Thursday, 3 December 2009

UK Bank Exposure to Dubai Inc

The Financial Times today carried a story that UK banks held US$5 billion or so out of the US$40 billion or so at Dubai World.   That gives them the dubious distinction of being the largest foreign creditor group.

US$ 2 billion at Royal Bank of Scotland, and US$ 1 billion a piece at HSBC, Lloyds, and Standard Chartered.  The article also identifies BNP Paribas, Societe Generale, and Calyon as large creditors.

The article goes on to say that their exposure is focused on the "still functioning" parts of Dubai World e.g.,  Jebel Ali Free Zone and Dubai Ports World.

Thus, of the Dubai World debt which the government has to date announced will be rescheduled, their exposures are a more modest US$700 million (RBS) and US$350 million for Stan Chart.

Some thoughts:
  1. It would be natural for big foreign banks to lend to what they perceived to be major companies.
  2. It is usually the tenderfoots in the market as opposed to the grizzled veterans who are most likely to see Bigfoot or its financial equivalent the "implicit guarantee".   As I noted earlier the implicit guarantee is not worth the paper it isn't written on.
  3. That being said some of the grizzled veterans in the market sometimes make mistakes.  It looks like the market and S&P are pretty much convinced that Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, Emirates NBD have massive exposures.   Local banks especially those owned by governments often step up to lend government entities, especially when in cases like Emirates NBD the same government owns both the lender and the borrower.

NIG Carlyle Group - Guarantee Watch Day #2

As promised earlier, AA has been scouring the financial press looking for one of our respected financial journals to call upon Carlyle Group to guarantee CCG. 

I'm sure if we asked Abu Muhammad he probably had the impression that Carlyle wouldn't let its subsidiary down.  And I'll bet just like the Shaykh in Abu Dhabi Carlyle never said it wouldn't.   If it's good enough for the Financial Times with Dubai, it sure ought to be good enough with CCG. 

Come to think of it, Shaykh Khalifa never said he wouldn't guarantee CCG.  So maybe he should step up and accept responsibility for not doing so.


BNSL Puts Zain Deal on Hold

There's no joy in Kuwait tonight as some important people up there were counting on this sale to help them with urgent cashflow needs.

And even less joy if they read this account.  The parties to the sale might not be serious in terms of intent.  Even more disturbing some of them might not be serious players in terms of capacity.  AA once broke a  financially strapped client's heart by telling him that his rich Arab white knight had only one of those three attributes.

Why this sale is important for a variety of reasons in explained in my earlier post here.

Bahrain Sand Shortage: Help (Sand) is On the Way


Picture Copyright Gulf Daily News


Good news for the Bahrain construction industry.

Bahrain Women Lead the Way

And on a sirat salim.

Honors well deserved.

AlYaum AlWatany - UAE



It's the National Day of the UAE. 

Alf mabruk wa mabruk.

Wednesday, 2 December 2009

Dubai: When the Going Gets Tough, Yet Another Goat

A follow-up to my earlier post "Dubai:  When the Going Gets Tough, The Tough Find Scapegoats".

And another addition to my flock.

A few more goats and I may add the honorific Shaykh to my nom de net.

Here's one I hadn't thought of --  consultants.

I should have given what I've seen.

Of course, sensible people don't believe everything they're told.

And consultants are usually hired for the purpose of telling one what one already believes. 

Dubai and Banking 051

I had posted a bit earlier about Banking 101.   After reading the press the past few days, I've decided that this approach was wrong.  Banking 101 would be a freshman course.  As in our great universities these days, we often discover that the entering class is not yet equipped to take the freshman courses.  So we offer remedial courses.

Sadly, in our financial world, it is fairly obvious that bankers and investors weren't ready for the freshman courses.  How they passed to get to the check writing stage is an educational mystery.  

Today while reading a rather prestigious foreign financial publication printed on salmon colored paper as well as what is considered the best newspaper in the United States, I was struck by the manifest claptrap that was being peddled.  It's clear that our financial journalists also need a bit of remedial tuition as well.

Some of the assertions that caught my eye and prompted this post:
  1. The existence of a new financial instrument:  the implicit guarantee.  Like Bigfoot, the implicit guarantee is discussed around the bankers' and investors' campfire at night.   As well in credit or investment committee meetings.  Often glimpsed from afar or perhaps just imagined.  But nonetheless apparently real.  Or real enough to serve as a "sound" foundation for an extension of credit.   One that no doubt sounded "sound" to credulous ears at the time.  Sadly, the implicit guarantee more often than not pays off with implicit cash.  And implicit cash is not much use for settling transactions unless of course you made an imaginary loan or investment.
  2. A case of mistaken identity.  We thought Dubai World was the government, despite the fact that it is separate legal entity.  A small fact noted in its constituent documents.  Yes, but we know that the parent will always bail out the subsidiary to protect its good name.  This is a real howler to anyone familiar with lending to subsidiaries of multinational firms or holding companies.  But perhaps the financial press believes the punters were suffering from sun stroke - Dubai is after all a bit warm in the summer and the sun is mercilessly blinding.  It is so easy to get confused in foreign lands as well. Strange food. Unfamiliar dress.  Why in many of these countries they speak another language! And again no one told us we were mistaken.  So it's clearly not our fault.  It's the fault of some local chap or Shaykh who didn't say anything.  This is not only not polite, it's downright irresponsible.
  3. Guilt by association.  Well, there's this rich Shaykh in Abu Dhabi.  We all thought he was the lender of last resort.  He sure looked like one.  He certainly never said he wasn't.  So it's his fault that we thought he was.  We never bothered to ask him or to confirm his obligation in writing because well that wouldn't be polite.  And it pays to be polite. 
  4. "Toto, we're not in Kansas anymore".  You mean the legal system here is different from that back in [insert name of lender's home country]?  Quelle surprise!   Another howler.  There have been enough debt crises since the first cross border loan where local laws have proven problematic  that anyone who makes this statement should expect to be hooted off the podium.  Yet despite abundant and painful history, this is a mistake the lenders and investors make over and over.  Sadly, while the right time for rigorous due diligence is much earlier, there is a lot of Monday morning quarterbacking after the loan goes bad.  Then legal defects are noticed.  The economics of projects are scrutinized in detail.  It's even said that offering circulars are read carefully.
So, let's start the class.

Here are ten basic and quite timeless rules for good lending and investing.  You will not require an MBA to understand them.  Nor the assistance of Philippe Jorion, sophisticated mathematical models or a Cray computer to implement them. Those skills - while highly useful - will be acquired in the senior year or graduate level courses.
  1. Develop a reasonably firm grasp on reality so that you may distinguish fact from fiction.   "What is" from "what is not".  Or what you'd like to be.  My own experience suggests that this critical faculty is highly useful in other aspects of life.  In finance, it is the basic precondition for intelligent decisions.
  2. Understand the environment in which you propose to do business:  the legal system and the enforcement mechanisms, the robustness of both regulation and regulators, business ethnics, availability and reliability of information, etc.  If you can't get a fair shake, (or a fair shaykh) you probably shouldn't be in the market.  You  might try to compensate by adjusting your lending strategy:  smaller loans, more collateral (ideally offshore) and higher pricing.  But be aware that prophylactic measures don't prevent disease.  They merely lessen the chances of an infection.  Ask yourself if you can afford to get sick.
  3. Know your customer and his business: legal status, ownership, business model, corporate culture, management competence, style and ethics and so on.  Adversity is the true test of character.  When the chips are down and your bluechip customer has become a financial cowchip, it's nice to have someone with integrity on the other side of the table.
  4. Appreciate the relative (legal and business leverage) positions between yourself and your customer.  Sovereign borrowers are indeed different than non Sovereign ones.  Members of a local elite may have certain advantages.  And so on.  If you can't fight City Hall at home, you may have even less chance overseas.
  5. Analyze the transaction and its economics.  Distinguish between productive and speculative transactions.  Basic Level Hint:  Speculative transactions are generally more risky.  Intermediate Level Hint:  Risky transactions generally have a higher incidence of failure than less risky ones.   Advanced Level Hint:  When projects fail, lenders and shareholders can get hurt.  Post Graduate Level Hint:  Speculative transactions are easier for a borrower to walk away from.  Rather abstruse and profound concepts it appears.
  6. Make sure the primary way out is cashflow from the project not the assumption that a greater fool is going to refinance your loan or buy your investment.   Or that the government will step up with a post-default guarantee.  Have a second way out if possible.  And, no, looking for a bail-out or a hand-out after the problem occurs is not a credible second way out.   Transaction structuring can mitigate risk.  Many "advanced" financial thinkers suggest it is a wise idea to match the repayment on a loan to the cashflow of the project or borrower.  If there is no discernible cashflow, adjust your loan amount commensurately, i.e., reduce it to zero.
  7. If you need credit support, the time to get it is before you write the check. As I am told one Saudi borrower said in 1984 to his lenders who were requesting he personally make them whole for loans they had made to his flagship company, "Gentlemen, the time to ask for the guarantee is when you initially negotiate the loan not after it goes bad". 
  8. Take a lesson from the auditor's rulebook.  "If it ain't written down, it doesn't exist."  If you have a guarantee, you will have a piece of paper carefully drafted by your legal counsel and with the guarantor's signature on it.  If you don't, what you don't have is not worth the paper it's not written on.  If you have an implicit guarantee, you may be in the position of  attempting to use imaginary proceeds  from the implicit guarantee to pay off your real loan.  
  9. Read the prospectus or offering circular or loan proposal.  Read it carefully.  If you don't understand the transaction or it doesn't make sense to you, pass.  Borrowers and great investment opportunities are like the Dubai Metro.  If you miss one, the next will arrive in no more than 15 minutes.
  10. If after all the above, you are satisfied, make sure that the reward you're getting is commensurate with the risk.
And be sure you perform these steps before you commit to the loan and for heaven's sake before you cut the check.

Because while hindsight is 20:20, usually at the point it is clear there is a problem,  it is really difficult to undo a bone-headed decision.  Not to mention very, very costly.

Dubai: When the Going Gets Tough, The Tough Find Scapegoats

As is typical in a crisis, there is an urgent need to find those responsible.

If we can identify those guilty of creating this crisis, we can not only mete out suitable punishment for this sin but also in so doing prevent future transgressions.  And sins these are if one looks at the scathing rhetoric in the press about integrity, responsibility, maturity, and so on. 

It appears to be a general law of nature, at least of human nature, that  such inquiries are best conducted far from home.  There is nothing more comforting in the midst of tribulations than finding out that one's misfortunes are someone else's fault.  Discovering one's own role in the debacle would be to needlessly pile sadness upon disaster.  

So far the culprits have been identified as:
  1. Misinformed journalists distorting and exaggerating a non-story.  It's really not a problem at all.  This elegant solution neatly simplifies the whole exercise. 
  2. Panic prone investors. The over reaction theory.
  3. Imprudent, incompetent, and perhaps even shifty borrowers.
  4. Alleged sober bankers and investors who thought they had a guarantee from Dubai.  Titans of finance unable to distinguish between legal entities.  Who thought an imagined guarantee (implicit guarantee) was the same as a real one.
  5. Abu Dhabi who these self-same sober bankers and investors were sure was the guarantor of last resort.  Well, the Sheikh there is rich and he's next door and never said he wasn't a guarantor, so he must be.
In this noble endeavor, one's ideology is often a  highly useful forensic tool in expediting identification of the culprit and his accomplices - both the witting and the unwitting.  The fellow travelers and the dupes.

Today I saw that a new suspect - Islamic banking - had been picked out of the line-up.   Here's one example from the less conventional press (Counterpunch).

The confusion as Sh. Mohammed might say is between the instrument and the person wielding the instrument.

A chap in a Saville row suit making a bone-headed loan or investment according to Western principles is no different than a chap in a thaub and ghutra doing the same thing according to "Shari'ah" principles.  A suit against the government in Dubai (and many other places) has probably the same probability of a decision against the government - whether the suit concerns "Shari'ah-based" or conventional financing. 

In any case, I guess we can take some small comfort that Acorn has yet to be blamed, though there is still time. 

Arab Banking Corporation - No Exposure to Dubai World or Nakheel

ABC disclosed at BSE today.

Arab Bank Ltd Exposure to Dubai Holding US$100mm

AlQabas reports that ABL issued a press release today disclosing that its exposure to Dubai Holding equivalent to US$100 million from its participation in an AED denominated syndicated loan.  The loan matures in June 2013.

ABL said that the loan was performing and had just made an interest payment.  It also noted that given its maturity, it would not be part of debts to be restructured.

The danger of course when a borrower restructures is that all debt eventually gets caught up. 

Islamic Financing & Restructuring Part III - Golden Belt Sukuk 1 (Saad Group)

This is the third installment in my series on Islamic Financing and Restructuring.

Today's it's the Saad Group's turn, specifically, Saad Trading Contracting and Financial Services Company (a limited partnership formed in Saudi Arabia) ("Saad") and Mr. Maan AlSanea.

Our "kit" is a bit lighter than our last excursion (TID Global Sukuk 1) as all I could find was the Offering Circular ("OC").   The OC is well done - no doubt a combination of Bahrain legal requirements and the professionalism of the parties involved in the transaction.  The Risks Section is  particularly robust and clear. 

Just in case, you left the AAOIFI principles behind on our last journey, here's another copy.

And before we start, just one disclosure.  While I watched Boston Legal carefully, I am not a lawyer so don't rely on this or earlier comments as legal advice.  What follows is based on practical business experience not legal training.  If you want Denny and Alan, you will have to hire them.   And probably for this transaction you'd be better served by Nigel or Neale.

Short details on the transaction:
  1. US$650 million in principal.
  2. Five year maturity with Periodic Distribution Amounts (in a non Shari'ah compliant transaction that would be called interest) paid every 15 May and November at Libor plus 0.85%.
  3. Final maturity 15 May 2012.  Single bullet payment of principal on that date.
  4. Islamic Structure:  Ijara (rent transaction).  Maan AlSanea as Chairman of Saad leases  (the Head Lease) certain land (ex buildings) in Saudi Arabia to the Issuer (a special purpose Bahraini company)  who in turn sub leases it back to Saad.  The net proceeds of the Sukuk issue (keep the word "net" in the back of your mind as it will come up again) are paid to Saad as the advance lease rental for the Head Lease.  A single payment up front.  This gets him his "loan" if we were using non Shari'ah financing. The payments under the Sub Lease are the origin of the debt service for the Sukuk.
  5. Legal Structure:  Limited recourse certificates (Trust Assets only) with a Saad purchase obligation.  Under the Sub Lease Agreement, the certificates are redeemed at face value plus any unpaid Periodic Distribution Amounts.  See the OC Section 9 "Termination Sum" on page 38.  Such purchase can take place either at maturity (scheduled dissolution) or prior thereto in certain cases (unscheduled dissolution after the occurrence of dissolution events and a vote to terminate by holders of at least 25% of the sukuk amount).  In effect this is a form of guarantee just like the structure in TID Global Sukuk 1, though we won't call it that.
  6. Governing Law:  English Law for the Head Lease, the Sub Lease, Certificate Purchase Agreement (agreement with banks who placed the deal), Service Agreement  (Saad to maintain properties including any major maintenance) and the Costs Undertaking (Saad to pay the various service providers, e.g., Ohad, Citicorp).  All these documents are part of the Trust Assets.  The Corporate Services Agreement (Ohad and the Issuer for Ohad's services) under Bahrain Law.   And finally Saudi Law for the Promissory Note and Note Issuance Agreement and each Payable Rental Promissory Note (for the next rental payment due under the Sub Lease).
Let's turn to the detail.

(1) The Trust Assets
As per the OC page 19 "Recourse to the Issuer is limited to the Trust Assets and the proceeds of the  Trust Assets are the sole source of payments on the Certificates. Upon the occurrence of a Sub-Lease  Termination Event which constitutes a Dissolution Event, the only remedy available to Certificateholders will be to require the Sub-Lessor (or the Delegate acting on its behalf) to invoke its rights against the Sub-Lessee to pay the Termination Sum due pursuant to the rights granted in favour  of the Sub-Lessor under the Sub-Lease Agreement."

So what are the Trust Assets?

Title to land parcels in Saudi?  No.  As per the OC page 26, the land parcels are recorded in the name of Mr. AlSanea.   And there they shall apparently stay.

As per the OC page 17  "The ‘‘Trust Assets’’ consist of all of the Issuer’s rights, interest and benefit, present and future, in, to and under the Head Lease Agreement, the Sub-Lease Agreement, the Promissory Note, each Payable Rental Promissory Note, each of the other Transaction Documents, all monies standing to the credit of the Transaction Account, and all proceeds of the foregoing." 

The investors' security then is in the strength of these contracts. 

(2) The Purchase Obligation
Under the Sub Lease, the Issuer may call upon Saad to redeem the certificates prior to maturity if there is a Dissolution Event and at least 25% of Sukuk holders vote to terminate.  OC Section 9.2 page 38.

Dissolution Events (in a non Shari'ah compliant financing "Events of Default") are detailed in OC Section 12 page 39.   These contain the normal non payment (7 day grace). as well as several others . This Section does not contain any general covenants on Saad nor any cross default language.   However,  Section 12 (c) contains reference to Sub Lease Termination Events also triggering a Dissolution Event.  Flipping to Section 3.5 pages 68-71 we find the usual event of default matters covered under Sub Lease Termination Events.

(3) Promissory Notes
To support the purchase obligation there is a note for US$650 million.  Note that is for the gross proceeds of the issue not the net proceeds.  It will become clear why I keep hitting this point later.

At the beginning of each rental period, Saad will execute an additional promissory note for the Payable Rental Amount which is the funding for the Periodic Distribution Amount (in a non Shari'ah compliant transaction that would be called interest).

This is a "neat" drafting approach.  In the event that Saad doesn't pay, instead of  hauling a stack of complicated documents subject to English Law into a Saudi Court, the intent appears to be to have a straightforward and simple document that clearly evidences Saad's obligation to pay.  Of course, the borrower would very likely try to get all the documents into court to prolong the case and seek whatever advantage he could. 

(4) Restructuring Issues
First, some background points from the OC.
(a) Page 25 - "The calculation of the Payable Rental Amounts is not directly linked to the value of the Land Parcels, and as a result should the calculation of the Payable Rental Amounts be challenged by the Sub-Lessee there is a risk that the Saudi courts may apply the principles of equity."  Recall that the rental payment is being reverse engineered.   We know where we want to get.  The investors want a return of Libor plus 0.85% per annum paid to them.  The borrower wants US$650 million.   This issue arises strictly because of the "Islamic" nature of the transaction.  There can be no interest, but the investors want a certain return.  The Promissory Notes are designed to overcome this issue in a Saudi Court by reducing the "case" to one of an unpaid debt acknowledged by Saad for a sum certain.
(b) Page 28-29 - There is a good description of enforcement of obligations in Saudi Arabia.  This is key because as the OC's Risk Section points out, most of Saad's assets are in Saudi Arabia.  The key sentence in this section is "The courts and judicial committees of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have the discretion to deny the enforcement of any contractual or other obligations, if, in their discretion, the enforcement thereof would be contrary to the principles of Islamic law."  An issue that faces every creditor whether he extends under Shari'ah compliant or non Shari'ah compliant structures.
(c) Page 30 -  Another key sentence:  "The concept of trust as deemed in common law jurisdictions does not exist in Saudi Arabian law."
(d) Page 45 Use of Proceeds - The net proceeds are estimated to be US$645,750,000 or US$4,250,000 less than the gross proceeds.  The difference is for the banks' placement fees as well as legal and other costs.

Second, as the Lease and Sub Lease are the heart of the security for the transaction, these would be a target for an attack.  Can a party overturn the Sub Lease contract on the basis of equity using an argument that the rental is not fair given the value of the land? If Saad is insolvent, can a creditor argue that the rental payments are a lesser obligation than that creditor's debt and that the creditor should be paid first.  Here again the Promissory Notes are a defense that the rental payment is just as valid a debt as the creditor's loan.

This is also where the difference between gross and net proceeds finally comes in.  The Promissory Note is for US$650 million.  But the amount Saad received was US$4.25 million less.  In Saudi Courts borrowers have been known to produce an accounting of all cash flows in an effort to reduce the amount they owe the lender.  The bank gave me a $100 loan and over the years I paid them back $100 (the borrower would list all payments to the bank irrespective of whether they were principal or interest).  Since the Shari'ah doesn't recognize interest, the Court could assume that all cash flows were principal.   Once a banker from a neighboring country told me that a borrower had pulled this ploy and the court ordered his bank to refund the overpayment!  That is, the bank wound up owing money to a non paying borrower.  If  Saudi courts still might  take this stance, then Saad could charge that he only received US$645.75 million not US$650 million -  and therefore there was something wrong with the Note and the transaction.  I think if the gross proceeds were desposited to Saad account and he paid the US$4.25 million in fees, there would be a stronger case than if  he only received the net.  This is not an issue particular to this transaction, even a conventional non-Shari'ah bond could run aground on this shoal.

(6) Other Interesting Points from the OC 
(a) OC page 14 Ownership of the Issuer.  AlGosaibi Investment Holding EC  Bahrain ("AGIH")  owns 99%.  Those of you who have been following the legal battle between AlGosaibi and Mr. AlSanea know that AlGosaibi has accused him of undertaking transactions in AlGosaibi companies without their knowledge.  It would be very interesting to know who at AGIH authorized this transaction.  Without that information, we can't draw any conclusions.
(b) OC page 22-23 Shari'ah Opinion.  The last paragraph gives an insight into the practical approach taken:  "The Shari’ah Board also took into consideration (i) the legal constraints under which this product is being developed; (ii) the need to facilitate and bring ease to the Islamic financial institutions and others who are determined to raise financing according to Shari’ah principles; and (iii) the prevailing conditions and a¡airs of the Ummah and the need to remove them from the shackles of riba. And Allah Knows Best."

For those interested there is a description of the Saad Group  as well as some now dated financials at the end of the OC. 

If there are any trained lawyers out there, I'd love to hear your thoughts on Golden Belt as well as on my previous post on TID Global Sukuk 1.  All without attribution and as well pro bono.

Tuesday, 1 December 2009

Moody's Estimate: Dubai Debt US$100 Billion?

Supposedly today in London Moody's gave out an estimate of Dubai Inc's debt as US$100 billion.

As well one of their senior staff reportedly described the Emirate as "high yield" territory.

If I find a link, I'll update this post.

HH Shaykh Mohammed Bin Rashid AlMaktoum Press Conference

WAM has just published a press release  relaying details of a press conference held by HH Shaykh Mohammed Bin Rashid AlMaktoum, Ruler of Dubai and Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates.

Here are some salient points from the release - though I encourage you to read it in its entirety.
  1. Sheikh Mohammed sat in a chat session with the journalists to talk about so-called crisis of Dubai World and the media buzz around this problem, as well as the confusion and exaggeration in conveying the right image of this topic across a section of the media.
  2. He asserted that he is not worried about the hype the media had created.
  3. "(In fact) we wanted this reaction, which has proven that we are the difficult figure in the equation of the global and regional economies as I had said earlier. This is what makes us feel satisfied and proud that we work, and play an important, vital and positive role in the international economy, which has suffered a strong jolt as the result of the announcement of the restructuring of a company".
  4. "People try to pelt stones or anything else within their reach at a fruit bearing tree. Then how it will be when we have seven fruit-bearing trees or more? It is natural that we are exposed to all these exaggerations, which are far from reality".
  5. He added: "The diligent waves have amazing patience.. amazing".
  6. At the end of the meeting, Sheikh Mohammed expressed his hope that the media will convey the truth, saving the people from falling into quagmire, and reminded that transparency and credibility are the most important attributes of successful media.  He called on the journalists to search for the truth, to uphold credibility and judge by conscience above all, so as to earn public trust and respect.
As I go forward I intend to report on this so-called story without hype and with minimal buzz, paying particular close attention to Point #5 above. (Tafsir on the waves comment:  long term versus short term).

National Industries Sues Carlyle Group

AA saw the news item in the Financial Times this morning.  Hard to miss it's on the front page.

What a shock!

There was no editorial (lead or otherwise) calling for Carlyle Group to step up and guarantee Carlyle Capital Corporation so that NIG could get back its US$50 million investment. 

Nor even more surprisingly was there a call on Abu Dhabi to step up and accept responsibility.

What's capitalism coming to?

Of course, AA will be keeping his eye on tomorrow's FT.  The editorial may be there.  

Other Kuwaiti Companies Report on Dubai Exposure

Most of the notices on the KSE today were about exposure to Dubai World and Nakheel.

Company KSE numbers provided in case you need to look up more details on them.  As per KSE classification, Investment Companies are 200 series,  Real Estate Companies 400 series and Services Companies 600 series.

All of the companies report they have no exposure to either Dubai World or Nakheel.  You'd expect the companies with no exposure would be the quickest off the blocks to report.
  1. Mansha'at (433)
  2. Aref Investments (216)
  3. Aref Taqa (627)
  4. Sukuk Holding (239)
  5. First Investment (219)
  6. Usul Investment (225)
  7. Arjan Global (431) - And despite it's name it states it has nothing in the UAE at all.
Link to earlier post on Kuwaiti bank exposure to Dubai. 

Golden Belt Sukuk 1 (Saad Group) Vote on Dissolution

Following the payment failure on 16 November 2009 and the earlier event of dissolution notified investors last August, the Delegate on the Sukuk has approached investors again asking them whether they wish to vote to dissolve the Trust and thereby collapse the Sukuk triggering Saad's purchase obligation. 

25% of investors have to vote for this to be effective.

So far 7.4% have. 

Notice posted on BSE here.

Kuwaiti Banks Dislcose Exposure to Dubai - Updated

As of yesterday evening, we hadn't heard from two of Kuwait's banks.  Today we have.

Gulf Bank of Kuwait - KD28 million (US$98 million) as a participant in an unfunded facility to Dubai World with expiry November 2010.

[12:13:22]  ِ.ايضاح من (خليج ب) بخصوص ديون "دبي العالمية "و"نخيل"‏
يعلن سوق الكويت للاوراق المالية بانه وردالينا الان من بنك الخليج (خليج ب)‏
ما يفيد بان البنك مشارك فى تسهيلات غير ممولة مشتركة لدبي العالمية تنتهي ‏
فى يونيو 2010 قيمتها 28 مليون د.ك ،وافاد البنك بانه بخلاف ذلك ليس ‏
للبنك اية تسهيلات نقدية او غير ذلك من التسهيلات المصرفية او استثمارات ،
سواء مع دبي العالمية او شركة نخيل التابعة لها .‏



Commercial Bank of Kuwait - No exposure

[10:21:43]  ِ.ايضاح من(تجاري) بخصوص ديون "دبي العالمية "و"نخيل"‏
يعلن سوق الكويت للاوراق المالية بانه وردالينا الان من البنك التجاري ‏
الكويتي على ضوء انباء تعثر شركة "دبي العالمية" وطلبها تاجيل سداد ‏
ديونها لفترة ستة اشهر ،افاد البنك انه ليس لديه اية انكشافات مباشرة او ‏
غير مباشرة على شركة "دبي العالمية" او على شركة "نخيل" التابعة لها .‏
 
This rounds out the Kuwaiti banks' exposure.  As expected, nothing of any real size.  Nor anything that poses a threat to the banks.

Link to earlier post on bank exposure.

Japanese Bank Exposure to Dubai - JPY100 Billion

Japanese banks' exposure to Dubai at JPY100 bln -Nikkei - as per Reuters.

DBS Bank Singapore US$1.28 Billion Exposure to Dubai Entities (Mostly in Asia)

SINGAPORE, 30 November 2009 - DBS said today its total exposure to the city-state of Dubai is approx SGD1.8 billion (USD1.28 billion). The bank believes that the situation is manageable as a substantial portion of this is to Dubai owned companies operating in Asia that are sound, such as Labroy and South Beach, which is collateralised.

As of today, the only credit that is captured under the standstill notice is a SGD558 million (USD400 million) bilateral loan to Dubai World Finance which represents 0.2% of DBS’ total balance sheet. The bank has no exposure to Nakheel.

DBS' exposure to the entire Middle East region accounts for around 2% of its balance sheet.

Kuwait Banks Disclose Exposure to Dubai

This won't be a big surprise to anyone out there familiar with GCC banking, but the Kuwaiti banking sector has little to no exposure to Dubai.

Let's run down the statements to date:
  1. National Bank of Kuwait- No exposure to any company owned by Dubai Government.  NBK also pretty much avoided the Suq Al Manakh.  Abu Shukry was at the helm there then.
  2. Boubyan Bank - No exposure to Dubai World or Nakheel.  
  3. Kuwait Finance House KFH - No exposure to Dubai World or Nakheel. 
  4. Ahli Bank of Kuwait - US$20 million in bonds.  No loans.
  5. Kuwait International Bank - No exposure to any Dubai company which has announced a standstill.  This is the "old" Kuwait Real Estate Bank. 
  6. Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East -  No exposure to Dubai World or Nakheel.
  7. Burgan Bank - No exposure to Dubai World or Nakheel.
Not yet reporting Gulf Bank and Commercial Bank of Kuwait.

Also Arab African International Bank Egypt  - in which the Kuwait Investment Authority ("KIA") holds 49.4% or so - disclosed it had US$700 million in loans to companies in the UAE.

As a final word:  This doesn't mean that Kuwaiti banks don't have exposure to other entities or companies in the UAE including Kuwaiti companies and/or individual investors.

UAE Markets Lose AED33 Billion (US$9 Billion)

ADX down 8.2% and DFM 7.3%.  The ADX drop was the largest in is history.  The DFM hasn't had a drop like this for over a year.

On the ADX (Abu Dhabi) there was a broad decline with many stocks down 9% for the day.  While one would expect declines in the banking, real estate and construction sectors, there were also large declines in companies such as Aabar (AD Government owned energy company), Abu Dhabi National Hotels, Agithia Group (Food Company).  Clearly a general market sell-off as investors  rush to liquidity (cash).   Looking at individual stocks, the forward order books are one-sided - all "asks" (sell offers) and no "bids" (buy offers).  That suggests market pressure for tomorrow.

On the DFM (Dubai), essentially all of the market's drop was in the first 45 minutes of trading - from 1970.2 to 1942.6 with a further slight drop to 1940.36 in the last 45 minutes.  I couldn't find the forward order book summary.  But again a quick glance indicates a broad sell off as in Abu Dhabi.  I'd expect more selling pressure tomorrow at the DFM as well.

On Nasdaq Dubai, Dubai Ports lost 14.88% (and earned the distinction of being the stock with the largest drop and the largest trading volume).  You'll recall that the Government announced that DP would not be part of the debt standstill.

Trading patterns suggest an absence of buyers during today's session.  And as indicated above (at least based on ADX data), there don't appear to be many buyers waiting to jump in tomorrow morning. 

Nakheel Asks NasdaqDubai to Suspend Trading in Its Bonds

Apparently in a move to prevent price deterioration  and further negative sentiment towards Dubai World.

Monday, 30 November 2009

First Gulf Bank - A Non Announcement of Its Exposure to Dubai World

Here's the official non announcement from FGB.

Commercial International Bank Egypt - No Exposure to Dubai World or Nakheel

CIB issued a press release this morning on the ADX.

No exposure to Dubai World or Nakheel.

Emirates Business 24/7 Weighs In

Emirates Business 24/7 weighs in.

However, the markets might react, this is Dubai we are talking about. An emirate that has redefined the terms "vision" and "ambition" for the world, which has given it the tallest tower, the largest mall, the tallest hotel, the largest man-made harbour and, in-the-making, the world's largest airport, among a host of other marvels. It has a track-record second to none. Dubai is one of the foremost centres of world gold trade and has indeed been gaining in importance as the preferred global destination for tourism, entrep t, real estate and construction activity, especially over the past three decades.

The Dubai dream lives on. If anything, this latest episode is a sign of Dubai's economic maturity, a clear conscience and commercial intent.

This Is Getting Serious - Dubai Police Intervene For Those Who Have Not Yet Gotten The "Message"

Well, I guess some people are hard to educate (not a real surprise when the intended audience is bankers and journalists  - their past and most likely future behavior indicates a need for more than one lesson).  The sight of a badge may focus some unfocused finds.

In an official press statement carried on WAM, Lt. General Dahi Khalfan Tamim, Dubai Police Commander and Head of the Dubai Government's Budget Committee (I guess there's a logical connection there somewhere between these two positions) noted that:
  1. "... in the whole region, real estate continue to be the top earning sector and that reality investors were still safe from the global slow down."
  2. "Only speculative real estate investors have been affected by the slow down in the sector," he added.
  3. Speaking of the budget process for next year, he remarked:  "The department heads showed remarkable efficiency in setting financial and administrative strategies that will ensure Dubai's continuous excellence," he said.
  4. "Dahi Khalfan pointed out that Dubai has more than a single landmark to be proud of.  'Usually, each of the world's countries has an icon to be proud of. Dubai has many, such as Burj Dubai, Burj Al Arab, Dubai Mall, as well as Dubai International Airport and the Emirates Airlines which are seen as major drivers for tourism.' Dahi Khalfan, who also heads Dubai's Crisis management Team, stated that Dubai government had no debts issue.
  5. "Dubai has rather an issue of unfair competition by some circles which seek to undermine the successful emirates and to unseat it as a global centre for finance and business and a magnet for foreign investments that thrived and succeeded in Dubai." "I noticed that Gulf and foreign media, as well as a large segment of general public, confuse between debts of Dubai government, which are almost non-existent, and the debts of local companies. This confusion should be corrected and the public should be made aware that to separate between the two types of debts." 
  6. "As for the real estate sector, Dahi Khalfan said it should be referred to as a "recovering sector" for the investors who are in the market for medium and long term gains."  AA: Admittedly, I may need another lesson.  I am having trouble reconciling statements #1 and #2 above with this one.  How precisely does the market differentiate in setting a price for a "speculator" from the apparently much higher one it sets for an "investor"?
In any case it's a tradition in some of the "sophisticated" Western countries that when the sheriff speaks up, he has the last word.   As was said a little more than two weeks ago, it is time to be "quiet".  Nothing to see here.  Move along.

Dubai Finance Department Educates Press - Crisis Officially Now Over

Director General of the Dubai Finance Department, Abdul Rahman AlSaleh, has issued a clarification to the market.

The crisis is now officially over.  Time to be "quiet".  I mean just how many times do people have to be told.

The sad thing (a profoundly sad thing for that matter) is that some "sober" bankers and investors actually thought they had government guaranteed paper when they made their loans and investments.   And that they had a "Greenspan put" to the nice sheikh up the road in Abu Dhabi.

And perhaps even more distressing, they will do this yet again in some other venue. 

"But, the government owns it and it undertakes 'strategic' projects". 

It's a general rule of business - I suppose - that government entities always undertake strategic projects, like hotels that are uneconomic (Anyone want to buy a Burj?) or indoor skiing mountains. 

No Time Like Good Times: The Times is Back

Apparently, The Times is back on the newstand.  Or at least the weekday Times.

This is why Abu Arqala always maintains a suitably deferential respect towards the relevant wise leadership - of whatever country.

National Bank of Abu Dhabi US$345 mm to Dubai World Group

NBAD issued a press release detailing its exposure:
  1. US$120 million in the Nakheel Bond
  2. US$100 million general corporate loan to Nakheel
  3. US$125 million to Limitless.

0-3 or 3-0 Red and White Forever

No need to say more.

No News is Good News: The Times Banned

In addition to the press campaign in the UAE about how the world is distorting the story of Dubai  as well as being unfair comes this gem of a news item. 

The authorities have apparently banned The Times.

I recall reading in the past that the ambition was to create a Singapore in the GCC.

Let's chalk this up as a success in that endeavor - at least in one respect.

Islamic Financing & Restructuring Part II - TID Global Sukuk 1

A second installment in my series on Islamic Financing and Restructuring. 

 But first just a note that I am not a lawyer and the following is not legal advice.

Tonight I want to look at The Investment Dar's "TID Global Sukuk 1" issued in September 2006.

Before we set off, let's make sure we have the right gear in our "kit":
  1. AAOIFI February 2008 Sukuk Principles  - You'll recall the issuance of this document was credited with causing turmoil in the market.  Here's Norton Rose's take.
  2. TID Global Sukuk 1 Offering Memorandum  ("OM")
  3. TID Global Sukuk 1 Musharaka Agreement   ("MA")
Some short details on the transaction:
  1. US$150 million issue
  2. Five-year final maturity with Periodic Distribution Profit computed at Libor plus 1.25% for the first three years and then Libor +1.75% for the last two with payments each 20 March and September.
  3. Principal repayment at the final maturity date  (Musharaka End Date).  A "bullet" structure.
  4. Islamic structure - Musharaka (Profit Sharing Agreement).  TID to contribute value in kind in form of Trust Assets  8,532 cars (as per the MA) plus property in Kuwait.  As a result, TID will hold 51.22% of the Musharaka.
  5. Legal structure - limited recourse certificates - recourse is to the Trust Assets.  Additional protection is given by a Purchase Undertaking by TID.  Re the Purchase Undertaking OM Section 8 (Pages 66-67) set forth an Early Redemption Date (voluntary redemption).  OM Section 9 (Pages 67-68) set forth redemption under a Dissolution of the Trust.  You might consider this a guarantee but don't let AAOIFI hear you say that.
     Let's turn to the detail.

    (1) The Trust Assets

    As per the OM page 7 "Proceeds of the Trust Assets are the sole source of payments on the Certificates".

    Let's take a close look at them given their importance.

    As per the MA Section 2.5 (d) "It [TID] shall hold and maintain such registered title as agent for the Musharaka and shall not do or omit to be done any act, matter or thing which will, or might reasonably be expected to, result in either of the Partners [TID and the Sukuk holders] breaching any of its obligations under any Transaction Document."  AA:  In other words, the Trust Assets remain legally registered in the name of TID.  The issue here is similar to that discussed in my earlier post about The International Banking Corporation and its trust arrangements with its parent, Ahmad Hamad AlGosaibi and Brothers.  One needs to be sure that such arrangements are "bullet proof" so that one's trust assets don't wind up in the legal estate of the agent.

    The critical issue for investors then is the strength of the trust agreement and its enforceability under Kuwait law.  Why Kuwait?  Because that's where these assets are located.  The trust indenture itself is drawn under English law as are the other Transaction Documents.   Since the Sukuk certificates are subject to English law, there is some logic in having a key document like the Trust Agreement also subject to English law.  However, marching into a Kuwaiti court with an English law agreement does pose some problems.  Kuwait does not have reciprocal agreements with England to honor each other's court judgements.  And any local judge - not just a Kuwaiti -  may wish to review the case.

    (2) The Purchase Obligation

    As per the OM Sections 8.1 and 8.2 (Page 66), investors have a "put option".  Nor more than 180 days and no less than 120 days prior to the Early Redemption Date (the sixth Periodic Distribution Date, i.e. 20 September 2009), the investors can require the Trustee (TID) to buy all or a portion of their certificates. and the Trustee is legally obliged to buy them.  

    The Purchase Obligation is also triggered by a Dissolution Event (an "event of default" in typical non-Shari'ah finance speak).

    The Purchase Undertaking is included to give investors recourse to TID so that they have a claim on its creditworthiness.  Clearly, the benefit of this arrangement depends on the ability and willingness of the Trustee to make such a purchase.  Assuming it works, TID is in effect an obligor on the certificates. 

    And note, if TID is an obligor (as in a guarantee) but does not pay, that guarantee obligation should be pari passu (equal in status) to funded debt - at least in most jurisdictions.

    The critical issue then is how a court treats the Purchase Undertaking.  Is it the equivalent of a guarantee?  If so, it then becomes an obligation equivalent to a loan made to the Trustee.   TID gives a representation to this effect in the OM on Page 4.  If the Purchase Undertaking is merely a commercial contract, could a court void it?  I don't know enough about Kuwaiti law to provide a definitive answer.  Would a Kuwait court take an English law determination?

    (3) Periodic Distribution Amounts

    Under a Musharaka, the partners participate pro-rata in profits and losses.  Since this is really a borrowing, the transaction has to be structured so that the Sukuk investors get their interest payment only.

    Let's step through the document.

    First, there is the obligatory comment in the OM (Page 3):  "Each Musharaka Partner, pursuant to the Musharaka Agreement, shall be entitled to share in the profits of the Muskahara and bear losses of the Musharaka ratably in accordance with the proportion that such Musharaka Partners' Units in the Musharaka bear to the aggregate of the Units then held by both Musharaka Partners".  AA:  The Shari'ah principle is upheld.

    Second, on the same page:  "The Management Agent [TID] shall be entitled to a management incentive fee computed as provided below.  AA:  Nothing obnoxious to the Shari'ah in compensating the Managment Agent for doing a good job. 

    Third, on the same page:  "The Management Agent is entitled to certain fee ("Incentive Fee") when, in respect of any Accounting Period (as defined herein), the Musharaka Accounts (as defined herein) show a Net Cash Profit payable to the Issuer greater than the Periodic Distribution Profit Amount [Libor plus the margin]".   AA: In other words, any profit over the Periodic Distribution Profit Amount (let's call that interest for the moment) is the Incentive Fee to the Management Agent.   That's some incentive.  But it achieves the goal.  This is a borrowing and the lender is entitled to his interest.  Exercise left for the student:  Are Shari'ah principles pristine at this juncture?   

    (4) Accounting Treatment

    TID's last annual audited statement was issued for Fiscal 2007.  This Sukuk and one issued previously are shown as liabilities in the balance sheet, equivalent to borrowings.  Note 18 describes the Sukuk transactions in more detail. 

    Section 18.2  of that Note states:  "Islamic Sukuk are secured by assignment of finance receivables amounting to KD 18,251,420 as of 31.December 2007 (KD 30,495,918 as of 31 December 2006)."   AA: This structure was approved prior to the AAOIFI February 2008 statement of principles.  While the balance sheet treatment looks uncomfortably close to a loan, one could argue that since TID is the majority owner of the Musharaka, under accounting principles it must consolidate the entire entity.

    (5) Restructuring Issues


    (a) Strength of the Trust Arrangement

    The Sukuk and non Sukuk holder are going to be motivated by their assessment of the value of the assets in the Trust.  If there is real value there, the non Sukuk holder will attack and the Sukuk holder will uphold the Trust Agreement.  If not, the Sukuk holder might try to argue that there was no Trust  so that he can access more assets as a general creditor.  In such a case the non Sukuk holder would argue for the Trust. 
    Another issue has to do with Sukuk holders changing the Trustee.  If the Trustee is in difficulty, getting the Trust Assets registered in another Kuwaiti entity's name - one not in a debt restructuring - would be ideal.  Without the text of the Declaration of Trust, it's not possible to determine  what can be done.    It would be a matter of law as one would expect the English law firms involved in drafting the Transaction Documents would try to incorporate this principle.   The potential "rub" would be Kuwaiti law and practice.

    What's also important here is the precise claim the investors have over the Trust Assets.  Is it merely the proceeds they generate?  Or do the investors have the right to the assets themselves?


    (b) Management Agreement

    What are the circumstances under which the Sukuk investors can replace the Managment Agent?  If the Agent is unable to fulfill his duties, the underlying property might suffer dimunition in value.  Those obligated under the car or property receivables might have a legal right to hold payment.  Or might choose to take advantage of diminished oversight to try to avoid their own obligations.  Again one would expect this to be addressed in the Management Agreement  And like the Trustee issue above, Kuwaiti law and practice would be the practical issues.  There is a disconcerting statement on Page 3 in the OM in the Management Agreement section "... the Management Agent shall be irrevocably appointed as manager of the Musharaka."


    (c) Purchase Undertaking

    Is this the equivalent of a guarantee?  Or a voidable contract?  Again a logical target for a non Sukuk holder creditor to attack.  This would be similar to the attempt made by the non Shari'ah BIB creditors described in my first post on this topic.


    (d) Public Policy

    As a final word, it's important to recognize that public policy is highly likely to influence decisions - not merely the letter of the law.  Countries in the area are unlikely to set precedents which undermine "Islamic banking".


    Central Bank of UAE to Guarantee Dubai World?

    Rumors in market that an announcement will be made before the stock markets open in the UAE today.

    Just a few hours from now.

    Nothing on WAM so far.

    Could last Thursday's announcement been a shrewd move by Dubai in the face of Abu Dhabi reluctance to step up for US$10 billion for the second tranche of the bond issue?

    UPDATE:  No guarantee from the CB UAE or for that matter from the Emirate of Dubai.

    First Gulf Bank Denies Dubai Exposure Reports




    The CEO of FGB has denied his bank has exposure to Dubai World in the amount mentioned in press.

    You'll recall a previous post at SAM which quoted Maktoob that FGB had AED 5 billion (US$1.36 billion) in exposure.

    Another chap no doubt worried that his customers may be a bit nervous when the doors open for business tomorrow.

    Sunday, 29 November 2009

    Shirk Fil Baraada (Unbelief in the Coldstore)

    AA's better half doesn't like her tahini with oil.  Not one to practice taqiya, she is very upfront: she  asks if she may pour off the oil in the store so that none will get mixed with the tahini on the way home.  And, yes, she comes prepared so the shop keeper will not endure any mess.

    Last week, on a mission for choice olives undertaken without AA, who was busy with work, she ventured into our local  Lebanese grocery.  Since Ibn AA  was returning from university for Eid AlShukr, we had decided to prepare hummus (the old fashioned way).   In case you're wondering, yes, as per her mathhab she eats her hummus bidun zayt zaytun.  On the other hand, I  have my own personal bottle.

    In any case, the request to pour off the oil triggered not only dausha but also fauda in the grocery.  One of the "Mutatahiniyin" in the store took away the jar and refused to sell it to her. Others sprang to action to block aisles.  Jars of Tahini were shaken to mix the oil.  Voices were raised.  Takfir was pronounced.

    The missus was, however, unmoved. 

    Eventually a younger more liberal member of the staff  allowed her to make the purchase and to pour off the oil.

    We had excellent hummus.  And, yes, she used AA's personal bottle of zayt zaytun quite liberally on the hummus for Ibn AA and AA.

    I am looking forward to our next trip to the grocery (the olives are fantastic and they sell Cafe Najjar - and we never seem to have enough CN here at bayt AA).  And we're out of tahini!

    My wife on the other hand has her eye on a Pakistani grocery in the neighborhood where such behavior is tolerated though not actively encouraged.

    I suppose I shouldn't mention that she prefers Turkish tahini to Lebanese?

    More Dubai Aftershocks: UAE Central Bank Affirms Support for Banking Sector

    The Central Bank of the UAE issued a press release today:
    1. advising that it was making available an additional liquidity facility to both domestic banks and branches of foreign banks in the Federation
    2. noting that the UAE banking sector was in better shape than it had been one year ago
    3. pointing out that the banking system is composed only of retail banks with stable deposits  "the best banking model"
    4. in light of the previous comment, it noted that UAE banks get most of their funding from customers with interbank deposits only at 10.3% of aggregate liabilities and foreign deposits only 5%
    Issuing such a statement during the Eid Holiday indicates a strong concern at the CB UAE about a potential run on banks tomorrow.

    This is in line with rumors of heightened expat "chatter" about securing their funds.

    I Hope This Isn't True, But Happy Easter to All

    Franklin Lamb has reported that last Thursday US Embassy Beirut wished the President of the Republic of Lebanon a blessed Eid al Fitr.  And that this is the second consecutive year!

    Anyways, since it's Sunday and one Sunday is I guess pretty much like another, I'd like to wish all min Qaumi Issa (samra or otherwise) - or at least the Western wing of the Qaum -  a very Happy and Blessed Easter.  (Mayna turwil 'atshan)

    I'll try to remember the Orthodox, but someone remind me is it one week later or earlier.

    A Favor

    Please go here.

    I think you'll find intelligent solid commentary.

    If you agree then go here and vote for the
    MEI Editor's Blog

    Two reasons:
    1. First and most importantly that blog deserves a vote for its content.  Solid and insightful.
    2. Second, whenever, he mentions my site, my hit numbers go way up.  I figure if he wins an award and then mentions Suq Al Mal my numbers will go up even further.  Afterall, this is  Suq Al Mal.  If you're looking for a qird hassan, you're at the wrong site.

    Saturday, 28 November 2009

    More Dubai Fallout - GCC and MENA

    Dubai dropped the first shoe - its request for a debt repayment standstill.  And what a big shoe it was.  Still causing shockwaves.

    Not only have Dubai and the region been affected but there have been knock-on effects.  European banks - who reportedly hold some US$35-45 billion of Dubai debt - have seen their shares fall.  As have European companies where Dubai and other GCC countries are shareholders.

    Real estate investors in major centers are reportedly licking their lips thinking about  potential fire sales of assets - the Adelphi Building in London and so on.

    Let's take a look at some repercussions closer to home.

    Following Dubai's real estate boom, everyone who was anyone in the real estate game had to have at least a $1billion dollar project.  And like Dubai, the more adventurous ventured from their home markets.  Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and so on.  Dubai even has a sky scraper building in Doha. Salam Resorts in Bahrain and Oman.  Sama Dubai.

    Now that bankers and investors have belatedly rediscovered risk (but perhaps as usual only temporarily) there is bound to be a slowdown.

    What is the fate of the projects a-building?  And what is the fate of new developments?

    Not likely a positive development (sorry for the pun) for some of the less rich, less resilient economies.

    Update on Dubai's Options from The National

    Here's an update from The National.

    I'm puzzled by one thing - just what did analysts think HSBC was going to say at this juncture?

    Dubai: The Typical Banker and Investor Response

    No sooner had Dubai announced its debt standstill request than the typical banker/investor reaction set in place.

    First, was the usual fear- "nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance".   Proof yet again, if any were required, of the power of the insights of behavioral finance.

    Second, came the typical recriminations.  Only a short time ago, Sheikh Mohammed was a man of vision.  A reformer who would lead a modern day renaissance of the Arab world.   A leader who would build a new Singapore in the Gulf.  Today suddenly he's changed - or at least we are asked to believe he's changed - to a charlatan or an incompetent.  What a difference a day or two can make!  And a debt standstill request.

    As an example, (though to be clear I am not accusing the FT or Ms. Khalaf of previously mindlessly cheerleading for Dubai), today's FT's lead editorial and a column by Rula Khalaf detail the manifest profligacy and unwise business and financing strategy of Dubai.  And do so in less than gentle language.  A small detail that the efficient market apparently overlooked - not the language, the analysis.  Sober bankers and investors tricked yet again despite the most careful due diligence and solid risk management skills.

    Third, there are the (sadly) usual calls for a bailout.

    The FT thunders that:  
    "For its part, Abu Dhabi should give whatever help is needed to bring this episode of incompetence to a close. Abu Dhabi allowed it to be believed that it was backstopping Dubai, so it should make good its promises. This will require a public guarantee of Dubai’s debts – and soon. The reputation of the whole UAE depends upon it."  

    Free market capitalism without the difficult central teaching of Adam Smith.  But done of course not to bail out bankers but to protect the reputation of the whole UAE.   A worthy goal.

    Perhaps, while Abu Dhabi is at it, it might help out the BBA by guaranteeing the debt of Saad and AlGosaibi.  The repuation of the GCC may well depend on it.

    Sadly, though, there is no thought of the reputation of banks and investors who have yet gain made some bone-headed lending and investment decisions.  Who indeed will restore their reputation?  Though one might search long and hard before one finds any criticism as scathing as that levied against Dubai.  In any case, responsibility is dealt with quite nicely by the market as described in the next point.

    Fourth, once again the transference of responsibility.  When the going gets tough, the tough apparently find a scapegoat.  Clearly, not the sober careful bankers and investors  themselves.  No, it is Abu Dhabi who misled them.  And as well, I suppose, the now hapless Sheikh Mohammed.

    Abu Dhabi Banks' Exposure to Dubai

    As per Maktoob:  "Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank has at least 8-9 billion dirhams ($2.2-$2.5 billion) exposure to Dubai World and related entities, forcing the bank to book more provisions, a senior executive of the bank said. First Gulf Bank has at least 5 billion dirhams ($1.4 billion)".  Followers of Middle Eastern finances will recall that to date among UAE banks who have declared their exposures, ADCB is the largest lender to Saad/AlGosaibi with some US$609 million equivalent.

    At 3Q09, ADCB had some AED20 billion in equity.  At that date FGB had AED22 billion.  Both banks should be able to withstand the shock.  The Abu Dhabi Government is not going to let these banks fail - particularly given their connection to the government.  One is 65% or so owned by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.  The other has a "major" ownership stake by the sons of Sheikh Zayed (deceased father of the current Amir).

    Other Abu Dhabi banks are likely to have significant exposures to Dubai.

    Perversely, these large exposures may be good news for Dubai as one would expect these banks to take a softer line in any restructuring because of the government connection.

    The International Banking Corporation - Comments on 2008 Financials

    Not so long ago I took a look at Awal Bank's financials, today it's TIBC's turn.

    From a review of TIBC's financials, it's clear that the bank was exposed to significant risks  arising from certain legal arrangements with its holding company, Ahmad Hamad AlGosaibi and Brothers ("AHAB").   AHAB held legal title to TIBC's investment portfolio and to the collateral on its loans.  And this may be a large part of the reason for the collapse of this apparently well capitalized bank.

    In both cases, under the legal agreements between AHAB and TIBC, AHAB held these assets in "trust" for the bank.   But the critical legal issue is whether such a trust structure would be recognized by a Saudi Court.  That is, would the Saudi Court look through AHAB's legal title to ascribe direct ownership of the assets to TIBC?  If it did, then these assets would be outside of AHAB's "estate" and would not be subject to  an AHAB bankruptcy, insolvency or administration.  If it did not,  then  these are AHAB's assets to be divided among  AHAB's creditors - not just TIBC.   

    Update:  From the Golden Belt 1 Sukuk (Saad Group):  ""The concept of trust as deemed in common law jurisdictions does not exist in Saudi Arabian law."  Here's the link to that post.


    I'm guessing as with Awal that TIBC's problem is solvency not liquidity.  With  TIBC's relatively high equity to total assets ratio, there would have had to been a substantial erosion in asset values to trigger insolvency.  From the structure of TIBC's balance sheet the two areas  where this is most likely to have occurred in are loans and investments.   The loss of the assets themselves would have the most impact on the  bank's equity.

    Now to the detail.

    Unlike Awal, TIBC posts more financial info on its website.   At the "Publication" drop down menu, you'll find quarterly financials for 2008 and audited annual financials for 2005 through 2008.

    As with Awal, let's focus on the changes from 3Q08 to 4Q08.

    Total Assets declined US$498.5 million from US$4.3 billion to US$3.8 billion - roughly 11.6%.  Compared to 4Q07 the decline was a more modest 6.6%.

    On the liability side, the major declines were US$268 million in due to banks, US$70.5 million in due to customers, US$30.9 million in due to related parties, and US$12 million in other liabilities.  A total of  US$381.5 million. A decline of US$117 million in equity accounted the remainder.  Declines are all fairly reasonably spread and there is no one group with a major cashflow in its favor as with Awal.

    It's difficult to use TIBC's 2008 quarterly financials to analyze term loans because the bank and its auditors appear not to have been able to make their minds up about a consistent presentation of term loans on the balance sheet during 2008.  After appearing earlier in the year, these completely disappeared in 3Q08 only to re-emerge in 4Q08.  Looking at Note 10 in the fiscal year end ("FYE") 2007 financials, TIBC had US$375 million of outstanding term loans.  US$100 million was due in the next twelve months.  In  the 2Q08 financials  term loans had decreased by $100 million and US$75 million was shown as due in the next twelve months (Note 8).  This suggests that there was no prepayment of term loans.  However, if there were, it would appear to be only for US$75 million - though this amount may be included in Due to Banks as a current payment.  The presentation in TIBC's financials is confusing on this score and so it's difficult to be definitive.

    On the asset side,  cash and banks were down US$429.4 million.  This funded the  reduction of US$381.5 million in liabilities plus increases in loans of US$77.2 million and other assets of $24.5 million.  The US$171 million drop in investments was largely due to  US$117 million in  (non cash)  fair value adjustments  (reflected directly in equity) plus an apparent US$54 million of cash realizations.

    At 31 December 2008, equity was US$1.3 billion and total assets US$3.8 billion.  Like Awal, rather  sharp declines in asset values would have to have occurred to significantly erode capital to zero or near zero.

    Let's take a closer look at the balance sheet.
    1. Cash and Banks was US$1.1 billion.  Three key items from Note 4.  (a) 86% of these deposits were with banks and financial institutions in Europe. (b) 76% of deposits were with A rated counterparties.  (c) TIBC claimed a strict risk concentration limit of 10% of capital.  Also there are no related party deposits of any significance disclosed in Note 25.  Taking these comments at face value, one would not expect a major loss in this asset category.
    2. Investments were carried at US418.1 million with negative fair value adjustments of US$426.6 million.  Earlier in the year TIBC carried its investments at fair value through profit and loss ("FVTPL").  At 31 March 2008, TIBC had recorded a net loss of US$204 million. due to investment losses taken through the income statement.  After 1Q08 TIBC engaged in an asset sale and asset purchase with related parties (presumably its parent AHAB).  Sales of US$867.2 million and purchases of US$839.1 million.  The sales would allow TIBC to dispose of the FVTPL assets - transferring them to available for sale ("AFS") would not have been possible.   However, the new investments could be booked as  AFS with no problem.  Why AFS?  Because any changes in fair value could be taken directly to equity by passing the income statement.   Through the miracle of accounting principles, TIBC was able to report a net profit of US$156.1 million for fiscal 2008.   The US$426.6 million loss on investments was recorded directly in equity.  However,  when we look at comprehensive income, we see that the bank actually had a loss for the year of US$270 million (US$156.1 million in net income minus the US$426.6 million in  negative fair value adjustments).  Another key piece of information is in Note 7 where it states that the bank's investment securities are registered in the name of the holding company (AHAB).  Use of a Saudi registered company to act as shareholder would facilitate TIBC making investments in the Kingdom.  There is no obvious legal reason/advantage to have AHAB hold shares in  the UAE, Kuwait or other GCC stockmarkets.  However, as outlined above, this arrangement could also present a danger to the bank if there were a problem at AHAB and a Saudi Court did not recognize TIBC's title.  Then the bank would be one of AHAB's creditors with a claim on AHAB's estate rather than as the legal owner of the investments.  This could be a potential area where asset values were lost.  Bolstering this view is that it appears the investments were shares traded on the Tadawwul (Saudi market).  There has not been a complete collapse in share prices on that market.
    3. TIBC's main business is commercial lending with US$2.3 billion out of the bank's US$3.8 billion of assets at FYE 08.  Again from Note 4, 99.9% of the loan portfolio was in the GCC/Middle East region.  TIBC also discloses that the majority of loans and advances are secured with a minimum coverage of 110%.  Describing the collateral later in the Note, TIBC says that it is land deeds, plant and machinery or cash collateral.  From the liability side of the balance sheet (customer deposits), it's clear that cash collateral is de minimis.   Usually with land or plant and machinery, most banks use a much lower borrowing base.  That is, they will lend maybe 50% or so against such assets given their illiquidity and high discounts required to sell.  If Borrower A didn't make a go with his factory, why would Buyer B believe he could unless he could get them at a steep discount a la Irridium?  And again there is the same note as with investments.  The holding company is the legal holder of the lien on a trust basis for the bank.  That implies that most of the loans were in Saudi Arabia - as there would be no advantage to using AHAB to hold collateral in another country.   There is the same problem as with the investments: if the holding company gets into trouble, all the collateral may be blocked in its estate, leaving the bank as a creditor of the holding company and with uncollateralized loans.
    Finally, one parting comment on a recent report that creditors had tracked down some gold shipments involving AlGosaibi and Saad.

    TIBC began gold trading in 2006 with sales volumes of some US$1.2 billion, followed by US$2.3 billion in 2007 and US$2.5 billion in 2008.  Profit margins were roughly 1.4% of sales.  It's unclear if TIBC were matching spot trades or whether it was taking actual possession of the gold.  The news articles suggest it was taking possession - at least for the sums mentioned in those articles.   It will be interesting to follow developments on this topic.

    Friday, 27 November 2009

    Sadiq AlBahrain AlAmin




    Long ago in a much warmer place, my then landlady made a comment that the patron saint of Lebanon was not Mar Marun but rather Jamal Abdul Nasir because his economic policies in Egypt were responsible for the rise of Beirut.

    Over the past 10 or so years, Dubai has mounted a serious challenge to Bahrain's role as the regional  banking center.

    I wonder if my landlady has an opinion on this issue?

    Two Timeless Classics - Perhaps Quite Timely Now

    Irving Fisher's Debt Deflation Theory.

    Hyman Minsky's The Financial Instability Hypothesis.