Tuesday, June 12, 2018

Dana Gas Sukuk First Look at Restructuring Terms

Dr. Arqala Will See You Now

On 5 June Dana Gas reported progress in reaching an agreement with 93.69% of its sukukholders for a “consensual” restructuring.  Later this month DG will be seeking shareholder agreement to the deal which was outlined in a 13 May press release.  
AA has just resurfaced after an intensive several months of work (not every investment turns out well) so initially missed the 13 May press release. 
While fully detailed terms haven’t been released yet, let’s take a first look at what we know. 
The USD 700 million sukuk which matured in October 2017 will be restructured in two tranches.  
Tranche A – Early Exit Option 
Up to a maximum of 25% of the face amount of the existing USD 700 million sukuk (USD 175 million) will be offered for immediate payment at 90.5% of the face amount of the sukuk.  Those responding within 7 days of the formal offer (“early election”) will receive an additional 2.5% flat of the face amount or a total of 93%.   No interest will be paid.  
Assuming a 31 July conclusion of the deal (roughly DG’s target date) and full take-up of the USD 175 million Tranche A, some USD 13.1 million in interest will be due-- 6 months at 9% and 9 months at 4% (the new “profit” rate) because DG’s last interest payment appears to have been made in April 2017.    
Including the “to-be-lost” interest in the calculation results in an effective discount of the total amount owed to holders of 15.8% or, if the early election is made, 13.5%. 
Tranche B – 3 Year Sukuk Maturing 31 October 2020  
The sukuk will have a three-year tenor starting from 31 October 2017 – the maturity of the existing sukuk.  It will be structured as a “wakala” with underlying “ijara” / “deferred sale” obligations.  
The new “profit rate” will be 4% per annum. 
Holders who make an early election to enter the deal will receive a similar 2.5% flat fee of the face amount of their tendered sukuks. 
DG will make an upfront payment of 20% of the face value of the existing instrument allocated to Tranche B (75% of USD 700 = USD 525).  This will result in a new sukuk with a face amount of USD 420 million. 
The terms call for a prepayment of 20% of the face amount of the existing sukuk (USD 105 million) within the first two years, i.e. no later than 31 October 2019.  That will reduce the sukuk to USD 315 million.  If DG does not make the prepayment within the specified time, the profit rate will increase to 6% per annum.  
DG will be allowed to pay dividends up to 5.5% of the paid in capital of DG (USD 1.9 billion equivalent) or roughly USD 105 million per year, subject to a minimum liquidity requirement of USD 100 million.  The dividend allowance is not tied to actual cashflow. 
All net free cash proceeds from the results of the NIOC arbitration and sale, if any, of Egyptian assets for repayment of the Sukuk.  There are also provisions relating to the buyback of the new sukuk under certain circumstances.  Not particularly clear, but then this is a summary.  
DG’s May 2018 Corporate Presentation appears to provide some additional information on this latter topic. Comments on page 5 state that, if Tranche A is not fully taken up, DG will use the remaining amounts allocated to Tranche A to buyback new sukuk at the market price within 9 months of closing of the restructuring.  If there is insufficient offer, then DG will prepay sukukholders pro-rata at par.   From the wording it seems that when the May report was issued, no deal had been struck with sukukholders. So these terms may not have been modified.   
Danagaz WLL has apparently been removed from the security package, perhaps compensated with the above. 
Comments 
Better Structure: Shorter tenor, more periodic amortization, additional “collateral”. 
You’ll recall, and if you don’t AA will remind you, that very early on AA wrote that the sukukholders needed to shorten the tenor (from five years), obtain interim principal repayments (no bullet structure) and secure more collateral.  To an extent that seems to have occurred.  To be very clear, AA is not claiming any credit for this outcome.  The sukukholders’ advisors don’t need AA to tell them the obvious.  
Reaching agreement is like some telephone calls with President Macron.  One doesn’t know all the details or what the course of negotiations was.  Like sausage one just has to eat it.  No doubt the case here.    
But as an outside commentator, AA will exercise his right to highlight things that might be better without the responsibility to make them so. 
Prepayment Failure: Doesn’t trigger acceleration of maturity.  
Failure to make the interim prepayment does not appear to constitute an event of default that allows acceleration of the sukuk.  Ideally it should be particularly given this issuer. Rather the penalty seems to be only an increase in the interest rate.  Realistically, if the Company can’t pay, a higher interest rate won’t be much deterrence.  
Dividend Payments:  Risks of cash leakage controlled?   
According to the transaction summary, approximately, USD 105 million in dividends can be paid each year—subject to maintenance of the USD 100 million minimum liquidity requirement—because  the dividend “allowance” is based on USD 1.9 billion in paid-in-capital at a 5.5% rate.  It is not tied to DG’s cash generation which would be preferable from a creditor standpoint, i.e., dividends tied to new cash generation.  
We don’t have sufficient details about the minimum liquidity requirement to know if it protects against leakage of cash needed to repay principal via dividends.    
The key issues are that DG's ability to generate cashflow from operations has been volatile, there are operating issues in Egypt and the UAE, much of its USD 636 million in cash as of 1Q18 will be expended on the restructuring, and the dividend allowance on its face appears overly generous.   
Over the past five years DG’s cashflow (defined as the net change in cash on the Statement of Cashflows adjusted to remove non-operating cash receipts–the sale of 5% of Pearl to RWE, the RWE dividend, the KRG/Pearl settlement, new borrowings, etc.) has been very volatile, averaging approximately USD 46 million per year.  While future cashflow (2018 forward) will benefit from an approximate USD 50 million a year reduction in interest expense, there seems to be little margin for error, absent asset sales or settlement with NIOC., the timing of which appear uncertain, if they will occur at all.  That’s particularly the case if sizeable dividends are paid.   
At closing of the restructuring, DG will have expended some USD 300 million of its USD 636 million in 1Q18 cash and banks (an amount which excludes USD 140 million earmarked for development of Pearl).  The prepayment on Tranche B will use another USD 105 million, reducing the remaining 1Q18 cash balance to USD 230 million and the sukuk principal to USD 305 million.  
Compounding risks, the final principal payment may be due shortly after the prepayment.  If it’s made on the last day (31 October 2019), only 12 months will remain until final maturity.  
Tranches A and B:  Sukukholders’ interests aligned?
The early exit option and ongoing market buybacks represent a potential preference to some creditors over others.  It will be interesting to learn, if possible, if those institutions that elect early exit were key in negotiating the restructuring.   There is a fundamental conflict of interest between those who are whole dollar creditors and those who acquired their stakes at a discount.  
Which option would you choose? 
So having raised that point, what would AA do if he had been unwise enough to purchase the sukuk?  
Take the early exit for three key reasons.  
First, if one doesn’t trust a potential business partner or issuer, one simply doesn’t do business with him.  No need for any further analysis.  
Second, if basic legal protections are lacking in a market, you can’t rely on the law to compel your counterparty to comply with the contract or the local courts to execute the judgments of foreign courts.  You are on the high wire without a safety net.  Usually, this is another deal breaker, unless your business puts the burden of risk preponderantly on the counterparty.  For example, you are a seller of investments rather than a buyer.  But is it worth the risk and bother?  
When the Ruler of Dubai created the DIFC, he sent a very clear message about the state of the law and courts in the UAE.  If you weren’t paying attention then, the recent decisions of the Sharjah Court hopefully caught your attention.  
Third, at the issuer level, DG exhibits high operating and credit risks.  Weak performance and a contration in squirrelly markets (that’s a technical term in case you don’t know).  DG has a “rich” history here (but not in the financial sense).  Future prospects do not appear bright. 
 

Wednesday, June 6, 2018

More Nonsense from Gulf News About the Qatar Crisis



Here’s another gem from the Gulf News re the Qatar crisis under the headline:  “Qatar’s defence of Iran drives further wedge with neighbours”  with the subheading “Comments by defence minister prove Qatar’s arrogant position when it comes to solving year-long crisis”.  

Just what did Qatar’s Defense Minister ("QDM") say to prompt such criticism?  

Let’s read GN's charges.  Words in quotes are verbatim from the GN article cited above. 

First, the Qatari Defense Minister “defended the Iranian nuclear deal despite criticisms from Arab states that the deal has empowered Tehran to wreak havoc in the region.”   

As AA reads the GN’s charge, it’s clear that the QDM did not defend Iran but defended the JCPOA, a position shared with the former President of the United States, Australia, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the UK – all no doubt as arrogant and intransigent as Qatar at least in the eyes of the GN.  Citations here and here.  

Interestingly, neither Kuwait nor Oman have adopted the “Quartet”'s position. 

Also Tehran’s influence/actions in the region pre-date the 2015 JCPOA, e.g., the Huthis seized Sana in 2014, Tehran has been supporting the Syrian Government since before  the JCPOA, and its influence in Iraq also predates the JCPOA.  While JPCOA's negotiations concluded in 2015,  the agreement came into effect in January 2016 (“Implementation Day”). I suppose one, perhaps the GN, would argue that actions before 2015 or 2016 did not consist in wreaking havoc.

Second, the QDM said that “Qatar would not ‘go and fuel a war’ in the region and called for engaging in talks with Iran” and that a war with Iran would be “very dangerous”.  

That seems an eminently sensible position on general terms.   

But for a region that has seen the sad consequences of wars in Iraq, Libya, and Syria a bit more caution on war would seem to be in order.  

Finally there is the lesson of 1967.  If you’re bogged down in a war in Yemen, best to keep your head down with regard to further military adventures, particularly if the potential new adversary’s power is a multiple of the current adversary in Yemen.  

GN had another article earlier "Lack of Wisdom Prolonging Qatar Crisis".  The article referred to above is perhaps an exemplar of the headline.  

Expect more to come as I clear out from under a rather busy past three months.



Friday, March 23, 2018

Dana Gas "Swings" to Profit in 2017

DG Ready for Takeoff The Sky is the Limit

DG announced its FY 2017 results on 15 March.  Net profit was USD 83 million equivalent up from a USD 88 million equivalent loss in 2016. 
Does this mean that DG has turned the proverbial corner and that future results are likely to show similar and perhaps even improved results? 
You might think so reading DG’s earnings press release.   
“The turnaround was led by higher realised liquid prices, higher production in Egypt and tight management of operational expenses. Higher profit was also supported by the successful settlement agreement ('Settlement') with the Kurdistan Regional Government ('KRG'). However, Q4 net profit was impacted by an impairment charge of $34 million (AED 125m) against the UAE Zora asset following the year-end reserve report.”
While admittedly it's too early to state conclusively, as the picture above indicates, AA is not convinced that DG has a smooth flight path to a rosier future. There are some fundamental problems at DG.  It's hard to see these being corrected.  Another cautionary message to the unfortunate existing creditors of DG and to any potential ones.
  1. DG’s 2017 Gross Profit was USD 118 million equivalent compared to 2016’s USD 103.  That’s a USD 15 million turnabout or just under 9% of the USD 171 net change between the two years.  So this led the “turnaround” only in the sense of occurring first in the income statement.  Note: Gross Profit = Gross Revenues –Royalties – Operating Costs and Depletion.   The Gross Operating Margin (GOM) in 2017 was some 26.22% versus a slightly higher percentage in 2016.  GOM = Gross Revenues/Gross Profit. 
  2. The real “turnaround” occurred in other expenses and income which were a net credit of USD 3 million versus a net debit of USD 58 million in 2016. 
Has DG discovered a magic solution to controlling expenses?  Has its business fundamentally changed, leading to new ongoing "other revenue" stream?  Or has it benefited from one-off events?
If you guessed the latter, you’ve guessed right.  References to notes below are to those in the 2017 FY Audited Financials available here. 
  1. DG had USD 26 million in other income (note 7).  Under the agreement with RWE regarding its investment in Pearl Petroleum Ltd, RWE owes DG additional payments when PPL pays a dividend.   PPL paid a dividend as a result of the settlement with the KRG.  Future PPL dividends are likely to be contingent on settlements with Iran’s NIOC.  Probably a low probability event. 
  2. DG benefited from a USD 114 million reversal of Surplus over Entitlement (note 29) again resulting from the settlement with the KRG. 
  3. These two items aggregate some USD 140 million in credits that are unlikely to recur.  Adjusting for these, 2017 results would be a net loss of some USD 57 million.  Income tax expense (note 9) appears related solely to DG’s Egyptian operations and so would not change based on these adjustments. 
  4. One interesting side note – DG appears to have accrued interest on the sukuk at contractual rates for the full year – some USD 67 million.  Though as the Statement of Cash Flows shows the Company only paid total interest of USD 32 million out of the USD 71 million accrued. 
On that basis, DG has not turned the corner. 
  1. With the recorded USD 83 million in 2017 net income, DG earned a whopping 2.9% on equity. More cellar than stellar. 
  2. Assuming 10% is the minimum appropriate rate for the risk of this company (Disclosure: AA thinks it should be higher but doesn’t want to pile on DG) and that other expenses are roughly USD 100 million a year, DG has to earn net operating revenues of USD 382 million. If ongoing other revenue streams of this magnitude are not likely, then DG has to increase its net operating profit.
  3. Assuming the 26% GOM would hold (and it probably wouldn’t given higher production), DG would have earn gross revenues of roughly USD 1.469 billion or 3.3x 2017 gross revenues. 
  4. Alternatively, without a change in gross revenue, DG’s GOM would have to be roughly 85% which is almost certain not to happen.  If gross revenues were doubled, the GOM would have to reach 42% - another level that seems less than attainable.
Other Information in DG’s Financials
What else did we learn from DG’s FY 2017 annual report? 
  1. Of the USD 1 billion KRG settlement, DG received USD 350 million of which USD 140 million is restricted for investments to increase production in the KRI. DG is able to utilize that amount for other purposes if it can raise financing.  Imprudent or uninformed is the financial institution that would lend to this discredited (that’s a partial pun) borrower for a venture in what might charitably be described as a squirrelly market.
  2. Some (a) USD 695 million in be-whiskered KRG trade receivables and (b) interest due on them which had been deducted from Surplus over Entitlement have been “discharged”.  The KRG no longer is legally obliged to unconditionally pay these amounts.  Rather they have been transformed into additions to “petroleum cost” carried under “property, plant, and equipment”.  Under its concession agreement with the KRG, PPL has the right to recover certain costs of investment in the KRG from future production. If there is insufficient future production or none at all, the amount is lost.  If recovery of these costs requires an extended period, then the present value of the amounts recovered will be less than the amounts booked.  And it appears that unlike the trade receivables, PPL and thus DG have no right to interest on the unpaid amount.  In short, as part of the settlement PPL has transformed a sum certain debt payment into a contingent payment the amount and timing of which is uncertain with no protection by way of interest accrual.  On the other hand, as a practical matter this may have been the only way to “collect” this debt. 
  3. The woes at Zora continue.  2017 production is 39% down from 2016.  The Company also assesses that “At present it is unlikely that further well interventions can be economically justified …” Financials page 5. 

Quibbles
As usual with AA, he just can’t resist a technical quibble.  Or two. 
  1. In its FYE 2017 Financials, DG observes that its 2017 net income of USD 83 million represents a 194% turnaround from the 2016 loss of USD 88 million.  That’s an interesting calculation.  If, for example, DG earned USD 1 million in 2016 and USD 83 million in 2017, then the net change would have been an impressive 82 times or 8200%.  But going from a loss of USD 88 million in 2016 to USD 83 million in 2017 is only 194%!  Trust this is an outlier error in DG's financial calculations.
  2. In commenting on DG’s 2017 results AA’s favorite GCC financial newspaper apparently misread the quote above from DG’s press release causing GN to say that “Revenues of the company went up to $450 million in 2017, from $392 million a year earlier due to higher oil prices, increase in production in Egypt and tight management of operational expenses, the company said on Thursday.”   DG’s quote referred to net income not gross revenues which are before any expenses.


Friday, February 16, 2018

Thoughts on "Thoughts and Prayers"



There has been significant adverse reaction from some quarters to politicians stating that their "thoughts and prayers" are with the people of Parkland, Florida.  They have been accused of dodging responsibility to do something to prevent events of this sort from happening by hiding behind pious words.

But what if instead of denigrating this approach, we were to react positively and apply it to other situations?

As an alternative to passing a tax cut and reducing spending on the average citizen, we could tell the affluent and big corporations that our "thoughts and prayers are with them" and do nothing more.  

Friday, February 2, 2018

Saudi Arabia: Value of AlSanea Group Debt Surges 67% to 200%

Beatrice and Benedict Discuss the Value Surge
1 February Thompson Reuters reported that following recent reported efforts by the KSA Government to “step up its efforts” to resolve the Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi/Maan al Sanea USD 22 billion or so debt dispute: 

“In a sign that some creditors are now more optimistic there will be a positive outcome to the debt dispute, Saad Group’s debt has been trading up at 3 to 5 cents on the dollar in recent weeks, compared to 1 to 3 cents previously, bankers say.”

In percentage terms that's quite a movement.  Not so much in absolute amounts.

AA would guess that these now more optimistic creditors are the same ones who made the original loans to AlAwal and TIBC.  Or would have if they had had the chance. 

For some of those earlier “great moments” in banking you can refer to the posts right here on SAM, e.g., AlAhli Bank Kuwait letters of credit, Mashreq Bank’s split value FX deals, and many more.  Here. Or here.  Name lending combined with what some might rightly consider unsound banking practices.  Talk about compounding errors!

Those less charitable than AA might also make a comment about the extent of the “step up” by the KSA Government of its efforts.  After all, it’s only been a scant 8 years 10 months. 

No surprise that when there’s good news, there’s always some naysayer like AA who refuses to acknowledge it or see the upside potential.  Saudi investment banking fee riches is yet another example. 

“But some investors remain skeptical. A hedge fund trader who had been considering buying Saudi debt described the attempts by Saad’s advisers to resolve the issue with creditors as a “dog and pony show” and said “very little” work had been done to reach a settlement since November.

Note that the anonymous hedge fund trader quoted above would be purchasing the paper at a deep discount.  Unlike the original lenders who have been well and truly skinned, he could still make a profit even if final settlement were at a 8% recovery level.  Yet, he still doesn’t find it attractive. 

Why is that?

As AHAB/AlSanea and REDEC have well demonstrated, generally KSA prefers (in the technical legal sense of a preference) domestic over foreign lenders. SAMA take good care of their banks. Foreign banks not so much. 

If that weren’t enough, the Saudi courts and legal system generate “uncertain” outcomes (euphemism of this post).  Hapless foreign creditors are more likely to get “shaken down” than to get a “fair shake”.  Or is that shaykh?  To be fair KSA is not alone in the region.  One need  look no further than Dana Gas in the UAE.

Friday, January 12, 2018

2017 Middle East Investment Banking Fees -- Get out Your Microscopes

Researchers at Arqala University Help AA Find MENA IB Fees

AA had a moment of near total shock as I read the headline Middle East investment banking fees total $912 billion in 2017” in the 10 January edition of AA’s newspaper of record the Gulf News.

Quite a change from 2016 or so it would seem. 

It only took the first paragraph to dash AA’s fervent hope for “investment bank fee riches” in MENA much less in Saudi Arabia to come crashing to the ground.   USD 912 billion quickly turned into USD 912 million. 

Thompson-Reuters estimate that global investment banking fees total some USD 104 billion in 2017.  MENA  fees  at USD 912 million are some 88 basis points of the total. 

AA’s point in writing this isn’t GN’s editing mistake, but rather to use it point out once again that in the grand scheme of matters financial MENA IB fees remain miniscule, more a rounding error that meaningful.  A hobby rather than a mainframe business.

Tuesday, December 19, 2017

السماء لا تمطر ذهباً ولا فضة One Gram

Personal preference: AA would remove the "l" above.  3:160
No, AA hasn’t branched out into pharmaceuticals. 

An article in Gulf News caught my eye “Buy Property in Dubai with Crypto-currency.” 
“OneGram will go live in June next. Investors in MAG properties will purchase OneGram to the value of the property and receive a 5 per cent discount on the property price as a result. The OneGram will then remit to MAG according to the payment plan, which is 35 per cent over six to nine months and 65 per cent on completion at the end of 2019”

At first blush this sounds like a great deal.

Assume you want to buy that corner unit in برج أوهام for AED 3 million.  Right off the bat you’ve saved AED 150,000.

But a closer look indicates that the deal may not be as sweet as the result of patience. 

Let’s look at the Shari’ah whitepaper prepared by OG’s advisor, AlMaali Training and Consultancy, specifically at the fee discussion on pages 16-17.

First, there is a 10% purchase fee equal to the amount of OG one wants to buy.  That’s 10% of AED 2,850,000 (95% of AED 3 million).  Or AED 285,000.   Oops, we now appear to be AED 135,000 in the red.  (AED 150,000 less AED 285,000)

But as they say “wait there’s more”.  There’s also a 1% transaction fee for another AED 28,500 for a grand total of AED 163,500. 

Thus, we’ll pay AED 3,163,500 for our AED 3,000,000 apartment. 

And as per the above quote, we’re required to pay 100% of the price to OG up front who will then carefully safeguard 65% of our funds until 2019 (roughly two years) when MAG is owed the money.  No interest paid I suppose since this is an “Islamic” financial instrument.  No need for any present value calculations even if based on "profit rates" as opposed to interest rates.

Despite all this, we can take comfort from using an innovative new Islamic financing tool and helping a deserving firm make a nice profit.  Can’t we? 

If you’re wondering, the 10% entry fee is used for the following purposes:
  1. 5% (or 50% of the total fee) for long term business development. 
  2. 1.5% (or 15% of the total fee) for marketing costs. 
  3. 1.5% (or 15% of the total fee) for operations –gold transport, fee for offering spot price, storage, insurance. 
  4. 2% (or 20% of the total fee) for salaries.
The 1% transaction fee is allocated as follows: 
  1. 70% to buy additional gold to back each OG token.  What this means is that over time more than one gram of gold will back each token.  Of course, if you sell your OG, you don’t share in this benefit. The chap who buys from you does unless some how you can work that future benefit into the selling price you receive. On that basis, the business logic of this mechanism escapes AA.   If one uses OG as a medium of exchange, the benefit of this feature would appear to be small.  If one were getting OG tokens for free as a “miner” or perhaps in some other way (founder), this could be quite attractive. Having said that another Dubai-linked gold cryptocurrency Currensee has a similar mechanism, though 80% of the their 1% transaction fee will purchase additional gold.  Interestingly their maximum transaction fee appears capped at USD 10.  Currensee whitepaper page 9. 
  2. 10% for operations and development.  The whitepaper has an error here and in the next two categories.  It states 2.5%, though from the numbers provided example it’s clearly 10%. 
  3. 10% for charitable contributions
  4. 10% for the “miner” reward with the caveat that under Shari’ah there can be no guaranteed returns.  It’s unclear what this is all about on two fronts.  First, the whitepaper describes the “miner” as the “investor”.    Second, if this is truly a transaction fee, it would seem that it would be perfectly halal.
There’s a different version on the allocation of the 1% transaction fee in the English “whitepaper” written by I.M. Khan in categories 2 to 4 above.  On page 6 the operations and development fee is 25% (Currensee takes 20%) and the charitable deduction and mining fee (here clarified as a fee for blockchain processing) are each 2.5%.  In IMK’s estimation the transaction fee is “minimal” compared to “traditional banking” (page 2). 

Analyst disclosure:  In all AA’s personal traditional banking relationships I pay no more than a flat USD 45 fee for a payment.  This is with both OECD and non OECD banks. The firm I work for has an even smaller cost. 

All OG’s fees—set on transaction amounts--look like a sweet deal for someone but perhaps not necessarily investors in OG.

By comparison Bitcoin’s transaction fees are a flat per transaction fee not a percentage of the amount.  Recently, there was a bit of a hue and cry over a temporary spike in Bitcoin’s transaction fee to USD 26.  At OG, you could move USD 2,600 equivalent for that fee!  If you wanted to move more, the OG fee would be higher.  

Bitcoin transaction fees vary by demands on the capacity of the (Bitcoin) Blockchain, resulting from what appears to be a rather small maximum size per “block”.  If one is not in a hurry to complete a transaction, one can simply offer a lower fee and wait until the higher fee offering transactions have cleared. As might be expected “miners” prioritize transactions based on the block processing fee they will earn.  

As to entry prices, Bitcoin has a typical trading bid/ask spread which fluctuates with market conditions and is not a fixed percentage cost. 

Second analyst disclosure, AA is not recommending Bitcoin as a superior investment but merely pointing out the difference in fee structure.

It should be noted that OG has ongoing operating costs regarding the storage, insurance, etc. of the physical gold that Bitcoin which is backed by air does not.  Whether its other costs are justified or not, الله أعلم 

OG’s fees may appear higher than market, but surely one can’t put a price on adherence to one’s faith.

Interestingly, OG also offers a Russian language copy of the whitepaper, but no Arabic version.  Apparently OG sees an opportunity to market to the legions of Muslim investors in the RF.