SWIFT
issues an excellent free monthly publication on use of the RMB in payments
outside the PRC: RMB
Tracker. As part of tracking RMB usage, RMB Tracker provides a
monthly value-based comparison of the top twenty currencies so even if
you're not interested in RMB usage you can track the fate of other
currencies.
You can either sign up for a monthly email or browse issues at SWIFT’s website.
The
report is based on customer and bank payment orders (SWIFT MT Series 100 and
200 instructions). SWIFT, of course, isn’t the only messaging system that
financial institutions use. However, it is widely used—probably the most widely
used method for sending payment orders. Thus, the report should give a
very good indication—though more directional than precisely locational—about
changes in the use of the RMB.
The
August issue focused on the Republic of
South Africa (RSA). Immediately below are extracts from the August RMB Tracker. I've used boldface to highlight key points as well as the comments I will focus on.
"Brussels,
24 August 2016 –
SWIFT data shows that Renminbi (RMB) usage in payments in South Africa
increased by 65% over the last 12 months and by 112% in the last two years,
moving the country from position #30 in July 2014, to #24 in July 2016. Excluding
domestic traffic, RMB payment messages increased in volume by 70% in the last
12 months. In addition, nearly 40% of RMB payments by South African
institutions have been offshore payments exchanged with countries other than
China and Hong Kong, compared to 16% in July 2015."
“South
Africa has experienced a major shift in RMB growth over the last two years,
strengthening the country’s trade relations with China and Hong Kong,” says Harry
Newman, Head of Banking, SWIFT. “The establishment of an RMB clearing centre in
South Africa in July 2015, as well as Singapore’s increased use of the RMB
for payments with South Africa, have been a catalyst for RMB growth in the
region.”
A
couple of things caught my eye.
But before I begin a technical note: SWIFT’s analysis on the RSA is based on the change in the number (not value) of RMB payments to/from the RSA. (Page 2). The number of transactions is one way to measure adoption of the RMB for transactions. However, I’d prefer analysis based on value, assuming both weren’t available. If the volume increase is being driven by a large number of small value payments that would put a different spin on the increase figures than if the increase in number were closely tracking value.
Why
doesn’t SWIFT provide this? They have the data. In addition to the
(free) RMB Tracker, SWIFT have a paid subscription sister publication and presumably
aren’t going to cannibalize its appeal by providing more information in
Tracker.
As
you read what follows, bear in mind that the lack of information on aggregate
payment value constrains the analysis that follows.
Now to my comments.
As
written, the report could be read to imply that South Africa has dramatically
increased its RMB denominated transactions. This is not strictly
speaking the case. Since the PBOC’s appointment of Bank of China’s
Jo’burg branch (hereafter BOCJ) as the RMB clearing bank in RSA, BOCJ has
marketed RMB correspondent banking services elsewhere in Africa. The
increase in volume reflects transactions from other African countries, not just
the RSA.
We
can find details of this activity in a February 2016 article by Yu Meng in The
Peoples' Daily Online and which the South
African China Economic and Trade Association relayed on its website. I’ve
highlighted the relevant portions in red and added some comments of my own in
boldface blue.
"According
to Bank of China, in the "first ten months of 2015, the Renminbi trade
settlement and investment amount in and out of Africa
(AA: that is,
not just RSA) has grown 35% to 126.6 bn yuan (R254 bn). Half the amount is facilitated by Bank of China’s
Johannesburg branch (AA: Here we have a USD equivalent number. Note BOCJ
handles one-half of the aggregate value amount for Africa not just RSA) , which was authorized in July 2015 by China’s
central bank, the People’s Bank of China, to serve as the clearing bank for
Renminbi business, the first in Africa."
"At the moment, the Johannesburg Branch’s Renminbi service has reached more than 30 African countries, and opened 69 Renminbi clearing accounts for financial
institutions in Africa."
(AA: While we don’t have the volume of these non-RSA
transactions nor the amounts, they could well account for a significant portion
of the RMB payments attributed to RSA by SWIFT).
"Li, executive vice president of the Johannesburg branch, oversaw a 2.7 bn yuan (R6.08 bn) transaction on Nov 30th for a Mauritian client — the bank’s biggest single clearing deal in Africa. “We wouldn’t have even imagined a transaction in Renminbi this big last year and because of the PBoC’s authorization we expect to do more,” says Li."
(AA: The wording is ambiguous. It’s not clear if
this was an outgoing or incoming payment. In either case, it seems a
rather large amount for single commercial transaction especially given the
amount and nature of bilateral trade between the two countries. Mauritius
annually imports roughly US$1 billion equivalent from the PRC – making this
single payment over 40% of annual imports.
The PRC is not among Mauritius five largest export markets. RSA is in fifth place and annual exports are roughly US$200 million equivalent so it’s unlikely this was an incoming payment for Mauritian goods.
Given that and the fact that Mauritius is an offshore financial center, AA suspects that this transaction was financial not commercial. This was a relatively large RMB transaction—apparently the largest or one of the largest in Africa. If it is an outgoing payment, its origin may not be Mauritius. If it is incoming ,its final destination may not be Mauritius.
Given reports of Chinese parties engaging in “gray” cross-border transactions
(AA’s euphemism of the post), AA imagines that a lot of parties might have an
interest in finding out more details, particularly if this were a repeating
transaction.
Second,
Singapore’s increase in RMB payments to the RSA is also interesting.
If
they are trade related, that would imply that the RSA has either redenominated
invoicing on existing trade or has "new" trade conducted in
RMB. If so, I’d expect that that pattern would be evident in RSA trade
with other countries. That’s based on the assumption that if the RSA is
moving to a greater use of the RMB in its trade, it would be doing so with more
than one country.
That doesn’t have to be the case of course. Perhaps,
there was a unique opportunity to increase sales with Singaporean entities.
As well, the information SWIFT has provided on the increase is based on number
of payments not value.
Assuming
that value is tracking to some extent the number of payments (again this need
not be the case), as above, I suspect that transactions are financial not
commercial. Perhaps, BOCJ is obtaining RMB for its operations from
Singapore via for example FX transactions. While ICBC Singapore is the PBOC-designated
RMB clearing bank (in Singapore) and not BOC Singapore, Singapore has some 110 or so banks. Besides
local banks that are active in the RMB, the country has a variety of foreign
banks including banks from the PRC (BOC has a full branch) and from Hong Kong
SAR who likely have RMB-denominated business and could serve as counterparties.