Ransomware Prioritize Prevention Then Pursue Prosecution – Part 1

 

Noted Internet Security Expert, B. Franklin
Interesting Fact: 
Colonial Pipeline Earlier Management Ignored His Advice

Alex Younger, former head of the Secret Intelligence Service, penned an opinion piece in Saturday’s FT Ransomware attacks have to be stopped — here’s how.

Some 898 words long. Lots of good advice and interesting points.

However, he had but these 37 words (4%) on what I consider to be one of the key steps to resolving the problem.

It follows that governments can and should do more but not to the point of absolving individuals and firms of their own responsibilities. A surprisingly large amount of this is about getting the cyber security basics right.

The last sentence “names the issue exactly”.

I think this is the major problem.

By way of analogy, let’s assume a town where no one locks their doors, where people leave valuables in plain sight, where it’s common to leave the keys to one’s Maybach in the ignition, and the car in the driveway..

Now we could crackdown on those who buy stolen goods even those in other cities.

We could station a policeman by each house to keep guard.

Or, we could get as many citizens as possible to lock their doors and secure their property.

What this latter step hopefully would do is lessen the opportunity for crime.

And the amount of crime that takes place.

It also lessens the number vulnerable targets that one has to guard.

If we can take the above steps, then resources can be more focused.

Also and perhaps more importantly, with national security issues, one would I hope prefer to prevent an attack over  a successful response to the attack.

Is this the case with ransomware? That doors are unlocked, valuables unsecured?

First, some macro examples from an earlier post.

Two quotes from the FT. Italics mine.

1. Just a quarter of companies in traditional infrastructure businesses, including oil and gas, utilities and healthcare, were properly braced for an attack, estimated Matias Katz, chief executive of the cyber security group Byos.

2. The oil and gas sector has been criticised for lax cyber security regulation.

The above points are estimates not facts.

But it should be not only an “overdue wake up call” but also a “sobering fact” even if these are overestimates by a factor of two.

The companies making these estimates are companies selling security products and so may have a profit dog in the fight.

So let’s turn to recent comments by US Secretary of Energy. She is reported to have said that “hackers” could shut down the US energy grid.

Second, some individual examples.

Colonial Pipeline was penetrated through a VPN which was “not intended to be used” but not turned off. That system had single factor authentication.

In February 2020, CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) published an alert on a ransomware attack on an unnamed US pipeline.

That alert mentions some of the same security failures as with Colonial Pipeline.

Lessons learned?

Wake-up calls unanswered?

Sobering facts insufficiently “sobering” to overcome the state of intoxication?

As well, you will note that many of the other failures mentioned in that alert are “basic cybersecurity”. The PC equivalent of locking doors, securing valuables, etc.

You will see this pattern of “rookie” mistakes in many of their alerts

Another study that ranks cybersecurity by country seems to confirm the above.

The US ranks 46^th out of 75 countries.

Some caveats:

1. This isn’t an apples to apples comparison. Rather it is an overall ranking across a broad gauge of metrics not just for ransomware. It includes attack attempts, infection rates on personal devices, etc.

2. But despite that drawback it does highlight the Willy Sutton Principle: One would expect the USA to be of more interest to hackers than many of the other countries on the list. And so more targeted. And so more in need of defense.

In Part 2, we’ll look at some other issues, not all of which relate directly to Mr. Younger's opinion piece.