Showing posts with label Debt Restructurings. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Debt Restructurings. Show all posts

Friday 31 May 2019

Dana Gas: FYE 2018 and 1Q2019 Financial Performance - A Brighter Picture But Not by Much

A 5 Watt Bulb is Brighter than 2 Watts

Last December I made a bold prediction based on DG’s 3Q18 financials that the company would have a break-even year or at best case perhaps earn a 4.5% ROAE.  
DG’s 2018 financials  (but not its glossy annual report) have been released. 
Let’s take a look and see how prescient AA’s prediction was.  
Net income for 2018 is what might charitably be described as “disappointing”, a net loss of USD 186 million driven by impairment provisions of USD 250 million.  USD 187 million for the write-off of the Zora field and USD 59 million for certain Egyptian assets (or perhaps uncertain Egyptian assets).  
Pretty far off from AA’s less than less than "prescient" prediction a scant five months ago.  
In the MD&A section of the report DG’s Directors emphasize that the 2018 impairment provisions were “non-cash items” and that “On a like for like basis, excluding one off impairments, profit from core operations increased to USD 64 million (AED 234 million) as compared with USD 5 million (AED 18 million) in 2017".  
On that basis, DG earned an ROAE of some 2.35% using total shareholders’ equity as reported on the balance sheet.  If we adjust 2018 equity for the non-cash impairment that year (add it back) then ROAE is 2.27%. 
In the Directors’ “best” case, a dismal return.  
Certainly well below the risk-adjusted return DG should be earning given its business concentration in risky markets.  Equally well below the return it should be earning ignoring risk.  
However, the picture in 1Q19 is brighter, but only marginally in an absolute sense.  
Net income of USD 35 million, largely driven by a USD 10 million reduction in interest expense.   If this pattern continues, projected ROAE for 2019 is some 5.3% much better than 2018.  
But still subpar for the risk.  No longer pitch dark.  But a 5 watt bulb is cold comfort.  
There was other good news.  
Continued reasonably good collection of receivables from Kurdistan.  
A less favorable 70% collection rate in Egypt, including some receipts in Egyptian pounds.  A less than happy approximate USD 9 million increase in Egyptian receivables.  Both factors –accepting funny money (Egyptian) and increasing receivables --something to keep an eye on.  
DG also reported that it and Pearl had prevailed in their arbitration (LCIA) with MOL over the KRIG settlement. 
So is DG out of the woods?  
Not quite yet.  
While better than 2018, the projected ROAE is still not at a level that a company with this risk pattern should be earning.  
One quarter does not a turnaround make.   
More importantly the factor driving the turnaround is financial not operational.  The current interest charge is based on a non-market rate.  Once the company has to borrow at market rates again, this financing advantage will disappear.  And financing will be important if DG is to materially grow its business.  
With an approximate 5% ROAE, there will also be little opportunity to use financial leverage to increase shareholders returns materially.  And, if lenders demand more than the ROAE, leverage will actually diminish ROAE.
There's a real negative on the operational side: the write-off of Zora.  It was DG's one revenue stream from a creditworthy country. Admittedly small, but perhaps with a potential to grow.
There's also another cloud on the horizon.  
DG is looking at a roughly USD 400 million principal payment on the sukuk in October 2020 some 17 months from now.  
With USD 442 million in cash as of 1Q19, an almost certain USD 95.5 million dividend this year and one next year which is likely to be approved and paid prior to repayment date, there’s little margin for error. 
The sukuk lenders/investors did not or could not impose any real control on DG's payment of dividends.  They agreed that DG could pay dividends equal to 5.5% of paid-in- equity on the condition that after such payment, DG would have cash of at least USD 100 million.  And they did this knowing the repayment due in October next year was going to be a multiple of USD 100 million.  Roughly 4 times.
If DG is able to honor the repayment obligation in full, and that’s not certain, it could be left with little cash for its business.  
In such a case it’s hard to imagine investors and lenders rushing to support DG, but then they (lenders and investors) routinely demonstrate little common sense in their underwriting. 
So the future while brighter (5 watts instead of 2 watts) isn't bright enough to lift DG from the dog investment category.

Thursday 19 October 2017

Dana Gas Strikes Again - "It's Just a Contract"

The above should not be read to imply that AA considers this a minor lapse.
Dana Gas has apparently struck again, suggesting its earlier unilateral abrogation of its legal obligations under its sukuk was no fluke.  

It seems that in negotiating the settlement with the KRG, DG and Crescent Petroleum did not obtain the consent of MOL Group Hungary, a ten percent shareholder in Pearl, before finalizing the agreement with the KRG. 
As noted in earlier posts, the agreement among Pearl’s shareholders gives the minority shareholders—MOL, RWE, and OMV—certain rights including the ability to veto some decisions of Pearl. 
MOL asserts that the settlement with the KRG is a decision that requires shareholder unanimity and that it did not provide its consent.  I’ve provided excerpts from DG’s and MOL’s press releases below.  
But first some comments.
  1. Counterparties considering concluding contractual arrangements with Pearl Petroleum and Dana Gas would be well-advised to carefully consider this “event” and whether it is further evidence of DG’s and PPL’s less than sterling record of honouring legal agreements. 
  2. As a side comment, AA notes that behaviour of this sort, if unchecked, might lead to widespread adoption of a cavalier attitude to legal agreements on a wider basis.  Countries may even be tempted to re-read binding treaties and find imagined breaches of the spirit of an agreement. 
  3. The hapless creditors in DG’s sukuk should carefully consider how to protect themselves in the ongoing restructuring negotiations.  What is the value of the word of a counterparty that appears to have a relaxed attitude towards legal obligations?  No doubt not USD 690 million.  Probably not USD 690.  
  4. On the other hand, if Dana’s assertion is that MOL is using “legal technicalities” in an effort to extort benefits or to abrogate the existing Pearl shareholders’ agreement is correct (a mighty big “if”), then this would seem a case of karmic comeuppance.   Perhaps to be followed by Baghdad reopening the concession agreements when it has settled affairs with the KRG. 
  5. In the arbitration proceedings will MOL be able to make a convincing case to the LCIA to DG's disadvantage that DG’s conduct with the sukuk and the shareholders’ agreement is part of a pattern of cavalier disregard and bad faith towards legal obligations? 
  6. Will Abu Yusuf come up with another far-fetched distortion of Shari’ah to support DG’s actions re the KRG settlement?  If he does, will the LCIA “buy” it?
  7. Are the fine courts of Sharjah standing by to issue an injunction if the LCIA proceedings seem to be going MOL's way?
  8. Will DG’s shareholders providentially and of course completely of their own volition intervene in Sharjah’s fine courts to block the arbitral proceedings or award?  
Here’s the excerpt from DG’s press release
The Settlement Agreement with the KRG was welcomed and endorsed by Dana Gas, Crescent Petroleum, OMV and RWE, together holding 90% of the shares of Pearl. Unfortunately, MOL (a 10% shareholder of Pearl) unreasonably sought to link its endorsement of the settlement to a renegotiation of the terms by which it first secured its participation in Pearl back in May 2009 (namely its commitment to certain contingent payments) and now complains about Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum for their handling of the settlement alongside Pearl, expressing dissatisfaction with the outcome as compared to the alternative of pursuing a final litigation and enforcement outcome against the KRG.
And from MOL’s press release.  I’ve boldfaced a key sentence which if true presents a world of trouble for DG and other shareholders. 
MOL Plc. (“MOL” or “MOL Group”) hereby notifies the market of the following:  MOL joined Pearl Petroleum Company Limited ("Pearl") in 2009 as a shareholder with a 10% stake and strong minority rights. Pearl’s shareholders include, among others, Dana Gas PJSC ("Dana Gas”) and Crescent Petroleum Company International Limited (“Crescent”). Dana Gas and Crescent, along with Pearl, entered into an agreement to settle Pearl’s long-standing dispute with the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (“KRG”) on 30 August 2017 (the “Settlement Agreement”), without properly consulting MOL or obtaining requisite approval, in breach of MOL’s contractual rights. MOL accordingly served a default notice on Dana Gas and Crescent on 11 September 2017 in accordance with the mechanism agreed by and between the shareholders of Pearl. The default notice has severe legal consequences for the defaulting shareholders, their shareholdings in Pearl and their related entitlements. As announced by Dana Gas earlier today, MOL received a Request for Arbitration from Dana Gas and Crescent in the London Court of International Arbitration, disputing the validity of MOL’s default notice. MOL will take all appropriate steps to enforce and protect its rights.

Wednesday 20 September 2017

Dana Gas: Creditors Negotiating With Themselves?

The Chicago Way But Not Milton Friedman's Way

As reported by Bloomberg, DG’s tragically unfortunate creditors made DG an offer to restructure the approximate USD 700 million of outstanding sukuk with the following terms:
  1. An upfront repayment of USD 300 million (par value) in principal.
  2. A maturity extension of three years. 
  3. Maintenance of the existing interest rates:  7% on the exchangeable sukuk and 9% on the ordinary sukuk. 
  4. A request for a dual listing of DG shares on the London Stock Exchange. 
  5. Maintenance of the existing conversion price at AED 0.75 for the exchangeable sukuk. 
  6. Payment of interest amounts due last July and this October. 
DG rejected the offer and is said to be pursuing a litigation-based strategy. Bloomberg cited an unnamed party not authorized to speak on DG’s behalf.  The FT was more categorical that the company had rejected the offer.  FT article here. 
Some comments. 
AA wonders about the creditors’ negotiating strategy.  In Middle Eastern carpet stores, the seller’s initial price is a long way from the price at which he sells.  The prospective buyer needs to have a similar negotiating strategy.  Once the buyer begins negotiations and gives his first price, it's hard to go lower. 
But DG’s creditors face a more complicated situation that buying a rug from a reputable merchant.  DG has adopted an extreme position.  Its current “offer” to the creditors is (a) you owe us money or (b) in worst case we owe you no more than USD 60 million.   
That’s what Herb Cohen would describe as a “Soviet” negotiating strategy.   The appropriate response is not to make a typical counteroffer and then split the difference because the Soviet tactic moves the frame of reference way off market terms.  
Often the counterparty (the party not adopting the Soviet style tactic) proceeds as though it’s in a “normal” negotiation, replies with a counteroffer to the extreme offer, and winds up in effect negotiating with itself to its detriment. 
DG’s creditors need to be very careful not to embark on that path. 
They’ve made an offer (their first price in rug shop terms) from which they will most likely negotiate less favorable (to themselves) terms.  So what does that mean?  A five year tenor?  A USD 100 million principal payment?  An interest rate of 3%?  All of the above. 
A Jimmy Malone (pictured above) strategy seems to be more appropriate given DG’s negotiating strategy and its less than sterling behaviour.  When you’re negotiating with someone you don’t trust, the typical rules of negotiation go out the door.  There’s no “win-win” when the other party is trying to cheat you.  
One other bit of unsolicited advice for creditors: a single word “amortization”. 
No doubt some clever mind has stated that with a three year instead of a five year tenor the average life of the sukuk has been drastically reduced – 5 to 3 years.  But –a rather large but—a bullet is a bullet.  Payment is promised in one lump sum in the future. Creditors would be better off with recurring principal payments (amortization).  Money in the hand now is much more valuable than a promise of money in the future, particularly when the integrity/ethics of the party making the promise to pay are doubtful. 
AA was particularly intrigued by the creditors’ request for a dual listing on the LSE. 

Listing this mutt on the LSE is not going to turn it into a purebred. Or magically create investor demand.  The dumb money is already present.  

Is this an attempt to try and force better corporate governance on DG or somehow bind them closer to English law?   Corporate governance is fundamentally a people issue.  Listing on the LSE doesn’t by itself change that.   Unless DG reincorporates, it is a Sharjah company with all the drawbacks of UAE law. 

Is this an attempt to scare shareholders that the creditors intend to convert the sukuk and take some or all of this “gem” of an investment from their hands, thus, prompting shareholders to put pressure on DG’s board to be more accommodative?  Not bloody likely, the shareholders are a disparate group.  From ADX trading statistics, they appear to be primarily retail investors who no doubt are right now calculating how they will spend their share of the USD 1 billion they imagine will soon be in DG’s hands. The major shareholder is a related party no doubt on board with DG’s “clever socks” strategy. 
To AA’s surprise Goldmine and Blackrock are apparently holders of DG paper.  Unless they bought their stakes at a deep discount and have a reasonable prospect of turning a profit with a fractional return of nominal principal, they should not be DG investors. 
Side note: If they purchased their stakes at a discount, then “whole” dollar creditors should understand there is a fundamental conflict between their own full price interests and  creditors whose entry price is much less. 
In defense of Goldmine and Blackrock, you might be inclined to remind AA about the role of risky securities in a well-diversified portfolio. 
AA is well-schooled in how such a portfolio can tolerate some risky securities.  DG paper certainly falls into that category.  The promised return is tempting, particularly in the current low rate environment.  But there are some risks that one shouldn’t take.  Or if one mistakenly takes them, one should exit.  Despite widespread belief to the contrary, finance theory doesn’t magically protect one from unwise investment decisions. 
Some of the "red" flags on this paper.
  1. This company defaulted five years ago. 
  2. Since then, its performance (ROE and ROA) and cash generation are dismal -- clear signs of likely future inability to repay. 
  3. The sukuk is structured as a bullet which is not appropriate for an issuer like DG nor one that operates in squirrely markets (that’s a technical finance term). 
  4. If that weren’t enough, DG is based in a country whose fine legal system motivated the government of one of its constituent emirates to set up an offshore regime, including offshore laws and an offshore court system.  It doesn’t take a law degree to figure out that legal protections for creditors are uncertain (you knew I’d slip a euphemism in somewhere) in DG’s home “court”. 
  5. Exacerbating that factor, the deal is highly structured with cross-jurisdictional legal issues abounding.  The fundamental (“Islamic”) structure is not well tested in courts.  Courts in more “certain” legal jurisdictions are unfamiliar with Shari’ah and likely to defer to local courts, undermining to some extent the benefits cross-jurisdictional legal structuring was designed to confer. 
Just one or two of these factors should disqualify this paper. But all of these? One can surely find other high yield securities with less risk baggage.   
One further point for those who read the FT article cited above.  To get more insight into the KRG settlement take a look at my earlier post. And don't miss the posts in reply.  Despite a comment in the FT article about the settlement removing DG’s “ability to pay” defense, cash is not about to rain down on DG.    

Saturday 1 July 2017

Dana Gas Restructuring: Certificate Holders in a Difficult Position

A Clearly Painful Position But Nothing Like the DG Creditors

Sukuk holders are in a weak economic position even though the documents as written give them relatively strong rights.  They are also now into year 10 of their planned 5 year adventure with DG and the obligor would like another 5 years!  But there is little to suggest that another 5 years will be sufficient to repay the debt.

Obligations are repaid by cash not covenants.  DG’s cashflow is uncertain. Creditors may well strike a deal and impose their terms on DG.  But unless there is a sea change in attitude or aptitude of Egypt and the KRG, creditors face a long and uncertain path to full recovery of their funds.  They also find themselves in "bed" with an obligor whose integrity may be questionable.

The simple fact is DG’s cash flow is insufficient to repay the debt as scheduled this October. Creditor huffing and puffing no matter how extensive is not going to change that fact.  The debt needs to be rescheduled.

But how can realistic terms be set?  Given the KRG’s and Egypt’s inability/reluctance to pay and no apparent way to force them to, it is difficult to develop reasonable cashflow forecast scenarios.  How does one design a restructuring when 95% of the obligor’s cashflow is uncertain? 

But sadly there’s more.

Back in 2007, the original Sukuk holders cleverly “signed up” for what was a limited recourse type project, funding it through a bond instead of a loan.  Horses for courses:  a loan probably would have been more appropriate because in general bonds are covenant light. Or in other words:  don't saddle up a cow if you're going "jumping".

The original “security” (such as it was/is truly “security”) consisted of equity (dead last in the legal priority of payments) in companies undertaking what was a new venture for DG.  The Sukuk holders accepted a structure which limited their repayment to the proceeds from these assets (the Trust Assets).  If the “Trust Assets” are insufficient to repay the Sukuk, the creditors have no claim against DG or its other assets.  Contrast that with the security package for the Zora project (described in my last post). Not an identical transaction but instructive for how risks can be better managed. 

They also agreed to a bullet repayment structure.  With a bullet instrument of any size one is generally relying on a refinancing for repayment. If there’s no market for a refinancing from other creditors/investors, then unless collateral is sufficient and legally accessible, the “bullet” is pointed at the heads of the creditors who must reschedule – either directly or via a disguised rescheduling, i.e., a bond exchange.   

With the (first) earlier restructuring, the Sukuk holders improved their position by adding USD 300 million of Egyptian receivables to the “security” package. If we assume a scenario in which the Sukuk holders get ownership of the collateral, what’s likely to happen?  If Egypt isn’t clearing up past due receivables by paying DG, what would be their motive for scrambling to make the creditors whole?  They have an ongoing commercial relationship with DG who generate cash for them.  A relationship with creditors would be a one-sided outflow of precious hard currency.

Similarly, if the Sukuk holders manage to access the KRG receivables by realizing the collateral, i.e., acquiring shares in the operating companies in the KRG, the situation is likely to be the same as with Egypt. And here the relationship between the KRG and DG has been strained by claims and counterclaims. 

One might expect these two obligors to delay even more and perhaps inspired by DG find or invent reasons to challenge the original amounts of the receivables or to reduce them based on asserted failures to provide ongoing contractual services. 

At that point what is DG’s incentive to assist the creditors collect the receivables if it has been shorn of its two "crown" jewels?

Wednesday 28 June 2017

Dana Gas Restructuring: Own Goal for Dana Gas

GOAL!!!!  (Sadly Own)
Without the Number Can't Tell If He's Management or an Advisor

DG’s maneuver—declaring the debt invalid, seeking court injunctions to restrict creditors’ rights, and apparently preferring UAE creditors with the Zora prepayment—is likely to have several effects. 
First, at the very least it will poison the initial phases of the restructuring negotiations. 
AA doesn’t understand why DG took this path. 
Unless completely somnolent, creditors were likely aware that they were not going to be repaid in full, though they were/are probably hoping for a significant “slice” of DG’s almost USD 300 million in cash to reduce outstandings. 
DG has a clearly compelling case that its ability to repay is restricted because its two main customers (95% of DG’s business) can’t or won’t honor their obligations in a timely fashion.  That allows DG to focus creditor anger away from itself to its customers.  
The creditors have limited opportunities to go on their own.  Additional security (more of those “current” receivables from the KRG and Egypt), a higher profit rate, tenor adjustments/principal amortization, etc. could probably secure a deal albeit with hard bargaining.    
Instead DG has in effect “declared war” on the Sukuk holders. 
Second, but that’s not all.  DG’s apparently half-baked strategy has caused it an even larger problem by creating more enemies who are likely allies for the creditors. 
Third parties whose interests are directly threatened by DG’s move are likely to oppose DG, providing ammunition to creditors in the courts.  Other third parties are likely to take positions that support the creditors, even if only indirectly. 
Instead of fighting battles with one adversary, DG has apparently though it wise to take on the “world”.
It’s hard to understand what DG are thinking, if indeed they are. 
A strategy like this is one that an obligor in a desperate situation adopts.  A very weak financial position, problems with ethics or legality that are about to emerge,  or an irrational set of creditors. 
If that's not the case, then the strategy is the result of some "clever boots" removing his shoes at the wrong moment during the decision process.
AA is not privy to insider information.
Third, but whatever the cause, it’s hard to see this turning out well for DG. It could "win" a pyrrhic victory or wind up on the pyre as the vanquished. 
  • If DG’s Abu Yusuf legal arguments prevail, finding additional or new creditors is likely to be difficult.  Those few with an interest in providing future debt capital will probably seek to impose higher profit rates and enhanced protective terms – legal structure, collateral, etc.  That assumes that any such creditors will believe that legal structuring can create adequate defenses against an obligor who has clearly demonstrated disdain for contractual agreements.  
  • If DG’s legal strategy collapses, creditors could well impose draconian terms on the company, e.g., a higher margin, additional collateral, shorter tenors, and a  requirement for a mandatory "sinking fund" or cashflow sweep. (More on this in a post to follow). Bond holders typically don't have the stomach or attention span to undertake these   In the worst case DG could wind up being managed for cashflow.  As I noted in my post about Global Investment House Kuwait, a creditor bent on principal recovery in an uncertain cashflow situation has little to no consideration for future growth of the firm. When creditors feel that an obligor cannot be trusted, that propensity is exacerbated. 

Tuesday 27 June 2017

Dana Gas Restructuring: Almost Certain Winners


Well Almost Every Time


As promised earlier, some thoughts on potential winners and losers from Dana Gas’s “clever boots” maneuver.  Given AA's positive nature, let’s start this series of posts with the most likely winners. 
As with any restructuring, the most likely winners are the financial and legal advisors engaged by the obligor and the creditors as well as other firms that may be called upon to provide services, e.g.,  accounting firms, subject matter experts (here Shari'ah law and "Islamic" financial structuring), etc.  
Assuming payment of fees (particularly those owed by the obligor) there is a financial win for both sets of advisors.
But reputational risks remain until the restructuring is complete. And sometimes even after.
Did a financial advisor give bad advice that harmed its client and did news of that harm become public?  Sometimes an advisor makes a bone-headed demand. The other party’s advisor recognizes the mistake, prudently keeps silent itself and advises its client to do so. Its client reaps the benefit. 
Did a law firm miss a critical detail and a legal case went awry?  Did its pen make an unintentional slip in document drafting that resulted in unintended benefit to the other side?  Or did it miss an intentional attempt by the other party’s legal advisor to “redo” the termsheet through clever drafting?  As one of AA’s legal eagle friends notes when you’re on the benefit end you need to have a poker face.  When you’re on the receiving end of mischief intentional or otherwise, you need to have a sharp mind and loud voice. 
  • DG’s advisors are Houlihan Lokey (financial) and Squire Patton Boggs (legal) as per the Company’s 5 June 2017 press release. 
  • Creditors have reportedly engaged Moelis (financial) and Weil, Gotshal & Manges (legal) as per Reuters.  

At present, advisor reputational risks are focused on the advisors being tagged whether rightly or wrongly with DG’s high risk and poorly thought out strategy.   More on that point to follow.      

Saturday 24 June 2017

Dana Gas: Why Did They Do It?

It's More Than Just Hot Air

I promised in my first post to write again on the winners and losers from Dana Gas’s maneuver.  A post from Arkad has temporarily derailed that plan.
What I’d like to offer today is some hopefully intelligent speculation on DG’s motive for declaring the outstanding certificates as “illegal under Shari’ah and thus unenforceable” and obtaining court injunctions against payment, particularly because these two steps are almost certainly going to poison the relationship with creditors which is critical in a restructuring.
Dana’s 13 June 2017 press release offers two potential explanations: 
  • An outflowing of piety perhaps triggered by prayerful meditation during the holy month of Ramadan.  As a result, a restructuring of the current Sukuk is necessary to ensure that it conforms to the relevant laws for the benefit of all stakeholders.”
  • A desire to avoid repeat alleged damage to the company because “During the 2012 restructuring, representatives of Holders unnecessarily declared a Technical Default while negotiations were still ongoing, causing lasting harm.” 
The press seems to share AA’s view that piety is not the motive and has seized upon the second: prevention of a Technical Default. 
AA thinks there’s more to the story.    
Simply put this is a maneuver to stop the creditors from exercising their rights under the security agreement to gain time and increase DG’s negotiating leverage in the restructuring.  
According to Reuters, last Sunday Dana advised that it has obtained an injunction from the High Court of Justice Commercial Division in British Virgin Islands (BVI) and a restraining order from the High Court of Justice in England blocking creditors from taking “hostile” action in addition to the Sharjah Court injunction. 
Why were these steps taken and why are they significant?
  • The BVI is “home” to DG’s affiliates who conduct business in Iraq in territory of the so-called Kurdistan Regional Government and in Egypt and whose shares are “security” for the Sukuk.  USD 300 million of Egyptian receivables owed to Dana Egypt also part of the security package.   A BVI injunction complicates an already difficult road for creditors to realize the collateral whose enforcement (but only the first step) is subject to the jurisdiction of the BVI. 
  • The laws of England and Wales apply to key transaction documents as I pointed out in my earlier post in particular those documents under which certificate holders would quite justifiably call a default.  
Another sign that protecting assets is a key concern are the steps Dana Gas has taken to minimize its exposure to potential actions by other creditors acting under cross default clauses.  This limits potential collateral (secondary) damage (pun intended).  It also lessens Sukuk holders’ negotiating leverage by reducing/eliminating this threat.
The step also prefers UAE creditors.  A step not likely to be received well by Sukuk holders. 
Let’s let DG make this case by using quotes from the Directors’ Report in its 1Q2017 interim unaudited financials.  As customary, red boldface to distinguish AA’s “distinguished” comments. Black boldface to highlight particularly relevant statements by DG. 

“Subsequent to quarter end, in early May, the Company prepaid the Zora outstanding loan amounting to USD 60 million (AED 220 million) plus applicable interests/costs.”    DG’s 1Q2107 financials were signed 11 May by the auditors which means that the prepayment took place before that date.  AA would hope that creditors would ask if that was before or after the 3 May announcement that the Sukuk was going to be rescheduled. 
But it gets even better.
After announcing the prepayment, in the very next sentence DG states: 

“On 3 May 2017 the Company announced that, due to continued challenges it faces around cash collections and the resulting need to focus on short to medium term cash preservation, it will commence restructuring discussions with the holders of both its Sukuk dated 8 May 2013.”
According to DG’s 1Q2017 interim report note 11, as per contractual terms, USD 33 million of the Zora facility was not due for repayment until 2018.  Zora is located in the UAE and the lending syndicate is composed of UAE banks.      
As a side note, interest due on the Sukuk next month would be approximately USD 14 million.  Apparently, the USD 14 million are worth more than the USD 33 million prepayment to local banks –roughly 2.4x as valuable – when it comes to cash “preservation”.    
Zora was secured by a very robust security package as is typical project finance structure.  Lots of tripwires and potential pain for DG. 

“Project Security covers, commercial mortgage over mortgage-able Zora gas field project assets (onshore & offshore), assignment of rights under Gas Sales Purchase Agreements, assignment of all Dana Gas Exploration FZE bank accounts, assignment of Zora Project Insurance proceeds, Project performance Guarantees from Contractors & Irrevocable Letter of Credits from Sharjah Petroleum Council. Dana Gas PJSC has pledged the shares of Dana Gas Explorations FZE in favour of security agent. Dana Gas PJSC is also a Guarantor for the entire tenure of the term facility”
As noted elsewhere in the note there was also a cash sweep mechanism. 
Prepayment neatly resolves the issue of cross default for an income earning project in the UAE albeit small “beer” earnings compared to its Iraqi and Egyptian operations. 
Dana also repaid roughly 84% of the FYE 2016 USD 12.5 million outstanding murabaha facility from Mashrekbank Egypt again as per note 11 1Q2017 financials.  This facility was cash collateralized. 
UAE banks’ exposure to Dana is eliminated or reduced.  Dana has clearly “preferred” UAE creditors over the Sukuk holders, though one might argue that these are relatively small amounts when compared to the approximate USD 700 million outstanding on the Sukuk and removing these makes the restructuring less complicated. 
Some USD 25 million of debt remains for two sale/lease back transactions for DG Egypt (DGE):  (a) a building in Egypt and (b) spare parts/equipment acquired some years ago that have yet to be used as per note 25 c.  Perhaps DGE would welcome returning the latter to the lessor. 
In following posts I’ll pick up the promised discussion of winners and losers, well mostly losers, from DG’s "clever boots" maneuver. 

Saturday 17 June 2017

Dana Gas Sukuk: The Providential Detection

Violation of Shariah Caught Just in Time
You’ve probably been reading articles-such as this, or this or this-- on Dana Gas’s 13 June announcement that its existing U.S.$425,040,000 Exchangeable Certificates and U.S.$425,040,000 Ordinary Certificates due October 2017 (together the “Sukuk”) are no longer Shari’ah compliant and therefore “illegal” under U.A.E. law, requiring their restructuring. 

As a consequence, the company announced it will not make the July “profit” payment or the October principal repayment.  This discovery appears to have been made during Ramadan.  Perhaps (but not likely) as a result of the company’s prayerful reflections during the holy month grounded in its fastidious adherence to both Shari’ah and UAE law.  

That this providential “detection” was made one month before payments are required under the allegedly “illegal” agreement is no doubt one of those “remarkable coincidences” that occur from time to time in the finance.

Apparently further compelled by its probity and piety, the company sought and obtained an injunction from the Sharjah courts that prohibits payment.  The courts will hear arguments on the case 25 December, that is roughly two months after the October principal due date.

Just coincidentally this will allow the company to conduct restructuring discussions with the certificate holders which Dana Gas asked for on 3 May 2017 before it seems it became aware of the “violation” of Shari’ah.  Then its only stated concern focused on more mundane cashflow related problems. 

Note that it gave its “solemn” word to proceed not only in a “practical” and “sensible” manner but to “balance the interests of all stakeholders”.  This probably does not apply.


“Dana Gas PJSC (the "Company"), the Middle East's largest regional independent natural gas company today announces that, due to continued challenges it faces around cash collections and resulting need to focus on short to medium term cash preservation, it will commence restructuring discussions with holders of its Sukuk dated 8th May 2013.  The Company will be addressing the way forward on the Sukuk, which has a maturity date of 31st October 2017 in a practical manner that balances the interests of all stakeholders. The remaining profit payments will be addressed sensibly as part of the solution.”
As near as AA can tell, the detection occurred sometime after that date and 13 June.  It wasn’t mentioned in the June 5 2017 press release announcing the appointment of Houlihan Lokey as financial advisors and Squire Patton Boggs as legal advisors.

AA sincerely hopes that neither of these firms advocated this transparent bit of Abu Yusuf-efry.  “Abu Yusuf” Yacub Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Habib Ibn Saad Al-Ansari for those who don’t immediately recognize the reference.
In a 13 June 2017 press release Dana broke the news about Shari’ah non-compliance.  AA comments in red boldface.  We’ll step through the press release one paragraph at a time.

“The Company has scheduled a call with the Committee for later today during which the Company will cover the following points and set out an initial proposal for restructuring the existing Sukuk based on these broad principles and terms: Due to the evolution and continual development of Islamic financial instruments and their interpretation, the Company has recently received legal advice that the Sukuk in its present form is not Shari'a compliant and is therefore unlawful under UAE law. As a result, a restructuring of the current Sukuk is necessary to ensure that it conforms to the relevant laws for the benefit of all stakeholders.
  • As a legal matter and AA claims no expertise in UAE law, it would seem that if Dana’s assertion is true (which AA doubts) the sukuk then would become a non-Shariah bond and that the legal concept of equity would require that Dana honor the debt as per the existing contractual terms.  There is no doubt that Dana borrowed the money (or more precisely restructured an earlier borrowing), agreed to the terms, and agreed not to challenge the legality of any of the transaction documents (more on that below).  Assuming Dana’s legal arguments are valid, one might expect Shari’ah scholars to “grandfather” this transaction which has a scant five months to run but forbid future such transactions.  But الله أعلم    
  • Dana’s assertion raises or should raise concerns among certificateholders that Dana will cite future such “continual development” and declare the replacement sukuk no longer “halal” to justify its non-payment in 2021.  See more on that below. 
  • Unlike The Investment Dar in its attempt to deny BLOM repayment, Dana has not alleged that the transaction was contrary to Shariah from inception, but has become so with the “evolution” of “interpretation” of Islamic financial instruments.  A neat way of not casting aspersions on the work of Dar al Shariah or Shaikh Hussain Hamed  Hassan  head of DAS Shariah Advisory Board.  AA hopes though that it will meet with the same stern rejection that TID did.   
"The Company therefore proposes to exchange the Sukuk with a new enforceable, Shari'a compliant instrument, which would have a tenor of four years, confer rights to profit distributions at less than half of the current profit rates and without a conversion feature.  Such new profit payments will comprise a cash and PIK element.
  • Dana does not appear to have provided details on why the existing sukuk is “illegal”. 
  • According to Reuters,  “a source with direct knowledge of the situation said the firm planned to argue the sukuk were not sharia-compliant because their repurchase price was fixed, the coupon was the result of interest-based not profit-based calculations, and the coupon paid out regardless of Dana's financial performance.”
  • The terms outlined above by Dana seem to mirror those of the existing transaction, albeit less generous than the existing sukuk as well as eliminating the conversion feature  
  • Given this is a second restructuring, credit risk has increased justifying a higher not a lower margin or profit share, absent of course of application of 2.280. 
  • But put that aside. 
  • If eating a ham sandwich is not halal, what makes eating one-half of the sandwich halal?  Or in other words, if the problem is a fixed rate, then how does a lower fixed rate solve the problem? 
  • If profit-sharing payments must be based on profit, don’t PIK (payment in kind) payments imply the company has not really realized profit?  And if so, will “evolving” legal advice in 2021 result not only in refusal to repay principal but also “invalidate” all the PIK payments.
"The new instrument would represent a fundamental improvement to the current situation for Holders as it would be enforceable and would provide repayment to Holders over time."
  • Since the courts have not ruled on this matter, this statement is an opinion by a party (Dana) which the less charitable of you out there might believe is not completely disinterested in this matter. 
  • Sharjah and the UAE still recognize conventional non-Islamic finance.   Thus, the local courts may rule that while the transaction is no longer “Islamic”, it is a debt Dana owes according to the contract signed by the parties.  
"As the Company's receivables and future damages payments may be unpredictable, Dana Gas proposes to make prepayments under the new Sukuk either in whole, or in part at par, prior to its maturity without any penalty thus providing a path for early pay-down for the Holders.
  • AA would advise the certificateholders to demand a cash sweep to make such payments mandatory and not rely on the company's good faith  of which there is scant evidence so far.  

"The next two Distributions scheduled for 31 July 2017 and 31 October 2017 cannot be paid now that the existing Sukuk is deemed unlawful but will be accounted for as part of the new Sukuk instrument."
  • As the courts have not ruled and given the very real possibility of conflicting opinions on Shariah as there is no single central authority, this is a mere assertion not a legal determination. 
  • Certificateholders should treat it with the derision it so richly deserves. 
"During the 2012 restructuring, representatives of the Holders unnecessarily declared a Technical Default while negotiations were still ongoing, causing lasting harm.  The Company now assures all parties that no Dissolution Event nor Technical Default has taken place, nor indeed can take place due to the unlawful nature of the Sukuk.  While the Company is keen to reach a consensual agreement with the Holders, Dana Gas has a duty to protect the assets of the Company for the benefit of all stakeholders and will take action to fulfill this duty.”
  • Another assertion. 
  • There is a very strong case for a default that’s default with a capital “D” not a “technical” default under transaction documents which are governed by English not local law which offer creditors a presumably easier path than the courts of Sharjah to call default.  And as outlined below default need not be called for a prospective (now) or actual (July) failure to pay.
  • The Offering Memorandum  page 108 outlines  events of default.  Here are a quick three.   (a) “Non-payment”: either the Obligor or the Mudarib fails to pay any amount payable pursuant to any Transaction Document to which it is a party and/or either the Obligor or the Mudarib fails to pay any amount payable or deliver any shares pursuant to any Transaction Document to which it is a party within three days of the due date for payment or delivery thereof; or  (c) “Repudiation”: either the Obligor or the Mudarib repudiates or challenges the valid, legal, binding and enforceable nature of any or any part of a Transaction Document to which it is a party or does or causes to be done any act or thing evidencing an intention to repudiate or challenge the valid, legal, binding and enforceable nature of any Transaction Document to which it is a party; or (d) “Illegality”: at any time it is or will become unlawful for either the Obligor or the Mudarib to perform or comply with any or all of its obligations under the Transaction Documents to which it is a party, or any of the obligations of either the Obligor or the Mudarib under the Transaction Documents are not, or cease to be legal, valid, binding and enforceable;
  • Dana has advised that it will not pay and has obtained a court injunction to engineer a legal obstacle to its payment.  The default under (a) will occur at the latest next month.    
  • In refusing to pay and seeking the court injunction, it has repudiated the transaction documents (c) as of at least 13 June.  
  • If on the other hand, its assertion that the transaction is illegal, then (d) is operative. By obtaining the injunction and applying for one in the BVI, the company is directly complicit in making its compliance with its obligations illegal.  It isn’t the Sharjah or UAE courts or a Shariah board which has initiated a legal action.  It is the company itself.
  • Bond indentures generally have a lower threshold than syndicated loans for an instructing group – 25% is a typical number and that is reflected in the offering circular at least in respect of some transaction documents.  Thus, a relatively small number of certificateholders can call default.
In following post(s) I’ll take a look at the "winners" and "losers" of Dana’s “maneuver”.  The former will require much less comment than the latter, if any.