Bratislava Hot Serenaders

Nothing to do with finance or the GCC but brilliant.  Mit "Henry de Winter" und Bobby.  

Here's the link to BHS website.

Riffa Views Bahrain: GP Zacharides Walks

Because if it’s not remarkable it will become invisible.

The Gulf Daily News reports that GP Zacharides, one of the main contractors at RV, had terminated its contract due to non payment of some BD4 million due since February.  

"We have been left with no option following numerous attempts to come to a mutually-beneficial agreement with the client to right the debts outstanding since March and provide comfort that future dues would be paid when due," he said.

"Unfortunately, it is reported that the client could not provide this due to their current and longer-term financial outlook."

GPZ's was contracted to build 300 villas in the Lagoons section of the project.   It claims to be owed BD4 million since last February.  With demobilization and other termination costs, its claim may more than double to BD10 million.

The project has been struggling since 2008 (when it was hit with dramatic cost increases in building materials due to the real estate irrational exuberance - a particular cause was the Dubai delusion).  Then later the collapse in real estate prices slowed sales, reportedly caused some buyers to walk from their commitments.  Tight financing terms didn't help either.

Arcapita brought the project to market in December 2004 for some US$260 million.   It's a measure of its own financial condition that it is not bailing out the project to finish it.

Moody's Downgrades DHCOG

Asa Fitch at The National has an article on Moody's recent downgrade of DHCOG.

"The credit ratings agency downgraded Dubai Holding Commercial Operations Group (DHCOG) by one notch on its rating scale to “B2” from “B1”and kept it on review for another drop. DHCOG, which has large holdings in the hospitality, business parks and property sectors, was unavailable for comment. The group was downgraded to “B1” last December, a rating already considered below investment grade."

You'll recall that last January, Dubai Holding had excoriated S&P for its:

1. manifest "lack of understanding of DHCOG's business, its operations and relationship with the Government of Dubai." 
2. "inaccurate statements coupled with factual errors that are misleading."  

While it may be unclear to some if Moody's is suffering from the same affliction or if S&P was indeed right after all, there's no confusion here at Suq Al Mal.

AlGosaibi v Maan AlSanea - Grant Thornton to Broker "Peace" Deal? Authorities Supporing?

Frank Kane over at The National reports that Grant Thornton is trying to broker a settlement between AHAB and Mr. AlSanea.  Under what is described as the proposed deal, the parties would cease litigation against one another and pool assets to repay outstanding debt.  The stated goal is to maximize creditor recovery.  First, by eliminating the costs of litigation which no doubt would be considerable.  Second, and perhaps, more importantly, shortening the time frame until ultimate payment. 

Acceptance of the proposed plan would also achieve at least four other highly convenient goals:

1. It probably closes the book on allegations of financial crimes - which would no doubt be a comfort to any party who may have committed a crime.   In this regard, it should be noted that not a single party to the dispute has admitted to any wrongdoing.  And all aver they are as pure as newly fallen snow.  Perhaps, the proverbial pristine white snows of Saudi Arabia. 
2. It could relieve jurisdictions of the need to engage in complicated, messy and uncertain criminal prosecutions.
3. It will reduce (but not eliminate) the current intense scrutiny and reputation bashing of regulators and their countries - an unwelcome event fed largely by continuing press reports of the feud.
4. It would settle the dispute between two very important Saudi parties via a compromise .  Peace among the tribes rather than a victory for one side over the other.  Well consonant with Saudi tradition.

As the Cayman Islands' Court appointed liquidator for Mr. Al Sanea's Cayman companies,  GT's sense of fiduciary duty is clearly the motive for devising the settlement plan.   

As outlined above the plan would benefit other parties.  And they might well be expected to promote its acceptance.

Since the beginning of the crisis, Mr. AlSanea has suffered  heavy personal opprobrium in the press despite his repeated denial of any wrongdoing.  He and his firms have borne the brunt of legal actions filed.  And thus he may be well incentivized to deal.  

AHAB has until recently had a kinder fate.  And may therefore need a bit of prodding.   As well, they are perhaps the key to acceptance given the nature and vehemence of their accusations against Mr. AlSanea.  If they will sign the deal, then it may be easier for Mr. AlSanea to agree-  particularly if as expected the deal will involve a removal of accusations.

That's why I wonder about the recent spate of litigation directed against AHAB.  

Could it be that certain authorities are attempting to put pressure on AHAB with the view of securing its acceptance?

You'll recall that in announcing its US$720 million lawsuit against TIBC on 16 June Trowers and Hamlins said it took the action "following referral of the claim by the Council of Ministers." Clearly a reference to the Saudi CoM.  No doubt, any proposed legal actions were vetted as well by Trowers and Hamlins with its employer, the Central Bank of Bahrain.   In both cases an official "green light" to proceed.

Then again this all may be coincidence, though I don't think so.  The affair has dragged on to long.  Each day it persists is highly inconvenient for important parties who no doubt feel that it's time to close the book and move on.

Bahrain Court Rules in Favor of Central Bank of Bahrain's Decision to Place Awal Bank in Administration

The CBB issued a press release noting that a Bahrain Court had issued a ruling supporting its decision to place Awal Bank in "administration".  The former Chairman (Mr. Al Sanea) had raised a court case challenging the CBB's action.

It's not clear from the press release or news items (which seem to be a mere transcription of the press release) whether this is the Court of First Instance (which I suspect) or a higher level.  If it is the Court of First Instance, Mr. AlSanea would of course have the right to an appeal. As well, if it is the Appeals Court.  Like American baseball, the Bahraini system gives each litigant three goes at bat - with the Cassation Court (Supreme Court) being the final one.  

I'm guessing that Mr. AlSanea may take another swing in the courts.  And here it's appropriate to remark that Mr. AlSanea still continues to deny any wrongdoing in the conduct of his business affairs.

The importance of the ruling to CBB is evident from the inclusion of quotes from three senior executives.  Their common focus on the CBB's actions to maintain the strength and reputation of the Bahrain banking sector no doubt reflects some concern over the market's perceptions of both. 

Dubai Properties to Countersue Hopkins

Quoting an item in Reuters, Business Maktoob says that DP has indicated it will countersue Hopkins Architects for damages it suffered when HA stopped work on Central O8 towers.

Maybe, DP is reading SAM?  Realistically, probably not.

Gulf Finance House - In Final Stages of Restructuring US$100mm West LB Syndicate

There are press reports (Gulf Daily News and Reuters) quoting Ted Pretty, CEO, of GFH that they are in the final stages of refinancing the "stub" US$100mm from the earlier US$300 mm West LB led-syndicate.  As you recall, they repaid US$200 mm of the loan on maturity in February and then rescheduled the remaining US$100 mm for payment this August.

Whether this reflected the lenders' desire to keep GFH on a very short leash, irrational exuberance on the part of GFH's management regarding the potential for sale of its highly marketable and valuable "non core" assets, or some other serious delusion on the part of GFH or its creditors wasn't clear at the time.  And is still not clear.

What was clear at the time is that barring a miracle, GFH was not going to be able to make the payment.

This time a more sensible two to three year rescheduling is apparently being contemplated.  According to the GDN article, GFH and its creditors are in documentation.  If this is correct, then the deal terms are set.

What will be interesting to see is the impact on pricing.  The six month extension resulted in a five-fold or so increase in pricing.

Also what is clear from all of this is that GFH's rather low stock of credibility has been depleted even more.  

The Company really doesn't do itself any favors by making unrealistic pronouncements (US$420 mm in asset sales) or reversing course as with the on again off again sale of its interests in Khaleej Commercial Bank.  

Adding to its problems, if S&P holds true to its earlier position, GFH is in line for a downgrade.  A particularly unwelcome development as it seeks to rebuild its market position.  Particularly with clients.

On a positive note, this more sensible rescheduling does offer substantial relief to demands on its cash flow.  As well as a third chance to move forward. And also looking forward probably no American baseball rules here.

It also  will also give the folks at GFH another opportunity to use their demonstrated talents for writing press releases.  I can see how this successful rescheduling might just demonstrate yet again (as if another demonstration were needed) the confidence of GFH's lenders and the market in its proven business model, leading position as the premier GCC Islamic Investment Bank, as well as its promising future. Smaller minds may just see it as lenders accepting the inevitable if they want to maximize their recovery.  But then these are minds without the "vision thing".

I'll also be looking tomorrow morning for the announcements on the BSE, KSE, and other exchanges regarding this material development.

Markaz Kuwait: Massive Losses in Kuwait Investment Firm Sector

The fine folks at Markaz have issued a report on the Central Bank of Kuwait's proposed new regulations for the Kuwaiti "Investment" Firm Sector.

Markaz is generally supportive of the CBK's actions.

The "headline" story here (and sadly not a surprising one) can be summed up in this quote:

The sector lost over USD 2 bn in 2009 following a monstrous loss of upwards of USD 3 bn in 2008, and continues to post an aggregate loss of over USD 100 mn in 1Q10 (an annual run rate of USD 400 mn). The losses are tied to impaired assets which companies have been writing-off in an attempt to restore some health to their balance sheets. Liquidity and over-leverage have also been an issue for the sector, whose assets are often comprised of difficult to value and illiquid investments which are then pledged as collateral against further borrowings. These issues were not bothersome during the boom periods; however, when the global financial crisis hit, it exposed the sector’s vulnerabilities resulting in a massive destruction of wealth.

The report has three main parts:

1. A discussion of the ratios.  This is well worth a close read.
2. The CBK's analysis of compliance. (Discussed below)
3. Markaz's own analysis from a sample of 32 companies.

I'll let you read Markaz's discussion of the ratios - not much for me to add.

As to the CBK's analysis,  of the 100 firms in the sector:

1. 94 meet at least one of the new criteria.
2. 82 at least two of the new criteria.
3. 49 all three of the criteria.

Markaz has done a bit of data gathering and number crunching to come up with a ratio compliance test for 32 firms in the sector for the first two new ratios:  total leverage and liquidity (the latter what Markaz calls the "Acid Ratio").  It's not possible to calculate the third ratio (foreign debt exposure) given the woefully inadequate disclosure of foreign borrowings.

The detailed results of Markaz's analysis are in Appendix 2.  On an aggregate basis, of the 32 firms in their sample.

1. 75% met the Leverage Ratio.
2. 44% the Acid Test (Liquidity Ratio)
3. 34% both ratios.

One point I would like to highlight is their focus on fair value reserves.

The problem arises in the valuation method used in this segment which can be vague at best and completely misrepresentative of “actual” value in the worst case. By misrepresenting the fair value of Assets Available for Sale, a company can inflate its Fair Value Reserve (and therefore Equity figure) by booking Unrealized Gains, which would produce a lower leverage ratio." 

Earlier post on this topic here.

Jones Lang LaSalle: "Dubai Real Estate Slowdown to Continue"

You've probably seen reports quoting Jones Lang LaSalle's prediction that half of Dubai's commercial office space will be vacant in 2011 and that the residential property market will also be under stress until then as well.

Well, here's the original JLL report that is the basis for those news items.  Besides containing more information, the JLL report also provides some nuances.

Commercial Office Real Estate

1. While there is a substantial vacancy rate in commercial office space currently at 38%,  only 12% of single ownership stock in the Central Business District ("CBD") is vacant.
2. JLL sees very little demand for "strata titled" space.
3. There is in some respects a shortage of good quality supply (location, specification, legal title) as evidenced by the lower vacancy rate in the CBD.

Residential Space

1. Rents for  higher end apartments (Burj Khalifa) continue to decrease significantly.
2. Higher end villas are hit even harder.

Retail Market Space

1. Estimated Rental Values down 39% from 2Q09 to 2Q10.
2. Retail sales growth expected to come from department stores and mid market value chains rather than luxury goods.
3. No significant new supply until 2013 (Mall of Arabia in Dubailand).

Hotels

1. Beach hotels have higher Average Daily Rates than business hotels - AED1,386 versus AED660.
2. New hotels are expected to intensify competition and lead to a decline in ADRs not a decline in occupancy percentages.

There's a lot more in the report and you can "mine" it according to your own interests.

Central Bank of UAE Preparing Provisioning Guidelines for UAE Banks for Dubai World Exposure

Quoting Reuters, Emirates Business 24-7 says that the CBUAE has advised banks not to take specific provisions against their Dubai World exposure pending the CB's release of guidelines on provisioning.

As discussed in February, the CBUAE is in the process of revising its general guidelines for loan classification and provisioning.   

No doubt they will want to do a bit of "fine tuning" regarding guidance for Dubai World.

British Architectural Firm Sues Dubai Properties for AED27 Million (US$7.3 Million)

Bradley Hope over at The National reports that Hopkins Architects, a major UK architectural and engineering company, is suing Dubai Properties in the DIFC Court  (Court Case CFI 034/2009) for AED27 million (US$7.3 million) for what it claims are unpaid fees and costs it has incurred in connection with Central Park 08, a set of twin 50 storey towers next to the DIFC.

As per the DIFC Courts website, Dubai Properties has until 12 July 2010 to present its defense.

This amount is rather small beer in financial terms.  And failure to pay reflects either a very serious commercial dispute.  Or a rather severe cash crunch at Dubai Properties.

The article leaves the impression that HA stopped work because of non payment and then DP sought to cancel the contract.  Assuming this is correct, it would seem then that DP would owe HA for work to date less any deductions for any damages it can claim against HA.  From the article it sounds as though DP is not raising any counterclaim against HA, though it may still be early in the legal game.

In any case, I am taking comfort as I suppose we all should by the recent words of a high placed guy in the Emirate who should know the score.  While this quote refers to Dubai World, I'm sure that it probably equally applies to Dubai Holdings.

"I'm not worried about the company, the company has got the wealth. So they have something, and they will come back very very quickly."

Though I'll confess I'm not so confident about HA collecting its receivable.

AlGosaibi Offers Creditors 20% on the Dollar Plus Proceeds of Lawsuits Against Maan AlSanea

Quoting informed sources, Frank Kane at The National reports that AHAB has offered creditors a cash payment of US$1.8 billion on US$9 billion of liabilities plus up to US$4 billion hoped to result from AHAB lawsuits against Mr. AlSanea.   

As Mr. Kane notes and as I have as well before, Mr. AlSanea continues to deny AHAB's allegations against him.

The al Gosaibi family of Saudi Arabia is prepared to sell much of its 70-year-old business empire to help pay its creditors, informed sources say.

The proposed net payment is a minimum of 20% (US$1.8 billion) with a maximum of 64.4% (US$5.8 billion).

As the article points out, the net value of Mr. AlSanea's assets is not known. 

Assuming for a moment that AHAB would be successful in its lawsuits, I believe it would become another of Mr. AlSanea's unsecured creditors.   And would therefore be entitled to a proportionate share of the "estate".  As well, the resolution of the lawsuits is probably something that will require a very long time to settle.  In objecting to a potential suit against itself by Trowers and Hamlins,  AHAB is reported to have said that "litigating the intercompany positions will take years if not decades and that such litigation only depletes resources that will be needed to effect a workable commercial settlement".   One may perhaps safely presume that the same would apply to AHAB lawsuits against Mr. AlSanea.  

Putting aside the depleted resources argument, one might argue that the present value of the proposed settlement is therefore less, much less, than 64% or 20% for that matter (which will depend on sales of AHAB assets). 

DIC Cashes Out of Merlin (Madame Tussaud's)

Asa Fitch over at The National reports that DIC has sold its remaining 6% stake in Merlin to CVC.  No doubt an element of cash need drove the sale, though DIC received the lion's share of its return in 2007 when it received GBP 1 billion in cash plus 17% of Merlin.  This is compared to the purchase price of GBP800 million in 2005.  

The additional amount for the sale to CVC is icing on the cake.

According to CVC's press release on the sale, the ownership of the Company is now KIRKBI 36%,  Blackstone 34%, CVC 28%, management 2%.

With no single investor holding majority control, managing the Company will be a bit trickier than if there were a dominant shareholder.   

On the other hand, a distinct benefit is that cash calls for new equity (if any is required) will not fall disproportionately on any one shareholder.  

The Company needs cash to fund its "ambitious growth programme" as the CVC press release states.  And there is the unfortunate bunching of loan maturities - the extension of which is being negotiated currently.  Both potential cash demands.

Additional debt financing is unlikely.

The CVC press release also states that "Merlin does not intend to increase its financial leverage."   I suspect that the decision reflects more than sober financial self-discipline. Bankers are now less willing to lever up the company than they were during the  "Bonny" days when Charterhouse owned Madame Tussaud's.  Then loans were abundant.  And with easy terms - long dated bullet loans.    

That leaves additional equity.

Last October, the Financial Times reported that Merlin would IPO in 2Q10 with the transaction mooted at some GBP2 billion.  The sale to CVC suggests that the IPO route is not as likely as there is little reason for Blackstone to reduce its position in a trade sale if an attractive IPO is imminent. 

The remaining source is private equity - and perhaps a rationale for several rather than one dominant shareholder.

The Investment Dar - No Agreement on Draft Budget Expenses

Citing informed sources, AlQabas reports that the meeting earlier this week between the Creditors Co-ordinating Committee and the Company did not resolve the differences over the level of operating expenses in the proposed five-year budget (which is required under the restructuring).

At the end of the meeting, the CCC came up with some modifications to the Company's budget which were devised by the Chief Restructuring Officer - who was appointed by both sides as a "neutral" party to review the proposed five year projected financials/budget.

The Company is expected to reply within the coming week.  If it agrees, then the revised budget will be submitted to the Central Bank for its review.  If not, the dispute will remain open (unresolved).

As noted in the previous article, the creditors' position is that expenses should be in harmony with the new situation the Company finds itself in.  Meaning probably fairly dramatic cuts in operating expenses.

The central question is just how deep the cuts are and whether they are really required.  Or if they are a bit of overkill by overzealous bankers.  Without details, there's no sound basis for judging one way or the other.

NY Court Compels Release of AlGosaibi Bank Account Details

As per the Gulf Daily News,  Trowers and Hamlins won an important legal victory in US Bankruptcy Court.  The Court ruled that AHAB's New York bankers must disclose details of a key AHAB account.   One to which reportedly a large amount of funds were transferred.  As the article notes, Trowers and Hamlins have been requesting information on this account since last August.  

Trowers & Hamlins partner Abdullah Mutawi, who is leading the asset realisation strategy, said it was a significant development.

"This is the first time AHAB has been compelled to reveal details of any of its bank accounts," he said.

"It is particularly significant because AHAB has repeatedly refused to hand over important information relating to the operation of the account.

"The account is important because a substantial portion of TIBC's funds were remitted to it and the information should help reveal the ultimate destination of those funds."

As I noted in yesterday's post about First Gulf Bank's lawsuit against AHAB,  there seems to have been a change in the dynamic of this story.  The focus is now on AHAB's behavior - both in terms of responsiveness to requests from creditors as well as its role in the collapse.

I suspect this is going to get increasingly messy.  At the end few reputations may be left undamaged.

Dubai: Self Made Challenge

HH Shaykh Mohammed Bin Rashid AlMaktoum set the record straight in an interview with CNN.  Or more precisely will do so next week when the interview airs.

Like Global Investment House in Kuwait, Gulf Finance House in Bahrain and several other careful students of the market, he's identified the sole cause of current problems - the global financial crisis.  As we always note here at Suq Al Mal out of an abundance of caution to prevent anyone from drawing the wrong conclusion, that's global with a lower case "g".

"The recession is a global phenomenon and I do not think that we in Dubai fear it, but instead we consider it a challenge."

It's often said that true progress and development comes by challenging oneself.  Sadly, other members of the GCC, like Qatar, apparently don't feel up to challenging themselves in quite the way that Dubai is challenging itself.

While in reference to Dubai World, he adds: "I'm not worried about the company, the company has got the wealth. So they have something, and they will come back very very quickly."

Some Kuwaiti Banks Overreaching in Collateral Demands

AlQabas quotes unnamed financial sources that some banks have been taking excessive collateral in restructuring debts for their subsidiaries and affiliates - reaching 400% coverage in some cases.  The issue is that such coverage levels effectively place other creditors - banks, investors in murabaha transactions, etc - in a much weaker position.

The financial sources expect that disadvantaged creditors will raise formal complaints with the Central Bank of Kuwait.  The article notes that the traditional collateral level is between 150% and 200%.

A final comment is that some restructurings are being delayed as creditors cannot agree - given some creditors' demands for a higher ratio of coverage or specific assets for themselves.

While nothing concrete was said, I wonder if this relates to "Islamic" banks.  

Perhaps one of my better informed readers will care to comment.

First Gulf Bank Sues AlGosaibi for AED58.7 Million

First Gulf Bank has launched a suit in the Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance against AlGosaibi's local company and AHAB itself.

Both parties are being quiet about the details of the case.

FGB reportedly has a US$55 million in exposure to both AlGosaibi and Saad.

From recent press announcements it appears that the legal tide has turned - and that the current focus is now on AlGosaibi.

AT Kearney: Reinventing Investment Banking in the GCC

An interesting report from ATK on the GCC investment banking sector.

The key issues that GCC investment banks face are:

1. Competition from more established firms - who are opening offices in the region.
2. Local investment firm's business models which focus heavily on private equity investments.  That in part reflects the state of local capital markets.
3. A debt capital shortage which constrains the ability to build asset intensive businesses.

To that I'd add:

1. A reluctance by clients to pay for advisory services unrelated to fund raising.
2. Relatively modest volumes.  This in part explains the focus on proprietary investments where the gross margins are higher than on capital markets and advisory business. 
3. Market deficiencies.  An absence of sophisticated institutional investors.  Local equity markets are largely driven by irrational exuberance and pessimism of retail investors.    Constrained free float on many major firms.
4. In general weaknesses in corporate governance and disclosure.   
5. Lack of skills and shortcomings in professionalism/ethics.

Central Bank Regulation - John Lipsky

John Lipsky, First Deputy Managing Director at the IMF, delivered a speech on deficiencies in central bank regulation prior to the recent crisis plus some prescriptions for correcting shortcomings in Moscow last Friday. "The Road Ahead for Central Banks: Meeting New Challenges to Financial Stability".

He identifies a central failing which might be described as simple minded credulity.

Prior to the crisis, for instance, supervisors relied excessively on financial firms’ own risk analysis and internal controls. In broad terms, they relied heavily on the self-disciplining qualities of markets. In other words, supervisors were insufficiently intrusive and skeptical.

What could possibly go wrong with allowing firms to police themselves?  Not just allowing them to judge when they had "broken" a prudential limit, but allowing them to measure whether they had broken it or not.  And, we hear yet again about the self disciplining qualities of markets - which is the regulators' equivalent of the implicit guarantee. 

In fact if you read the speech carefully, you'll see that this failing is the root cause of most of the other shortcomings he identifies.