Qatar: Doing Quite Nicely Thank You

The Lights are Still On 

So how is Qatar faring in the face of the Quartet’s boycott?  

Of course, not everything is perfect but as the 2019 IMF Article IV consultation with Qatar demonstrates the country is coping and in some areas doing quite well.

From this point on what follows are a series of direct quotes from the IMF. 

On May 13, 2019, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with Qatar and considered and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting.  

Economic performance improved in 2018. Qatar’s economy has successfully absorbed the shocks from the 2014–16 drop in hydrocarbon prices and the 2017 diplomatic rift. Real GDP growth is estimated at 2.2 percent, up from 1.6 percent in 2017. Headline inflation remained low.  The central government’s fiscal position switched to a surplus of 2.3 percent of GDP in 2018 from a sizable deficit in 2017. Recovery in non-resident deposits and foreign bank funding helped banks increase private sector credit. Banks have been able to diversify the geographical composition of non-resident deposits. The current account is estimated to have reached a surplus of 9.3 percent of GDP in 2018, largely reflecting higher average oil prices. Reserves reached US$31 billion (5½ months of imports) at end-December 2018. Recently, Qatar issued US$12 billion in international bonds, which was more than four times oversubscribed, with lower spreads than in previous issues.

Qatar’s banking sector remains healthy, reflecting high asset quality and strong capitalization. At end-September 2018, banks had high capitalization (CAR of 16 percent) and maintained strong profitability (ROA of 1.6 percent), low non-performing loans (ratio of 1.7 percent), and a reasonable provisioning ratio of 83 percent. Banks are comfortably liquid, with a liquid-asset-to-total-asset ratio of 29.7 percent. Nonetheless, strong credit growth that outpaced deposits resulted in the system-wide loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio of 103 percent which is higher than the CB’s guidance of 100 percent. After a period of rapid growth, real estate prices in Qatar are adjusting to new levels. According to the real estate price index developed by QCB, following an 82 percent increase during 2012–16, real estate prices fell by 15 percent during 2017–18. Macro-financial prospects remain favorable, though risks skew to the downside.   

The external position is weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and medium-term policy settings. (Annex II). Nonetheless, with gradual fiscal adjustment, the estimated current account gap could be closed in the medium term. While reserves are low relative to the ARA metric, risks are mitigated by large sovereign wealth fund assets (Annex II) and external debt is assessed to be sustainable (Annex III). The peg to the U.S. dollar continues to provide a clear and credible monetary anchor and is considered to be sustainable 

Stress test results indicate that Qatari banks can withstand severe macroeconomic shocks. Given the strong position of the financial system, with low NPLs, adequate provisioning, and solid profitability, banks can comfortably withstand higher NPLs and lower profitability brought about by macroeconomic shocks (see IMF Country Report No. 18/136). Many of the real estate borrowers are reportedly well-diversified large conglomerates that are able to support their loan payments from other businesses.

The recovery in non-resident deposits (by 23 percent y-o-y by December 2018) and foreign bank funding (up by 23 percent) helped banks increase private sector credit by 13 percent y-o-y by December 2018.5 Banks have been able to diversify the geographical composition of non-resident deposits and lengthened their maturity structure.  

The stock market performed well in 2018, with the index recovering its 2017 losses and rising by 23 percent in 2018. Bond yields declined reflecting positive investor sentiment towards Qatar.  

More Nonsense from Gulf News About the Qatar Crisis

Here’s another gem from the Gulf News re the Qatar crisis under the headline:  “Qatar’s defence of Iran drives further wedge with neighbours”  with the subheading “Comments by defence minister prove Qatar’s arrogant position when it comes to solving year-long crisis”.  

Just what did Qatar’s Defense Minister ("QDM") say to prompt such criticism?  

Let’s read GN's charges.  Words in quotes are verbatim from the GN article cited above. 

First, the Qatari Defense Minister “defended the Iranian nuclear deal despite criticisms from Arab states that the deal has empowered Tehran to wreak havoc in the region.”   

As AA reads the GN’s charge, it’s clear that the QDM did not defend Iran but defended the JCPOA, a position shared with the former President of the United States, Australia, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the UK – all no doubt as arrogant and intransigent as Qatar at least in the eyes of the GN.  Citations here and here.  

Interestingly, neither Kuwait nor Oman have adopted the “Quartet”'s position. 

Also Tehran’s influence/actions in the region pre-date the 2015 JCPOA, e.g., the Huthis seized Sana in 2014, Tehran has been supporting the Syrian Government since before  the JCPOA, and its influence in Iraq also predates the JCPOA.  While JPCOA's negotiations concluded in 2015,  the agreement came into effect in January 2016 (“Implementation Day”). I suppose one, perhaps the GN, would argue that actions before 2015 or 2016 did not consist in wreaking havoc.

Second, the QDM said that “Qatar would not ‘go and fuel a war’ in the region and called for engaging in talks with Iran” and that a war with Iran would be “very dangerous”.  

That seems an eminently sensible position on general terms.   

But for a region that has seen the sad consequences of wars in Iraq, Libya, and Syria a bit more caution on war would seem to be in order.  

Finally there is the lesson of 1967.  If you’re bogged down in a war in Yemen, best to keep your head down with regard to further military adventures, particularly if the potential new adversary’s power is a multiple of the current adversary in Yemen.  

GN had another article earlier "Lack of Wisdom Prolonging Qatar Crisis".  The article referred to above is perhaps an exemplar of the headline.  

Expect more to come as I clear out from under a rather busy past three months.

What is the Qatari Banking Sector’s Foreign Currency Exposure? Part 4 – Consolidated Annual Financial Reports “Approach” Continued

AA Puts the Finishing Touches on His Analysis

Earlier posts here, here,  here, and here.

With all the caveats in the preceding post, let’s look at a series of charts which I’ve compiled from the FYE 2016 annual reports for 7 Qatari banks.  Recall there are 3 banks (AlAhli, AlKhaliji, and IBQ that don’t provide full geographical analysis of assets and liabilities) and one bank Development Bank of Qatar that has a relatively miniscule positive NFA position and so I’m not inclined to spend time analyzing it.

Before we begin, one important note.  I will be comparing consolidated data as of 31 December 2016 to QCB data as of that same date in what follows  Keep in mind that since 31 December 2016, QCB data shows a QAR 79 billion reduction in TFL (USD 21.7 billion), and a QAR 41 billion (USD 11 billion) reduction in NFA.  For a net decrease in the negative NFA position from USD 47.7 billion to USD 36.6 billion equivalent.

Qatar Banks NFA 31 Dec 16
Consolidated Financials  - QAR Billions
BANKS	TFA	TFL	NFA	NFA-USD
QNB	278	355	-77	-$21
QIB	25	37	-12	-$3
CBQ	43	53	-10	-$3
MAR	16	13	3	$1
DOHA	10	9	1	$0
BAR	11	5	6	$2
QIIB	2	6	-4	-$1
TOTAL	386	478	-92	-$25

1. MAR = Masraf al Rayan and BAR = Barwa Bank. 
2. As per the QCB’s statistics, the NFA position was a negative USD 47.7 billion equivalent at 31 December 2016.  Using consolidated financials, the NFA position was negative USD 25 billion at that same date.  While this is based on a sample instead of the population, it’s unlikely that the remaining banks have a negative net foreign position anywhere approaching USD 23 billion.  As per QCB data, the QDB has a miniscule though positive NFA exposure equivalent to some USD 84 million.  Because total liabilities (foreign and domestic) of the first three banks equal QAR 112 billion (some USD 31 billion). It’s highly unlikely that they have foreign liabilities equal to 74% of total liabilities.  And also if they have such FL, they probably have some amount of FA to offset them. 
3. On that basis and subject to the caveat about the free transfer of assets between overseas entities and Qatar, particularly for subsidiaries, it certainly looks like the Qatar banks aggregate position (onshore and offshore) is even more manageable. 
4. One can also look at other measures of this exposure. If we look only at banks with negative NFA, they owe some QAR 102 billion (USD 28 billion). 
5. If we look at a base worst case (because we lack data on three banks), consolidated financial derived TFL are QAR 478 billion (USD 131 billion) which is higher than QCB’s TFL of QAR 447 billion (USD 123 billion). 

But what is the exposure to Other GCC countries, which would include the GCC 3?

Qatar Banks NFA  31 Dec 16
With Other GCC States
Consolidated Financials - QAR Billions
BANKS	TFA	TFL	NFA	NFA-USD
QNB	32	24	8	$2
QIB	9	28	-19	-$5
CBQ	10	14	-4	-$1
MAR	3	7	-4	-$1
DOHA	10	9	1	$0
BAR	5	2	4	$1
QIIB	1	5	-4	-$1
TOTAL	71	89	-18	-$5

1. NFA exposure to Other GCC is QAR 18 billion (USD 4.9 billion). But note that not all banks have negative NFA positions. 
2. As argued more than once in earlier posts, it’s more proper to look only at those banks with negative NFA positions.  In that case, the exposure is QAR 31 billion or USD 8.5 billion.  Still manageable. 
3. The total TFL to Other GCC (some QAR 89 billion equivalent to USD 24.5 billion) is only 19% of the QAR 478 billion in TFL. 
4. The GOQ shouldn’t have a problem providing either of these amounts and by some reports has already transferred this amount to Qatari banks. 
5. The above is based on a sample of 7 banks because the remaining banks—AlAhli, AlKhaliji, IBQ and DBQ—don’t provide the sufficient information to include them. While we are missing detailed data for four banks, it’s unlikely that their positions will dramatically change these amounts. 
6. AlKhaliji has disclosed subsidiaries with gross assets of QAR 8.9 billion (USD 2.4 billion) primarily AlKhaliji France (AKF) which appears to operate primarily through its branches in the UAE. On the asset side AlKhaliji reports some QAR 9.9 billion in assets with OGCC.  We don’t know the total FL to OGCC. AlKhaliji shows FX assets of some QAR 3.5 billion and FX liabilities of QAR 3.3 billion in its currency risk note. 
7. AlAhli and IBQ do not appear to have foreign branches or operating subsidiaries overseas. IBQ reports some QAR 1.4 billion in OGCC FA and a negative net FX position of QAR 4.4 billion in AED in the banking book so a quesstimate of their FL position vis-à-vis the OGCC is some QAR 5.8 billion.  That assumes no significant non AED funding from the OGCC. 
8. AlAhli reports some QAR 1.1 billion in FA with OGCC.  It does not report any significant FX position in AED.  Again assuming no significant non AED funding from OGCC a good guesstimate is that OGCC FL are QAR 1.4 billion.   
9. Qatar Development Bank, the missing fourth bank, doesn’t release financials but from the QCB data we can see that it is funded primarily with equity and has a positive NFA of some USD 84 million equivalent.
10. If we adjust the base worst case scenario for the above QAR 17.1 billion in estimated FL in the worst case increases by USD 4.7 billion equivalent to USD 29.2 billion.  Reasonable increases in the QAR 17.1 billion amount (say in the range of 2 -4) would still leave the base worst case at a comfortable level. 
11. Other GCC includes Kuwait and Oman. These states may be less “enthusiastic” about withdrawing their funding from Qatar.  That being said, Oman and Kuwait are unlikely to have as large positions with Qatar as the GCC 3. 
12. What this means is that for the GCC 3+1’s efforts to be successful they will need to persuade other foreign creditors and depositors to withdraw funds from Qatar.  That seems a difficult row to hoe. 

But there are some strains on the individual bank level.   For example, QIB has OGCC-related TFL (QAR 28 billion) greater than QNB (QAR 24 billion) a bank which is roughly 5 times its size. 

Qatar Banks NFA 31 Dec 16
Other GCC FA & FL to TFA & TFL
BANKS	GFA/TFA	GFL/TFL
QNB	12%	7%
QIB	38%	76%
CBQ	23%	27%
MAR	20%	52%
DOHA	94%	95%
BAR	49%	32%
QIIB	36%	71%
TOTAL	18%	18%

1. Looking solely at foreign assets and foreign funding, four banks have ratios that cause concern:  QIB, QIIB, MAR, and Doha, though on an absolute basis the GOQ could easily provide replacement funding.
2. Note the potential exposure of QIB, Doha, Barwa and QIIB to asset concentrations in Other GCC states.  If the boycott continues, this business may be “lost”.  If the GCC 3 takes steps to restrict these banks’ access to their assets in these countries, including the proceeds of the realization of those assets, by way of additional boycott steps, then much larger but still manageable GOQ support would be required. 
3. QNB on the other hand is relatively well positioned. 

But this chart measures OGCC FA and FL in terms of total FA and FL.  That tells us how important OGCC business is to their foreign activities.  But what about the importance to their total business both foreign and domestic?

Qatar Banks NFA Position 31 Dec 16
Other GCC FA and FL to TA & TL
BANKS	TA	TL	OGCC/TA	OGCC/TL
QNB	720	621	4%	4%
QIB	140	120	7%	24%
CBQ	130	130	8%	11%
MAR	92	79	4%	9%
DOHA	90	77	11%	11%
BAR	46	39	12%	4%
QIIB	43	36	2%	12%
TOTAL	1,260	1,102	6%	8%

1. QIB again “sticks” out.  Looking at details in their FYE 2016 annual report, their liability concentration in Other GCC is driven by customer deposits.  80% of QIB’s QAR 28 billion in Other GCC liabilities is from “equity of unrestricted account holders”.  There isn’t a breakdown by maturity of QIB’s TFL.  If we assume these track its other customer deposits of this nature, we can use the maturity note on page 39 of their FYE 2016 report.  According to that note, some 70% of EUAH mature within 3 months with an additional 14% between 3 and 6 months.  Assuming these maturity patterns have carried forward, then QIB could be facing some serious withdrawals. 

At this point I’ve thrown a lot of data at you.  It’s time to organize that data into key takeaways and to provide some scenario analysis of the exposure of Qatari banks to foreign liabilities and as well of the exposure of Qatar’s Central Bank to that exposure if the banks are incapable of dealing with it themselves.   That will be the topic of a future post.