For the first nine months of 2020, GFH
reported net income of roughly USD 30.3 million down roughly 50% from
the comparable period last year.
That’s
not surprising. COVID-19 is casting a pall over many firms’
financial results.
But,
neither is the full story.
That’s why one has to read the entire
financial report and not just the Income Statement.
By
my calculation the true economic performance of GFH over the period
was a loss of roughly USD 66 million.PPA
“swing” of some USD 96 million from
the reported number!
Where
does AA’s performance
number come from?
The
Consolidated Statement of Changes in Owners’ Equity page 4 in GFH’s
Third
Quarter 2020 interim financials.
The
Retained Earnings column is the appropriate locus of focus for our
attention.
Why?
Because
it’s where economic gains and losses that
are not required to be
included in the Income Statement appear.
Despite
their being excluded from the
Income Statement, they are as
real a loss as the charges that appear in the Income Statement.
And, at times, gains are recorded here that are not included in the
Income Statement.
To be very
clear there is nothing
inherently wrong
with these entries.
Equally at times company management may use the
discretion
allowed under accounting principles to shift
a “loss” from the Income Statement to the Statement of Changes in
Shareholders’ Equity
in
order to present
a “better” picture of performance.
Motives
might be the desire to pay dividends, particularly for a regulated
firm like a bank. Management bonus. Share price.
That’s
why looking a comprehensive income or loss over a period is a better
measure of the firm’s performance.
Let’s
review the pertinent charges to Retained Earnings.
There
are three significant “losses”
disclosed here.
First
up is a USD 59.9 million
charge arising from GFH’s underwriting of the entire BD 72 million (equivalent to USD 191 million) AT1
capital increase at Khaleeji Commercial bank. Note 1 on page 9
contains a detailed explanation if you’re interested. GFH's carrying value of equity in KHCB is based on its share in the net assets of KHCB. Not the purchase price.
Next
USD 13.9 million
arising from “modification of terms” of financiing GFH has
provided. That is, an easement of repayment terms on the debtor
which decreases the amount GFH will ultimately receive (assuming the
debtor pays) and thus the value of the related asset. Think
of this as the recognition of a likely loss on the related
financing.
Following that USD
22 million which represents
the difference between the cost of Treasury Shares GFH sold (USD
108.7 million) and the amount it received (USD 86.7 million).
I’ve
heard of “buy low sell high”, but not the opposite. Perhaps, an
alternative investment strategy?
These
transactions result from what GFH calls “market making” and AA
calls a failed attempt to prop up its share price.
Not
much evidence of a positive prop
for the price of GFH’s shares. They began the year at USD 0.23 per
share and were at USD 16.0 as of end of 3Q. As of 16 November
trading at USD 14.9.
Of
course, COVID has depressed markets.
But
a look at previous posts analyzing this activity over several years suggest that GFH shareholders receive scant
benefit from these “market making” activities.
You'll find these using the search tool on the right hand side of the page and the words "treasury shares".
As
noted above, if we adjust GFH’s reported Net Income for these
three items, GFH had an economic loss for the period of some USD 66
million.
2 comments:
Welcome back we missed you! Had been waiting for this analysis following the "released financials"
Thanks for the comment and the sentiment.
On a percentage basis, this blog generally runs below 1% on serious comments. The remainder are posts touting this or that online lending service.
GFH is a consistent but rather predictably sad act.
Care to speculate if the recent development in the Kingdom may have an impact on GFH's fortunes?
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