Thursday, 24 October 2019

Tesla Reports 3Q2019 Net Profit – But Hold the Champagne

Perhaps not precisely every minute, but often enough to 
fulfill demand for "wise" investors


So how excited is Abu Arqala?  Not much.

Has AA changed his view on Tesla?  No.

Why?

First, let’s look at Tesla’s 3Q2019 “performance”.

Reported GAAP net income is USD 143 million.

Sales of regulatory credits are USD 134 million.

That USD 134 million is 94% of the quarter’s net profit.   It has nothing to do with Tesla’s fundamental businesses making a profit.  Rather it is (another) gift from Uncle Sugar.  Corporate welfare.  See my earlier post.

Excluding that amount Tesla’s automobile and other businesses generated a “massive” net profit of USD 9 million in 3Q19.   AA is suitably un-wowed.

And of course there are likely to be other non-automotive regulatory credits sold, e.g., by Solar City.

On a simple proforma basis, that’s USD 36 million a year from the businesses.  An amount so large that in order to calculate it, AA had to employ both the supercomputer and electron microscope he used to calculate Saudi investment banking fees for an earlier post.  Saudi investment banking fees were much larger.

Net income for the first nine months is a loss of USD 967 million.  Excluding regulatory credit sales, the net loss is USD 1.428 billion.

AA thinks it’s interesting that regulatory credit sales were not mentioned in the breathless hype over Tesla’s “crushing” or “wowing” earnings. Are our financial journalists reading more than the press releases?  Do they understand the importance of regulatory credit sales to Tesla's business.  One (that would be AA) sure hopes so.

And a bonus link on an accounting change adopted in 2019 that makes Tesla look better on paper.

"Better" is a relative term -- as in USD 967 million in losses is "better" than USD 1.428 million.

Monday, 21 October 2019

Great Moments in Capitalism: Tesla – He Built It All by Himself or Did He?

"Daddy, read me the story about how the Power Ponies saved the Job Creators"

There are many stirring yarns of dogged entrepreneurs who by dint of their prodigious intellects, hard work, and business smarts built businesses all by themselves.  Giants of the business world.

Secular saints for our national—and dare I say international--religion:  Steve Jobs, Henry Ford, even according to some, Papa John.  Visionaries, pioneers, rugged self-reliant individuals.  The kind that disdain handouts.

According to these tales, more often than not these hardy individuals have had to struggle against the heavy “dead hand” of governments that seem more interested in crushing their visions than stepping out of the way to allow them to succeed.  Men like Hank Rearden.

In today’s installment, we look at but one slim chapter from the storied career of Elon Musk—visionary technology investor, entrepreneur, engineer, and product architect.  

An  immigrant to these shores and to Canada in more tolerant times, he’s built many businesses all by himself demonstrating, though no demonstration is really required, that a hard working smart individual can succeed on his own without government handouts.

But would you be surprised if I told you that Musk like many other of our secular saints had a silent partner who helped make his dreams reality?

An unsung hero.  One that AA will now reveal.

To set that stage some information from Tesla’s financials. They say that numbers never lie, though they rarely ascribe that virtue to all accountants.


TESLA REGULATORY CREDIT SALES (RCS)
Millions of US Dollars

Year
RCS
Net Loss
RCS/NL
NL-RCS
2009
$8
($557)
1.5%
($565)
2010
$3
($154)
1.8%
($157)
2011
$4
($254)
1.5%
($258)
2012
$41
($396)
10.2%
($437)
2013
$194
($74)
262.7%
($268)
2014
$216
($294)
73.6%
($510)
2015
$169
($889)
19.0%
($1,057)
2016
$302
($773)
39.1%
($1,075)
2017
$360
($2,241)
16.1%
($2,601)
2018
$419
($1,063)
39.4%
($1,481)





TOTAL
$1,716
($6,695)
25.6%
($8,411)



Regulatory Credit Sales are from Zero Emission Vehicle Credits (ZEV), Green House Gas (GHG), and since 2016 credits associated with Solar City.  You can read about it here on page 11 of Tesla’s 2018 Annual Report.  Data above is from that AR and earlier ARs.

Tesla has also indirectly benefited from the USD 7,500 tax rebate given purchasers of its cars by the Federal Government.  To be fair Tesla is not the only company that has benefited.  That tax rebate is not reflected above as it accrues to the purchasers not directly to Tesla.

However, without Uncle Sugar’s discount, Tesla cars would cost more and sales would be less.

Tesla has reached the 200,000 car sales milestone at which point the credit halves and then haves again this year.  Unless Tesla and other electronic vehicle manufacturers are successful in their efforts to “save the environment” by having a usually compassionate Congress extend the rebate program, an important support for sales will be lost.

At this moment prospects don’t appear good for the “Driving American Forward” Bill.  Senate Bill.  House Version.

Let’s assume that this noble effort falters.

Ignoring the reductions in 2019 in the rebate, and assuming that anyone who buys a Tesla has at least a USD 7,500 Federal tax bill, then Uncle Sugar has supported Tesla’s business to the tune of at least an additional USD 1.5 billion.  Or USD 3.2 billion in total.

Beyond that Tesla benefited from a US Government Guaranteed  USD 465 million loan under the ATVM program.  Tesla repaid the loan prior to its maturity.

Tesla also benefits from various state incentives.

There are a lot of Sugar Daddies out there for struggling corporations and the deserving rich who can afford to buy Tesla’s product.

With partners like these it’s hard to see how Tesla can fail, unless you look closely at the financials. 

Friday, 18 October 2019

Dana Gas - Potential Negative Effects from Proposed UD 350mm Pearl Petroleum Bond

Great White Whale or Great White Tiger -- AA Stays in the Hunt Until the End

This post is an “early warning” about a potential negative impact of the proposed USD 350 million new Pearl Petroleum bond on the creditworthiness of Dana Gas’s Nile Delta Sukuk.

As the italicized words in the previous sentence indicate, we won’t know the extent of the impact until the final terms of the proposed issue are published and the deal is placed.

Reuters reported that Pearl  in the market for a USD 350 million bond and has hired Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley as “joint global co-ordinators and book runners” with  Shuaa Capital as a “co-manager”.

At this point, I’d note that the term “underwriter “ has not been used which may indicate this is a “best efforts” transaction – reasonable given the preliminary subzero (non-investment grade) credit rating.

More detail—though still preliminary--on the proposed issue can be found here in a Fitch Ratings press release on its preliminary rating for this transaction. Fitch has assigned preliminary  B - rating (non-investment grade) to the proposed issue, subject to satisfactory review of the final documents.

What are the implications for the unfortunate holders of the Nile Delta Sukuk?

First, as a matter of law, debt service payments on the new bond will have priority over Pearl dividends to shareholders.  Thus, reducing the amount of cashflow to Dana Gas.

How much?  The amount of reduction will depend on Deal Terms (final maturity, the principal amortization schedule--AA hopes this isn’t a bullet--, and the coupon) which are currently unknown.  As well, it will depend on underwriting standards applied.

Second, looking at the Fitch press release a couple of additional potential problems emerge.

The issue is a senior secured facility.

Two consequences.

Pearl’s assets are going to be pledged for the new bond.  While DG’s interest in Pearl isn’t pledged as security under the Nile Delta Sukuk, these assets do provide support for DG’s creditworthiness.

Fitch estimates that in the case of a going concern reorganization or sale of Pearl, the USD 350 million bondholders are likely to have a 50% recovery.  That means nothing for DG or the other Pearl shareholders in this case. If the company goes completely bust, then the USD 350 million bondholders will have the first “cup of pain”.  Pearl’s shareholders will be no worse off unless they have provided some support on the bond.

To put this into context as of FYE 2018, some 26% of DG’s reported assets were its share of Pearl’s assets.  And that USD 818 million “share” was  some 32% of equity.

Given Pearl's dismal rating, AA would hope (but is prepared to be disappointed) that the bondholders will place solid "protective" covenants on Pearl.  A key area would be controls on cashflow. That would directly affect DG.

On that topic Fitch notes that it expects dividends starting in 2020 to be lower than this year’s projected USD 550 million (DG share roughly USD 193 million), probably because that is included in the draft documents it has seen.

How much lower isn’t specified. Presumably that will be related to the Deal Terms.   Hopefully, this bond will not repeat the Sukuk’s unfortunate failure to relate dividends to cashflow.

Pearl is a significant contributor to DG’s cashflow.  Constraints on Pearl’s dividends paid will have an impact on DG’s ability to repay the sukuk.  Keep in mind that DG has use of cash when it receives dividends from Pearl.

Note that DG’s financials show DG’s share of Pearl’s cash and receivables.  But those amounts are not directly available to DG.  See Note 15 2018 Annual Report.

According to a very rough analysis of that Note, DG may be reporting as much as USD 100 million in its “Cash and Banks” that belongs to Pearl.  Money that DG cannot use until Pearl issues dividends.  See that analysis here part of an earlier post recently amended.

Sadly there is more.

If you'll read DG's 2Q2019 Investor Presentation, you'll see that DG is considering the strategic sale of its "fine" Egyptian assets.  Potentially good news for the Nile Delta Sukuk holders as these assets are pledged to them.

But for the shareholders probably not so good.

DG appears to think it's a good strategy to focus its "portfolio" on Pearl, essentially turning DG into a Kurdish investment. I trust I don't have to spell out the risks in that strategy.  .

Sunday, 29 September 2019

عندي خطابٌ عاجلٌ إليك



يا أيها المعلم الكبير .. كم حزننا كبير
كم جرحنا كبير
لكننا نقسم بالله العلي القدير
أن نحفظ الميثاق ونحفظ الثورة
وعندما يسألنا أولادنا
في أي عصر عشتم ؟
في عصر أي ملهم ؟
في أي عصر فاجر ؟
نجيبهم .. نجيبهم
في عصر عبد الناصر ..
في عصر عبد الناصر

Saturday, 28 September 2019

الرئيس الراحل


زمن الرجال والرجولة


What a difference 49 years make!


Monday, 5 August 2019

Send Him Back #2 - Desperately Needed Politician

 His Party and His Country Need Him

No, AA isn’t proposing deporting anyone.
There was a time when we were a classier and kinder bunch.  Sadly that seems to have passed.
Let's “bring back” some of the people from those happier earlier days. Even if only in spirit.
Readers should feel free to “bring back” those they consider exemplars.  Remember no one is perfect.  They just have to be better than current. That’s a fairly low bar to jump.

Send Him Back! #1 Desperately Needed Neighbor

Who Wouldn't Want a Good Neighbor

No, AA isn’t proposing deporting anyone.
There was a time when we were classier and kinder.  Sadly that time seems to have passed.  
Perhaps, one way to remedy the current vulgarity and mean spiritedness would be to “bring back” some of the people from those happier earlier days. Even if only in spirit. 
Readers should feel free to “bring back” those they consider exemplars. 
Remember no one is perfect.
They just have to be better than current. That’s a fairly low bar to pass.

Wednesday, 31 July 2019

5 Fundamental Misperceptions about Transparency International’s Country Corruption “Rankings”

Plenty of Cake to Go Around: Eat Your Fill, Sleep Well

Probably the most well-known source for “rankings” of country corruption is Transparency International.
Well-known as the source, but less so for the contents.
AA believes that most people who use or quote TI’s rankings do not know what they mean and operate with some or all of the following misperceptions.
To be very clear upfront, this post is not arguing that we should not use TI’s CPI.  But rather than we should understand what it is, what are its limitations, and how to use it intelligently.
FIVE COMMON MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT TI’S CPI
  1. TI’s rankings assess the overall level of corruption in a country.
  2. While not “facts”, the analytic process behind the rankings results in fairly accurate assessments.
  3. TI performs the analysis behind the rankings or at the very least directs it.
  4. Every country is rated using the same common set of standards.
  5. The rankings are sufficiently precise that we can use them to distinguish the level of corruption in one country from the level in another.
TI provides extensive disclosure about the CPI at its Methodologies page.
Those who read this material carefully will not hold any of the first four misconceptions.  The problem is it appears that TI’s disclosures are infrequently read.
TI’s apparently precise ranking system does give the impression that Misconception #5 is correct.  It is not.
MISPERCEPTION #1 – Overall Level of Corruption in a Country
Here’s a quote from a TI FAQ that on its rankings:
“Is the country/territory with the lowest score the world's most corrupt nation?  No. The CPI is an indicator of perceptions  public sector corruption, i.e. administrative and political corruption. It is not a verdict on the levels of corruption of entire nations or societies, or of their policies, or the activities of their private sector.”
What does TI rank then?  What is its definition of “corruption”?
Why should we care?
It’s very important to understand TI’s focus if one is to use their rankings intelligently.
If you read the FAQs in the Methodologies material (page 2), you will find a list of what is included and what is not.
Money laundering, IFFs, informal markets, the private sector are NOT included.
Broadly speaking, TI’s CPI focuses on the public sector only.
TI is very clear on this but AA wonders how many users of TI’s CPI understand this.
What this means then is that a private sector member’s actions do not affect the ranking of its respective country.
This is very important because if one is using TI rankings to construct assessments of money laundering and terrorism finance, one might be mis-specifying the risk, if one assumes that TI rankings assess the overall level of corruption in a country.
Why?
Private sector enterprises are probably the major channels through which ML and TF take place in most jurisdictions.
MISPERCEPTION #2 – Rankings as “Facts”
TI’s annual ranking for 2018 is here.
The first thing to note is that this is described as the “Corruption Perceptions Index”.
The key word here is “perceptions”.    “Opinions” not “facts”.
That makes sense.
There are no formal reports filed on bribes paid or bribes accepted.
One has to infer the extent of corruption in a country from very limited hard data – corruption cases that have come to light—and other indirect indicators.
The first takeaway then is that a ranking for a specific country is an estimate. 

Likely a very rough estimate.
Similar to the 2% to 5% of global GDP (usually mis-stated as amounts from USD 800 billion to USD 2 trillion) estimate bandied about as the annual flows of money laundering, corruption rankings are often treated as scientific fact.  They are not and should not be treated as such. 
MISPERCEPTION #3 - The rankings are based on TI’s research.
TI uses the published assessments of 13 sources.
Each of these sources prepares reports for its own or its clients’ use using its own criteria and methodology.
TI does not do the research itself. It does not set the focus, criteria or methodology for these sources’ studies.
Rather TI repurposes the 13 sources’ reports to create the CPI.  In 2015, one source, IHS Global, stopped providing data to TI.  TI now accesses some IHS data via information published by the World Bank.
MISPERCEPTION #4 – Common Standards and Methodologies
Who are the experts? What are their methodologies?
For a detailed answer click on “Methodologies”. Here you will find a discussion about each expert and its methodology.
Click here to see the sources used in ranking a specific country.
The first thing you will notice is that not every source rates every country.
In a situation where some countries are rated by some experts and other countries are rated by other experts should we automatically assume that all the experts use an identical single common standard and methodology?

Clearly we need to look a bit deeper because if the experts don't have a single common standard, then which experts rate a country will impact that country's rating.
AA has read this material and encourages everyone who uses TI’s CPI to read it as well.
Why?
First, this is quite a heterogeneous group.
It includes multi-lateral institutions (2), NGOs/Foundations (5), companies selling country risk or business information services (4), university affiliated entities (2).
Each of these has a specific purpose for its study motivated by its stated “mission” or, in some cases, perhaps by its ideology.
That is not meant as a pejorative remark. But as a practical one.  We need to be sensitive to conscious and unconscious factors that may influence a rating, particularly in the case where “perceptions” play a key role in determining rankings.
AA argued in another post that the collapse of Abraaj seemed to be treated in some circles as evidencing a more serious failure by regulators and markets than scandals in certain OECD countries that had a much greater impact on the world economydid.
Are there other geographical biases? Is corruption in African Country G more heinous than Baltic Country L?
Without taking a stand on the issue, AA would note that there is some controversy about the independence of Freedom House from US foreign policy. The FH study that TI uses rates former Soviet bloc states.
Second, the experts’ focus is also heterogeneous.
Not all of these sources focus on corruption itself: bribes paid, bribes taken.
Rather a number of them focus on legal/institutional capacity.  Whether the country has an adequate framework to prevent/punish corruption, e.g., legislation, staffing and independence of investigative and legal bodies, administrative practices, e.g., professional independent civil service, open bidding, whether information is available to the public, etc. 
These indicators by themselves are not indicators of corruption but rather perhaps indicators of opportunities for corruption.
Very big difference.
Laws and frameworks are fine but as experience shows repeatedly they do not prevent crime from occurring.
That’s not to say that these elements aren’t important.
They are necessary but not sufficient elements.
The question is how much weight they should be given when assigning corruption perceptions to a particular country.
AA would be in the camp where actual corruption rather than opportunities for corruption would be given more weight in “rankings”.
Third, the experts’ methods are not identical.  Some use in-house experts to make assessments.  Others reach out to local contacts, and other outside experts, e.g., academics, lawyers, accountants, etc.  In some cases like EIU they use in-country free-lancers at least in part.
Some of the experts appear to ask a single or a couple of questions as part of a larger study on more than just corruption.
Others have a more robust set of questions on corruption.  Or survey a wider set of contacts.
For example, in 2018 The World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey (WEF-EOS)--one of TI’s sources—received 12,274 responses from executives in 140 countries in 2018 about corruption.
Fourth, some of the experts—primarily the 3 firms that sell political risk and country assessments to businesses -- assess all levels of corruption from the petty to “grand” corruption.  Varieties of Democracy, another of TI's expert sources does as well. 
As a practical matter, their 3 firms' clients (businesses) are likely to be most interested in the need to pay ongoing bribes to ensure their daily operations run unhindered if they invest in Country X.
So smaller recurring cash payments to facilitate clearance through customs of imports and exports, to secure connection to and maintenance of utilities, to deal with tax authorities, to obtain licenses, etc. are of prime concern.
Finding out about them is fairly easy.  One can ask businesses in the country. They will be more likely to report such occurrences because they are imposed on them as opposed to grand corruption where they may be a willing participant.
Because it’s harder to find out the true level of grand corruption, there is a risk that corruption ratings based on petty or moderate corruption may skew the rating for a country.
Fifth, unlike the countries in the CPI, the 13 experts are unranked.  Their perceptions are accorded equal weighting.  Each expert’s score is added and a simple arithmetic mean is calculated.
They are all presumed to be all equally smart and informed and use equally valid methods to evaluate corruption.  It doesn’t matter whether an expert asked a single question or sent a questionnaire and got 12,274 responses.
It doesn’t matter if the expert is expert in a limited geographical area or covers the world.  The Economist Intelligence Unit who use in-country free lancers in part to do their assessments and rated 131 countries in 2018 are presumed to know as much about each of those countries as the African Development Bank which uses in-house economists knows about the 54 African countries it rated. Or PERC which contacts a wide range of potential respondents to ask a single question and rated 15 Asian countries.
As you might expect, not every country is rated by all 13 experts.  Some of this is because of geographical specialty. The experts from the African Development Bank don’t rate Switzerland, the USA, or France. PERC’s focus is a slice of Asia.
It’s not unreasonable to say then that the rating standards across all countries are not uniform given the diversity of focus, methodology, level of detail, etc. of the 13 experts and the fact that the same 13 experts do not rate each country.
The full data set shows the score, the standard error (think standard deviation but for a sample), the Upper CI and Lower CI.
There is a wealth of information here.  If you use the TI CPI, then you should be familiar with this information so you can use it intelligently.
For example, should we treat a rating with only 3 experts (the minimum required for a rating) as being as valid as one with 10?
If the standard error is large, should we assess that the rating is less accurate than one which has a smaller standard error?  For example, the SE for Switzerland is 1.57, Bahrain and the Philippines are at 1.81, Saudi is at 6.34, Qatar at 8.08, and Oman at 9.46.
MISPERCEPTION #5 - Ratings are Precise Measures
TI ranks some 180 countries.  100 is the theoretical “best” score.  0 the worst.
Denmark in the first rank with 88.
New Zealand is at 87.
Then four countries follow at 85.
All the way down to Syria (13) and Somalia (10).
This is some very precise parsing of differences in corruption.
Let’s stop and reflect for a moment.
We started with “perceptions” but we seem to have wound up with “precision”.  AA would argue “false” precision.
On a hundred point scale, NZ would appear to be 1% more corrupt than Denmark.
Can we really parse gradations this fine?
More importantly is there really a practical difference in corruption between Denmark (ranking #1 with 88) and Germany (ranking #11 with a score of 80)?
The answer to both questions is no
TI agrees with this at least in part.
In their FAQs, they answer a hypothetical question from a reader about changes of 1 or 2 points in a specific country’s rating year-on-year with:
“It is unlikely that a one or two point CPI score change would be statistically significant.”
AA would argue that even larger differences among countries are not significant either.
Let’s look at an endeavor that has more data and more rigorous mathematical analysis of the data, though one which is not devoid of opinion:  credit ratings. 
S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch rank issuers.
But they don’t assign them individual ranked ratings.  Rather they group them into categories of similar risk.
Those issuers least likely to default are rated (placed in category) AAA.  If distinctions are made, a “+” or “–“sign is used.
AA doesn’t think it’s a sensible proposition that corruption analysis is more scientific than credit analysis and hopes you do too.
AA suggests that TI adopt a similar approach in an effort to prevent misunderstanding and misuse of its rankings.  That is, divide countries into broad categories of risk of corruption like credit ratings or S&P's BICRA.
This will have the immediate effect of preventing users from plugging the current “precise” ratings into their models and coming up with equally imprecise results in theirs.
Some even more impressive with results to two digits to the right of the decimal point, though admittedly not on a 100 point scale.