Tuesday 3 March 2020

Goldilocks Investment Fund “The Midas Touch” – Khaleeji Commercial Bank

As Legendary Investor Fred C. Dobbs Can Tell You Not Only Have to Have 
the Golden Touch, But You've Got to Know How Hold On to Value
Continuing our fairy tale theme, another instalment on Goldilocks Investment Fund.

In doing a bit of research on GFH, I just happened to discover that Goldilocks owned some 9.98% of the shares of Khaleeji Commercial Bank Bahrain.

From a quick look at previous years KHCB financials, their ownership first emerged in the FYE 2017 report and has been consistent since then.

What changed was that as of FYE 2016 Shuaa Capital owned 14.01% of KHCB.

In the FYE 2017 report it “disappeared” from the list of major shareholders – 5% and above.

According to the Bahrain Stock Exchange, on 26 September 2017, Shuaa sold 100 million shares to Goldilocks at BHD 0.096 per share on the Special Order Market.

According to Bahrain Stock Exchange data, the closing price on that day in the regular market was BHD 0.1113 so Goldilocks bought at a 15% discount.

Goldilocks already owned some 3,950,000 shares as of that date and apparently acquired another 829,110 shares prior to FY 2017 end.

Shuaa retained 40,779,824 shares or 3.88 % of its holding then.

It’s not clear if it still does.

What was Goldilocks’ return on its investment?

KHCB paid no cash dividends since Goldilocks’ acquisition.

So the return is change in the market value of stock.

KHCB closed at BHD 0.052 on 2 May 2020.

ROI is negative 46% (based only on the cost of the 100 million shares purchased from Shuaa).

That’s before consideration of the likely negative impact on Goldilocks and other KHCB's existing shareholders of KHCB’s need to raise BHD 37.1 million in new Tier 1 equity. 


But save some of your pity for KHCB which is sitting on a similar size block of Treasury Shares at an average cost of BHD 0.1138 and facing a much lower ROI – negative 54%.

You’ll recall and if you don’t AA will remind you that Shuaa bought AlImtiaz's 14% stake in KHCB in December 2006 for BHD 0.065 per share. Approximately one month after ADFG bought a little over 48% of Shuaa.

Shuaa’s ROI on its investment in the 100 million in KHCB shares it sold Goldilocks was roughly a positive 48%.

Side note:  Ending of film pictured above presents an unrealistic scenario when atomic weight is considered, though it has a nice cinematic effect.

Khaleeji Commercial Bank – Dismal FY 2019 Results & Suggested Questions for Shareholders for the AGM


UPDATED FOR INFORMATION CONTAINED IN KHCB'S OGM/EGM ANNOUNCEMENT. 

Comments below in boldface red font.

Link to new post here.

Some quick comments on KHCB’s FYE 2019 financials.

Plus an additional section with suggested questions for shareholders for the AGM.

The bank reported a net loss of some BHD 15 million due to BHD 20.4 million in provisions for FY 2019.

But if you’ll look a bit closer you’ll see that actually provisions for troubled debt were really more than BHD 20.4 million

They were just called something else.

As often occurs with the adoption of new accounting standards financial institutions are allowed to make prior period adjustments.

That is, they do not have to include the amount of the total adjustments or provisions required in current year’s income, but only the current year's portion.

So they "pretend" that they made the adjustment in the previous financial year (hence the need to restate that year's numbers) and only have to book the "catch-up" since then in current year's income.

This is the case with AAOIFI’s FAS 30.

Sometimes there is an added benefit. The new standards do not require a formal restatement of the prior period financials.

What that means is they make the change in the prior year's financials but do not have to label that year as "restated".  

This is the case with FAS 30 as outlined in Paragraph 63.

This isn’t idiosyncratic behaviour on AAOIFI’s part. IAS and FASB do allow this on some of their new standards.

What this means is that you don’t see the word “restated” above the comparative numbers for FY 2018 in KHCB’s FY 2019 financials.

Why is that a potential problem?

The word "restated" alerts you to the fact that a material change has been made in the financials. 

When it's not there, you might overlook a significant development.

Usually prior period adjustments are not positive events, though sometimes they are.

That’s why you can’t just look at the Balance Sheet and Income Statement. You also need to look at the Cashflow Statement and the Changes in Equity Statement and read the notes.

Looking at the Statement of Changes in Consolidated Equity in KHCB’s FY 2019 report, you’ll notice a BHD 11.1 million prior period adjustment for FY 2018 associated with FAS 30.

What this means is that the provisions required were actually BHD 31.5 million.

Why care?

That is roughly 33% of shareholders’ equity.

As a result of these provisions, KHCB’s equity fell to BHD 85.7 million as of 31 December 2019.

As their auditor points out in Note 1, this is below the minimum capital of BHD 100 million required by the Central Bank of Bahrain.

Further in that note, you will “note” that

The Board of directors has mandated an international bank to assist it with issuing additional tier 1 capital (AT1) of BHD 37.7 million to help strengthen its equity and meet the regulatory requirements.



Suggested AGM Questions for Shareholders

In light of these developments some suggested questions for shareholders to raise at KHCB’s AGM.

Amount of New Capital

  1. CAR remains a very acceptable 16.5%.
  2. Why is KHCB raising BHD 37.7 million 2.5x its capital shortfall of BHD 15 million?
  3. KHCB have announced they will seek EGM approval for up to a USD 200 million sukuk as new capital.
  4. Why is KHDB now raising potentially 5x its BHD 5 million equity shortfall?
  5. Does the Board or management anticipate the need for further provisions or the occurrence of other problems?
  6. Is the CBB requiring that KHCB have more than the minimum BHD 100 million in shareholders’ equity? Admittedly a difficult question for the Board for a variety of reasons.
  7. Is KHCB planning any acquisitions?
  8. Have existing major shareholders advised whether they intend to participate in the new equity?
  9. Hint: It’s not a good sign if they are not interested.

Form of New Capital and Impact on Shareholders
  1. Is the AT1 Capital going to be in the form of preferred stock or a similar instruments, e.g. cocos?
  2. KHCB will ask shareholders at the EGM to approve up to a USD 200 million Sukuk as the instrument.
  3. That’s a more likely scenario than additional common equity because the potential direct dilution of existing shareholders would be significant unless they contributed additional equity.
  4. Assuming the new equity is in the form of preferred stock or similar preferred instruments, what will be the impact on shareholders’ ability to receive dividends?
  5. Usually these instruments have preference over common equity so payments to the new AT1 Capital will reduce the amount available for common dividends.
  6. It’s likely that the new AT1 Capital will lead to a reduction in the market price of common stock given its size relative to existing equity, its likely pricing and privileges vis-a-vis common equity.
  7. If on the other hand, it is going to be issued as common equity, what is the dilution impact on existing shareholders? 
  8. It would appear to be rather large because of the amount required.
  9. AT1 Capital of this size is not going to be cheap.
Alternatives – Treasury Shares?

If you’re like AA, you will have noticed the BHD 11.79 million in Treasury Shares and wondered if these were an alternative that would spare the existing shareholders some pain.

But note this is "efficient" only if KHCB has to raise BHD 15 million not BHD 37.1 million in new Tier 1 capital.

Treasury Shares are deducted from equity. Somehow removing these from the balance sheet would increase equity and thus reduce the amount of new capital required.

If KHCB could sell them at its cost (BHD 11.79 million), it could reduce its BHD 15 million capital deficit to roughly BHD 3 million.

Perhaps, the CBB could even be persuaded that the amount was so small that KHCB could be given the “grace” to cover it from profits over a couple of years.

That would obviate the need for new capital and prevent loss of value of the existing shareholders.

Alas, KHCB’s average cost per Treasury Share is BHD 0.1138.

If it could sell all its shares at market price – not a likely scenario given the size of the “block” and less than enthusiastic appetite for KHCB shares--, it would as a best case raise about BHD 5.4 million based on the closing price of its shares on 2 March  2020. 103.6 million Treasury Shares* BHD 0.052.

However, selling such a large block of shares would decrease the realized price. So the actual amount would be less.

The BHD 6.4 million “loss” on the best case sale (=103.6 million TS * (BHD 0.052-BHD 0.1138) would be a transfer of BHD 6.4 million from the Treasury Shares sub-account in equity to Retained Earnings in Equity.

So it would not affect the total for shareholders’ equity.

And thus not increase or decrease the amount of funds KHCB has to raise to “cover” the BHD 15 million shortfall. Only the cash received would decrease the amount needed to be raised.

Now, if KHCB were to cancel its Treasury Shares, it would recognize a loss of par value (BHD0.10) less average price (BHD0.1138) times 103.6 million shares or roughly BHD 1.5 million.  

That would mean that the BHD 15 million deficit would reduce to about BHD 5 million. The same logic for grace might apply, thus eliminating the need for any new capital.

The question would be the trade off.

Is the benefit to existing shareholders (quantified in BHD terms) of avoiding the issuance of new equity worth more than the cost of canceling the shares and wiping out forever the BHD 11.79 million spent on Treasury Shares.

One would probably want to analyze this in terms of various presumed "recovery" rates (selling prices) of the Treasury Stock. 

If, however, KHCB must raise BHD 37.1 million, then this method would be of limited utility.

As an aside, shareholders might want to ask their Board to remind them again of the compelling business logic of KHCB acquiring roughly 10% of its shares as Treasury Stock.

This may also be a topic that KHCB’s regulator should consider though sadly retroactively.

There’s not much that can be done about past purchases, but KHCB could be required to gradually decrease its holdings of Treasury Shares to a much lower level.

It may also be a 'wise" move for the CBB to ask all regulated entities with significant holdings of Treasury Shares to report to the CBB if the average cost of the holdings is materially different than the current market price.


Thursday 27 February 2020

Bahrain Middle East Bank FY 2019 Review and Suggested Shareholder Questions for the AGM

Lots of Tunnel Little Evidence of Light


A quick review of BMB’s FY 2019 financials provide no real reason for optimism.  

Based on that review, I’ve included some suggested questions for shareholders attending the upcoming AGM.

FY 2019 Performance Review

As might be expected given the problems BMB is facing, its business activities were adversely affected. For the year net income was a loss of USD 3.6 million.

Other information of note.
  1. Non performing bank obligation: BMB identified a USD 13.1 million non performing obligation from a “locally incorporated” financial institution. I did not see an explicit reference to this in the FY 2018 report. 
  2. Non performing Assets Under Management: As per Note 28 some USD 32.897 million of Assets Under Management as of FYE 2019 (91.5% of total AUM) are placed with related parties. These assets are non-performing. I missed this in the FY 2018 report which shows it pays to read all the notes.
  3. Focus on recovery means little to no focus on income generation: The Board has identified recovery of related party exposures as its primary mission. The Central Bank of Bahrain has also placed restrictions on the bank’s activities. A sensible step given its financial condition.
Questions for the AGM

Shareholders will rightly be focused on the progress and prospects for recovery of related party exposure.

Below are some suggested additional questions.

Recapitalization
  1. The long term future of BMB depends on getting new capital. Otherwise the bank will be liquidated. 
  2. Liquidations generally result in less recovery than ongoing concerns. 
  3. Recapitalization is key to a long term future for BMB.
  4. As per BMB’s Articles of Association-which mirror the Bahrain Commercial Companies Law-, the minimum acceptable quorum for an Extraordinary General Meeting requires attendance by shareholders holding 25% of the bank’s shares.
  5. Since ANI owns just under 81% of the bank, it appears that an EGM cannot be held without their active participation. That seems unlikely given the risks such participation would expose them to.
  6. How, if at all, can a recapitalization take place if an EGM can’t be held?

USD 32.897 Million in Non Performing Assets Under Management
  1. Are the assets non-performing because of underlying economics of the investments?
  2. Or was there fraud?
  3. Are the related parties the same entities as with the credit exposure, i.e., the Turkish Three Amigos?
  4. Does the bank have any legal liability to make its customers whole? Note this particular question is likely to be one that the bank may prefer not to answer.
USD 13.1 Million Non Performing Bank Obligation
  1. Is the bank unable to pay BMB?
  2. Or is the bank unwilling to pay BMB perhaps because this is entwined with related party transactions?
  3. The bank appears to be located in Bahrain. Is the Central Bank helping BMB with collection, assuming this is not a case of general insolvency of that bank.
If AA were to attend, you can bet he’d have questions about the single regional financial institution to which BMB owes some USD 127.6 million.

As per the financials (Note 2 and Note 12), it seems clear that that bank is constrained from removing its deposits from BMB.

AA would want to know why this is the case? And of course the identity.  Another question that the bank and its regulator may prefer to avoid.  

Link to earlier post here.

Wednesday 19 February 2020