Games Fund Managers and Investment Advisors Play and How to Avoid Getting Played

Sometimes the Best Way to Avoid Being Played
Is Not to Play

Among other things, Alicia McElhaney at II keeps a close eye on academic research on the “investment space”.

She’s had quite a run with outlining the games fund managers play.

Here are just two examples.

• 27 May - VC Firms ‘Inflate’ Portfolio Valuations Ahead of Fundraising, Study Shows 
• 9 February - Private Equity Firms ‘Try to Manipulate Their Performance’ When Raising Money

Anyone who is sentient on the buyside has experienced this. 

But it is nice to see academics confirm what we've learned.

So how does one minimize getting “played”?

The first thing to understand is that similar to other sellers of goods fund managers are looking to make a sale and a profit. Sales pitches run from “puffery” to outright misrepresentation.

The second is that these PE and VC and similar products are sold to “sophisticated” investors--the so-called “big boys”. 

Regulators make the laughable presumption that the “big boys” don’t need the usual protections given retail investors.

That means disclosures and sales materials are allowed to be less robust and less detailed. One example relates to presentation of past returns, modelling, etc.

Professional standards of care are also lesser because the imaginary big boys are imagined to be able to take care of themselves. 

Careful investors will draw the following conclusions from those “facts”.

Healthy skepticism is warranted.

Verify first, then give provisional trust, but keep verifying.

If it seems to be too good to be true, you're probably right. 

Begin by carefully reading the prospectus/offering memorandum.

I have had representatives of major firms misrepresent products to me.

During one pitch, I commented that apparently their prospectus was wrong and cited “chapter and verse” from the prospectus to contradict the statement an earnest sales rep had just made.

Whenever I’m given a 1,000 page offering memorandum for all the seller’s products with a central definitions section separate from the product description so that the reader has to jump from here to there to make sense of a product, my antennae get more sensitive.  

Complexity is not the friend of the investor.

Be sure you understand the product.

That means you need to do your own research if this is your first "rodeo" with a product.

But also ask the sales rep to explain the product.  

Be wary of excessive use of jargon which is sometimes designed to deflect questions.  Who wants to admit that they don't really understand "vol" or the "greeks" on derivatives?

As well be wary of vague phrases,  waving of hands, and then the implication that a miracle occurs and you get rich.

The risk section and product/transaction description in the prospectus/offering memorandum can provide a good source of questions. And a check on the what is said in the "pitch".

Presentation of results that do not comply with CFA Institute GIPS (Global Investment Performance Standards) should not be relied on.

Non GIPS results can generally be managed to show whatever the seller wants.

GIPS also requires certain disclosures and prohibits certain practices.

Make sure benchmarks and historic performance make sense.

No one beats the market consistently.

Benchmark selection can affect relative performance.

See my earlier post on Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund.

If you do not understand how financial models may be “gamed”, you really should NOT invest in Level 2 and Level 3 assets.

This isn’t just about growth and discount rates, but also how “multiples” that are used to “determine” terminal value can disguise unrealistic assumption about those two previous factors.

If return is tied to or dependent on derivatives, you would be well advised to make certain you understand the downside risks.  

Ask the utilities in Texas who found derivatives a rather costly tuition.  

Or you could ask the good folks at JBS Spain about the derivatives they purchased.

Upward revisions of valuation should be examined carefully.

If one is being pitched, a very simple question is when the last revaluation took place and what the direction and impact was.

Amounts, timing, and the basis for the upgrade.

New funding provided by the fund manager at a higher valuation should not be considered as definitive proof the value has actually risen.

Sales of investments from one of the fund manager’s investment vehicles to another should be questioned, especially when the sale results in increasing the IRR of the selling fund. 

Or sloughing off a dog into a fund that can bear a subsequent loss of value.

Yes this occurs.

Watch out for debt financing tricks that drive IRRs and presumed value. Oh and just incidentally affect the fund manager’s compensation.

On the “outgoing” cash flow from LPs: funding LP drawdowns with debt to delay capital calls.

On the “incoming” cash flows to LPs: refinancing equity with debt to generate a “return of capital” without any realisation of the investment, e.g., trade sale or IPO.

Be sure you understand the skill set of the fund manager and how deals are accessed.

When the fund manager's primary skill seems to be the use of leverage, you may want to consider fund managers with skills in developing the underlying business. 

If the fund manager is buying assets from other funds or via auctions, ask whether he or she is getting a good price?  

If the fund manager is buying an investment from another fund, why does he or she think they can turn another fund manager's "cast off" into gold?  And is it credible?

Be sensitive to offers of preferential treatment.

Once we had a major fund management firm tell us that they were poised to revalue (upwards) investments in their existing fund. 

We could invest in that fund now and take advantage of the lower current (entry) price before mark-up.  Thus, earning a "guaranteed" return.

Needless to say, we not only declined the invitation for this investment opportunity but put them on our “blacklist” on the basis that if they were going to “screw” their existing LPs, we would be better off not becoming one.

Sometime later that fund had what might be charitably described as “disappointing” returns.

The New Era of Due Diligence Likely to be Pretty Much Like the Old

 

Latest Technology, But Still the Same Spots

Over at Institutional Investor on 27 May Nathan Yates wrote how "The Old Era of Due Diligence Is Over. Here’s What the Post-Pandemic Future Might Hold"

A very good article.

Lots of sensible points about why in-person due diligence is better than that conducted over Zoom.

What caught my eye was the comment of one “expert” he interviewed.

Clear, frequent, and honest communication among stakeholders is especially important during remote due diligence and will stay in place post-pandemic.

Three reactions.

As an introduction, I presume that there was some context that is now missing around that quote because it doesn’t make much sense.

It seems to me that “clear, frequent, and honest communication” would be especially important no matter how the due diligence was conducted.

One could also read the phrase “will stay in place” to suggest that it did not widely exist pre-pandemic. 

That’s probably not an unwarranted assumption.  That is, that it did not exist pre-pandemic.

The unwarranted "bits" are that (a)  it currently exists and (b) will so in the future. 

There are many fund managers and investment advisors who come up short in the "clear" and "honest" categories no matter how they pitch prospective and existing clients.

Can we really expect those leopards to change their spots just because they're now using new technology?

Does Zoom have an honesty enhancing effect?

Caveat emptor and some prophylactic measures are probably better steps than hope for change.   

More on that topic to come in a subsequent post on games fund managers play.

Tether - How to Correct Deficiencies in Reporting on Reserves and Simultaneously Set Boundaries

So You'll Have to Read the Post Below

The central premise and promise of Tether is that it will maintain the value of its “stablecoin” at US$ 1 for each tether in circulation.

As outlined in previous posts, there are gaps in the information Tether provides that a careful investor would require to evaluate this promise.

1. The strategy that Tether applies to maintain this “stability” so that an investor could check whether that strategy is appropriate. As noted in this post, Tether has not explicitly done this and from the composition of the reserves I find it hard to believe their strategy is fully appropriate.

2. Sufficient periodic disclosure so that an investor could confirm that Tether is adhering to the promised strategy. As noted in this second post, Tether’s current disclosure of its “reserves” is insufficient to enable this. What were the NYS AG thinking when they set the disclosure requirements for reserves in the settlement agreement?

On the other hand, one could make the argument that someone who buys Tether is not a careful investor but rather a speculator or punter. So any information is likely to be ignored.

Or that the best strategy for careful investors is to avoid any investment in Tether. 

If you want a stablecoin backed by the US dollar wait until the UST issues one.

But let’s presume that this information would be useful to some investors. 

Equally it would also set boundaries within which Tether would have to operate. Perhaps, very advisable given past questionable stewardship of the reserves.

Now as we all know and will be told by cryptocurrency aficionados that one of their main reasons for investing in sh*tcoins is that one certainly can’t trust the government.

That same skepticism should be directed to non-governmental entities, especially a party with Tether’s track record.

How do we implement those information requirements? And not just for Tether?

Here’s a suggested minimum standard model: Fidelity’s Money Market Fund SPRXX.

The prospectus and monthly fact sheet set forth the fund’s objectives and strategy.

An investor would therefore have the information necessary to make a determination whether that strategy is appropriate.

Each month Fidelity discloses each of the holdings in the fund.

It also issues a semi-annual and annual audited financial report with that same information. You can access those here.

Similar reports on holdings from Tether would allow an investor to check whether the promised strategy is being adhered to.

As a holder of a stablecoin, wouldn’t you like to have a commitment as to what are the permitted asset classes, issuers, obligor credit ratings, tenors, concentrations, use of derivatives, etc. that your money can be “parked” in?

So you know if your money is on deposit with Oz at Crypto Capital in Panama or with HSBC London? Or invested in less liquid instruments?

Wouldn’t you also like to check periodically to make sure that the commitment was being adhered to?

Apparently the answer to both questions is no.

The February settlement agreement with the NYS AG had little impact on Tether.

As of 31 March the value of outstanding Tether was some US$ 42 billion.

In early June some US$ 62 billion.

There is as they say no vaccine for stupidity.