Monday, 19 July 2010

AlGosaibi v Maan AlSanea - Fortis Bank versus ADIB - The Letter of Credit

See important additional information here on Bunge's role in transaction and ADIB's knowledge of the nature of the transaction.

As promised a look at the Letter of Credit ("L/C") issued by Awal Bank which Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank ("ADIB") advised and confirmed to Fortis Bank Netherlands.

The text of the L/C issued by ADIB through Fortis is Exhibit #2 to Document #24, the Declaration of Nuhaid Saliba dated 31 August 2009. Note Exhibit #1 is the text that Awal proposed to ADIB.  That of course is not the instrument on which Fortis relied and through which ADIB conveyed its irrevocable undertaking.  Exhibit #2 is the key document as ADIB is its author.

And just to be complete, as you'll recall, ADIB is asserting fraud as the basis for voiding its obligation but not fraudulent documents or fraudulent shipment or non shipment.  Most jurisdictions have held that if the documents comply with the terms of the L/C then the bank is obligated to pay.  The "fraud" defense is applicable only in very limited circumstances.  

These and other documents can be found at the NY Supreme Court Website http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcivil/FCASMain  under Case # 601948/2009, 

Let's step through the details of the L/C.
  1. Issue Date: 16 June 2008.
  2. Expiry Date:  14 July 2008
  3. Applicable Rules:  UCPURR = Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (#600 of 2007) and Uniform Rules for Bank-to-Bank Reimbursement under Documentary Credits (#725 of 2007).  The former sets forth the rules for the handling of L/Cs.  The latter the rules for banks to reimburse or pay one another   These are pretty much the standard governing principles for commercial letters of credit (aka "documentary credits").
  4. Issuing Bank:  Awal Bank BSC Bahrain
  5. Applicant - AlGosaibi Trading Services Hamilton Bermuda
  6. Beneficiary - Bunge SA Switzerland
  7. Currency/Amount:  US$39.999,996.52
  8. Payment:  360 Days after acceptance of documents.
  9. Port Loading:  Any port in Brazil.
  10. Final Destination: Any port in Taiwan and/or Spain.
  11. Latest Date of Shipment:  30 June 2008.
  12. Goods Description:  (a) 52,686.31 MTS of Brazilian soybeans, packing in bulk at US$564.90 Per MT CFR Taiwan (b) 30,000.00 MTS of Brazilian maize SLM packing in bulk at US$341.25 per MT CFR Spain.  (Note: CFR = Cost and Freight)
  13. Documents Required:  (a) One copy of commercial invoice.  (b) One photocopy of the bill of lading. (c) One copy of beneficiary's certificate stating that the copies of shipping documents provided are true and correct copies of the originals.  That the original bills of lading relating to the shipment should be sent to the Notify Party stated in the B/Ls or to the agent at destination and that the goods described should be discharged at the port state in the B/Ls.
Additional Conditions:
  1. Third party documents except drafts and invoices acceptable.
  2. Documents showing one or more third party (ies) as shipper and/or exporter are acceptable.
  3. Fax or photocopy of documents are acceptable.  Documents issued before LC issuance (including B/L) are acceptable.
  4. Documents acceptable inspite of any and all discrepancies with exception that invoice value drawn may not exceed the maximum letter of credit value and the letter of credit may not be expired.
  5. Typing mistakes do not constitute a discrepancies.
  6. Late presentation of documents is accepted on the condition that documents are presented within LC validity.
  7. Bill of lading presenting a greater quantity/amount than shown on invoice is acceptable.
  8. Documents shall be acceptable as presented.
  9. Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank Abu Dhabi UAE is authorise to confirm this L/C and advise it to Fortis Bank Rotterdam.
  10. Fortis Bank Rotterdam is authorised to confirm this L/C at the request and for the account of the beneficiary.  The confirmation of the first advising bank, that is Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Abu Dhabi UAE covers the obligation of the issuing bank, that is Awal Bank BSC, Manama and the confirmation of the Fortis Bank (Nederland) NV Rotterdam only covers the obligations of the first advising bank, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Abu Dhabi UAE.
  11. Charges:  ADIB's confirmation charge (a cool US$500,000) for Awal.  Fortis' charge (not specified here) for Bunge.
Now to the tafsir.

First, as is pretty clear from the text of the L/C this is not a typical documentary letter of credit.  It is closer to a standby letter of credit - which you can think of as a guarantee of payment.
  1. At no time do any of the banks involved have an original bill of lading in their possession.  An original bill of lading is generally required by a shipping company to release goods it has shipped.    Having the B/L provides a measure of collateral security, if the applicant does not pay.  Now in a transaction in which the bank is giving its obligation to pay the beneficiary in the future (in this case 360 days after it accepts the documents) having the B/L only provides collateral comfort for a short period while it is at risk for the applicant or issuing bank's failure to pay.
  2. In Additional Conditions #4, the issuing bank has explicitly waived all and any discrepancies in the documents except for the amount drawn under the credit and presentation within the L/C validity.  That means any other condition.  Hardly the stance that a party concerned with the underlying commercial transaction would take.  The power to refuse payment for discrepancies (in the documents) provides a way to enforce the terms of the contract on the seller. Giving this right up doesn't make a lot of commercial sense.
  3. In Additional Conditions #7, B/Ls showing a larger quantity are acceptable.  Under UCP 600, for bulk commodities, a variation of +/- 5% is allowed (Article 30 (b)) unless prohibited.  5% of the amount shipped would be roughly US$2 million.  Would all of you out there who think that Bunge is going to ship another US$2 million worth of crops but not get paid for them, please raise your hands?  Didn't think I'd see any.  Of course there is no harm in this clause as it benefits the applicant.   But what is the commercial reason this would be included?  
  4. A couple other conditions are worthy of mention.  As noted above, Additional Condition #1  allows third parties on the shipping documents.  Meaning the shipper need not be Bunge and the party receiving the goods need not be AlGosaibi.   Additional Condition #3 allows documents to be dated prior to the L/C issuance. Faxes of documents are acceptable.  Coupled with the earlier waiver of  all discrepancies except for payment amount and presentation within L/C validity, all this looks like setting up the conditions for document shopping.  That is, making it very very easy to find conforming documents from another trade transaction not involving the parties named in the L/C.  All one needs is access to documents and a photocopier.
Second, is there a commercial reason for such a structure?  Possibly but how likely?
  1. The above conditions would be useful if both parties were engaged in rapid turnover trading.  Bunge strikes a deal with ATS at price X but finds another seller willing to sell at less than X.  Being able to substitute sellers/shippers allows Bunge to make an additional profit by buying the goods from this other party and delivering to ATS.  This condition allows ATS to sell the goods  to a third party, Buyer B, before it has taken possession by switching the delivery party.
  2. But waiving the right to refuse to pay for any discrepancies could be problematical if ATS has on sold the goods as described to new Buyer B.   One would think Buyer B would have stipulated certain quantity and type of goods and reserve the right to refuse payments if these and other conditions that it required were not met.  Now perhaps Buyer B has waived these.  But what are the chances?  The goods are the commercial heart of the transaction.
  3. On that score it might be more typical to see an inspection certificate (of the goods) particularly since a third party shipper might not be as reliable as Bunge. 
  4. Now it's not unheard of that cargoes already at sea are sold (remember that documents issued prior to the L/C issuance date are acceptable).  But at that point, one should know the exact quantity of the goods and the identity of the parties.  And this could be incorporated into the L/C.  Now, I suppose the transaction could be taking place so quickly that speed was of the essence - a split second response required.  However, the documents submitted in the case indicate that ADIB cogitated for a while (though perhaps not long enough) before agreeing to the transaction.  And then it appears the transaction amount was increased after it had given an approval for a lower amount.  And so it had an opportunity like Proud Edward "tae think again".  Though to be fair, ADIB seems like Proud Edward to have thought again after "24 June" and not before.
  5. Generally, transactions of this sort would be secured (from the intermediary buyer's perspective -- here ATS) by use of a transferable letter of credit (opened by the final buyer Buyer B in favor of ATS).  Or through a "back to back" L/C which is a particular favorite among many MENA banks though it is technically less sound from a protection perspective, including for the issuing/confirming banks of the second or "back to back" L/C.
Third, so what could be another reason for this structure?   To provide Awal and/or ATS financing.  But this requires a few bits more in the structure.
  1. This L/C provides for a payment to Bunge 360 days from documentary acceptance.  At this point there has been no movement of funds.  Now it's not uncommon in such situations for the seller (Bunge in this case) to ask the confirming bank (Fortis) to make an immediate payment.  The bank would "buy" (discount) the acceptance for an amount less than its face value.  You can think of the difference as interest.  This could get the money to Bunge, though strictly speaking that's not necessary to get funding to ATS/Awal.  
  2. If you reflect on the typical "Islamic" "trade" financing described above, you'll see that the ADIB L/C is the equivalent of the purchase of the goods on deferred payment basis.
  3. Getting the funds to Awal/ATS requires the other half of the "Islamic" "trade" financing structure: the offsetting transaction the sale of the goods for spot settlement.  Such as sale could be either back to Bunge.  Or to a third party.  This may be a reason why ADIB's lawyers are pushing for further disclosure by Fortis to see if they are involved in this critical leg.
  4. Just to close the Bunge circle.  The usual "Islamic" "trade" finance transaction keeps the deal "all in the family" so it's not inconceivable that they might have been involved.  If Bunge were involved, one would presume that it discounted the Fortis payment to use as the purchase price back from ATS/Awal - of course with a suitable commission for its trouble.   Note:  This is hypothetical.  I have no knowledge of Bunge being involved in the second leg. This discussion provides an illustration of how the transaction may have been structured.  Not that it was so structured.
  5. Presumably, ATS did not hang on to the commodities with the intent of selling a year later.  Equally, it's unlikely that ATS has a "factory" in which to process the goods.  So the likely disposition of the goods is a sale.  If the goods were sold on a spot basis, then ATS/Awal have a one year loan due when the Fortis acceptance "matures" - irrespective whether Fortis has or has not discounted that obligation.
  6. It's well known out there that commodity companies and brokers (including the one named in the TIBC  BNPP / ADIB legal dispute) specialize in providing "trade documents" for "Islamic" "trade" transactions that are really disguised financings.  Because Shari'ah Boards have become a bit more alert, many of these parties have established special purpose subsidiaries with completely different names so the buyers and sellers appear to be unrelated parties.   And have made presentations to  banks who wish to engage in "Islamic" "trade" transactions (or loans if you'd prefer) on how they  can help.
  7. How does this work?  The financing bank arranges to acquire goods from Company A (Let's call it Dewey Night Company).  It then sells them to the Buyer (borrower if you will) on a deferred payment basis (the tenor of the loan) at original cost plus a mark-up.  At the same time it offers to sell the goods spot for the Buyer (borrower) to another company (Let's call that one "Eagle" Trading Company).  Usually the Murabaha contract (for this is a Murabaha trade transaction not a loan!) specifies that the spot sale cannot be for less than the original cost. The helpful commodity firm or broker provides all the required documents for the two sales   The mark-up miraculously just happens to equate to the interest on the loan.  Proving that in some forms of "Islam" miracles are indeed common. The commodity company makes a fee for its role - just as the innkeeper makes a profit for renting you a room for a night.  Documents are available for the Shari'ah Board to review if it wants.  These on their face document a trade transaction.  It seems everyone is happy.  و الله اعلم
  8. And if you'd like to place a deposit with a bank, you can do the reverse transaction.
Fourth, how does this transaction differ from a typical "Islamic" "trade" transaction?
  1. The ultimate financing bank in the transaction is ADIB.  While it is true that it does not advance funds, it is ultimately on the hook if Awal does not pay.  Under its confirmation it is obligated to pay Fortis if Fortis claims within the validity of the L/C and complies with the miniscule conditions provided.
  2. For this transaction it only requires half of the set of documents.  A bit less financial engineering.
  3. More importantly what is in effect a guarantee or a standby L/C is treated as a commercial L/C with a lower capital charge under Basel II.  Thus, ADIB's risk adjusted ROE/ROA is higher.  And more importantly, its CAR is higher.
Fifth, how credible is ADIB's sudden charge that something was wrong with the transaction?  That there was potential for fraud.
  1. First, to accept ADIB's contention, one has to begin by assuming that ADIB has a very limited understanding of letters of credit and UCP600.  Or that the L/C Department personnel assigned to this transaction were incompetent.
  2. Second, one also has to assume that ADIB is rather new to structured transactions.  However, since AA has seen ADIB's "Islamic" "trade" documentation of various flavors, at least for AA accepting that is more than a "bit of a stretch".
  3. Third, the documents submitted by lawyers in this case indicate what would appear to be scrutiny of the transaction by ADIB's credit department.  If this transaction "slipped by" and wasn't recognized as a "structured" transaction - a payment guarantee and not a trade transaction - then one has to draw some rather unfortunate conclusions about credit analysis and risk management at that bank.
  4. Rather what seems to have happened is that ADIB decided for about 500,000 good reasons (the US$ equivalent of the confirmation commission it received from Awal) to go forward with a structured transaction.   One that had some CAR advantages.  
  5. Now that Awal has hit the wall, in what sadly seems to be a tradition of some "Islamic" banks (paging TID in re BLOM)  it's looking for a legal way out. (Paging Abu Yusuf).  At least in this case, it doesn't appear they're resorting to spurious arguments regarding the Shari'ah.
  6. Finally most of what is labeled "Islamic" "trade" finance  is structured with manufactured transactions   All the parties (save perhaps for the Shari'ah Boards) know that these transactions are structured.   That they are really money on money loans, dressed up in thaubs and ghutras to disguise the reality.  For ADIB to suddenly claim ignorance of this is well beyond the plausible. 
A bit later I'll post some more comments on this case.  In the interim, you can look at the NY Supreme Court website.  Documents #78 and #79 contain letters by the two sides recapping the main points of their arguments.

UGB to Purchase Burgan Bank Shares at KD0.390?


Citing informed sources, Jamal Ramadan over at AlWatan reports  that UGB will purchase the additional 13% of Burgan shares using an auction mechanism.  The contemplated starting bid is reported to be KD0.390 per share. 

Three separate tranches are envisioned.  The first two for 5% each and the third for 3%.

I'd like to note the following which I hope will put the purchase into perspective:
  1. BB last traded at KD0.390 or higher on 24 March 2010.
  2. During April this year BB offered new shares amounting to a 35.47% increase in capital at KD0.280 fils per share.
  3. The KD0.390 starting auction price is a 16% premium over 18 July's close.
  4. An auction process where the buyer's starting bid is KD0.390 is likely to result in a higher price.  
If successful, the auction will lift BB's share price having a favorable impact on its collateral value and allowing selling shareholders to cash out at a nice profit.  Particularly those who bought shares at KD0.280 in April.  

Over the past three or so months the KSE  Index has, if I'm not mistaken shed some  1,000 points.  This sale marks a truly unique value creation event.

Kuwaiti Listed Companies – Who’s on the Boards?


Augustus Pugin Senior and Thomas Rowlandson - Public Domain

In a recent article, Eissa Abdul Salaam at AlQabas published a study on the board seats held by various Kuwaiti families. Here's the more important link to the detailed results.  

The study considers families with 5 or more board seats on listed companies.  It also notes the legal and regulatory requirements to be eligible to be a director as well as restrictions.

At first blush, this report might be considered a way of getting an insight into economic influence in the country, though one has to recall that owners often have a corps of dedicated retainers known in local parlance as رجال النعم who serve in a variety of functions, including as board members. As well, one would expect that certain prominent families, especially those with a particularly noble and regal presence, might be asked to adorn the board of this or that company as happens in the "developed" West.

In any case there is some utility to the report. It gives a snapshot of the prominent families. And perhaps to a limited extent a relative ranking of wealth.

Here's a quick summary.  Note:  I'm using the numbers in the details not the article.  Below is only a partial list.  Those families with  14 seats and above.  As noted above, the AlQabas list extends to  five seats and above - giving a grand total of  583 seats.

Family# Seats
AlSabah42
Cadet Branches37
AlGhanem30
AlKhorafi23
AlOsaimi19
AlBahar19
Behbehani19
AlMutairi18
AlShaya16
AlWazzan15
AlKhalid15
AlHomaidi15
AlMarzouk14

Cadet Branches are identified as Sultan, Bin Eissa, AlBadr, AlMutawa by AlQabas.

AlQabas also provides a breakdown of the number of directors, though again it seems there is a difference in totals. The article refers to 192 listed companies. Excluding Non Kuwaitis and parallel market stocks, I believe 198 companies are listed on the KSE. Unless I've done the maths wrong, the total companies accounted for are 186.
 
# Directors# CompaniesTotal Directors
4    4    16
5  74  370
6  14    84
7  65  455
8  10    80
9  16  144
10    3    30
TOTAL1861179

 

Sunday, 18 July 2010

International Investment Group: Draft 2009 Financials KD 36.6 Million Loss

IIG Funding Limited announced on Nasdaq Dubai this morning that the Central Bank of Kuwait had accepted IIG's 2009 financial statements, though it didn't post a copy.  I didn't see the financials at the KSE but over at the DFM there's a copy - with some of the notes provided.  Also at the BSE but without the notes.

IIG advised the Deloitte is preparing an English language version.  AA certainly hopes with a larger type than in the Arabic extracts provided so far.

If like mine your microscope is in the shop for it annual servicing, you'll  have  to join me in squinting as we review the DFM material.

Accounting/Legal/Regulatory Matters
  1. No Audit Opinion:  Due to a variety of factors (including a concern over the "Going Concern" assumption), IIG's auditors have decided not to express an opinion on the financials.
  2. CCL Article 171:  IIG has accumulated losses which exceed 75% of its legal capital.  It has called a shareholders' meeting to approve a plan to eliminate some KD40.7 million in accumulated losses by (a) reducing legal capital some KD25.5 million (from KD45.7 million to KD20.2 million) and  (b) using share premium (KD4.3 million) and reserves totaling KD12.1 million).  See Note 22.
  3. Violation of Limit on Related Party Transactions:  As its auditors' note, IIG is in violation of the Central Bank of Kuwait's limit on exposure to related parties.  I presume this breach resulted from the collapse in IIG's capital from KD64.5 million to KD23.4 million and not from any new extensions of credit. 
As we continually hear on this blog, debts are settled with cash.  So why the initial focus on non cash matters?  Because these "events" are likely to further sap confidence in IIG.  That will have a direct impact on  the attitude of various market participants towards the Company's future.   And IIG needs all the goodwill and forbearance it can muster.

But in the final analysis cash is king.  A pocket full of money can buy a lot of goodwill and burnish the most tarnished of reputations.

So let's turn to the financials.  We'll begin with the balance sheet because repayment is unlikely to come from operating cashflow.  Rather asset realisation (sales) are the most likely (theoretical) source of the cash necessary  to reduce debt.  I'd note that all that follows is preliminary because we don't have a legible copy of the Company's full 2009 audited annual report.

Balance Sheet
  1. More 50% of the Company's assets are with related parties.  And are not only in "Investments in Associates" but as well Receivables and Murabaha and Wakala Transactions (which should be a source of liquidity IIG but apparently isn't) and land acquired from an affiliate.  That can't be particularly encouraging. 
  2. Investments in Associates (KD47.3 million out of KD107.1 million in total assets) are carried on the equity method (original cost plus share of net income).  Over the past two fiscal years IIG has recognized income statement losses of some KD32.6 million - which like the original profits declared were "paper" entries only.  If there are more "profits" in these firms, there may be more "air" to let out of IIG's balloon. 
  3. The Murabaha and Wakala transactions are secured by collateral.  In 2008 it was worth KD71.2 million.  As of FYE 2009, it's valued at KD44.2 million.  Presumably a decline in market value.  Another perhaps disturbing trend.  And since related and other parties who gave the collateral are no doubt suffering from liquidity problems of their own, it would seem to make sense for them to liquidate the collateral and pay off their dues to IIG leaving themselves roughly half or more of the KD44.2 million.   Since that's not happened, the value and liquidity of this collateral has to be questioned.
  4. And finally there's the Egyptian real estate purchase (from a related party of course) for KD10.5 million in Other Assets and Real Estate.  I can't read all of Note 21.2 but it seems the total transaction was for KD13.4 million.  IIG got the Egyptian land  (KD10.1 million) and shares worth KD3.3 million in exchange for shares in an affiliate worth KD4 million and non cash debt "settlements" of some KD9.4 million.  No doubt some very fine assets changed hands here.
  5. Most of and perhaps all of the above carried on a "cost less impairment basis".
  6. Turning to liabilities, there are some KD83.6 million - no question about their value.  Equity is at KD23.4 million.  If the ultimate value of assets turns out to be lower by more than 22% then creditors won't get back 100% on the dollar. 
 Income Statement
  1. A glance at IIG's income statement shows that most of the income (or losses) are paper items not cashflow.  Share in earnings (for the past two years losses) of affiliates.
  2. For 2009 operating results were a loss of KD15 million versus KD6.6 million in 2008.  A major driver was increased (equity method) losses from affiliates which rose to KD21.2 million from KD11.4 million the year before.
  3. Operating expenses were KD21.6 million, KD6.8 million over 2008 due largely to provisions of KD6 million.
  4. Net loss was KD36.6 million versus KD21.5 million the year earlier.
  5. Comprehensive Income was a KD41.2 million loss resulting from KD4.5 million in fair value changes not passing through the Income Statement.
Cashflow Statement
  1. None included.  
  2. Perhaps there was no cashflow for 2009?  More likely IIG forgot to include.
It's hard even for an optimistic fellow like AA to take too much comfort from these financials.  With all the related party transactions, one has to question the real value of assets.  And the very real prospect for an accelerated death spiral if there is an attempt to undo the daisy chain. On top of that is the general lack of liquidity in Kuwait.

Aabar: UAE Securities and Commodities Authority Orders AED1.95 Tender Price

The UAE SCA ordered IPIC to raise its tender price to AED1.95 per share based on the average of the past six months' trading.

It also set the Offer Period from 20 July through 5 August with payment to all tendering shareholders no later than 10 August 2010.

I must confess that I hadn't expected the SCA to upset the original price.  And for the small percentage I assigned to that event, certainly not as dramatic an increase in price as this.  The SCA may show only one eye in its logo, but it apparently has keen sight and a strong will - even when faced with "important" parties on the other end.   Hopefully, a trend that will continue.

International Investment Group: Defaults on Sukuk 2009 Financials Released

Today Deutsche Trustee Company, Delegate on the IIG Funding Limited Sukuk, announced on NasdaqDubai two further defaults on 10 July 2010:
  1. First, IIG Funding did not pay the July 2010 Periodic Distribution Amount ("PDA" or "interest").   As you'll recall, the April PDA of US$3,353,062.50 was missed.   Since the Sukuk has a fixed interest rate (6.75% p.a.), the July PDA is the same amount meaning IIG has not paid a total of US$6,706,125.00 in PDAs.
  2. Second, IIG (the parent and ultimate borrower) did not honour its Purchase Undertaking in the amount of US$152,467,782.23 representing principal of US$147,490,000 plus 100% of the unpaid PDA of US$4,977,782.22 on these amounts.  That is, 74.2274% thereof.
What is interesting is that Certificateholders did not dissolve the Trust for the April non payment under Article 13.  Rather they chose to use the Put Option under Article 6.5.   See Offering Circular here.   

What that means is that IIG was only obligated to Purchase the interests of those investors who exercised the Put Option (which had a one time exercise date of 10 July 2010).  Only 74.2274%. voted to exerecise the Option.  Technically, the remaining 25.773% of principal is not past due.  Those Certificateholders are in effect in a subordinate state.  Not a particularly wise position to be in. 

Presumably, the Certificateholders will vote again on a Dissolution - thus accelerating the entire principal and ensuring they are all on the same legal footing.  A failure by IIG to honour its Purchase Undertaking is another Article 13 Event of Dissolution. 

Anyone out there who has an explanation for this approach - that is, not voting straight away for Dissolution and accelerating all the Certificates - please post.  This seems a very perplexing approach.  The prudent passenger does not stay below deck on the Titanic after it has collided with the iceberg.

IIG has advised that it is unable to make the payment and referred to its engagement of KPMG to help it devise a restructuring plan. 

I'll post separately about IIG's 2009 financials.  As you might expect, they are not "pretty".

Saturday, 17 July 2010

Abdullahs Roll in Recovery for Damas

This is the actual headline in The National, though I suppose at some point the editor will change it to "role".  But the original headline is forever immortalized above.

Some quotes from the article which are just too good to pass up.
The three Abdullah brothers, whose family founded Damas jewellers and were held responsible for unauthorised transactions including about 50 property deals and two tonnes of gold borrowed from the company, are back at the firm – in charge of recovering money owed to the company.
Someone is definitely getting "rolled" here.  I suspect it's the hapless shareholders once again.

Though in light of this explanation from Damas' new CEO, shareholders will probably have a better understanding of the Abdullah Brothers' transactions.
“Not everything was well documented, which was very normal in the jewellery business. Most of the business was done on the basis of a handshake and based on the personal relationship between the management and the business partners … One of the three brothers was in charge of that file. Without his assistance, any progress on the recoveries front would have been impossible.”
An interesting explanation for what might charitably (and AA is always charitable) be described as theft.  It's always very important to be sure the documentation is properly prepared when you take someone else's assets.

In any case it's pretty clear from the above quote that the new CEO has an apparent keen understanding of  the intricacies of corporate governance.  There isn't the slightest doubt in my mind that he will be looking out carefully for their interests.  And making sure any related documentation is in tip top shape.

Thursday, 15 July 2010

Bahrain: Saudi Driver Crashes - Lost or Never Had Control of His Car?

The Gulf Daily News carried one of the typical GCC traffic accident stories.  As is common, we're told that at some point the driver "lost control" of his car.

Whenever I read one of these accounts, my natural reaction is to wonder if he ever had control.

If you know this road, you've got to have a pretty powerful faculty to imagine an innocent loss of control resulting in a dip in the drink.   (Yes, that last word was deliberately chosen as I'm sure some drink of one kind or another was involved).  This chap was probably practicing for the F-1.  And as everyone in Bahrain knows, the nearest venue for that is the King Faysal Highway.

The Investment Dar - No Decision from Central Bank


It's been roughly four months since TID received the preliminary approval of the Special FSL Court to begin the process for the Company to seek protection under the FSL.  Under the law, the Central Bank of Kuwait has four months to review a proposed  restructuring plan, the financial condition of an applicant and make a determination as to whether it believes there is a reasonable chance that the a company will be able to meet its restructured obligations.  Earlier post on details of FSL here.

At this point the Central Bank of Kuwait has not issued its final conclusive decision.  

Mohammed Al Itribi at AlQabas reports TID held a consultative meeting yesterday (14 July)  with the Creditors Co-Ordinating Committee to advise them of the lack of a decision by the CBK. 

The article notes that this can mean that (a) the CBK is about to issue a negative decision or  (b) as allowed under Article 19 of the FSL ask for additional time no to exceed another four months.   The FSL allows only a single four month extension.

I still think it's unlikely the CBK is going to reject TID's restructuring given the negative fallout on Kuwait.  Perhaps, they're looking to find a way to approve.  And that ties into the E&Y report.   

The  KD64,000 question is precisely what it said.   Did it support the restructuring plan?

If not or if the CBK is uneasy,  then a possible alternative would be to change terms of the plan - extend the tenor or re-profile payments to push any perceived problem out far enough so that the possibility of repayment is increased.  The promise of CBK approval for changes in the Plan could be a powerful incentive for banks to go along and agree - as this will provide some closure to the TID file.   Even if it's only a temporary pushing of the problem to the future.

The article also notes that some alternatives were discussed if the CBK's decision is negative.

The central issue with alternatives is ways to prevent dissident creditors' lawsuits from threatening the viability of the restructuring plan.   One would expect that dissident creditors would seek Court orders  forbidding the disposal of assets by TID during the course of their legal action.   That cuts off cash flow for repayments under the restructuring.  If the dissident creditor wins, assets could be lost - though no more than the creditor's claim (including legal interest, costs, etc).  

One strategy is to just tough it out delaying court decisions as much as possible. Seeking court permission to sell assets and place the  amount at dispute (but not the entire proceeds) in escrow pending the court's decision - allowing the remainder of the proceeds to make payments under the restructuring. 

Or trying to substitute less desirable assets.  Here take my shares in TIDBank and let me have the Bahrain Islamic Bank shares. 

Following the tough it out strategy requires  the co-operation of the  agreeing creditors to go forward.  And strong discipline in their ranks.  It also depends in the final analysis on the amount of the dissident creditors' exposure and their ability to bring suit in various jurisdictions.     

You Said What?: Sue Myrick "The Iranians are Coming"



Well the thing that concerns me, and you mentioned this briefly, Iran is working with Venezuela. And they're transiting through Venezuela, taking Spanish for maybe six months. They're getting the false documents that they need, coming up through Mexico and if they're stopped, they just say well I'm Spanish. And it, oh I mean Mexican, and it only takes a smart border agent who knows the difference in the accents. He can tell, but if he doesn't have that, there's no way to know.

And the other thing that we're seeing, and we're seeing it in your state in particular in the prisons is Farsi tattoos. Farsi is basically a Persian language, which Iran is, and we know we've seen Arabic tattoos in our prisons for a long time, but we haven't seen Farsi tattoos in a long time. That's a pretty good indication that these people coming across our border are not just coming from Mexico and other countries that are looking for work. And that's what scares me. Being on Intelligence, we know there are people who are are here who do want to do us harm who are already in the country and it's not a matter of will they get in anymore, it's a matter of they're already here because of our lax border laws.
Well, as I'm sure you'll agree, this is mighty disturbing.  Rather sophisticated Iranians - capable of learning Spanish in six months - are infiltrating our country.  The only thing that stands between "them" and "us" are the language skills of our border patrol.  If they can't tell a Mexican or Spanish accent from  a Farsi  one, we're in for big trouble.

Of course, if they have those "Farsi tatoos", I suppose that would be another way to catch them.  Though I have to admit it's unclear why they would have these tattoos.  Wouldn't that undermine their clever disguises?

And if they're in jail, haven't we already caught them? Or is this a diabolical plan to take over our prisons?  And what greater threat to our nation?  For what more symbolizes a nation than its prisons? 

Perhaps, convenience stores?  And there's another threat lurking there.  And it isn't Apu.

After all this AA is pretty scared but not more than by two chilling facts:
  1. Representative Myrick has represented the 9th Congressional District in North Carolina since 1995 .
  2. She has a seat on the House Intelligence Committee.
I'm hoping the name signifies the Committee works to raise the intelligence level of its members.  No Representative left behind, no matter how far back he or she starts out.

Wednesday, 14 July 2010

AlGosaibi v Maan AlSanea - Saudi Court Rejects AHAB Suit Against AlSanea

AlQabas reports that the Saudi Administrative Court for the Eastern Province rejected a lawsuit raised by Ahmad Hamad AlGosaibi and Brothers Company ("AHAB") against Mr. Maan Al Sanea citing lack of jurisdiction and competence to hear the case.

In the case AHAB was seeking 43 million shares of SAMBA plus earnings thereon of some SAR1 billion (US$266.6 million) which it claims are in Mr. AlSanea's possession but which it asserts belong to it.

Tuesday, 13 July 2010

Towers Watson on Pension Fund "Alternative" Asset Allocations



A very interesting report from Towers Watson on pension fund Alternative Assets' AUM by asset class, geography, top managers (by volume, no performance numbers given), etc.

And this very delightful quote from the press release accompanying the release.
Carl Hess said: “Infrastructure and commodities managers have significantly increased their pension fund assets under management during the past year, as investors have become more comfortable with these asset classes and while others have continued to opportunistically add to their allocations. However, investors should be very wary of the structure of some of these mandates with careful attention being paid to the ‘net of fees’ proposition, in particular for infrastructure.”
Wise advice indeed.  "Net of fees" is an important concept to perceptive investors in all asset classes.  I presume Carl mentioned it here because some fee "propositions" in the infrastructure class were in his opinion a bit "rich".  Which just goes to show that "conventional" firms can charge fees like so-called "religious" ones.  Doing God's work, indeed!

Aabar Takeover - The Wall St WTF "Take"

Ken has a good post on Aabar's take-over offer over at his blog.  Worth a read.

Monday, 12 July 2010

National Investments Clarifies Bahrain Judgment Against The Investment Dar



Yesterday evening, I posted a quick translation of an article in AlQabas about an NIC Court victory in Bahrain that was interpreted as posing a potential serious problem to TID in implementing its restructuring.   Today NIC responded with a clarifying announcement on the KSE.  The text is below.  As usual Arabic language only.

NIC makes the following points:
  1. In the lawsuit, it is acting as manager of the AlWataniya (or National) Money Fund.
  2. The judgment it has won is procedural.  Earlier the Court of First Instance in Bahrain had refused to hear the case claiming it did not have jurisdiction.  The Appeals Court ruling overturns this judgment but it does not decide anything against TID.
  3. This step will allow NIC to refile its attachment/freeze on TID's Bahrain assets and refile its case in the Court of First Instance.
  4. The total amount of the money owed to the Fund (including both NIC and its clients) is KD 9,755,548 against which it has taken provisions of KD4,879,649 to today's date.   (Re earlier post: It's pretty sad if you can even get the numbers right when you're translating).
  5. And that it will not get any money until a final judgment is rendered by Bahrain Courts. Remember the three strikes analogy here.  The case can be appealed all the way to Bahrain's "Supreme Court", the Court of Cassation.
  6. NIC will keep the KSE advised.


[11:7:1]  ِ.ايضاح من (استثمارات) بخصوص ما نشر فى احدى الصحف المحلية ‏
يعلن سوق الكويت للاوراق المالية بان شركة الاستثمارات الوطنية ‏(استثمارات)‏
تود ان توضح بخصوص ما نشر فى احدى الصحف اليومية حول الحكم الصادر ‏
من محكمة الاستئناف البحرينية ،تفيد الشركة بالاتي :‏
ِ- ان الحكم المذكور صادر لصالح شركة الاستثمارات الوطنية (استثمارات) ‏
بصفتها مدير صندوق الوطنية النقدي اى ان الحكم صادر لصالح الصندوق ‏
المذكور .‏
ِ-الحكم ينص على الغاء حكم محكمة اول درجة والقاضي بعدم اختصاص ‏
محاكم البحرين بهذا النزاع والحكم مجددا باختصاص محاكم البحرين ‏
بذلك النزاع وتثبيت الحجوزات المتخذة على اصول شركة دار الاستثمار محل ‏
النزاع فى البحرين ،ومن ثم اعادة ملف الدعوى الى محكمة اول درجة للفصل ‏
فى الموضوع .‏
ِ-اما بالنسبة لتاثير ذلك على البيانات المالية لشركة الاستثمارات الوطنية ‏
فالشركة تفيد بان اجمالي استثمارات الشركة وشركاتها التابعة فى الصندوق ‏
المذكور يبلغ 9,755,548 د.ك ،وقد تم حتى تاريخة اخذ مخصص لذلك الاستثمار ‏
يبلغ مجمله 4,879,649 د.ك .‏
ِ- الشركة لن تقوم باسترجاع ايا من المخصاات الماخوذة سواء لها او لشركاتها ‏
التابعة الا بعد صدور حكم نهائي بهذا الخصوص وتحصيل المبالغ المشار اليها .‏
وسوف تقوم الشركة بموافاة ادارة السوق باى تطورات بخصوص ذلك الموضوع .‏
وعليه سوف تعاد الشركة الى التداول بعد عشر دقائق من نزول الاعلان .‏

KIPCO Clarifies UGB Purchase of Burgan Bank Shares




Responding to an article in the local press about UGB's potential purchase of Burgan Bank shares, KIPCO kindly set the record straight this morning with an announcement of its own on the KSE.  (Text below.  As always Arabic only).

KIPCO noted that:
  1. While UGB had authority to buy up to 20% of BB, the Company was only intending to sell 13% of its BB shares.
  2. No profit would be recognized on this transaction.  See below.
  3. That it owns 96% of UGB.   
As regards point #2, this makes perfect sense.  No doubt UGB is buying shares at market.  Any profit at the parent only KIPCO level will be eliminated on the consolidation of UGB into KIPCO.'s financials  However, at the individual company level, UGB  has already recognized the profit on the sale of Tunis International Bank to Burgan in the earlier round of "musical assets".  The investment in Burgan is, as we noted earlier, part of recurring pattern of "astute business" of re-investing the proceeds of inter Group asset sales back into  Group companies.  "All in the Family" as they say.

The KSE and BSE might want to look over their respective  list of major shareholders in UGB and revise.  KSE hereBSE here.   Perhaps, the music is a bit too up tempo to keep up with.
 
 [13:29:6]  ِ.
ايضاح من (مشاريع) بخصوص ما نشر فى احدى الصحف المحلية ‏
يعلن سوق الكويت للاوراق المالية بان شركة مشاريع الكويت القابضة (مشاريع)‏
تود ان توضح بخصوص ما نشر فى احدى الصحف اليومية حول بيع حصة بنسبة ‏
ِ20% من بنك برقان لمصلحة بنك الخليج المتحد ، تفيد الشركة ‏تنوي بيع نسبة ‏
مقدارها 13% من رأس مال بنك برقان الى بنك الخليج المتحد ، علما بان بنك ‏
الخليج المتحد قد حصل على موافقة بنك الكويت المركزي لتملك حصة تصل ‏
الى 20% من رأس مال بنك برقان .‏
كما تفيد الشركة بان بنك الخليج المتحد هي شركة تابعة مملوكة من قبل شركة ‏
مشاريع الكويت القابضة بإجمالي نسبة 96%، وبالتالي لن ينتج عن العملية ‏
المذكورة اي ربح او خسارة .‏

Aayan Leasing and Investment - Financial Stability Law is the Last Refuge


Muhammad Shabaan at AlQabas has an article in the 12 July issue with the headline:  "Aayan:  FSL the Last Refuge."  Which I suppose is perhaps an apt update of Samuel Johnson's April 1775 aphorism - at least in this case.

The article quotes financial sources that the Company is considering resorting to the FSL as it has been unable to reach agreement with its creditors.  Negotiations began over two years ago with the lead bank (KFH, I think), then morphed into multilateral negotiations.  No real progress has been made.  The Company has reportedly stopped servicing its debts.

Some lenders are planning to provision 50% of their outstandings - which is given as evidence that not much more progress is expected.  And which is it suggested will make progress more difficult. 

The article closes by noting that changes in the executive suite will be forthcoming.

It also repeats market talk that Aayan's 2009 financials submitted to the Central Bank some time ago (not specified how long) show a KD40 million loss.  And that the CBK and ALI have not yet been able to agree on the numbers.

If this is true and note that all we have is a market rumor, then ALI's 2009 FYE equity is probably around KD59 million.  That's derived in case you wonder from 3Q09's KD71 million plus and additional KD12 million in losses for 4Q09.

I'm going to go out on a limb here.  I suspect that's because CBK thinks the loss and any asset writedowns should be larger rather than smaller.  Though we did have one Islamic bank state earlier today that it had taken the option of increasing provisions to enhance its financial position.  Maybe the CBK is unlike the Central Bank of Bahrain not open to such moves.  (In case you're wondering, in a radical departure from most comments you read here, that comment is made with tongue firmly in cheek).

AlGosaibi v Maan AlSanea - Fortis Bank v Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank In Re Awal Bank

Asa Fitch over at The National has an interesting article on Fortis Bank's suit against ADIB for some US$40 million for ADIB's failure to honor its confirmation of an Awal Bank LC which was the basis for Fortis adding its own confirmation.  

The underlying transaction appears to one of those fairly common "Islamic" transactions - a loan disguised as a commodity purchase transaction carefully to  meet "Shari'ah compliant" banking "principles".  Yes, those quotations marks mean exactly what you think they do.

ADIB is asserting fraud in the inception by Mr. AlSanea as its defense against payment to Fortis.

Where have I heard that legal defense before?

And this is as good place as any to note that Mr. AlSanea denies any wrongdoing.

In any case, I'll post a bit more on this in a day or two once I regain my composure.  I can't stop laughing.

I thought the letters of credit that Ahli Bank Kuwait issued for TIBC were a howl.   ADIB's "letter of credit" is beyond that.  

As an extra bonus for your patience, I'll also post on BNPP Bahrain's suit against ADIB for some US$44.9 million involving letters of credit issued by TIBC that BNPP confirmed against ADIB's irrevocable undertaking.  

The Investment Dar - Restructuring Plan Does Not Incorporate New Central Bank Regulations - So What?


You've probably seen the articles (Gulf Daily News, AlWatan, and AlQabas) saying that TID, its creditors, Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse met 6 July to discuss the draft restructuring plan and to discuss the fact that the plan does not incorporate the new Central Bank guidelines for investment companies.

Much is made of the fact that the Central Bank guidelines must be completely implemented by June 2012.

As you'll recall (and if you do not, look here and here), these impose certain rather strictly drafted ratios:
  1. Leverage of 2:1 (Total Liabilities to Equity)
  2. 10% Liquid Assets Ratio
  3. A cap on foreign borrowing - 50% of total equity.
Frankly, this seems much ado about nothing.

Barring a miraculous recovery of asset values, there are two ways that TID can get in compliance with the ratios.
  1. Its shareholders agree to fund a massive increase in capital.
  2. Its creditors, particularly the foreign ones, forgive debt.  Other options would be defeasance.  Or equity conversions.
Hard to imagine rational investors throwing good money after bad (subscribing for new equity) for the sake of complying with some regulation.

Impossible to imagine creditors forgiving debt - especially the "Islamic" ones even in light of the clear guidance in 2:280.  

Defeasance would require sufficient assets in the "trust" to provide a comfort margin.  Given the quality of TID's "core assets", one would expect a very large margin.   That would leave other creditors high and dry.  As well, the hook into the Company by not defeasing provides at least additional theoretical source of repayment. 

Converting secured debt into equity doesn't seem like a particularly appealing prospect unless the conversion could be into an instrument that was called "equity" but was actually the equivalent of secured debt.

There's no real motive for a shareholder or creditor to take any of these actions.  Both realize that the Central Bank's options are limited.  It's not going to place TID into Administration (at least not beyond what the restructuring is already doing) for the sake of  enforcing a regulation.

More likely than not the Central Bank of Kuwait will have to give TID a special exemption from the new rules - an extension beyond the 30 June 2012 "deadline".   Just as it is likely to have to give Global such a pass.

The Investment Dar - National Investments Wins Appeal in Bahrain

 

Muhammad Al Itrabi at AlQabas reports that National Investments Company Kuwait has won an appeal in Bahrhain against TID relating to some KD30 million in debt.

The article notes that this judgment given before the Central Bank has made its final decision about allowing TID to enter the safe harbour of the Financial Stability Law potentially complicates implementation of TID's restructuring.  And opens the doors to other lenders taking action.

That may be a bit of a over reaction.

First, like American baseball, one gets three "goes" in the Bahrain (and other local court systems).  In Bahrain in particular, it's not over until the fat lady (the Court of Cassation) sings.   By the time the Court of Cassation renders its verdict it's highly likely that the CBK will have decided whether or not TID should enter the FSL.  

If the CBK rules against TID, then the implications are clear.  A massive legal scramble.  It's not likely that the CBK is going to unleash this sort of "trouble" on the already troubled Kuwaiti financial sector.  

If it rules in favor of TID, then it's going to be mighty difficult for any Kuwaiti Company to launch legal actions in a foreign jurisdiction.  It's also highly likely that the Courts of Bahrain will recognize the FSL protection.

Hard to see this being anything but a minor annoyance.  And it might just prompt the CBK to speed up its decision.

Sunday, 11 July 2010

Dubai World Restructuring: Hard Slog to the Finish Line


Business Maktoob reports that Dubai World will meet with its creditors 22 July to make another presentation on the terms of the proposed restructuring.  And that subsequent workshops will be held in Hong Kong, London and Dubai to allow banks to pose questions on the restructuring to DW's expert advisors.

It's pretty clear that the sales process is still continuing.  

And from the number of "commercials" DW is either taking no chances on the outcome of the creditors' vote.  Or perhaps more likely has been encountering some resistance to the deal.  I say that because the 22 July meeting is at least three weeks behind the original schedule.  If smooth sailing were expected, the presentation would have taken place already.  And the creditors' deadline for a response would be running.   It's not. 

While ultimately a deal will be done (as the alternative is unthinkable), if a sufficient number of banks balk, there might be some improvement in terms.

GCC Oil Fims Accused in Kickback Scheme


You may have seen articles like this one recently.

I don't know about you, but AA is doubly shocked.
  
Shocked at allegations of corruption, though at least I suppose I can rest easy knowing that there is nothing untoward going on with oil exports from the GCC states.  No special deals, no personal discounts or the like.

In one sense this is old news, the US Department of Justice issued a press release last year July on the case in which CCI entered into a plea bargain with the DOJ.   The allegation is for fairly widespread activity: 200 payments in 30 countries from around the globe not just the GCC.

I'd of course hasten to add that while CCI has admitted wrongdoing as far as I know no representative from any of the name countries has admitted guilt.  Nor have any such parties be judicially determined to have taken a bribe.  

As the DOJ notes in its press release (link above): 

"An indictment is merely an accusation and the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty at trial beyond a reasonable doubt."
The recent resurfacing of this story has to do with the extradition to the United States of a foreign national former employee of CCI who is accused of participating in the scheme.

Bahrain Islamic Bank - Trouble on the Horizon?



Today an apparently rather "pleased" as well as "satisfied" BIsB announced that:
BisB has taken the option of enhancing its financial position, by increasing its provisions mainly due its investment portfolio, rather than announcing profits for its mid–year results.
AA:  Should the reader interpret this to mean that contrary to IFRS, AAOIFI "FAS" allow a reporting entity full discretion to take provisions even when they are not really needed?  Perhaps, merely as "a precautionary step against any market changes, and in line with the Bank's conservative policy in this regard."  No deterioration in the portfolio here.  Move along.  It's pretty much in line with 2009 when the Bank appropriated "precautionary provisions" as "a conseqeunce to the International Financial and Economic condition".

By the way if you're wondering BIsB "has registered non-cash losses to the tune of BD 5.7 million for the first half of the current year."  In 1Q10 it had a small profit of BD1.2 million. 2Q10 Financials here.

We also learned that:
The Board of Directors agreed to increase the paid-up capital of the Bank by up to 75 % by issuing new shares with at its nominal share price issue of 100 Fils per share.
And that:
Mr. Khalid Abdulla Al-Bassam went on to confirm the Bank’s strong financial position and its satisfactory liquidity status and reiterated that the Bank needs the new injection of cash to finance the growth requirements in its business activities.
AA:  Apparently a rather sudden decision on an expansion strategy.  You'll recall that no capital increase was presented at the 16 March 2010 Annual General Meeting for 2009.   Perhaps like AA you're  also wondering where BIsB is going to grow by 75% particularly in this market.  Though perhaps a part of the capital increase will go to cover the BD35 million deduction from regulatory capital for the "excess amount over maximum permitted large exposure limit".  That and 2009's BD20 million loss were the primary cause of the approximate halving of the CAR.  (Note 16 2009 Audited Financials).

It's also a bit surprising that a successful institution like BIsB is offering its shares at par BD0.100 - when it trades at BD0.159 per share and its book value per share is BD0.183.  Though I suppose one might note that roughly a year ago the Bank traded for BD0.264.  And that its order book is one-sided with more than 100,000 shares on "offer" - roughly 14 x the last traded volume.  Market data here.

There would appear be more here than meets the eye at first glance.
  1. Clearly, BIsB - which is well known for its focus on the real estate sector (not only for lending but also for  proprietary investment  in construction and development companies -- has some issues with its portfolio.    
  2. It needs provisions.
  3. It needs additional capital.  Hence the Rights Offering at par.
  4. That being said, Moody's ratings on the Bank remain the same as they did in March 2010 a respectable Baa1..

Ownership and the "Joy" of Maintenance Fees

The National points up one of the issues of the strata or condominium form of ownership of real property.

One is at the mercy of one's neighbors.  If they fail to pay the maintenance fee, the upkeep of the building suffers from cosmetic to more substantial matters.    The market value of one's apartment or villa then declines. 
Mr Aldendorff said: “How many owners have disappeared or are just not paying? And how viable is it to put a property on the market in an economy where nobody is buying? The legal process is so lengthy, we won’t be able to immediately recover the money.”

There's an even more serious question.  Who in their right mind is going to buy into a property - even in a good market - where there are substantial arrears?   Unless perhaps one is the buying the last defaulter's unit.

If there are projects with a 75% maintenance default rate, they are going to be hard pressed to recover.  And the 25% who do pay aren't going to be able to shoulder the defaulters' share - at least not without serious economic consequences.   One also expects that banks would (if they are alert, perhaps a questionable assumption) be highly concerned about deterioration in the physical condition of  their collateral on top of general market price levels.

There is a bright side.

As one of my local friends said:  "It's all part of the "Vision".  When the existing properties get run down enough, they'll have to be knocked down and new ones erected.  And there will be another boom."  At least perhaps from the demolition.

Saturday, 10 July 2010

Limitless Limits Its Exposure: Pulls Out of Haute Development Malaysia

On 8 July Bandar Raya Developments Berhad announced that its subsidiary had entered into a conditional sales agreement with Limitless to buy its 60% stake in Haute Property SDN.  Haute was set up with UEM  (who own 40%) to develop luxury homes in Johor State.

Ardent will pay Limitless:
  1. RM1.0 (roughly US$0.31) for Limitless' 60% stake in Haute.  (The company's unaudited financials show negative shareholders' funds).
  2. RM 75 million (US$22.9 million) to reimburse Limitless for partial payment of development rights.  The amount will be converted to US$ at the FX rate at time of payment RM3.27 = US$1.00.  While the RM/US$ rate is currently RM3.196, this will not represent a loss to Limitless as it should get back the exact amount of US$ it paid.
  3. RM1 million representing full and final compensation to Limitless for the RM10 million it advanced Haute for operating and development expenses.
The project is still in the development stage.  It's expected that there will be revisions to the development plan.

For those interested in a trip back to the original Limitless announcement, here is the link.

This move allows Limitless to exit the project with minimal losses and eliminates potential cash calls.  And no doubt not the last step by the various companies in Dubai Inc to reduce foreign projects to concentrate now limited resources at "home".

BTW anyone out there able to cite a single instance of such a comprehensive announcement on a GCC exchange?