama Dubai.

Now that bankers and investors have belatedly rediscovered risk (but perhaps as usual only temporarily) there is bound to be a slowdown.

What is the fate of the projects a-building?  And what is the fate of new developments?

Not likely a positive development (sorry for the pun) for some of the less rich, less resilient economies.

Yemen LNG Makes First Shipment

A bit of good news for this beleaguered country - which is desperately in need of hard currency earnings, not to mention water, peace, progress .....

Most estimates are that over its 20 year or so life the Yemen LNG project will generate US$20 billion for Yemen.  The Yemeni Government's own "conservative projections" estimate US$30 to US$50 billion.

Much needed because oil exports, Yemen's current major source of FX revenues (roughly 90%),  are rapidly running out.  Estimates are for 10 years more production, though the Yemeni Government disputes these figures.

Anyways a few random data points to illustrate the importance of Yemen LNG to the country:

1. In 2003 Yemen exported 450,000 barrels of oil per day.  In January 2009 the total was down to 280,000 bpd.
2. During the first six months of 2009, FX earnings from oil exports were down 75% from the same period in 2008.  Most of that is due to the decline in oil prices, but a worrying 25% drop in volumes exported was also a major cause.
   

So Yemen LNG's first shipment is good news for Yemen.  A substitute for dwindling oil exports.

For those interested in more on Yemen LNG, here's a link to their website.

The project has been "kicking around" since the 1990's.  As one might expect, putting a deal of this magnitude together in Yemen is not an easy task.  The shareholders' group has been a bit of a revolving door - ExxonMobil withdrew after the 1994 civil war.  Enron sniffed around a bit but declined. At one point Hunt Oil (an old Yemeni hand) was rumored to be contemplating withdrawing from the project.  Competition from Qatargas and Dolphin in which Total (the major shareholder in Yemen LNG) has interests also were obstacles.

For those interested in a bit more information on Yemen, two suggestions:

1. Christopher Boucek's "Yemen Avoiding a Downward Spiral" at Carnegie.
2. The IMF's Public Information Notice ("PIN") on  Article IV Consultations with Yemen released this March.
   

Boucek's piece is an overall analysis of all factors - political, economic, and social.   It is also written to promote a particular policy response so factor into your evaluation how that goal may affect his diagnosis and conclusions.

The IMF PIN is focused on economics only.

Some background on the Article IV process and PINs.

Each country that has joined the IMF  (there are 186 or so) undertakes certain obligations with respect to the conduct of its affairs.  A key part of those are reflected in Article IV.   Each year the IMF "consults" with countries about their obligations focusing on Article IV. Member countries have the right to decide how much detail is released to the public about the results of those consultations.

Two other things are relevant to Article IV consultations.

1. Diplomatic Speak:  The position of the IMF is couched in diplomatic language.  Criticisms come in the form of "encouragements" or "strong encouragements".  Issues are described in similar gentle language.  Instead of stating that a member country's economic statistics are deficient, the PIN will speak about improving the timeliness and accuracy of statistics. 
2. Mathhab:  The IMF holds more or less to a certain economic philosophy.  It's important to understand this when reading both their diagnosis and prescriptions. 
   

A second post will follow to hopefully shed some light on the intriguing story of how US$2.8 billion in long term financing was raised for a project finance in a country in Yemen's situation.