Wirecard: More Missing Money - This Time Real Money

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The FT reported 24 March that sources told them that Oliver Bellenhaus, late of WireCard and Al Alam, informed investigators that in 2011 he and Jan Marsalek, Wirecard’s former CF), began a scheme to shift money out of WC into “an array” of offshore accounts of shell companies in Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands. Said account opened in 2010.

As I read this account, I suspected that many readers would think that this is where WC’s missing Euros 1.9 billion had gone.

I don’t think that this is the case.

Why?

Because it’s hard to steal what doesn’t exist.

If press reports are correct and WC was loss making, then the Euros 1.9 billion never existed. And couldn’t therefore be stolen.

These “shifted” funds would have had to be derived from other sources. And while no doubt significant, nothing close to the former amount.

Earlier I posted a detailed explanation why fiddling with the income statement requires fiddling dollar for dollar with the balance sheet (and vice versa) in my earlier post here.

Let’s look at WC’s financials from FY 2004 though 3Q19 to see if there was evidence of income above the imaginary Euros 1.9 billion. That may have produced actual cash to be stolen.

Why that period?

Prior to 2004 Wirecard was InfoGenie, a rather small call center with negative retained earnings.

There wasn’t much to fiddle with before 2004.

As the table below shows, during that period WC reported Euros 1.919 billion in net income, paid dividends of Euros 165 million, and had other adjustments to retained earnings of Euro 15 million. The dividends were likely funded via increased liabilities rather than cash flow from operations.

So, if there were transfers of “millions” as Mr. Bellenhaus is reported to have said, where did they come from?

Two likely possibilities.

Overstatement of  Expenses/Costs

Either those recognized through the income statement (expenses) or capitalized (costs).

For the former, professional services are a frequent favorite as they don’t generate a hard asset. Or business acquisition/referral fees, processing fees. 

Perhaps, imaginary fees on the imaginary transactions with the difference here is that the latter were paid in cash.

A particularly fertile ground for the latter might be the creation of intangible assets.

What is the proof of the cost of new software, other than the bill for development, particularly if outside vendors were contracted?

In its FY 2018 annual report, WC discloses it spent some Euros 86 million in FY 2018 and Euros 98 million in FY 2017 in cash for “investments in intangible assets”.

Over the period 2016 through 2017, WC’s internally created and other intangible assets increased from Euros 181 million to Euros 252 million.

Could some of these be the result of shifting funds? We don’t know.

Overpayment for Acquisitions

Acquisitions by their nature are “chunky” unless there are periodic payments, e.g., if the newly acquired company performs above a benchmark, the sellers may be entitled to a payment reflecting the greater value of the company they sold. That of course will depend on the terms of sale.

Another possibility would be fees to those who sourced acquisitions for WC, provided WC financial advice, performed due diligence, etc. This presumes such charges were capitalized as part of the cost of the acquisition rather than expensed.

Expense fiddling would a better “cover” for frequently recurring transfers than acquisitions which tend to be lumpy, particularly if the same accounts were used again and again.

It’s not clear from the FT article whether the same accounts were used over and over. 

Does “array of accounts” mean a single group of accounts created in 2010? 

Or could it mean repeated creation of new accounts?

Acquisitions would allow for larger payments in a single transaction. But it would seem that these would be handled by using a different (new) account for each acquisition rather than the same accounts. 

It would (should?) look a bit suspicious to auditors –at least I hope so—if acquisitions from different sellers and in different part of the world went to the same account.

So, if I’ve read the FT article correctly, my best guess would be expense fiddling.

With Mr. Bellenhaus’ co-operation and access to WC’s accounting records, investigators should be able to calculate the amount “shifted” and what transactions were used for cover.

Presumably, the stolen amounts were used to fund the costs associated with running the income fraud as well as to compensate the key players (like Mr. Bellenhaus) for their role.