Summary
Based on limited financial information available, it appears that there was a severe reduction of the liquidity in Awal's balance sheet in 4Q08. Without more financial reports (only 3Q08 and 4Q08 are available on Awal's website) and a full set of financials including the notes (only summaries are posted in public area of the website), it's impossible to determine what caused this reduction in liquidity.
It's also equally difficult to determine if Awal's problems in 2009 (leading to Administration) were the result of illiquidity (reasonably good assets but illiquid so they could not be converted to pay off short term creditors) or insolvency (a decline in asset values significantly below carrying value). As outlined below, my initial view is that it was the latter.
Background
On 30 July 2009 the Central Bank of Bahrain
announced that pursuant to Article 136 of the Central Bank Law, it had placed Awal Bank under administration. Later on
9 August it announced the appointment of Charles Russell LLP as Administrator.
- "If the Licensee becomes insolvent or appears most likely to be insolvent.
- If the license is amended or cancelled pursuant to the provisions of items (1) and (3) of paragraph (c) of Article (48) of this law.
- If the Licensee continued to provide regulated services which resulted in inflicting damages to financial services industry in the Kingdom."
Presumably, the reason for the CBB's action was the first. But note that Article 133 of the CBBFIL of 2006
defines insolvency as "A Licensee is deemed to be insolvent if his financial position becomes unstable and he stops paying his due debts other than administrative fines and whatever type of tax."
Financial Analysis
Since Awal was not traded on any exchange, it is not required to publish its full financials. It did, however, release financial highlights: balance sheet, income statement, cashflow statement and statement of changes in equity - all consolidated. 3Q08 and 4Q08 reports are
here.
Without detailed footnotes, the following analysis is somewhat limited. Admittedly, it raises more questions than it answers.
Let's focus on the balance sheet changes between 30 September 2008 and 31 December 2008. This would be the first critical period after the financial crisis hit but before the full force was felt.
- Between these two periods, total assets declined US$1.8 billion dollars.
- Equity is only US$25 million lower between 3Q and 4Q08 (the change in YTD net income between the two periods). Therefore, we can say that in effect liabilities accounted for the entire change.
- Every liability category declined: long term debt US$779 million, due to non banks US$605 million, repos US$227 million (probably greater haircuts by counterparties), due to banks US$141 million, and other liabilities US$46 million.
- This reduction of liabilities (a negative cashflow) was funded by reductions in assets. Cash and cash equivalents decreased US$1.429 billion (from US$2.2 billion to US$785 million). loans US$630 million, equities and options US$366 million, Funds US$315 million, and interest bearing securities US$49 million. Partially offsetting these were increases of US$841 million in Investment Properties and US$125 million Other Assets.
What does this all mean?
Without notes to the financials it's hard to tell, but here are a few observations.
- A substantial outflow of cash --19.25% of the entire balance sheet -- occurred during the last quarter of 2008.
- Investment properties (illiquid) increased while more liquid instruments (at least presumably more liquid) equities and options as well as funds declined.
- Due to non banks declined roughly 45%. Due to banks only 6%. Were these contractual maturities? Or did non banks have a greater insight into credit? Or inside information?
- Long term debt declined 43%. It would be very interesting to see the notes to the financials to confirm this was a scheduled payment and not a prepayment. LTD decreased over the year from US$2.373 billion (31 December 2007) to US$0.867 million (31 December 2008).
Conclusion
As far as the public reports I've seen, there was no payment default. Rather Awal announced its decision to initiate debt rescheduling with its creditors. One might expect that if there had been any sort of significant payment default, it would have become public fairly quickly. Here's the CI
downgrade and withdrawal of ratings report. It does not mention a payment default.
That leaves a more classical balance sheet insolvency as the likely cause of Awal's problems: assets worth less than liabilities.
At 31 December 2008, Awal had US$7.6 billion in total assets supported by US$4.9 billion in liabilities and US$2.7 billion in equity.
That means a drop of at least 35% in the value of assets to reach insolvency.
The recent instruction by the Central Bank of the UAE to its banks to provide 100% for their exposure to Awal supports that view.
As you'll recall from
my earlier post on this topic, the CB UAE Governor is reported to have said that the provision requirements were in line with regional and international supervisors. A 100% provision implies no recovery - which implies that Awal's assets are worth zero or close to zero (administrators, lawyers, and accountants always feast first on the estate of the bankrupt).
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