GFH Bahrain: What’s Changed Since 2010?

Heading Up But Still Lots to Climb

I last posted about GFH in 2010. 

At that point, its financials were a mess.

Along with Global Investment House and The Investment Dar it was part of the trio of once high-flying regional investment banks that hit the wall at high speed. 

What’s happened since then?   

On a positive note, GFH escaped the fate of Global Investment House.  Its shareholders remain in control, cases have been lodged to recover funds, additional capital has been raised, and assets have not been stripped off to creditors. 

Nor is GFH in what would appear to be the nearly persistent vegetative state of The Investment Dar –a chronic condition punctuated by infrequent bouts of apparent lucidity in which TID announces yet another restructuring plan. Sadly during those periods TID is insufficiently lucid to issue financials, the last to see daylight being from FYE 2009, or to even update its website.  Love the Board members’ pictures.  Despite the difference in surnames, three of them look remarkably similar.

So how has GFH performed since 2010?  

Short answer:  not so well. 

On page 36 of its 2015 Annual Report, GFH kindly provide five years of financial highlights.     

GFH ROE 2011-2015
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
GFH	0.22%	3.26%	-4.00%	4.79%	1.80%
AA	0.22%	3.26%	-4.01%	2.62%	-0.83%

As you see from the above, AA has a different analysis of the last two years’ ROE.

1.      For 2014 and 2015 GFH used total net income— both GFH shareholders and those of non-controlling interests (NCI)—and equity attributable only to shareholders of GFH (excluding NCI’s share of equity) to determine ROE. 

2.      AA used net income—actually a loss of US$5.5 million—attributable only to shareholders of GFH and like GFH used equity attributable only to GFH shareholders.   Why? Because the point is GFH’s ability to generate income for its shareholders.  Also this choice is related to the nature of consolidated statements as outlined in #5 below. 

3.      As consolidation only affected 2014 (restated) and 2015 results, those are the only two years where there is a difference in calculation methodology.  

4.      Both GFH and AA used beginning and end of period equity to determine a year’s “average” equity to calculate ROE.  Because there were significant capital increases over the five year period (an almost three times increase), this method overstates ROE for certain periods because it understates average equity.  But what’s important here are trends, directional rather than locational statistics.

5.      One very important note:  consolidated financials are an accounting construct.  They are designed to provide a way to analyze the economic performance of a “group”.   But the consolidated "group" is not a legal entity.  That is, the group does not really (legally) directly owns the assets or receive the income shown.  Parent only or individual financial statements show the legal status ownership of assets, cash flows, etc.  Take a look at note 34 in JPMC’s 2015 AR and compare the data to the consolidated financials.  Parent revenues are largely dividends and assets are largely investments. This fact has important implications for investors and creditors that buy holding company equities or unsecured debt securities. Or for lenders to holding companies.  Access to cashflow, access to assets, priority in bankruptcy, responsibility for subsidiary/affiliate debt (absent parent guarantees) are some of these. 

Whether you take GFH’s or AA’s calculations, performance has been “disappointing” (euphemism of the post).  Earnings have been volatile.  ROE has been subpar.

Some of this is economic:  a “weak” (second euphemism) legacy portfolio, the cyclical nature of GFH’s businesses, etc. 

Some of this is a function of internal management: legacy leadership—responsible for the high risk portfolio—was only conclusively removed in late 2013, no doubt delaying remedial action.  GFH has also conducted successful legal actions against “two of its ex-Chairmen for bonuses illegally obtained during the period 2005-2008”  which some readers may interpret as indicating less than the ethics one might hope to find in a self-described Shari’ah compliant institution.   الله اعلم

A coming post will take a look at GFH’s attempt to address its problems.