Dubai: More Pain to Come

Tom Arnold over at The National has an article on the pain likely to come from Nakheel and Dubai Holding restructurings.

As well as a few quotes from the ratings downgrade of ADCB.  Sounds like Brother Eiraqat already needs more than two 1000 mg Dolgit.

Global Investment House - Al Madina Wins Appeal Against Global

"You're it!"

Today Al Madina Finance and Investment announced (on the KSE and the DFM) that the Appeals Court had overturned the earlier judgment in Global's favor which was rendered by the MOCI's Arbitration Tribunal.

Under that earlier judgment (last April), Al Madina had been ordered to pay Global:

1. US$10,011,224 dollars principal of a loan plus
2. US$300,000 in compensation

If you remember the history, at that time, Al Madina noted that the  judgment was only preliminary and not final and that it would appeal.

Today it noted that on 8 September the relevant court had voided the MOIC Arbitration Tribunal's judgment and had referred the case to the Department of Experts for study.  Al Madina noted this meant that any steps taken by Global to enforce the Tribunal's judgment would be void.

For its part, Global retorted on the KSE (text Arabic only below), that the court judgment was preliminary and not final. And that Global would appeal.

In effect, the game of tag continues.

[12:39:50]  ِ.ايضاح من (جلوبل) بخصوص الدعوى رقم 2010/1675 ‏
يعلن سوق الكويت للأوراق المالية عطفا على اعلانه السابق بتاريخ 04-04-2010 ‏
والخاص بمنازعة التحكيم رقم 2010/41 والتي صدر فيها حكم من هيئة التحكيم ‏
التجاري فى غرفة صناعة وتجارة الكويت بالزام شركة المدينة للتمويل ‏
والاستثمار (المدينة) بان تؤدي لشركة بيت الاستثمار العالمي (جلوبل) ‏
مبلغ وقدره 10,011,224 دولار امريكي قيمة اصل الدين ،ومبلغ 300,000 دولار ‏
امريكي على سبيل التعويض .‏
تفيد شركة (جلوبل) بانه صدر فى الدعوى المذكورة ‏حكما بجلسة 08-09-2010 ‏
والذي جرى منطوقه حكمت المحكمة: ‏
ِ1-ببطلان حكم التحكيم الصادر عن مركز الكويت للتحكيم التجاري بتاريخ1-4-2010‏
لدعوى التحكيم لسنة 2010/41 .‏
ِ2-‏وفى موضوع الدعوى :باحالتها الى ادارة الخبراء ‏
كما افادت شركة (جلوبل) بان هذا الحكم ابندائيا تميهديا غير منهي للخصومة و
ليس نهائيا وانه سوف يتم الطعن عليه بالاجراءات القانونية المناسبة فيما ‏
اذا صدر فى غير صالح شركة بيت الاستثمار العالمي (جلوبل) ‏

International Investment Group - Succeeds in Repaying Some Loans

Update:  Apparently, Al Watan's sources were less informed that thought.  Or perhaps success is fleeting.  In any case IIG denied any "success" in repaying loans.  Such is life.

Informed sources have told Al Watan newspaper that IIG recently "succeeded" in repaying US$15 million to one of the Emirati banks and US$3 million to the holders of its sukuk.     As to the latter I didn't see any announcement on Nasdaq Dubai.  US$3 million is the amount of the periodic profit distribution (or  what we here at Suq Al Mal call "interest").

In any case an interesting definition of "success": meeting one's contractual obligations.   In other words, doing what one is expected to do.  Based on that definition, I've had a remarkably successful day today.  I personally had repeated successes in posting on this blog.  I also successfully consumed breakfast, lunch, and dinner today with intermittent successful cups of tea and coffee at other times - both of which, I will add, I successfully prepared. 

The source of liquidity is reported to have been the sales of (a) some shares presumably local, and (b) some real estate and non real estate assets outside the local market.

The article ends with a discussion of how the bulk of IIG's 2009 losses were its share of losses of subsidiary and affiliated companies as if this made some sort of difference.

Dubai World: The Impact of the Fixed Interest Rate on Secondary Debt Prices

FOR SALE 

 

Great Price.  One Owner Only! 
Carefully Underwritten and Maintained

Asa Fitch over at The National has a report on secondary loan sales of DW debt.  As per his report only US$25 million has been sold so far by an unnamed Asian bank at US$0.55 of par.

Traders are quoted as saying there is a disconnect between the bid and offer prices with sellers looking for modest discounts and buyers thinking more in the range of 30 to 60% discounts.  That's an extremely wide range - which indicates the lack of real demand.  Also it may be reflective of differing discounts for the five-year and eight-year paper.

For a potential buyer there are two key risk issues with a purchase:

1. Repayment Risk - Will DW settle its debt in full?  So there is a premium added to the "risk free" yield to compensate for this risk.
2. Interest Rate Risk -  DW's debt is at a fixed not floating interest rate.  The price of financial instruments with fixed interest rates moves inversely to the current market level of interest rates.   If you think about that it makes perfect sense.  If the market if offering to sell you a new bond with a fixed 5% coupon, why would you pay the same amount for an equivalent credit risk bond with a fixed 2% coupon and the same repayment profile? You'd be willing to buy the 2% bond only if its price were less than par.  Sufficiently less so that you earned 5% on  the bond. The extra bit of yeild coming from capital appreciation.  This price risk exposure is measured by duration and convexity. Duration estimates the price change using a linear approximation of the price change function (equation).  Since the actual function is not linear, a second approximation, convexity, (technically the second derivative) is used to correct the first. Bond sensitivity to interest rates can work both ways.  If market interest rate levels decline, then one's bond is worth more.  That is, reversing the example above, one has the 5% coupon bond in the 2% market coupon environment.  As noted above in the original example, if market interest rates increase, one's bond is worth less.  Since DW's bonds are at below market rates and since market rates are at historic lows, there is little upside potential.  Any buyer will be focused on pricing the downside risk into it's bid.  Compounding the pricing will be the credit risk element.  Just to complete the discussion, floating rate instruments are less much sensitive.  Their duration is generally equal to the length of the repricing period not a function of maturity.  With, for example, a quarterly interest payment reset one can ignore interest rate risk.

These two factors affect the discount.  The bigger the required yield on the instrument the bigger the discount.

Since I haven't seen much discussion of interest rate risk, and since I think it's an important factor affecting the secondary pricing of DW debt, I'm going to focus on it in this post as you may have guessed from my "succinct" discussion of this topic immediately above.  

This is a structural issue.  As the restructuring was crafted, lenders had two options to reflect the economic value of the debt.  

1. Haircut the debt and get a market or near market rate on the debt. 
2. Maintain the fiction that the debt was worth par and take a below market interest rate.

Why did they choose the structure they did?

Some potential explanatory factors:

1. The importance of cashflow to DW.   DW is cash strapped.  A higher interest rate will impact them more now than reduced principal repayments which in traditional restructuring style are going to be backended.  DW's overriding goal is to delay as long as possible the sale of assets, hoping that an economic recovery will allow them to realise more value.  Or that  a refinance will become possible.  Particularly important because a lot of these were purchased at the top of the market with more than modest levels of leverage. 
2. The wise lenders in the steering group who have the remarkable accomplishment of being responsible for 60% of DW's debt (Another great moment in banking!) are probably not going to be selling because the pain would be too great.  It's much easier to absorb say an US$11 million loss on one's US$25 million stake than say a US$2+ billion loss.  So they have no burning incentive to  create a more seller friendly structure.  They're holding at cost not marking to market.  Assuming DW performs under the restructuring, their "haircut" will be the IAS#39 mandated one time present value difference using the new interest rate versus the older higher one.
3. Forgiving principal sets all sorts of dangerous precedents and raises all sorts of dangerous ideas in the minds of borrowers.  
4. Also since interest rates can't go negative, an interest rate reduction has an absolute bound in terms of the haircut.  
5. Additionally, many folks don't understand the concept of present value so an interest rate reduction is not considered as serious as a principal reduction.  You might be surprised (and maybe some of you dismayed) to learn that in many institutions a principal reduction requires a more stringent approval than an interest rate reduction - even when the present value impact is the same.   With the financial press and the average investor the awareness appears to be even lower.

 As usual,  let's begin with the assumptions:

1. A market-demanded discount of 50% of par.   Roughly in the midpoint of the mentioned discount rates.
2. An average 5 year life for the 8 year DW restructured loans.  Since we don't know what the principal repayment schedule is, we have to assume an average life.  I think five years is a good guess. DW's repayments probably mirror the pattern typical for restructurings:  low payments in the first years with the largest in the latter years.  If equal amortization would result in a bit over 4 years average life, then 5 years should be on the safe side. Use of 5 years then sets what I think is a reasonable upper bound to the YTM.  In any case hopefully enough for a directional analysis.  Hint:  I will gladly receive a copy of the  restructuring term sheet if anyone wants to send it to me.  Use the Contact Form to make the initial contact to agree transmission details.
3. A 2% (fixed) coupon.
4. Repayment in full on schedule assumed.

Here are the numerical results.

We can bound the yield to maturity on the 8 year tenor loan between two  points.

Yield to Maturity ("YTM")

1. Assuming a straight bond with a bullet repayment of principal at the end of Year #8, the YTM is roughly 12%.  While interest payment frequency affects the YTM, the difference is minor.  For our directional analysis, I'm therefore going to ignore it.  12% represents the minimum YTM because the restructured loans provide for principal repayments during the life of the loan not just at the end.
2. Using a 5 year average life, the rough YTM is 17%.

Modified Duration

1. For the straight 8 year bond, duration is very roughly 7 times.
2. For the straight 5 year bond, duration is very roughly 4.5 times. Recall that as above we're guesstimating that the average life of the loan as 5 years.
3. What that means is that if  interest rates increase 1% with no change in default risk (credit rating of DW) and no change in credit spreads (the margin demanded for a specific credit grade), then the DW debt will lose roughly 4.5% of its market value. I've chosen to ignore convexity here because it's not likely to be a significant decrease of the duration impact for  the range of likely market interest rate levels.  Since over the next five to eight years, interest rates are more likely to go up than further down, this is a real risk.  A modest 2% hike in interest rates and there is a 9% loss - which will more than outweigh the coupon earnings.
4. Of course, for an investor who intends to hold the bond to maturity, the price loss will be a mark-to-market event and not necessarily a cash flow loss.  Unless of course the investor sells the bond.  However, a fund or a trader will be marking to market and thus performance will be affected.    With a direct impact on such personally important things  for a fund as fees and reputation for the next fund sale. Or for a trader his bonus and perceived trading skills. You can probably easily imagine how these might increase reluctance to increase one's bid, particularly when demand is minuscule in relation to supply.

Other Factors Affecting Demand

1. Secondary Play:  There is no secondary play here.  Often in distress situations, buyers of debt may be motivated by the chance to acquire a company cheaply (buy the debt wipe out the existing shareholders) or other factors.   Emirates Airlines or Emirates NBD are not on offer.   The restructuring is "done and dusted" so there's no negotiating leverage over deal terms.  And one would have to make quite an investment to acquire a blocking vote on the chance there would be a future covenant hiccup that one could take advantage of.    One of our regular commentators, Laocowboy2 mentioned a time-honored sovereign debt settlement mechanism - using the debt as the currency for investing in a new project in the country.  Often with the debt being exchanged at par (not its purchase price) and sometimes at a favorable FX rate which effectively lower the cost of the investment.  Many an savvy investor in Latin American tourism reaped a bonanza return using this framework.  Others who invested in more brick and mortar enterprises less so.  Hint:  An investor's return in such transactions depends more on the creative use of imaginative transfer pricing than one's ability to run a business, though the latter is important.  In any case,  I suspect it is unlikely that Dubai will offer such a program.  The sovereign debt "hole" here is not that deep. Nor the distress that acute at present.
2. Credit Rating Upgrade:  While the "hole" is not that deep, there is still a hole.  Assuming good performance, at some point DW will be upgraded.  However, this is unlikely to happen in the near term.  By the time significant debt is repaid, it may be so close to final maturity that the impact on YTM may be relatively modest. As well, the structural fact that the debt is at a below market fixed rate is going to work against any significant increase in the price.   
3. Credit Spread Compression:  Usually this occurs in times of irrational exuberance.  Judging by the state of the world economy, a near term return to such giddy days is perhaps not a bet a savvy investor would make today.  And again the very low fixed rate is a negative.
4. Prepayment:  It's unlikely that DW is going to prepay the loan in the near term. If it did,  the YTM could dramatically improve. With a rate this low there is an incentive to ride to maturity. Presumably, the desire to "repay" the restructuring and remove a living blot from its escutcheon would be a motive to refinance (when that was possible).  More importantly, it could alleviate cashflow demands, including the requirement to dismantle its expensively acquired empire of  "core" investments.  The unknown is when banker and investor ADD will kick in and permit a refinance.  A good guess is probably more than 3 years out, particularly as the upcoming US$30 billion of new maturities over the next 2 years will remind the apparently congenitally forgetful and heedless of the "hole".

Dubai Holding: Some Creditors Selling Debt

Asa Fitch over at The National reports that some creditors are looking to exit their exposure to Dubai Holding - DHCOG and DIC - through secondary sales at a hoped for modest discount.

This makes eminent sense in view of the many indirect costs associated with carrying distressed debt.  Costs of additional internal reporting and monitoring for credit purposes as well as for accounting purposes (both book keeping and disclosure).  

On top of all of this, if a creditor feels there is the possibility of an impairment, the decision to close the file  now, recognize the loss and move on may be highly appealing, particularly if there is no long term relationship.  Or if such a relationship is not perceived as being sufficiently profitable in the future.

Clearly, this strategy does not work with banks holding sizable shares.  Unloading a $5 million or US$10 million "bit" is a lot less painful than $50 million or US$100 million.

New CEO at Unicorn Investment Bank Bahrain (Delayed News)

I'm catching up on some old news.  

In case you missed it on 2 August, Unicorn appointed Mr. Ikbal Daredia as Interim CEO of the Bank with immediate effect replacing the former MD and CEO, Mr. Majid Al Refai.   Mr. Al Refai remains a member of the Board of Directors.

Mr. Daredia is the Global Head of the Bank’s Capital Markets, Institutional Banking and Treasury units. 

While no reason was given for the abrupt change, rumor (and note that word) is that the Board had differences over "strategy" with Mr. Al Refai - similar to those he had with the Arcapita Board earlier.  Mr. Al Refai is known in part for his keen interest in developing Islamic banking business in Asia.  The Board reportedly wanted to concentrate on Saudi Arabia.  As with Arcapita, he was one of the drivers of the foundation of Unicorn.

Those who read Unicorn's 1H10 financials will also note a loss of US$160 million for the first six months of the year due to provisions of US$97 million and fair value negative adjustments of US$51 million.   This resulted in an approximate 40% decrease in shareholders' equity to US$253 million.  In 2009 the Bank had a modest net income of US$2.2 million.

Public Prosecutor Stays Gulf Bank Case Against Derivatives Client

Citing parties close to the case, Al Qabas reports (or at least I think so) that the Public Prosecutor has stayed Gulf Bank's case against its client responsible for the derivatives debacle in 2008 (when GB lost some KD359.5 mm leading to the surgical removal of its board and elements of senior management along with the KIA taking a significant stake to top up the needed capital restoration).

I say I think so because I'm not quite sure that my translation of " النيابة العامة حفظت القضية المرفوعة من قبل بنك الخليج "  is correct.  Sadly, AA didn't graduate from KU's Faculty of Law.

Anyone out there who can confirm or correct my translation, please post.

Gulf Investment House - Debt Problems Largely Solved: Only US$7 Million of Foreign Debt Left KD45 Million Rescheduled by KFH

In an exclusive interview, AlWatan quotes GIH's CEO, Badr Abdullah Al-Ali, saying that: 

1. GIH has repaid all by US$7 million of its foreign debt.  The remaining amount is due in November and GIH may prepay given its strong financial condition.
2. The Company has been successful in rescheduling KD45 million with KFH (who own about 30.72% of GIH's shares) over five years.  No doubt KFH's shareholding interest was a major  positive factor in achieving the rescheduling agreement.  This amount is substantially all of the non foreign debt of the Company - whose total bank debt as of 30 June 2010 was KD56.8 million.  It's unclear at that point just how much foreign debt remained. In May if I remember they were reported to have KD13 million of foreign debt.

With respect to 2010 financial performance, GIH reported 1H10 losses of KD1.9 million roughly half of 1H09's KD3.8 million, though it should be noted that for the full year of 2009, GIH's losses were KD20.5 million. 

KFH's support provides a nice safety net for GIH's future which Mr. Al-Ali sees as bright.

Aref Investment Company - 1H10 Losses of KD21.4 Million

Aref Investment Group reported its 1H10 financial results on the KSE this morning.  As usual, the announcement is in Arabic only (text below).  With the provision of this report, the KSE will allow the resumption of trading of AIG's shares.

1H10 losses KD21.4 million versus KD38million for the comparable period the year before.  The KD206 million amount for shareholders' equity includes minority interests of some KD37 or so million.

As I've noted before KFH owns some 53% of AIG and is providing support to weather the current crisis.  Earlier posts can be accessed using the tag "Aref".

[10:27:46]  بلغت (خسارة)(عارف) (21.4) مليون د.ك لل6 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-2010‏
يعلن سوق الكويت للأوراق المالية أن شركة عارف الاستثمارية (عارف)‏
حصلت على موافقة بنك الكويت المركزي على بياناتها المالية المرحلية للفترة ‏
المنتهية في 30-06-2010، يوم الاثنين الموافق 30-08-2010 ،
وفقا لما يلي:‏
البند     ال3 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-10     ال6 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-10‏
الربح (خسارة)(د.ك)             (16.954.474)            (21.418.959) ‏
ربحية(خسارة)السهم (فلس كويتي)     (16)                         (20) ‏
اجمالي الموجودات المتداولة                                   299.743.103‏
اجمالي الموجودات                                            661.056.688‏
اجمالي المطلوبات المتداولة                                   392.279.750‏
اجمالي المطلوبات                                             452.963.950‏
ِ اجمالي حقوق المساهمين                                     208.092.738‏
بلغ اجمالي الايرادات من التعاملات مع الاطراف ذات الصلة مبلغ 680.466 د.ك
بلغ اجمالي المصروفات من التعاملات مع الاطراف ذات الصلة مبلغ 7.859.169 د.ك
الفترات المقارنة:‏
البند     ال3 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-09     ال6 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-09‏
الربح (خسارة)(د.ك)            (20.470.712)           (38.020.436)‏
ربحية(خسارة)السهم (فلس كويتي)     (19)                       (36)‏
اجمالي الموجودات المتداولة                                  311.066.999‏
اجمالي الموجودات                                           657.443.445‏
اجمالي المطلوبات المتداولة                                  333.757.640‏
اجمالي المطلوبات                                            450.767.484‏
ِ اجمالي حقوق المساهمين                                    206.675.961‏
وعليه سوف تعاد الشركة الى التداول اليون الثلاثاء الموافق 31-08-2010‏ 

The Investment Dar and Commercial Bank of Kuwait - Settlement of Boubyan Bank Shares

Quoting informed banking sources, AlQabas reports that Commercial Bank of Kuwait has proposed to TID that the BB shares be sold and that any amount remaining after the settlement of TID's obligations to  CBK will then be remitted to TID.

In effect then, CBK is proposing to treat the transaction as a secured loan rather than a failed repurchase agreement.  Under the latter, CBK would be entitled to absolute ownership of the shares with no payment at all to TID.

Clearly, CBK doesn't want to enter into the rescheduling as one of the creditors and share the BB shares (very good collateral) with the entire set of creditors in return for "security" in the pool of what Adnan Al Musallam has more than once described as "strong" assets (which are probably less "strong" and certainly less liquid than Boubyan's shares). 

There is a reason why some creditors lend on a secured basis as opposed to an unsecured one.   They get to pick the collateral that gives them the credit comfort they need to extend the loan.  And know that if the borrower doesn't pay, they have a second way out that doesn't involve a rescheduling.

The proposal seems an eminently reasonable solution.  

As the parties have haggled over this problem, they lost a chance to conclude a quick sale with a willing buyer with deep pockets (National Bank of Kuwait).   Perhaps, the Central Bank can be persuaded to allow NBK to buy another 19.196%.  The share price is an attractive KD0.560.

Aayan Leasing and Investment - 1Q10 Loss of KD7.8 Million

ALI announced its 1Q10 earnings today on the KSE.  As usual only Arabic text  (below) is available. The Central Bank of Kuwait approved release of the financials on 16 August.  There was no explanation for the delay.  Based on "history", I'm guessing that as with the Company's 2009 financials, the delay has been occasioned by the KSE's more than usual scrutiny.

The headline number is a loss of KD7.8 million for the first quarter compared to a loss of KD12.5 for the period the year earlier.  Shareholders' equity is KD23.6 million versus KD89.1 million at 1Q09.  Equity was KD31.2 million at 31 December 2009. 

As you might expect, the auditors have raised a matter of emphasis about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern.  Current Liabilities (KD410 million) exceed Current Assets (KD166 million).  Accumulated losses are KD75 million.  

That last comment has got me scratching my head.  On 10 August ALI held its OGM/EGM in which shareholders agreed to use Reserves of KD37.8 million plus reduce the paid in capital to KD29.6 million (from KD63.9 million) to offset accumulated losses.  They also agreed to a KD10 million capital increase by way of a rights offer at par (KD0.100 per share).  So is it that the legal steps to accomplish this have yet to be finalized?  If so, isn't this fact worth noting?  That is, that the Company is taking steps to rectify the situation. Otherwise readers might infer there is an ongoing unaddressed  violation of Article 171 of the Commercial Companies Law.

The auditors also mention ALI's default on some KD100 million of debt.  In the August 10 OGM/EGM Ali "T" AlGhanem, the Company's Chairman, predicted the signing of a rescheduling agreement within two to three weeks.   KFH is the lead bank on the rescheduling negotiations.

A difficult situation. 

[13:38:23]  بلغت (خسارة) (أعيان) (7.7) مليون د.ك لل3 أشهر المنتهية في 31-03-2010‏
يعلن سوق الكويت للأوراق المالية أن شركة أعيان للاجارة و الاستثمار (اعيان)‏
حصلت على موافقة بنك الكويت المركزي على بياناتها المالية المرحلية للفترة ‏
المنتهية في 31-03-2010، يوم الاثنين الموافق 16-08-2010 ،
وفقا لما يلي:‏
البند       ال3 أشهر المنتهية في 31-03-10     ال3 أشهر المنتهية في 31-03-09
الربح (خسارة)(د.ك)               (7.785.523)              (12.553.455)‏
ربحية(خسارة)السهم (فلس كويتي)   (12.6)                    (20.6)‏
اجمالي الموجودات المتداولة      165.971.276             248.207.741‏
اجمالي الموجودات               510.637.020           595.882.901‏
اجمالي المطلوبات المتداولة      410.252.612             351.840.048‏
اجمالي المطلوبات               441.957.164             458.057.552‏
ِ اجمالي حقوق المساهمين        23.643.193              89.142.376‏
بلغ اجمالي الايرادات من التعاملات مع الاطراف ذات الصلة مبلغ 66.680 د.ك
بلغ اجمالي المصروفات من التعاملات مع الاطراف ذات الصلة مبلغ 1.303.522 د.ك
علما بان تقرير مراقبي الحسابات يحتوي على عدم التأكد المتعلق بالاستمرار
على اساس مبدأ الاستمراريه :‏
دون التحفظ في نتيجتنا ، نلفت الانتباه الى الايضاح 2 حول المعلومات الماليه
المرحليه المكثفة المجمعه و الذي يبين ان المجموعه تكبدت خسائر بمبلغ ‏
ِ8.042.649 د.ك لفتره الثلاثة اشهر المنتهيه في 31-مارس-2010 ، و كان لدي ‏
المجموعه خسائر متراكمه بمبلغ 75.175.026 د.ك ، وكما في ذلك التاريخ تجاوزت ‏
المطلوبات المتداوله للمجموعه موجوداتها المتداوله بمبلغ 225.830.362 د.ك
اضافة الى ذلك ، عجزت الشركة الام عن سداد التزامات دين بمبلغ 99.993.871د.ك
و علقت دفعات سداد المبالغ الاساسيه لالتزامات الدين الى البنوك و المؤسسات ‏
الماليه ، و هي تعمل بفاعليه مع الممولين لاعادة جدولة التزامات ديونها ‏
بالكامل ، ان هذه الظروف مع الامور الاخرى المبينه في ايضاح 2 تشير الى وجود
عدم تأكيد مادي مما يمكن ان يثير شك كبير حول قدرة المجموعه على الاستمرار ‏
في اعمالها على اساس مبدأ الاستمراريه .‏

 

DEPA 1H10 Loss: The AED185 Million Burj Al Khalifah Claim

If you've seen DEPA's 1H10 financials, you know they declared a loss of some AED117.5 million of which AED103.7 million is attributable to the shareholders of DEPA.  The firm bills itself as the third largest interior contractor in the world.

You've also seen their earnings press release that this loss relates to expenses incurred on a contract at Burj al Khalifah (but not with Emaar the project developer).  Apparently, a large portion is for overhead expenses incurred over a couple of years.  As per the press release, were the claim paid, DEPA's 1H10 results would have been a net profit of AED81 million, making the size of the claim AED185 million.

That seems a rather large amount.  Unclear what this represents as a percentage of total project cost.  And what the likelihood of getting the full amount is.  As well as the identity of the project owner (obligor).

Perhaps, The Real Nick can weigh in with an observation.  And certainly anyone else out there with something to contribute is welcome as well.

The Investment Dar - Al-Musallam Denies Problems

This Thursday (26 August) TID held its 2008 shareholders' annual meeting (delayed because of the delay in finalizing its financials).   Both AlQabas and AlWatan have accounts of that meeting.  Some 73.11% of shareholders' interests were represented.  As per the KSE, the only disclosed major shareholders of TID are the Kuwaiti General Organization for Social Insurance (7.7%) and Efad Real Estate Company and associated companies (18.21%).  So there appears to have been broad shareholder participation.

AlQabas notes that the meeting was held in an atmosphere of "impressive calmness".   All items on the agenda were approved, including agreement with the Board's recommendation that no dividend be declared for 2008. (TID reported a net loss of  KD80.3 million for 2008 of which KD78.6 million is attributable to TID shareholders.  From 2007 to 2008 TID's total shareholders' equity declined from KD349.6 millionn to KD168.5 million due to KD52.9 million of 2007 dividends, KD 37.4 million of losses recorded directly in equity and net purchases of treasury shares of some KD12.2 million.)

The tenor and results of the meeting no doubt a clear reflection of shareholders' confidence in Mr. Al-Musallam's stewardship and performance.

Mr. Al-Musallam also took the opportunity to "set the record straight" on several points, including most of the assertions in a recent AlQabas article:

1. As he has on several earlier occasions, he noted that statements that TID was going to be liquidated were not true pointing out the strength of TID's assets.
2. The CCC is not discussing resigning.
3. In that connection he commented that TID is happy to have the Central Bank of Kuwait's supervisor, Dr. Abid AlThafiri, stay on, but that decision is solely the CBK's.
4. There are no differences with the CBK.  The CBK poses questions and TID answers them.
5. More than 83% of the creditors have agreed to participate in the rescheduling.  The remaining 17% represent only KD110 million.
6. He expects to achieve success with Commercial Bank of Kuwait and Cham Islamic Bank (Syria)  and then will have 89% agreement.
7. He's optimistic about obtaining the Central Bank of Kuwait's approval for TID to enter under the protection of the FSL.  
8. He noted that many of the creditors who have indicated they intend to pursue legal claims (the 17% soon to be 11%) were waiting to see the results of the current stage (presumably whether TID gets under the FSL) before proceeding.  The unspoken point here being that if TID enters the FSL, then perhaps some or all of these holdouts may join the rescheduling.  Not an unreasonable assumption.
9. Contrary to rumors, there is no raise for any senior member of TID's management.  Apparently, not even an "unrealized" one! 
10. TID is not late with its prior year's zakat.  Though the wording used here seems to imply that perhaps the committee has not yet distributed it - which would qualify as being "late" for a simple minded guy like me.  وأكد المسلم أنه لا يوجد تأخير في دفع الزكاة عن الشركة، مستشهداً برأي لجنة الفتوى والتشريع التي أكدت على ان الشركة لم تتأخر ولكن هذه الزكاة تعود الى السنوات الماضية، منوهاً الى ان اللجنة تقوم باخراج الزكاة من وقت الى آخر حسب الحالات التي تقوم بدراستها من وقت الى أخرى
11. Perhaps, the answer is that "class is not yet over" and the studies continue?  Anyone who can confirm or amend my translation, please jump in with a post.
12. He did take the time to point out that the 2008 loss (largely due to provisions of KD89.5 million) was not realized.  
13. Asked about 2009's financials and the CBK's requirements for additional provisions, he declined to answer, commenting that the Company respected its regulator's (the CBK's) views, would have the auditors review them. But in the final analysis will do what the CBK requires.
14. One other important "bit" he stated that the Company had appointed new auditors (dual case used).  In 2008 TID used the local incarnations of Deloitte and Touche and KPMG.  
15. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry raised comments during the meeting that the Board did not meet during 2008 (I take this to mean regarding 2008 financial performance not that there were no board meetings that year) and that TID failed to properly register its shares in Bahrain Islamic Bank,.  These shares (8.7% of BIsB) were acquired by TID in satisfaction of a financing receivable and are discussed in Note #8 to its 2008 financials. Mr. Al-Musallam said that the Board did not meet because the financials were not approved (presumably he's referring to the auditors and CBK).  The BIsB shares are in the process of being registered.

A new Board was elected as follows:

1. Adnan Abdul Qadir Mohammed Al Musallam, Chairman and MD
2. Rajam Al Roumi
3. Ghanem Al Ghanem
4. Adel Behbehani
5. Adnan Nisif
6. Musa'id AlMukhaytar
7. Nabil Abdul Rahim

And "reserve" directors (in case of need for a replacement of a sitting director):  Nabil Amin, and Abdul Muhsin Al Kandari.

Hopefully, this impressive performance (there's that word again) will silence the unfounded criticism of TID in the market, leaving only the founded sort.

The Investment Dar - Creditors Committee "Fed Up" or Posturing for the Central Bank?

Today's (25 August) AlWatan and AlQabas carried two quite different articles on the Creditors Committee.  One can consider these straightforward news items.  And perhaps, just perhaps, attempts to influence the Central Bank's decision making process.

Playing the role of good cop is Bader Abdullah Al-Ali, CEO of Gulf Investment House Kuwait, the official spokesman of Creditors' Coordinating Committee ("CCC").  As reported in AlWatan, he noted:

1. That the Central Bank of Kuwait had played a pivotal role in the rescheduling expending considerable efforts to bring agreement between the concerned parties.
2. That the CCC believed the rescheduling remained the best means available and offered the ideal reclamation of lenders' rights.
3. That the fundamental goal of the CCC was the essential role of involving the lenders in crafting the rescheduling according to generally accepted international principles.
4. That the CCC was confident that the CBK understood the role the CCC played.
5. That the CCC hoped for the response of the CBK in the shortest time possible.

Or in other less polite words:

1. You've done your part and we acknowledge your professionalism.  So now it's time to acknowledge ours.
2. The plan is fine we, the CCC on behalf of the lenders, crafted it according to generally accepted international principles (which should no doubt trump any purely local or regional views that you might have).
3. So don't tamper with it.  And be sure not to exclude us in the process.
4. Get off your duffs and approve it.

The bad cop role falls to unknown sources who have provided AlQabas with the background for its article.

1. TID's application for entry under the FSL has effectively ended the productive work of the CCC.  The Central Bank has the entire file in its hands.  As a result, the CCC is reduced to holding meetings to discuss the latest developments without being able to influence them.
2. The FSL represents the last chance of the Company.  If entry is rejected, a myriad of lawsuits against the Company and its management will be launched seeking bankruptcy.
3. Ernst and Young have bluntly told the CCC that they were engaged by the CBK and have no connection with the CCC or the lenders.  Their marching orders come from the CBK alone.
4. The CCC, mindful of its responsibility to the lenders, are fearful that actions may be taken affecting the Company without their involvement or knowledge.
5. As a result, they discussed at their last meeting whether or not they should withdraw and resign en masse.
6. Adding to their rancor from exclusion from the process are several items, some of which have recently emerged.  
7. Apparently TID has advised the CCC that it had some KD12 to 15 million of  unpaid Zakat arrears which date from before the crisis.  The CCC do not understand why these were not paid as the associated profit has already been distributed.  There was no note of these in information provided.  Nor does there appear to be any fatwa authorising the delay.
8. There are increases in salary for one of the senior executives as well as a requested bonus.  (No doubt a "performance" bonus.  And, yes, the term "performance" is used in the same sense as in my recent post on GFH's 2Q10 financials).
9. The Company's failure to present financials for periods after 2008.
10. The resolution of TID's file is dragging on and may extend to next year.
11. The dissolution of the CCC would deal a fatal blow to the Company as the CCC is the glue which binds the "alliance" of consenting creditors.
12. Failure to obtain the protection of the FSL will lead to thousands of lawsuits which will rain down on the Company.
13. The article closes by noting the frustration of the CCC with TID's public relations firm who are felt to have issued a torrent of meaningless press releases about nothing.  Adding insult to injury, it seems that TID has incurred payables of 7 million (presumably KD) for these services.  This last bit has me questioning my translation as I'd expect there would be some sort of expense controls in place from the CBK appointed manager and/or the CRO.  So I'm inviting comments on my translation - the last sentence in the Al Qabas article.

Certainly, there's a lot of justification for rancor in the CCC and among the lenders.  They've expended a lot of time dealing with the rather slippery management at TID to get this far.  That matters aren't moving more quickly has got to be distressing.  As I am sure are the latest "shenanigans" of the Company - though frankly speaking, the lenders can no doubt expect many many more during the implementation phase of the restructuring.

But as we did above with the good cop's position, let's translate the bad cop's argument into less politically correct speak:

1. We, the CCC, are the critical guys in the process holding the creditors together. If we walk, TID comes crashing down.
2. You're ignoring us.
3. We're fed up by your inaction and by the Company's shenanigans. (Notice, as usual, AA is being highly charitable.  And my zakat in that respect is being paid on time!).
4. If we don't get what we want, we're going to take our ball and go home.
5. Then you'll be the culprit as TID collapses.

While no doubt this tactic does put a bit a pressure on the CBK, in the final analysis it's not very credible.  The lenders are not going to walk away from their best hope of recovery:  the rescheduling and the FSL.

If the Central Bank is looking for way out of approving TID's request, then this may be just the entree they're looking for.    That being said, I don't expect that.  My worst case scenario is that the CBK comes back with modifications to the plan - which by that time the parties thereto should be sufficiently exhausted that they will willingly accept what the CBK wants in order to finally close the file and move forward.

Gulf Finance House - 1H10 Financials: Now You See It Now You Don't -- The Magical US$137 Million Provision

GFH has finally posted its 2Q10 interim report.

Let's get straight to the heart of the analysis and our headline, Note 15:

"During the period, the Group's credit enhancement amounting to US$ 102 million issued to financial institutions against credit facility arrangements for a project managed by the Group were enforced by the lenders due to contractual defaults by the project company.  Further, based on the Group's assessment of the likelihood that another project will be able to meet the financing when they fall due, the Group has estimated that its financial guarantee of US$ 35 million may be enforced.  In accordance with the requirements of IAS #37, Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, the Group has recognised a provision of US$ 137 million towards these liabilities until revised/ renegotiated terms are agreed with the lenders of the project companies.  The Group has recognised an equivalent amount of reimbursement right which has been included in other assets (note 8)."

Presto, changeo with a bit of Accounting Magic a potential US$ 137 million addition to 1H10's net loss is transformed into an asset!  What's even more astounding is that these projects that cannot meet their debt commitments (to the apparently impatient lenders) will nonetheless be able to honor GFH's reimbursement claim upon them.  Now that is truly magical!

(Side Note:  According to my copy of KPMG's Third Edition of "Insights into IFRS" page 635 commenting on IAS 37.35 (about the recognition of Contingent Assets), KPMG states:

"When realisation of a contingent asset is virtually certain, it is no longer considered contingent and is recognised.  In our view, virtually certain generally should be interpreted as a probability of greater than 90 percent."

Unfortunately, I don't have the latest edition so I would caveat that there may have been some new thinking on the topic of what constitutes "virtually certain".)

Taking this amount to the income statement would roughly triple GFH's loss.  It would also breach the US$400 million minimum shareholders' equity covenant.  But there's one more adverse effect making this US$137 million truly a "triple threat".

As we learn in Note #2 during the discussion of the going concern issue, GFH's capital adequacy ratio at 30 June was 12.92% - leaving little room for maneuver or in the words of KPMG "which restricts the Group's ability to absorb further losses or undertake additional exposures".   (Note to KPMG:  You need to amend the reference in your report to the matter of emphasis from Note #1 to Note #2.)

And I suppose -- to add a fourth reason -- such a loss and such consequent events might make a difficult capital raising exercise just a "wee bit" more difficult.

Where there is a need and a will, there is a way -- as the old saying goes.

Turning to the rest of the financials:

1. Note #5: US$115.4 million (95%) of 1H10's US$121.4 million of Placements with Banks and Other Financial Institutions is pledged against commitments and facilities of projects of the Group.   And so should be excluded from liquidity.  You'll notice it is in the Cashflow Statement.  Some might suggest that proper presentation would be to have these amounts in Other Assets.  And well they might but to no apparent avail.   Some of this cash may be pledged to those adversely affected projects discussed in Note #15.
2. Financing Receivables US$14 million decline (which took place between FYE09 and 1Q10) is still a mystery to me.  It's not in the cashflow statement so it must have been offset against something else?
3. Receivable from Investment Banking Services declined from US$85.3 million at 1Q10 to US$40.5 million at 2Q10.  I can find a provision of US$20 million but am unable to locate the remaining US$25 million in the cashflow statement.  Another magical offset?
4. Note #6:  Assets held for sale include Bahrain Financial Harbour Company (US$175 million), $50 million of GFH's long outstanding Receivable from Sale of Investments (now reduced to US$44.5 million and carried in Other Assets) plus US$35 million of Financing to Projects.  The first two items will be settled "against receipt of consideration in the form of cash and land plots."  Well, when you can't pay cash why not settle your obligation with a highly valuable piece of (no doubt) blank land.  The upside potential is, well, enormous, especially at current depressed prices! 
5. Other Assets - As noted above there are reductions of some US$85 million (See Point #4 above), against the introduction of reimbursement rights of US$137 million whose collection is no doubt at least virtually certain if not certain to a much higher degree.
6. Note 9 updates on the financing.  The LMC US$100 million facility (US$80 million outstanding) carries a "profit rate" (read interest rate of 8.5%!).   The rescheduled West LB facility a 3.75% profit rate (reduced from 5%).  This facility is now secured by GFH's shares in Khaleeji Commercial Bank, which no doubt explains why the promised sale of this asset suddenly was postponed.  Perhaps, the collateral will be sufficient cover to prevent an impairment under IAS #39. Also of note during 2Q10 some "wise" and brave lender has provided a US$16.64 million Murabaha financing due in November 2010.
7. Note #10:  Some 69% of Other income (1H10: US$8.6 million) is composed of income declared because certain liabilities were no longer payable (US$4.2 million) and from recoveries of project expenses (US$1.7 million).  

All in all quite a performance in 2Q10.  For those curious that's not a reference to financial performance but the magic of accounting.

Oqyana Group - KD72.6 Million Loss for Fiscal 2009

AlQabas reported on Oqyana's annual general shareholders meeting which was held at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.  As you might guess from the latter statement, that's not a particularly favorable development.  The MOCI doesn't rent out space for meetings.  When a company has a shareholders meeting there, it's because the Ministry has instructed the company to hold one so that it can convey  information directly to the shareholders, usually to advise them of regulatory and other violations  by the company.  These days the MOCI seems to be holding a lot of such meetings.

AlQ mentions two of the comments made by the Ministry:  the Company's financials were delayed.  And it had not registered a piece of property it owns in Bahrain in its own name. Oqyana's Chairman, Nabil Jafar Abdul Rahim noted that the delay was because of the delay in Stehwaz preparing its financials and Oqyana holds 100 million shares in Stehwaz (!).  As to the second comment, he noted that the Company had set up a 100% owned Bahraini subsidiary to hold the real estate.

The Chairman also commented that the primary cause of the Company's loss of KD72.6 million for 2009  versus a gain of KD98 million the year earlier was the revaluation of assets.  Or perhaps more precisely devaluation of assets.  Shareholders' equity stood at KD369 million at FYE09 versus KD429 million the year earlier.  Total assets were down from KD493 million to KD438 million.  

Oqyana holds both Stehwaz and The Investment Dar shares in its investment portfolio.   What value they are being carried by Oqyana is not clear.  If you're not aware, all three companies can be considered distinguished business partners and members of The Investment Dar Group.

Abdul Rahim also noted that Nakheel had given the Company a two year extension to develop its property in Dubai.  Originally the property was to have been developed within 42 months ending in 2009.  Oqyana was unable to secure the necessary financing.  So the extension.  It's unclear  but presumably it's two years from 2009.   Recently, it's been knocking on the doors of local and other banks looking for between US$50 million to US$100 million in loans to move forward.  But it has had no success so far.   

As I'm sure The Real Nick can confirm, a real estate development company without access to loans is in dire straits.  Sort of the equivalent of "The Donald" losing his ego.

On the subject of financing, the Chairman noted that the Company had obtained a loan from a bank in Bahrain against shares of Stehwaz.   This apparently dates from more than a few years back given that Stehwaz has been in rather distressed conditions for some years now.

A new board was elected consisting of Mr. Nabil Jafar Abdul Rahim and representatives of TID, Safwat Real Estate, Efad Real Estate (also affiliated as a business partner with TID), and Adeem.  

If you're not familiar with Adeem, you can link here to "The Navy Seals" of the Investment World!  You can also use the tags "Adeem", "Stehwaz" and "The Investment Dar" to find earlier posts on those entities if you're interested.

Board of Saudi Zain Proposes Capital Reorganization for Shareholder Vote

Saudi Zain announced on the Tadawwul (Saudi Stock Exchange) today 21 August a plan for a capital reorganisation to be put to a vote at an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders for their ratification subject to the Company obtaining the prior approval of the Saudi Capital Markets Authority, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and any other concerned body for the plan.

The reorg will take place in two steps:

1. In the first capital will be decreased.  While it's not stated, this is clearly to eliminated accumulated losses.
2. In the second a partial restoration of capital.

Here are the details. 

Capital Reduction 

1. Reduce paid in capital from SAR14,000,000,000 to SAR7,328,843,885.  This covers the accumulated losses of SAR6,671,561,150 as of 2Q10.  2Q10 financials:  Arabic version here and English version here.
2. There will be a reverse split with shareholders getting 1 share for approximately each 2.096 shares they currently own.  As a result, 667,156,115 shares will be canceled.
3. Not stated, but the balance represented by these shares SAR6,671,561,150 will be transferred to Accumulated Losses zeroing it out.

Capital Increase

1. Increase capital by SAR4,383,487,180 to to SAR11,711,926,030.
2. 438,348,718 new shares are to be issued.  There is no discussion of the offer price.  SZ's nominal (par) value is SAR10 per share.  If the shares are offered for a higher price (at a premium) then SZ will raise more than the SAR4.4 billion.  My guess is that there will be a strong incentive to issue the shares at par given the Company's financial condition and a desire to obtain as close to 100% take-up as possible.
3. In addition to the normal pro-rata allocation among shareholders, founding shareholders will be able to convert all or part of the debt they've extended the Company.  That amounts to SAR2,914,000,000.  Of that amount Zain Kuwait holds SAR1,859,397,000 (63.8%).  Zain Kuwait holds 25% of SZ's stock and 50% of the Founding Shareholders' portion.  The Saudi General Organisation for Retirement and the Public hold the remainder.
4. Kuwait Zain's response to the new share offer will give a clear indication of Zain's ability and willingness to continue as a shareholder.  There is perhaps an indication of their attitude in that the SAR2.2 billion 6 month supplier credit SZ obtained in June 2010 was guaranteed by one of the Founding Shareholders, presumably Zain Kuwait.

In a bit I'll post on Saudi Zain and the indications of a turnaround.

AlGosaibi v Maan AlSanea - More on The "Fix"

They say there is no surer proof of someone's intelligence than the fact that he or she agrees with you. (See point #3 below).

Echoing a theme raised here earlier, AlQabas has an update on the AlGosaibi and Saad debt restructurings:

1. AHAB has reportedly offered to settle with its creditors at 15 cents on the dollar, an offer that creditors are reported to have rejected as they did the earlier 9 cents offer -- absolutely.
2. Saad has offered to settle a large (but unspecified) portion of its debt to its creditors but noted that freezes on its assets in the USA and Europe resulting from AHAB lawsuits against it frustrated that desire.
3. The Saudi Government is currently undertaking intensive efforts to achieve an accommodation (or reconciliation) between the two groups so that reschedulings can move forward.

As you'll notice, Saad's offer is as well a strong tactical move to develop support for The Fix.

While the article doesn't contain proof of its assertions, nonetheless it clearly demonstrates remarkable insight -- at least using the principle stated in the first paragraph. 

The question remains will AlGosaibi itself get "fixed" in the process?

Gulf Finance House - 1H10 Financials: Reports of a Turnaround Greatly Exaggerated

On Friday I was quite excited to see that GFH had posted its 1H10 financials and press release thereon.  That is until I printed out the 2Q10 report and found it was actually that for 1Q10.  While the First Quarter was much much better than the Second, I'm assuming this is just a technical glitch, and not a desire to focus on relatively happier days of 1Q.  Hopefully by the time you use the link  above to the financials  all will have been corrected.

In the interim, here are some preliminary observations on the summary 1H10 financials printed in the newspaper, sans as is customary the all important notes thereto.  More detailed comments will follow when the full report is released. 

Income Statement

Revenues

1. GFH doesn't really have much to report for 2Q.  Like Global, GFH's first quarter was much better.  The second for both is rather disappointing to use a charitable term.  
2. GFH had US$7.4 million in revenues during 2Q10 (28.5% of 1H10's US$25.9 million).  In 1H09 the comparable revenues were US$68 million.  A decline of 61% for 2010.
3. 77% of 2Q's revenue was due to FX earnings. I don't believe that GFH has an active Treasury function and so this is probably FX translation gains - a non cash non business revenue. 
4. The US$5.2 million in revenue from "Investment Banking Services" was earned entirely in 1Q10 and as per that Quarter's report US$5.0 million was earned from related parties (Note #11).  That's  96%.  You can tell the economy's bad when when your own "relatives" have no business for you.
5. US$5.1 million in placement, arrangement and management fees, of which 79% was earned in 1Q10.  From the Cashflow Statement it seems that GFH has only collected US$0.2 million during 1H10.

Expenses

1. Staff costs at US$8.8 million are 34% of 1H09's!  Though there is an interesting spike in staff costs in 2010.  In 1Q10 staff costs were US$3.6 million and in 2Q10 US$5.2 million.
2. GFH took a US$20 million impairment provision in 2Q10 as opposed to zero in 1Q10.  This is down from 1H09's US$80 million.
3. The bottom line is that GFH's remarkable improvement in 1H10 versus 1H09 is due primarily to the reduction in expenses from 1H09's US$160.1 million to 1H10's US$73.6 million.  Chiefly reductions in impairment provisions and staff expenses.
4. You'll recall AA's test for a real turnaround in a business is the revenue line.  There is no evidence of any turnaround in the Company's core business. In fact compared to 1H09 core businesses are doing worse.  

Balance Sheet

1. Cash Positions -  Cash increased US$7.8 million largely it seems (though money is indeed fungible) from the sale of US$29.1 million of Treasury Stock for US$7.6 million.  That's a loss of US$21.4 million.  You'll see these numbers reflected in the changes in Treasury Stock and Statutory Reserve in the Equity Account.  An interesting transaction.  I wonder if this was through the market (presumably on the KSE) or a private placement to a wise investor?  Or to a related party?
2. Placements with Banks are down to US$121.1 million at 1H10 from US$156.7 million at 1Q10 and US$455 million at FYE09.  The large drop between FYE 09 and 1Q10 is due to  largely to debt repayments during the first three months of 2010.  In any case, as noted earlier the bulk of the remaining funds are pledged to secure GFH's commitments to make investments.  And so should (unless the 1H10 financials reveal otherwise) not be considered as part of the Bank's liquidity.
3. There was an approximate US$45 million decrease in the Receivable for Investment Banking Services from 1Q10, which I cannot find in the Cashflow Statement.  This may be responsible for the increase in Other Assets by a similar amount?
4. An intriguing new category "Assets Held for Sale" ("AHAS") with a balance of US$260 million makes an appearance in 2Q10.  Apparently a shift of assets from "Investment in Associates".  It will be very interesting to see the basis on which these are carried on the balance sheet versus Investment in Associates ("IIA").  If I remember correctly, IIA are carried at Fair Value Through Profit and Loss.  A change to a different basis for AHAS could have income statement implications., e.g. fair value through equity for one.  As well if they are no longer fair valued but carried at cost, that could potentially - but not necessarily - provide some relief on the recognition of changes in value as "impairments" have a different set of rules than "fair value changes".   The reason my antennae are up on this is because GFH chose 2Q to make this change at about the same time it has signalled that it wants to slow asset sales down.  So I'll be taking a close look at the note on this category in the 2Q10 report  when it is available to see if there is any potential Accounting Magic at work here.
5. Other Liabilities have dramatically increased from 1Q10 and from FYE09.   By US$124 million!!  Hopefully, unlike 1Q10, GFH will provide a note with a breakdown of this category for 2Q10.
6. 1H10 Equity was at US$416.5 million uncomfortably close to the US$400 million net worth trigger in GFH's Sukuk.  Without the 1Q10 remarkable conversion of the Deutsche Bank Murabaha which added US$25 million to Equity, GFH would have breached the covenant.  I use the term "remarkable" because I find it hard to understand why a rational investor would be converting debt in GFH to shares at this point.  Or why there would be a market to purchase GFH's Treasury Shares for that matter.  As I've written before, this transaction's structure allows capital to be infused into the firm without the time consuming process of an Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, a Rights Issue, etc.   With the selection of the amount and timing discretionary.  Then again perhaps a wise investor saw and continues to see something here that I don't.

As usual, GFH's Chairman and Group CEO have many favourable things to say about their  imagined turnaround.  And I suppose one would expect them to make these statements.  

However, to attempt to blame GFH's predicament on factors outside its control or to portray GFH as being in the same condition as every other "global investment bank" is a bit much.

First, GFH is not a global investment bank.  It was and is a regional investment bank.  Just as TID, Global, or Shuaa were and are.  In the grand scheme of things looking across the world, rather modest sized shops all of them.  

Second, the list of global investment banks in serious trouble is rather shorter than the list of all global investment banks.   Even if we were to grant GFH temporary hypthetical membership in the ranks of global investment banks, the Goldmine, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank et al may have tinkered with their strategies.  But they are not fighting for their lives.   Make no mistake GFH is in serious trouble.  Its rating, its share price and its financial condition clearly indicate that.

Gulf Finance House - 1H10 Losses of US$47.7 Million

Asa Fitch over at The National has an article on the subject.  Funny how GFH was able to get the news out to The National and other media outlets but unable to get the announcement on the three regional exchanges it's registered on.  Or on its website for that matter.

Once they publish their financial report, I'll comment in more detail.  For now, I'd just note that with other firms who have announced dramatic improvements in their 1H10 over 1H09 results that once you've written the assets down to realizable value there are no further write downs and income "improves".  Real improvement comes of course when your firm generates sustainable revenues and cashflow.