Tuesday 17 August 2010

Global Investment House: 1H10 Financials – A Closer Look: Looming Cash Crunch


GIH released its 1H10 financials on the DFM on the 15th.

With these in hand we can look at a bit more detail – the good, the bad and the ugly – some of which was missing from its earlier press release.

SUMMARY

While Global's press release did some fancy dancing around the losses, the real story from the financials is a looming cash crunch this year. If we assume that cash income from operations can pay most of the operating expenses (except interest), as outlined below, Global has to pay an estimated KD39.8 million in principal repayments and interest for the rest of the year. Estimated adjusted Cash and Banks as of today is some KD40.5 million, leaving no margin of error.

The implications are clear.   

Global is under intense pressure: 
  1. To come to deal with NBUQ on the KD71.8 million "frozen" deposit unless justice is swift in Dubai. In which case there is always one more appeal.  Perhaps, a "break-up" fee for walking from the deal?  It may be a small price to pay to unlock this much needed cash.  Forgive interest plus an additional sweetener?
  2. To conduct major asset sales – which in this down market are likely to cause accounting losses. While these will be "paper" not cash losses, they will erode capital further which will erode market confidence. 
  3. Sell debt or equity to a convenient أبو سكر or الهيئة
  4. Or to cause a "miracle" at a subsidiary via a successful prayer through Wali Al Thouraiya. Luckily that saint's tomb is in Kuwait and not in Saudi where that sort of thing is frowned upon. At least officially. 
  5. Whatever miracles might occur this year, thanks to Global's wise lenders who imposed an unrealistic and irresponsible three-year rescheduling tenor, the problem only gets worse next year and the year after.
ANALYSIS

Net Income

Unlike Global which danced around the earnings issue, let's go straight to the bottom line.

1H10 Net Loss was KD34.9 million versus KD99.7 million for the comparable six-month period in 2009. 2010's performance was affected primarily by losses related to various investments which drove operating income to a loss of KD8.6 million (2009: KD45.6 million). Operating expenses were KD26.8 million (2009: KD54.1 million).

A closer look at 1H10 Operating Income shows that GIH basically broke even in 1Q10 with a loss of KD0.4 million. 2Q10 the loss was KD8.2 million.

Operating Expenses were KD15.9 million in 1Q and KD11.9 million in 2Q. 1Q's personnel expenses were KD0.4 million higher than 2Q's, other operating expense KD1.1 million higher, interest KD0.6 million higher and impairment provisions KD0.75 million higher. Interestingly, personnel expenses were KD0.9 million higher in 1H10 versus 1H09. Perhaps performance bonuses? New hires? More than 50 MBAs as one of our frequent commentators would have it?

During 2Q10, while its fee generating businesses accounted for a respectable KD6.9 million in income (1Q10: KD5 million), these revenues were overwhelmed by losses on financial assets held for sale (KD4.1 million), losses on FVTPL (KD11.9 million), and losses on subsidiary disposal (KD2.4 million). To some extent this is not a surprise. Global's investments are market sensitive and the market declined in 2Q10. Also the company is on a forced "Jenny Craig" diet – selling assets to pay the light bills and its rescheduled debt.

Comprehensive Income

1H10's comprehensive loss was KD41.6 due to downward revaluation of financial investments (KD6.7 million) offset in part by a FX gain of KD1.1 million. The comparable figure for 2009 was a comprehensive loss of KD90.1 million as the Company benefited from a net KD9.6 million in unrealized revaluations.

Cashflow

1H10 cash from core operations was a negative KD18.8 million versus KD16.0 million the year before. When financing costs are factored in (you will see these at the very end of the section on operational cashflow), the numbers are a negative KD25.9 million (1H10) and KD32.6 million (1H09).  They  include principal payments on short term debt: KD10.6 million in 1H10 and KD24.4 million in 1H09. (Note:  The US$50 million (KD14.6 million) debt payment 12 July is not included in these financials).  These are the light bills that Global needs to pay to stay in business.

Cashflow from changes in operating assets and liabilities were a positive KD30.1 million in 1H10 and KD34.1 million in 1H09. Essentially Global is dis-investing from its operating businesses – through asset disposals. Also as its business activities and volumes slow, there is less need for "working capital", e.g., receivables, etc.   The bad thing about a strategy like this is that it's limited to the amount of assets you have to sell.

As a result of the above, total operating cashflow was KD4.1 million positive in 1H10 versus KD1.5 million positive in 1H09.

Investing activities in 1H10 were a net use of cash of KD12.6 million (largely associated with the closing of AlThouraiya in 1Q10). In 1H09 this category provided KD35.9 million in positive cashflow.

Financing activities were a negligible outflow of KD0.5 million in 1H10 versus KD4.9 million outflow in 1H09.

The bottom line a net reduction in Cash and Banks of KD8.9 million in 1H10 and a net increase of KD32.5 million in 1H09.

The pattern in operating cashflow is likely to repeat itself: operating losses from the core business plus negative cashflow from financing costs offset by a net inflow from further disinvestment/reduction in core operating assets and liabilities.

Balance Sheet

Global's assets have shrunk from KD1,011 million at 30 June 09 to KD823 million at FYE 09 to KD774 million at 30 June 10. This pattern is likely to continue as the Company continues to sell off assets and reduce debt.

Equity (excluding minority interests) continues a similar downward pace: KD213 million at 30 June 09, KD163 million at FYE09 and KD124 million at 30 June 10. Minority Interest also is declining. KD81.3 at 30 June 09 to KD31.0 at 30 June 10. As Global sells its less than wholly owned subsidiaries, it "loses" the Minority Interest associated with these companies.

There is another side to this coin (pun intended). It also loses the Cash and Banks associated with the sold subsidiaries. As disclosed in Note 6, the closure of Al Thouraiya "cost" Global KD18.725 million in Cash and Banks. At 1H10 (Note 8), KD37.2 million of the Company's KD92.3 million of Cash and Banks is cash at subsidiaries – which arises solely on consolidation and may not be under the Company's control – though the sad stories of Global MENA Financial Assets and Al Thouraiya may evidence Global's powers of persuasion, particularly where it controls the Board. An ability to persuade legally independent companies to take actions contrary to their interests and then settle the resulting obligations by taking fantastic assets instead apparently less valuable and pedestrian cash. Notwithstanding this "history", a conservative approach would be to discount Global's liquidity position by excluding the "consolidated" cash.

A discussion of cash would not be complete without referring to the US$250 million deposit frozen at NBUQ by the wise application of both impeccable transaction structuring skills and similarly impeccable legal document drafting. The saga continues. Global has won in the Court of First Instance. NBUQ is appealing. When this will be settled is not clear. We're only at Round Two out of a potential three round bout.

Looming Cashflow Crisis

Finally, as Global has noted, it has paid in principal payments US$78.9 million under the restructuring so far this year, leaving another US$92.6 million (roughly KD27 million). We can estimate the remaining interest for 2010 at roughly KD12.8 million by using 1H10's expense. The required debt service is KD39.8 million. Global's estimated cash on hand (excluding amounts arising on consolidation) is KD55.1- KD14.6 July principal repayment = KD40.5 million. This rough calculation indicates how close Global is to the "tripwire".

Global is under intense pressure to: 
  1. Settle with NBUQ on the US$250 million "frozen" deposit unless justice will be uncharacteristically swift in Dubai. And if it is, NBUQ has the right of one more appeal. 
  2. Sell assets. Under these market conditions, fire sale may be the more apt description. The result of which while they will be "paper" losses, will nonetheless inflict real damage on Global in terms of eroded market confidence following further erosions in capital. 
  3. Sell equity or obtain debt from أبو سكر or الهيئة. One of our regular commentators suggested this may be a viable option, if things get difficult. 
  4. Look to create a miracle with a subsidiary – an appeal to the regional St. Jude of financial institutions – Wali Al Thouraiya. Subsidiaries, watch your cash!
The problem is that this is only Year 1. Under the irresponsible and unrealistic three year debt rescheduling imposed on Global by its wise lenders and agreed by its wise management (probably at the financial equivalent of gunpoint), the problem only gets worse next year as the scheduled payments are larger than this year's. So Global could well meet this year's cash requirements only to find itself in the same dire situation on 31 December 2010.

Monday 16 August 2010

International Leasing and Investment - The "Fix" is in? Central Bank Trying to Stop?


The 16 August issue of AlQabas has an intriguing article on ILI: "Supervisory Reservations About Return of AlHomoud to International Leasing."  KSE page on ILI here.

The article states that:
  1. The regulatory authorities, among them the Central Bank of Kuwait, have reservations about the return of Fuad AlHomoud to ILI especially after his membership to the Board and appointment as Managing Director.  
  2. One of the largest creditors of ILI has joined in these reservations on the basis that he has been following the company for years and knows its "ins and outs".
  3. PWC who the creditors had engaged  issued a report that accused the previous executive management of taking loans and using them for other than the purposes for which they were obtained.  
  4. And PWC had recommended that court action be taken against previous executive management.  
  5. The article quotes an unnamed source in Munshaat (a Kuwaiti Real Estate company) that Mr. AlHomoud is facing a court case related to the time he was at both Munshaat and ILI.  
  6. After an examination, the Central Bank of Kuwait found that the previous management guilty of a number of violations and excesses and levied a fine of KD200,000.
What's apparently troubling some is the sudden "understanding" between Mr. AlHomoud and Mr. Bassam AlMutawa, the investor who has proposed a plan to save ILI.  The question is whether they have joined forces to save the company or for another reason.

At this point, AlQabas speculates (and note that word) that legal cases relating to ILI could be very uncomfortable for a variety of people and that having  control over the Company's "files" related to such cases could be a powerful motive for some to seek to obtain control over ILI.

ILI is currently suspended from KSE trading due to failure to provide financials.  It has not yet provided its 31 December 2008 financials or any subsequent ones.

And finally, while not stated in the article, I am going to presume that Mr. AlHomoud like a prominent expatriate Kuwaiti  businessman denies all allegations of wrongdoing.

KSE Suspends Trading in 12 Additional Companies (Now 24 Suspended)


You'll recall that yesterday the KSE warned 55 companies that they risked suspension of trading if they did not present their 2Q10 financials by 10:15 AM Kuwait time this morning.

12 of the companies on the list were already suspended for failure to provide earlier financials so the warning to them was a matter of form.   I've highlighted them by changing the color of the word (موقوفة)  (suspended) after their names to blue.

Of the 43 new "warnees" (55-12), 31 of them managed to get financials in to the KSE.  Thus, the 24 suspended companies are composed of the 12 of this group "left behind" along with the 12 previously suspended.

In relatively short order most or all of these firms should provide financials and the list will shorten again.

[10:40:7]  ِ.وقف التداول باسهم شركات اعتبارا من اليوم ‏
يعلن سوق الكويت للاوراق المالية بانه تم وقف التداول باسهم (24) شركة ‏
وهى الشركات التالية:‏
الشركة الكويتية للاستثمار (كويتية)‏
الشركة الاهلية القابضة (اهلية) (موقوفة) ‏
شركة المستثمر الدولي (مستثمر د) ‏
شركة بيت الاوراق المالية (البيت) (موقوفة) 
شركة الاستثمارات الصناعية (ا صناعية) ‏
شركة مجموعة الاوراق المالية (م الاوراق) ‏
الشركة الدولية للتمويل (د للتمويل) ‏
شركة المجموعة الدولية للاستثمار (المجموعة د) (موقوفة) 
شركة مجموعة عارف الاستثمارية (عارف) ‏
شركة الدار للاستثمار (الدار) (موقوفة) 
الشركة الاولى للاستثمار (الاولى) ‏
شركة اعيان للاجارة والاستثمار (اعيان) (موقوفة) ‏
الشركة الخليجية الدولية للاستثمار (غلف انفست) (موقوفة) 
الشركة الكويتية للتمويل والاستثمار (كفيك) ‏
الشركة الدولية للاجارة والاستثمار (د للاجارة) (موقوفة)‏
شركة المدار للتمويل والاستثمار (المدار) ‏
شركة الصفاة للاستثمار (الصفاة) ‏
شركة المدينة للتمويل والاستثمار (المدينة) ‏
الشركة الكويتية البحرينية للصيرفة الدولية (صيرفة) ‏
شركة لؤلؤة الكويت العقارية (لؤلؤة) (موقوفة)
شركة الصفاة العالمية القابضة (صفاة عالمي) (موقوفة)‏
شركة المعدات القابضة (موقوفة) ‏
شركة فيلا مودا لايف ستايل(فيلا مودا) (موقوفة)‏
شركة الشبكة القابضة (الشبكة )(موقوفة)
اعتبارا من اليوم الاثنين الموافق 16-08-2010 ،وذلك لعدم تقديم البيانات ‏
المالية المرحلية للفترة المنتهية فى 30-06-2010 ،فى الموعد المحدد .‏

Gulf Finance House Apparently "Hits the Wall": Delays Publication of 2Q10 Financials Until Study on Capital Reorganisation and Capital Increase Completed. Share Trading Suspended.

The Bahrain Stock Exchange announced this morning the temporary suspension of GFH from today until 23 August.

Yesterday instead of approving the Bank's 2Q10 report, GFH's Board met and took the decision that a  capital reorganisation and capital increase were necessary.  It  advised the BSE that it would therefore delay approval/issuance of its financials until it completed studies related to both and their effects on the financials.  It also requested the one week temporary suspension of trading.

From this rather dramatic last minute announcement it certainly appears that GFH has finally "hit the wall".   It had earlier received approval for a delay in issuing its financials with the deadline today.  Since it has not issued them, the news therein must be fairly grim.

There's a trading suspension announcement on the KSE (copy below, Arabic only).   Sadly, as you might have guessed,  it misses the important "bit" why the financials are delayed.  It just suspends trading because the financials were not provided.  Confirmation, if one were needed. that the news is not material to investors?  Or perhaps more accurately to Kuwaiti investors?

[10:25:14]  ِ.وقف التداول باسهم (تمويل خليج) لحين ورود بيانات 30-06-2010 ‏
يعلن سوق الكويت للاوراق المالية بانه تم وقف التداول باسهم بيت التمويل ‏
الخليجي(تمويل خليج) لحين ورود بيانات 30-06-2010 .‏

There is also an announcement at the DFM - where the exchange simply posted a copy of GFH's letter.

As of the writing of this post, there is nothing posted on GFH's website on this topic.

Footnote:  A "capital reorganisation" need not mean a rescheduling/restructuring of debts.   As of 1Q10 GFH had accumulated losses of US$440 million versus its legal (paid in) capital of US$621 million.  Under Bahrain Commercial Companies Law (as with some other GCC jurisdictions) when a firm has losses 75% or greater of legal capital, it's obliged to take action.  Either dissolve the firm, raise new capital, or use existing capital and reserves to offset the losses.  The latter can involve reducing legal capital.   So the capital reorganisation may be this process.  It may also include a debt rescheduling though with the recent West LB deal and earlier rescheduling of its LMC facility, the Bank shouldn't have an immediate debt repayment problem.  Unless of course things have really deteriorated.  On the debt front, don't forget that GFH's sukuk indenture requires them to maintain US$400 million or more of shareholders' equity.  So it's not too hard to imagine the Bank being close or below this trip wire as of 30 June 2010.

AlJoman: Cross Holdings on KSE Equal KD3 Billion or 9.4% of Market Value

AlJoman issued another interesting analytic piece.  This one on cross holdings on the KSE.

A bit of initial tafsir:
  1. It's based on information from the KSE on shareholders of listed companies.  
  2. As per KSE rules, shareholdings 5% or more are to be reported. 
  3. Data is as of 5 August 2010.
Here's a quick summary.
  1. 84 listed companies have cross shareholdings spread across 132 companies.
  2. The amount is KD3.035 billion which represents 9.4% of the total market capital of KSE listed companies (KD32.4 billion).
  3. It also is 21% of the disclosed investments by KSE listed firms (KD14.7 billion).  
  4. Al Joman estimates that aggregate cross holdings (including those below the 5% threshold) equal 20% of the market capital of KSE listed firms.  It doesn't detail its rationale.
  5. It ascribes this motive for this cross holding essentially as market manipulation.  Companies cross hold, inflate demand (sometime fictitious) for their partners' shares, and thus create bubbles.  When the downturn came, this mechanism which had been so powerful in creating the updraft was powerless to stop the downdraft.  Not the manipulators, nor the market makers, nor even the Government with its National Portfolio.   Al Joman refers to it as like a snowball rolling downhill, getting bigger as it goes and crushing all in its path.
  6. As it has done before it faults the regulator and the weakness of the existing system, noting that many companies violated their corporate charters by investing in economic activities outside of the one listed in their Articles.   There's a biting comment about some real estate companies that own no real estate - not even a single apartment or shop.
  7. In closing it notes that some out there may say that Al Joman is "beating a dead horse" on this topic.  But that it's intent is to remind the Kuwait CMA of the necessity of ending such "deviant" practices.
Here's an abbreviated version of the chart in the report.
Sector# w Cross HoldKD Millions% Total
Banking  6   836 27.5%
Investment311,237 40.8%
Insurance  4     44   1.4%
Real Estate17   286    9.4%
Industry  9   371  12.2%
Services11   108    3.6%
Food  2       4    0.1%
Non Kuwaiti  3   148    4.9%
Parallel Market  1       2    0.1%
TOTAL843,035100.0%

One final note, an appeal actually for some linguistic help.  There are two expressions that Al Joman uses in the report, the precise translation of which elude me.  Appreciate it if someone will post to give me not only a translation but a  ذوق of the expression.
  1. الضحك على الذقون       
  2. طاح الفاس بالراس

Sunday 15 August 2010

Shuaa Capital Turns the Corner or Does It?



Following the announcement of its 2Q10 financials, there have been several articles on Shuaa. From this one Shuaa Capital Improves Financial Stability Despite Downturn to more nuanced articles like this one over at The National Cautious Investors Leave Shuaa in Lurch.

The question on everyone's mind seems to be: Has Shuaa turned the corner?

SUMMARY

At this point, the simple fact is that it's not possible to say one way or another. One swallow does not a summer make. Nor six months' performance a turnaround, particularly after the last two dismal years. What has happened is that there has been material improvement in net income. But that was primarily due to improvement in a single line of business, proprietary investments. The LOB primarily responsible for Shuaa's past problems. The LOB that Shuaa is therefore de-emphasizing/exiting.

Most of Shuaa's other LOBs are underperforming. No surprise here. These are highly market sensitive. The markets in which the Company operates have been very, very difficult: significant reductions in trading volumes on local exchanges (down 45%) and declines in market indices.

Right now it appears that the current market slump is likely to be prolonged with a less than vigorous recovery. If that's the case, Shuaa with its high correlation to markets has a real problem. Can it staunch the bleeding, return to profitability (even if only modest) and generate sufficient cashflow from operations to meet its cash expenses? Doing this in the next two to three years is likely to be critical.  During that period, external sources of finance (for debt rollovers, expenses as well as expansion) are probably going to be very difficult to come by and very expensive if obtained. Expensive in terms of direct cost (margins and fees) as well as collateral requirements. 

At the worst, continued bleeding could be fatal. And if only modest profitability is achieved, the Company may slowly fade into irrelevance. On the other hand, with the distress at other regional firms, this might be the opportunity of a lifetime.

ANALYSIS

Let's take a close look at Shuaa's financials. The key documents for this excursion are Shuaa's Earnings Press Release and its 2Q10 Financials.

Income Statement

Net Income

Yes, there is a dramatic improvement in the bottom line. The AED37.2 million loss for 1H10 is roughly one-third of 1H09's AED113.7 million.

But the improvement is largely within one line of business.

The Net Loss Before (Losses)/Gains from Other Investments for the first six months of 2010 is AED 52.6 million almost spot on the AED52.9 million loss for 2009. The difference between the "bottom lines" (Net Income) of the two periods is Other Investments. An AED15.4 million gain in 2010 versus a loss of AED60.9 million in 2009.

The nice thing about write downs is that at some point they stop because one cannot write an asset below zero. But all this does is stop the bleeding. It doesn't generate new revenues. And unless it's accompanied by improvement in other LOBs' performance, the Company can "stabilize" at a loss or modest income. A bit later we'll take a look at Shuaa's other LOBs. For now let's concentrate on the macro picture.

Comprehensive Income

Comprehensive Income is more favorable: AED17.2 million loss in 1H10 versus AED88.2 million in 1H09 due to net revaluations of some AED20 million in 2010 and AED25.5 million in 2009. Both of these are non cash items – in a situation where cash generation is key. And largely related, it seems, to the business Shuaa will exit.

Cashflow

The gross operating cash flow is weak. AED18.4 million negative in 2010 versus AED10.6 million positive in 1H09. Also the Company is reducing/selling assets (chiefly Other Investments and Loans) to fund reductions in debt. A pattern they followed last year as well.

Deleveraging does improve the Company's risk profile. Usually the intent is to sell only the underperforming assets. But that doesn't always work especially in a down market. Often such assets can't be moved. Or if they can, only at fire sale prices leading to losses – which even if only paper losses  will erode market confidence and capital. As a result, the firm winds up selling good assets with a pernicious effect on future ongoing cashflow and earnings. Whatever the case, this is a limited strategy. Limited because there are only so many assets one can sell. At some point, if Shuaa doesn't have sufficient operating cashflow, it won't be able to continue.

Balance Sheet

Total Assets decreased from AED3.6 billion at 30 June 09 to AED2.4 billion at 30 June 10 due to a roughly AED710 million reduction in liabilities plus an AED469 million decline in equity (primarily 2H09 losses). The Company has also been able to improve its liability maturity profile via a secured (AED300 million of collateral versus an AED240 million facility) medium term loan from Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank. Quarterly repayments commence in December 2010 and end March 2013. The rate on this loan is not disclosed. Spreads on the Company's short term borrowings are at 3.5% to 4.0%.

From Macro to Micro

As mentioned above, we need to understand performance at the level of individual lines of business.

Let's turn to Note 17 in the 2Q10 Financials for Segmental Results.

One very important caveat, the allocation of revenues and expenses among segments is more an art than a science. Different definitions of LOB, different management assumptions on how best to allocate revenues and expenses can result in quite different allocations. Accounting and reporting system limitations are another factor. From Shuaa's description of its segments, it seems that there are significant management and administrative items (probably including shared or cross LOB revenues and expenses as well as Treasury functions) in its Corporate Segment which haven't been allocated to LOBs. As such, at the segmental reported net income level, we may be dealing more with gross operating margins than net operating margins. If the LOB numbers aren't fully allocated, and I don't think they are, this exercise is likely to be more "directional" than precise.

With that caveat let's begin with LOB revenues. LOB figures are based on Net Income and expressed in AED thousands.

LOB
1H10
1H09
Private Equity  8,571  21,885
Asset Management  7,280  16,835
Investment Banking  7,499    2,239
Brokerage19,155  30,527
Finance32,874  49,029
Corporate18,848  34,662
Total93,837155,177

Revenues were down across the board except for Investment Banking. For many of the LOBs this isn't surprising as they are highly market sensitive and markets have been dismal. 

Asset Management revenues declined due to (a) an almost halving of fees and commissions which were down from AED10.1 million to AED5.37 million and (b) gains on Shuaa managed funds were down from AED6.8 million to AED1.9 million. You'll note that from the latter that asset management is not solely client related fees but includes gross performance on the portion of the funds that Shuaa owns.   In most firms I've worked in, holdings of own funds do not "belong" to Asset Management but to Treasury based on the idea that they do not fundamentally differ from holdings of other third party funds. On that basis Shuaa's Asset Management Revenues and Operating Margin are probably inflated. 

Next net profit (before Minority Interests) in AED thousands.

LOB
1H10
1H09
Private Equity      811  13,137
Asset Management     (491)   11,185
Investment Banking  (2,321)    (6,536)
Brokerage   2,038   12,378
Finance 16,071   14,332
Corporate(53,289)(158,219)
Total(37,181)(113,723)

The Corporate Segment (which seems to be the "warehouse" for the legacy assets) is allocated the lion's share of assets and expenses. Though it should be noted that as described above this LOB is also a central administrative and management unit as well. The amount of assets in Corporate indicate just how much "non strategic" business the Company developed. 

If we assume that this business is largely being wound down, there are two key conclusions: 
  1. The future is in the other LOBs. 
  2. The "new" Shuaa is likely to be a much slimmer (in balance sheet terms) entity with a more modest income stream than it was in its heyday. 
Turning to the remaining, LOBs, in absolute income terms, the most profitable LOB is "Finance".  The Press Release describes this as "vehicle finance", though the FYE2009 financials  identify it as primarily "construction equipment finance". The lending focus makes a critical difference in terms of future prospects – at least over the next 3 to 5 critical years.  Renting construction equipment probably doesn't have a bright future in the near term. While not investment banking or broking, lending (assuming the right economic segment) could deliver an annuity cashflow to offset Shuaa's more volatile market sensitive revenue streams. It is one, however, that is asset intensive and requires leverage to generate the ROE that investors require. 

Brokerage depends on the tone of markets as well as the perception of market participants about Shuaa's longevity. With other brokers shuttering their doors, Shuaa may have an opportunity for growth. The trick here will be driving volumes – largely dependent on market recovery -- to offset what appears to be a rather high (perhaps somewhat fixed) expense base of roughly AED17 million in annual G&A. Further extension of the platform would make business sense though the capital to fund might be difficult to attract. Thinking ambitiously, a single firm able to offer its own brokerage services in more than one GCC market (as opposed to working through local firms) might be a compelling value proposition.

Asset Management could be another promising venture. Success will depend on Shuaa's reputation (largely based on its performance and favorable market perceptions of firm longevity) as well as like Brokerage the all important market tone. This is another volume business given generally modest margins. For a comparable, Global earns about 1% in gross fees and commissions (excluding performance related compensation) on its KD1.5 billion in AUM.

Investment Banking and Private Equity are perhaps more "long shots". Despite higher gross margins, these are likely to be even more hit and miss than Asset Management or Brokerage because of the uneven timing of transactions. Investment Banking requires deal flow – a function of markets, the firm's reputation, and pricing. Private Equity is more equity intensive (on a risk basis) with highly volatile cashflow and income. With this LOB there's always the danger of becoming the "lender of last resort" to a failing investment under the sunk cost fallacy: investing just a few more dirhams to protect all the ones you've already invested. 

Clearly there are opportunities for Shuaa.

But to make a success of its business, Shuaa needs to convince lenders and shareholders that it is viable. To a large extent that means having a reasonable prospect of delivering a meaningful ongoing revenue stream as well as an attractive ROE. It needs both. A 50% ROE on AED100 is unlikely to excite anyone. AED100 million of net income with a 0.5% ROE is likely to be similarly unattractive.

At this point, logically, an ROE analysis of Shuaa's individual LOBs makes sense. Unfortunately, the Segmental Results really don't contain the data I think is necessary for such an analysis. Revenue and expense do not appear to be fully allocated. Determining LOB equity is similarly troublesome. Shuaa's own data has some seems too volatile for Private Equity. Allocated assets don't seem to have a logical pattern. They were AED123 million at FYE2008, AED155 million at 1H09, AED93 million at FYE09 and AED172 at 1H10. Determining required equity for Shuaa's Asset Management and Investment Banking is more than just a matter of the very slim amount of assets these LOBs carry. One needs to consider the equity required to cover operations and risk absorption. While it's possible to construct models to calculate all these, that would require a lot of work and be well beyond the intended remit for this blog.

So we'll end with some general observations.
  1. The road in front of Shuaa is difficult. 
  2. By their nature its major LOBs are market sensitive and/or volatile. 
  3. Markets are difficult and may remain so for some time. 
  4. LOBs offering good prospects (Asset Management and Brokerage) are generally low margin requiring significant sustainable volumes to deliver acceptable ROEs.
  5. External financing - debt or equity capital - is likely to be difficult to obtain and when obtained costly.
While this analysis does not definitively answer the question about Shuaa's future, it provides some insight into the key challenges and as well some key milestones to watch for progress. 

The exercise of determining whether they can realistically develop the ROE and quantum of earnings to be a meaningful player has been left to the student.

Kuwait Stock Exchange Warns 55 Companies of Suspension of Trading


The KSE issued an announcement today that 55 companies had until 10:15AM tomorrow (16 August) to provide their financials.

The group is divided into two:
  1. 33 companies who have not set a meeting for their directors to discuss the financials.   This includes 12 already suspended companies.
  2. 22 others.
A pretty clear indication of the state of company finances up in Kuwait.

Text of KSE announcement below in Arabic.

[11:1:3]  ِ.ايضاح بخصوص الشركات التي لم تقدم البيانات المالية في الموعد المحدد
يعلن سوق الكويت للأوراق المالية واستنادا الى قرار لجنة السوق بجلستها
رقم 97/4، والذي يلزم كافة الشركات والصناديق المدرجة في السوق بتقديم
البيانات المالية المرحلية في موعد أقصاه 45 يوما من تاريخ انتهاء الفترة،
فان الشركات التي لم تقدم البيانات المالية المرحلية للربع الثاني المنتهي ‏
في 30-06-2010 كما يلي :‏
ِ1-شركات لم تقدم بياناتها المالية ولم تحدد موعد اجتماع مجلس الادارة و
عددها (33) شركة على النحو التالي: ‏
الشركة الكويتية للاستثمار (كويتية) ‏
شركة الاستشارات المالية الدولية (ايفا) ‏
الشركة الاهلية القابضة (اهلية) (موقوفة) ‏
شركة المستثمر الدولي (مستثمر د) ‏
شركة بيت الاوراق المالية (البيت)(موقوفة) ‏
شركة الاستثمارات الصناعية (ا صناعية) ‏
شركة مجموعة الاوراق المالية (م الاوراق) ‏
الشركة الدولية للتمويل (د للتمويل ) ‏
شركة الكويت والشرق الاوسط للاستثمار المالي (كميفك) ‏
شركة المجموعة الدولية للاستثمار (المجموعة د) (موقوفة) ‏
شركة عارف الاستثمارية (عارف) ‏
شركة الدار للاستثمار (الدار) (موقوفة) ‏
شركة الامان للاستثمار (الامان) ‏
الشركة الاولى للاستثمار (الاولى) ‏
شركة المال للاستثمار (المال) ‏
شركة اعيان للاجارة والاستثمار (اعيان) (موقوفة) ‏
الشركة الخليجية الدولية للاستثمار(غلفت انفست) (موقوفة) ‏
الشركة الكويتية للتمويل والاستثمار (كفيك) ‏
الشركة الدولية للاجارة والاستثمار (د للاجارة) (موقوفة)‏
شركة تمويل الاسكان (اسكان) ‏
شركة المدار للتمويل والاستثمار (مدار) ‏
شركة الصفاة للاستثمار (الصفاة) ‏
شركة المدينة للتمويل والاستثمار (المدينة) ‏
شركة نور للاستثمار المالي (نور) ‏
الشركة الكويتية البحرينية للصيرفة الدولية (صيرفة) ‏
الشركة الكويتية الصينية الاستثمارية (الصينية) ‏
شركة لؤلؤة الكويت العقارية (لؤلؤة) (موقوفة)‏
شركة الصفاة العالمية القابضة (صفاة عالمي) (موقوفة)‏
شركة المعدات القابضة (المعدات)(موقوفة) ‏
شركة فيلا مودا لايف ستايل(فيلا مودا)(موقوفة) ‏
شركة الشبكة القابضة (الشبكة )(موقوفة)‏
الشركة الكويتية للمنتزهات (منتزهات) ‏
بنك الاثمار (الاثمار) ‏
ِ2- شركات لم تقدم البيانات المالية وحددت موعد اجتماع مجلس الادارة وعددها ‏
ِ(22) شركة على النحو التالي: ‏
بيت التمويل الخليجي (تمويل خليج)‏
شركة مدينة الاعمال الكويتية العقارية (م الاعمال) ‏
شركة القرين القابضة (قرين قابضة) ‏
شركة وثاق للتامين التكافلي (وثاق)‏
شركة برقان لحفر الابار (ابار) ‏
شركة المساكن الدولية للتطوير العقاري (المساكن) ‏
شركة مركز سلطان للمواد الغذائية (م سلطان) ‏
شركة الصناعات الهندسية الثقيلة وبناء السفن (سفن) ‏
شركة المواساة للرعاية الصحية (المواساة) ‏
شركة الانظمة الالية (الانظمة) ‏
شركة مجموعة الصناعات الوطنية القابضة (صناعات) ‏
شركة مشاعر القابضة (مشاعر) ‏
شركة مبرد للنقل (مبرد) ‏
الشركة الاولى للتامين التكافلي (اولى تكافل) ‏
الشركة الاهلية للتامين (اهلية ت) ‏
شركة الديرة القابضة (الديرة) ‏
شركة الدار الوطنية للعقارات (ادنك) ‏
شركة التمدين العقارية (تمدين ع) ‏
شركة داماك الكويتية القابضة (داماك كويت) ‏
شركة مجموعة عربي القابضة (عربي قابضة) ‏
شركة صناعات التبريد والتخزين (تبريد) ‏
الشركة الكويتية لصناعة الانابيب (انابيب) ‏
وعليه فانه سوف يتم ايقاف اسهم تلك الشركات عن التداول فى حال عدم تقديم ‏
البيانات المالية المذكورة فى الموعد النهائي المحدد فى الساعة 10:15من صباح
يوم غدا الاثنين الموافق 16-08-2010 .‏

Saturday 14 August 2010

Burgan Bank 2Q10 Financials: A Closer Look


Let's take a closer look at Burgan's 2Q10 financials.  Press release here.

Income Statement

Net interest income for 1H10 at KD50 million was in line with 1H09's 48.6 million – no doubt some of the increase resulting from the consolidation of Tunis International Bank ("TIB") and Bank of Baghdad ("BoB") which BB acquired from United Gulf Bank, a related party (common KIPCO ownership). Earlier post on the asset sale here.

A similar case with Fees and Commissions: KD16.5 million in 1H10 versus KD15.9 million in 1H09.

Other Income (FX, Investment Income, Share in Associates Results, Dividends and Other) was KD17.1 million versus KD14.6 the half year earlier. As Burgan states in Note 5 referring to the acquisition of banks from UGB, "The business combination was achieved in stages. The Bank re-measured its previously held equity interest in BoB and TIB at the acquisition-date fair value and recognized a resulting gain of KD10,909 thousand , net of acquisition related expenses of KD43 thousand in the interim condensed income statement as part of "Net investment income" (note 10)."  Proving I guess, if one needed any proof, of just how wise and profitable these acquisitions were and are!

Operating Profit before provisions was KD53.8 million versus KD55.9 in 1H09.

Provisions were KD51.1 million versus KD27.8 million in 2009. 

As per Note 13, Provision for Impairment of Loans and Advances is split among BB's three LOBs as follows: 
  1. Banking KD53.4 million charge 
  2. Treasury and Investment Banking KD6.8 million "recovery" and 
  3. International KD4.6 million charge.
As per BB's press release, with its specific provisions plus KD33 million of unallocated general provision, its Non Performing Loans are covered at 58%. 

Let's go back to FYE 2009 financials. At that point as per Note 5: 
  1. Non Performing Loans totaled KD236.7 million.
  2. KD5 million of which are "pre 1990 invasion" loans fully provided for. 
  3. Specific Provisions were KD98.4 million.
  4. General Provisions 80.8 million.
Since then it has added KD51.1 million in Specific Provisions. The language of the press release is not clear. It states that "In addition KD33 million in unallocated precautionary general provisions is available in the bank's books which resulted in a 58% provision coverage ratio". 

Either this means that only KD33 million of the KD80.8 million in General Provisions have been allocated to cover NPLs. Or that during 1H10, BB transferred some KD47.8 million in General Provisions to Specific Provisions. 

Because Burgan's regulator doesn't think this sort of information is useful it has not mandated that it be disclosed. Nor has it required the movement in the Provisions Account to be disclosed (write offs, FX movements, recoveries, etc). Apparently the KIPCO Group's legendary Shafafiyah Program doesn't call for this disclosure. Or perhaps Burgan may not deviate from the Central Bank's mandated form. Whatever the case, the lack of information affects the precision of the calculation below.

If we assume that only KD33 million of General Provisions are being counted for the 58% ratio, then Burgan's non performing loans are roughly KD314.7 million =(KD98.4 +KD51.1 +KD33)/.58. If on the other hand, Burgan made the KD47.8 million transfer from General to Specific, then NPLs are KD397.1 million. = (KD98.4 +KD47.8 +KD51.1 +KD33)/.58.

Those equate respectively to 13.3% and 16.6% of the gross Loans and Advances Portfolio (L&A as stated on the balance sheet plus the Provisions). One can assume that the 1H10 capital increase was motivated primarily by a need to shore up the Bank's defenses against troubled credits. And so these sort of levels make sense.

Balance Sheet

I didn't see any significant changes on the face of the balance sheet.

Looking at Note 3, Burgan has redirected some of its Cash and Banks from current accounts to time accounts (due within 30 days). At 1H09, the ratio of current deposits to total Cash and Banks was roughly 40%, falling to 35% at FYE09, and 19.7% at 1H10. No doubt motivated by Burgan'sTreasury's desire to wring a few more bps into interest income.

From Note 14, we see that KD168.8 million of Burgan's liquidity  (=Cash and Banks)  -- roughly 32.5% -- is placed with related parties. Sadly, it seems that United Gulf Bank has not bothered to publish the notes to either its 1Q10 or 2Q10 interim financials on its website. Without related party disclosures, it's not possible to say how much of UGB's US$401.9 million in interbanks taken at 1H10 were from related parties like Burgan. However, we do have data for FYE09 when US$333.2 (72.7%) of UGB's US$458.3 million in Due to Banks was from "Associates" (in which category Burgan should fall, though it may not be responsible for all of UGB's related party deposits. It is a big Family after all!). At FYE09 (Note 18), Burgan has KD172 million with Other Related Parties (US$602 million).

Finally from Note 13, we see that Burgan allocates its assets: KD1.1 billion to Banking KD1.4 billion to Treasury and Investment Banking and KD1.0 billion to International.

Cashflow

Operating Profit before Changes in Operating Assets and Liabilities is pretty much the same: KD46.8 million in 1H10 versus KD54.9 million the comparable period in 2009. 

Change in Operating Assets and Liabilities are a net source of funds of KD207 million in 2010 versus a rough balance in 2009 – a source of KD0.8 million. 

A substantial portion of the funds were used to acquire new subsidiaries – some KD92.7 million – which as Note 5 discloses were those involving UGB. 

During 1H10, Burgan paid down some KD72.8 million in Other Borrowed Funds, including KD48.1 million in a subordinated debt from a related party after obtaining "the approval from the regulatory authorities". (Note 14). The Bank also raised KD100.8 million in capital during the period.

After considering all the various items in cashflow, Burgan's cash decline is KD83.3  million (almost spot on equal to the payment to UGB for the acquisitions and the repayment of the related party subordinated loan).

Since AA is not only a strong believer in but also a strong supporter of Family Values, I am positive this is just a coincidence.

Idiocy Knows No Borders: Terrorist Babies

You may recall, if you're prepared to think some very scary things, how Dan Maes revealed that his opponent in the Republican primary for Governor of Colorado was under the influence of the United Nations and promoting programs (bicycle riding and recycling) which posed a manifest danger to our very way of life. Luckily for our embattled Republic, Mr. Maes will be representing the Republican Party in the general election - the UN's plan in Denver having been dealt a hopefully fatal blow.

But dangers abound.  Stepping forward with the latest warning is Representative Louie Gohmert, Republican, Texas who asserts in the following clip future terrorist babies are being born right here in America by illegal aliens, spirited back home for the necessary training and indoctrination, and then to be later infiltrated back to conduct their nefarious operations.   

While the good Representative did not provide conclusive proof of his warning, I think he did conclusively demonstrate that Idiocy Knows No Borders - a perhaps even more imminent and critical threat to the USA.

Friday 13 August 2010

Repost: AAOIFI May Limit Shari'ah Scholars' Role

An interesting article from Haris Zuberi over at The Islamic Finance Portal.

The guidelines may address whether Shariah scholars can own shares in the institutions they serve and how many advisory boards they join, said Mohamad Nedal Alchaar, secretary-general of the Accounting & Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, whose standards have been adopted in countries including the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.

Global Investment House 1H10 Results: Still Bleeding Not as Fast

GIH announced its results for the first six months of 2010.  The press release was three pages.  Since financial/business performance wasn't that great, a great deal of space was devoted to awards and other "lemonade from lemons" type items.

But, let's let Global speak for itself.
Key points of the results :
  • Fee-based businesses (asset management, investment banking and brokerage) generated operating income amounting to KD12.0 million and a profit of KD6.8 million during H1 2010. 
  • During H1 2010 losses from principal investments and treasury activities were KD41.1 million, representing a reduction of 49% compared to H1 2009
  • During H1 2010 interest expense reduced by 37%
  • Global made a second principal prepayment of USD50 million of its restructured debt thereby meeting 46% of the principal repayment obligations due by 10 December 2010
  • Overall net loss of KD34.4 million (KD0.028 per share), a 65% reduction over H1 2009 loss of KD98.6 million (KD0.080 per share).
And now to the tafsir.
  1. Global's fee based businesses won't be paying too many bills with a net profit of KD6.8 million, particularly when this probably doesn't consider their corporate overhead.
  2. The Company notes elsewhere in the press release that the annualized average loss on its principal investments during 1H10 was 12.4% compared to 17.4% in 1H09.  One suspects that the other contestants for PERE Awards 2009 "Middle East and North African Firm of the Year" had records less stellar than these.
  3. Interest expense came down largely from the signing of the rescheduling agreement which eliminated the additional penal default margin.
  4. On the debt rescheduling front, as noted earlier, Global has a long way to go on the debt repayment front.
  5. And proving that net income is truly the bottom line, net income for the period is mentioned last:  a KD34.4 million loss, 65% lower than KD98.6 million for 1H09.  Do firms really think that by burying the bad news investors will overlook it?  Or that by reciting modest and manufactured achievements they can make it look less bad?  And anyone want to bet if there were positive net income that it wouldn't be the very first item right  on the top of the list?
Some additional items:
  1. Global continues its drive to rationalize its cost base, cutting general overheads by 15% 1H10 versus 1H09.  As noted these include business travel, promotion, and communication costs - essential expenditures to develop revenue.  
  2. NBUQ intends to appeal the Dubai Court of First Instance's judgment in favor of Global.
As always we at Suq Al Mal are on the look out for major contributions to advancing corporate spin.  We were not disappointed today.  
So a very special tip of Abu Arqala's massive tarboush to whoever at Global came up with the phrase "impeccable track record" and used it in conjunction with Global's success in having a US$103 million in assets in its Saudi fund.   Presumably, that track record does not include Al Thouraia Project Management Company  or Saudi Mazaya - as both are now safely interred.   Or Global MENA Financial Assets.  Or maybe there's a local definition of impeccable that I've missed.

Once Global releases its 1H10 financial report expect more comments.

You Said What?: Tomalin Reveals Why There Will Always Be Banking Crisis


Taking a leaf from Charlie Prince's notebook, Michael Tomalin, CEO, of NBAD revealed why there will always be bad loans and banking crises in this article from The National:
“The problem if every bank is name lending and you are not is that it puts you in an awkward position,” Mr Tomalin said.
Dance to the music.  And pay the piper later.

Or perhaps, "But, Mom, all the kids were doing it".

Thursday 12 August 2010

Booz and Company to Assist Central Bank of Kuwait with Bank Stress Tests


AlQabas reports that the CBK has engaged Booz and Company to assist it with stress tests for the banking sector.

The article states that the CBK has taken the stress tests prepared by the banks at face value with no follow-up or consultations.  You might find it suprising but the banks apparently did quite well on their self administered test.  An "A" for all in the middle (or medium) case.  And only a few "remarks" on a bank or two for the worst or severe test.  ! مبروك

Booz and Company will review the banks' financials and the information they provided to the CBK and then design neutral (perhaps a better translation is "unbiased") half yearly and annual tests.   It sounds as though this may be an ongoing program).   Booz's "neutral" (unbiased) test will be a decisive factor in determining whether a bank needs to augment its capital or reserves.

Wednesday 11 August 2010

Burgan Bank - KD6.8 Million Loss for First Six Months 2010

Burgan announced its 1H10 results on the KSE this morning.  Arabic text below.

The headline is the loss of KD6.856 million versus a profit of KD11.748 million in 1H09.   No explanation for the loss.

A couple of other points:
  1. In case you're wondering the KD100 million or so increase in Shareholders' Equity to KD531.28 million is largely accounted for by the KD100.8 million rights offering BB undertook in 2Q10.  
  2. The other bit of information here is that the Central Bank approved Burgan's financials 10 August 10 - which suggests there may have been differences (perhaps "creative") between the CBK and BB over the exact income number to report.
While Burgan participates in the legendary KIPCO Group Shafafiyah program don't hold your breath waiting for a set of quarterly financials.  What you'll get instead is a two-page press release, a large portion of which is occupied by a picture of the Chairman.  By all accounts a splendid looking fellow! Or an investor presentation with a few metrics.  Apparently, the operative theory apparently being that investors in Kuwait can't deal with more than one or two facts which must be presented with lots of colors and pictures.

On that topic, since Burgan's regulator the Central Bank of Kuwait sets the financial reporting "standards" for Kuwaiti banks (I use the term "standards" because AA is always charitable), apparently a view shared by the authorities.



[9:51:28]  بلغت (خسارة) (برقان) (6.8) مليون د.ك لل6 أشهر المنتهية في30-6-10 ‏
يعلن سوق الكويت للأوراق المالية أن مجلس ادارة بنك برقان قد
اعتمد البيانات المالية المرحلية للبنك للفترات المنتهية  في 30-06-2010،
وفقا لما يلي:‏
ِ1) الفترات الحالية:‏
البند      ال3 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-10    ال6 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-10‏
الربح (الخسارة)(د.ك)     (8.730.000)                   (6.856.000)‏
ربحية السهم(فلس كويتي)         (7.4)                                (5.7)‏
اجمالي الموجودات المتداولة      -                          2.572.566.000‏
اجمالي الموجودات               -                         4.056.517.000‏
اجمالي المطلوبات المتداولة       -                       3.392.630.000‏
اجمالي المطلوبات                -                         3.525.269.000‏
اجمالي حقوق المساهمين          -                        531.248.000‏
علما بأن بنك الكويت المركزي قد وافق على هذه البيانات المالية بتاريخ ‏
يوم الثلاثاء  الموافق 10-08-2010.‏
بلغ اجماليى الايرادات من التعاملات مع الاطراف ذات الصلة مبلغ 4.446‏
د.ك .‏
بلغ اجمالي المصروفات من التعاملات مع الاطراف ذات الصلة مبلغ 2.756 د.ك .‏
ِ2) الفترات المقارنة:‏
البند      ال3 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-09    ال6 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-09‏
الربح(د.ك)               760.000                       11.748.000‏
ربحية السهم(فلس كويتي)     0.7                                      10.9‏
اجمالي الموجودات المتداولة     -                            2.056.457.000‏
اجمالي الموجودات              -                           4.141.082.000‏
اجمالي المطلوبات المتداولة     -                           2.566.220.000‏
اجمالي المطلوبات              -                            3.713.497.000‏
اجمالي حقوق المساهمين       -                            427.585.000‏