Showing posts with label Sukuk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sukuk. Show all posts

Saturday 8 February 2020

GFH's USD 300 Million Sukuk - Success Has a Price

And Sometimes It's High as Well

On 29 December 2019 GFH’s shareholders approved GFH issuing up to a USD 500 million sukuk through an SPV in one or more tranches.

On 22 January 2020—less than one month later—GFH announced that it had “successfully priced” a USD 300 million 5 year sukuk. 

Strangely, GFH didn’t disclose what the successful price was. 

An inadvertent lapse in " شفافية "? Modesty or something to hide?

AA will tell you later as I want to let GFH have the first change to explain its success.

GFH’s press release outlined several key takeaways. Italics are AA’s. 

This is a landmark transaction for GFH, placing it in the international debt capital market

The successful issuance was supported by a ‘B’ rating from each of S&P and Fitch with strong demand from international investors reflecting market confidence in GFH and its subsidiaries (the Group) and recognition of its healthy financial position, sound strategy and business model.

The order-book for the Certificates was oversubscribed 2.5 times exceeding US$750 million. The Certificates saw strong demand from international investors who were allocated 47% of the issuance with the additional 53% taken up by regional investors.

In terms of the types of investors, 61% were fund managers and 39% were financial institutions.

The proceeds of the Certificates will be used to enhance the financial position of the Group and to fund its next phase of growth.

GFH’s CEO, Hisahm AL-Rayes summed it all up by saying
This is another important milestone for GFH and further recognition from the market of the success of GFH’s transformation into a sound and well diversified financial group. The strong uptake from both regional and international investors attests to the strength of our strategy, our financial health and performance and, importantly, to our future prospects as we push forward in further building our business and position as a leading regional and international investor. The proceeds of the Certificates will enable us to continue to build and deliver even greater value to our investors, shareholders and the economies in which we invest.

Italics in above quote are AA’s and set the stage for some observations below.

First, the successful price was a fixed rate of 7.5% per annum.

You can look over a list of indicative sukuk quotes from Emirates Islamic Bank to get an idea just how successful the pricing was.

Perhaps, GFH is thinking about the success of the investors?  Perhaps relieved that it didn't have to pay 10%?

Of course, the pricing looks “generous” before consideration of credit risk. Then maybe not so rich.

It’s unclear to AA how a low non-investment grade rating of B supported issuance, though it does justify the price. Rather AA suspects that this very generous successful price certainly drove interest and the oversubscription.

One might speculate if at this pricing, oversubscription should have even been higher.

In issuing its ratings announcement, Fitch made the following points.
  1. Its rating of B/RR4 was based on GFH’s credit rating as Fitch sees GFH’s obligation under the transaction as the source of repayment.
  2. It has not assigned any collateral value to the Trust Assets.
  3. It does not express an opinion on compliance with Shari’a principles.
For those who don’t know, a Fitch Recovery Rating of “RR4” represent a historical average recovery 31% to 50% of principal and related interest on securities in the “B” category. Page 24 in Fitch’s Ratings Definitions publication. Be sure you read Fitch’s complete explanation of Recovery Ratings, including limitations.

To AA that sounds like GFH has less than a strong “financial health”.

As to being well diversified, perhaps GFH’s CEO is thinking about the future.

The Offering Circular contains the following contrary comments.

The Group has significant exposure to the real estate sector (page 13)

As at 31 December 2018 and on an original basis, 54.1 per cent. of the Group’s total assets were concentrated on the real estate sector, principally in the form of the development properties (which constituted 26.4 per cent. of the Group’s total assets as at 31 December 2018), its investment properties (which constituted 10.5 per cent. of the Group’s total assets as at 31 December 2018) and its financing assets and assets acquired for leasing (which constituted 8.7 per cent. of the Group’s total assets as at 31 December 2018).

Real estate concentration at KHCB. (page 13)

In addition, 50.5 per cent. of the Group’s commercial banking business’ assets exposed to credit risk as at 31 December 2018 were concentrated on the real estate and construction sectors and 93.9 per cent. by estimated fair value of the collateral accepted by the Group against financing assets and assets acquired for leasing including lease rentals receivable was in the form of real estate as at 31 December 2018.

Real estate valuation is inherently subjective and uncertain, and real estate investments are illiquid (page 9)

Real estate assets are inherently difficult to value. As a result, valuations are subject to substantial uncertainty and subjective judgments and are made on the basis of assumptions which may not be correct.

Temporary forbearance from CBB regulations (page 16)
  1. The Group currently benefits from a CBB exemption that permits it to exclude the assets acquired through litigation settlements and by way of a share swap from the CBB’s large exposure and connected counterparty limits. This exemption is re-assessed by the CBB on an annual basis. If the CBB decides to no longer grant the exemption, this will negatively impact the Group’s capital adequacy ratio which may lead to non-compliance with regulatory requirements and result in the Group becoming subject to potential enforcement measures and/or significant penalties. 
  2. The Group also has an exemption from the CBB related to its exposures to certain large real estate projects which are higher than 15 per cent. of its regulatory capital. This exemption is also re-assessed by the CBB on an annual basis. If the CBB decides to no longer grant the exemption, this could require the Group to reduce its exposure which could result in significant losses.
From the above AA does not see a picture of strong financial health or the diversification that others see.

One further comment: Know Your Obligor

Under certain conditions GFH is obliged to make full repayment of the sukuk. Fitch considers GFH to be the source of repayment.

It’s critical to understand exactly “who” is on the hook here.

In an indirect way, the Offering Circular does this, but AA fears not clear enough so investors understand.

On page 13 the OC states:
The claims of Certificateholders against GFH will be structurally subordinated to the claims of the creditors of GFH’s investees.

What that means then is prospective investors in the sukuk should have looked at the financials of the parent company of the GFH Financial Group BSC, not the consolidated financials.

Why?

The consolidated financials reflect an accounting construct not a legal entity.

One signs contracts, including debt contracts, with legal entities.

One enforces one’s contractual rights against legal entities not accounting constructs.

Unless GFH’s subsidiaries and investees separately legally committed themselves under this transaction, they are not obliged to repay the sukuk.

Therefore, one needs to look at the parent company’s financials.

These will look quite different than the consolidated group financials.

For example, all of KHCB’s assets and liabilities will not appear in the parent only financials. They will be replaced by a single number representing GFH’s investment in KHCB stock.

All KHCB’s income and expenses will be not appear in the parent only financials. In their place will be dividends received and perhaps a change in value of the stock investment, depending on the method used to account for KHCB.

In this respect it’s important to understand that as a shareholder in KHCB or any other investee, GFH is subordinate to the creditors of the investee.

Also that any cashflow from KHCB or another investee—which AA would venture to claim is critical to repaying the sukuk—will come via dividends or perhaps loans. There are various controls on the amount of dividends an investee may pay and generally limits on intragroup transactions. Thus, funds may not be available.

Here’s an example using Bank of America’s FY 2018 AR

Compare the Income Statement and Balance Sheet for the parent company in Note 24 with the Consolidated Income Statement and Balance Sheet. 

Quite a difference. You’ll see each of the points made above reflected in the parent only numbers.

The OC doesn’t contain parent only financials. Yet the parent is the Obligor.

Why? 

How could this critical piece of information be lacking?

Rather than rely on the issuer/obligor, legal advisors, or investment banks to ensure that this information is provided, regulators should require that parent only summary financial information be included.

Tuesday 28 January 2020

Setback for Golden Belt Sukuk Holders

Worth Its Weight in Golden Belt Sukuks
On 27 January Citibank who are acting as Delegate for the Golden Belt Sukuk (the Company) advised that:
On 25 December 2019, the trustee of the financial reorganisation of Saad and Maan Al-Sanea pursuant to the Bankruptcy Regulation (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Royal Decree No. M/50) informed that the Commercial Court in Dammam had rejected including the claims of the Company and the Delegate in the financial reorganisation. On 1 January 2020, the Company and the Delegate filed appeals against these decisions. The appeals will be decided by the Court of Appeal of Saudi Arabia

It’s highly likely that the estate-in-reorganization is insufficient to pay creditors a significant portion of their outstanding dues. Nevertheless, this is a setback for Sukuk holders.

Earlier posts on Golden Belt (10 in all) can be accessed using this link.
 

Thursday 19 October 2017

Dana Gas Strikes Again - "It's Just a Contract"

The above should not be read to imply that AA considers this a minor lapse.
Dana Gas has apparently struck again, suggesting its earlier unilateral abrogation of its legal obligations under its sukuk was no fluke.  

It seems that in negotiating the settlement with the KRG, DG and Crescent Petroleum did not obtain the consent of MOL Group Hungary, a ten percent shareholder in Pearl, before finalizing the agreement with the KRG. 
As noted in earlier posts, the agreement among Pearl’s shareholders gives the minority shareholders—MOL, RWE, and OMV—certain rights including the ability to veto some decisions of Pearl. 
MOL asserts that the settlement with the KRG is a decision that requires shareholder unanimity and that it did not provide its consent.  I’ve provided excerpts from DG’s and MOL’s press releases below.  
But first some comments.
  1. Counterparties considering concluding contractual arrangements with Pearl Petroleum and Dana Gas would be well-advised to carefully consider this “event” and whether it is further evidence of DG’s and PPL’s less than sterling record of honouring legal agreements. 
  2. As a side comment, AA notes that behaviour of this sort, if unchecked, might lead to widespread adoption of a cavalier attitude to legal agreements on a wider basis.  Countries may even be tempted to re-read binding treaties and find imagined breaches of the spirit of an agreement. 
  3. The hapless creditors in DG’s sukuk should carefully consider how to protect themselves in the ongoing restructuring negotiations.  What is the value of the word of a counterparty that appears to have a relaxed attitude towards legal obligations?  No doubt not USD 690 million.  Probably not USD 690.  
  4. On the other hand, if Dana’s assertion is that MOL is using “legal technicalities” in an effort to extort benefits or to abrogate the existing Pearl shareholders’ agreement is correct (a mighty big “if”), then this would seem a case of karmic comeuppance.   Perhaps to be followed by Baghdad reopening the concession agreements when it has settled affairs with the KRG. 
  5. In the arbitration proceedings will MOL be able to make a convincing case to the LCIA to DG's disadvantage that DG’s conduct with the sukuk and the shareholders’ agreement is part of a pattern of cavalier disregard and bad faith towards legal obligations? 
  6. Will Abu Yusuf come up with another far-fetched distortion of Shari’ah to support DG’s actions re the KRG settlement?  If he does, will the LCIA “buy” it?
  7. Are the fine courts of Sharjah standing by to issue an injunction if the LCIA proceedings seem to be going MOL's way?
  8. Will DG’s shareholders providentially and of course completely of their own volition intervene in Sharjah’s fine courts to block the arbitral proceedings or award?  
Here’s the excerpt from DG’s press release
The Settlement Agreement with the KRG was welcomed and endorsed by Dana Gas, Crescent Petroleum, OMV and RWE, together holding 90% of the shares of Pearl. Unfortunately, MOL (a 10% shareholder of Pearl) unreasonably sought to link its endorsement of the settlement to a renegotiation of the terms by which it first secured its participation in Pearl back in May 2009 (namely its commitment to certain contingent payments) and now complains about Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum for their handling of the settlement alongside Pearl, expressing dissatisfaction with the outcome as compared to the alternative of pursuing a final litigation and enforcement outcome against the KRG.
And from MOL’s press release.  I’ve boldfaced a key sentence which if true presents a world of trouble for DG and other shareholders. 
MOL Plc. (“MOL” or “MOL Group”) hereby notifies the market of the following:  MOL joined Pearl Petroleum Company Limited ("Pearl") in 2009 as a shareholder with a 10% stake and strong minority rights. Pearl’s shareholders include, among others, Dana Gas PJSC ("Dana Gas”) and Crescent Petroleum Company International Limited (“Crescent”). Dana Gas and Crescent, along with Pearl, entered into an agreement to settle Pearl’s long-standing dispute with the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (“KRG”) on 30 August 2017 (the “Settlement Agreement”), without properly consulting MOL or obtaining requisite approval, in breach of MOL’s contractual rights. MOL accordingly served a default notice on Dana Gas and Crescent on 11 September 2017 in accordance with the mechanism agreed by and between the shareholders of Pearl. The default notice has severe legal consequences for the defaulting shareholders, their shareholdings in Pearl and their related entitlements. As announced by Dana Gas earlier today, MOL received a Request for Arbitration from Dana Gas and Crescent in the London Court of International Arbitration, disputing the validity of MOL’s default notice. MOL will take all appropriate steps to enforce and protect its rights.

Wednesday 20 September 2017

Dana Gas: Creditors Negotiating With Themselves?

The Chicago Way But Not Milton Friedman's Way

As reported by Bloomberg, DG’s tragically unfortunate creditors made DG an offer to restructure the approximate USD 700 million of outstanding sukuk with the following terms:
  1. An upfront repayment of USD 300 million (par value) in principal.
  2. A maturity extension of three years. 
  3. Maintenance of the existing interest rates:  7% on the exchangeable sukuk and 9% on the ordinary sukuk. 
  4. A request for a dual listing of DG shares on the London Stock Exchange. 
  5. Maintenance of the existing conversion price at AED 0.75 for the exchangeable sukuk. 
  6. Payment of interest amounts due last July and this October. 
DG rejected the offer and is said to be pursuing a litigation-based strategy. Bloomberg cited an unnamed party not authorized to speak on DG’s behalf.  The FT was more categorical that the company had rejected the offer.  FT article here. 
Some comments. 
AA wonders about the creditors’ negotiating strategy.  In Middle Eastern carpet stores, the seller’s initial price is a long way from the price at which he sells.  The prospective buyer needs to have a similar negotiating strategy.  Once the buyer begins negotiations and gives his first price, it's hard to go lower. 
But DG’s creditors face a more complicated situation that buying a rug from a reputable merchant.  DG has adopted an extreme position.  Its current “offer” to the creditors is (a) you owe us money or (b) in worst case we owe you no more than USD 60 million.   
That’s what Herb Cohen would describe as a “Soviet” negotiating strategy.   The appropriate response is not to make a typical counteroffer and then split the difference because the Soviet tactic moves the frame of reference way off market terms.  
Often the counterparty (the party not adopting the Soviet style tactic) proceeds as though it’s in a “normal” negotiation, replies with a counteroffer to the extreme offer, and winds up in effect negotiating with itself to its detriment. 
DG’s creditors need to be very careful not to embark on that path. 
They’ve made an offer (their first price in rug shop terms) from which they will most likely negotiate less favorable (to themselves) terms.  So what does that mean?  A five year tenor?  A USD 100 million principal payment?  An interest rate of 3%?  All of the above. 
A Jimmy Malone (pictured above) strategy seems to be more appropriate given DG’s negotiating strategy and its less than sterling behaviour.  When you’re negotiating with someone you don’t trust, the typical rules of negotiation go out the door.  There’s no “win-win” when the other party is trying to cheat you.  
One other bit of unsolicited advice for creditors: a single word “amortization”. 
No doubt some clever mind has stated that with a three year instead of a five year tenor the average life of the sukuk has been drastically reduced – 5 to 3 years.  But –a rather large but—a bullet is a bullet.  Payment is promised in one lump sum in the future. Creditors would be better off with recurring principal payments (amortization).  Money in the hand now is much more valuable than a promise of money in the future, particularly when the integrity/ethics of the party making the promise to pay are doubtful. 
AA was particularly intrigued by the creditors’ request for a dual listing on the LSE. 

Listing this mutt on the LSE is not going to turn it into a purebred. Or magically create investor demand.  The dumb money is already present.  

Is this an attempt to try and force better corporate governance on DG or somehow bind them closer to English law?   Corporate governance is fundamentally a people issue.  Listing on the LSE doesn’t by itself change that.   Unless DG reincorporates, it is a Sharjah company with all the drawbacks of UAE law. 

Is this an attempt to scare shareholders that the creditors intend to convert the sukuk and take some or all of this “gem” of an investment from their hands, thus, prompting shareholders to put pressure on DG’s board to be more accommodative?  Not bloody likely, the shareholders are a disparate group.  From ADX trading statistics, they appear to be primarily retail investors who no doubt are right now calculating how they will spend their share of the USD 1 billion they imagine will soon be in DG’s hands. The major shareholder is a related party no doubt on board with DG’s “clever socks” strategy. 
To AA’s surprise Goldmine and Blackrock are apparently holders of DG paper.  Unless they bought their stakes at a deep discount and have a reasonable prospect of turning a profit with a fractional return of nominal principal, they should not be DG investors. 
Side note: If they purchased their stakes at a discount, then “whole” dollar creditors should understand there is a fundamental conflict between their own full price interests and  creditors whose entry price is much less. 
In defense of Goldmine and Blackrock, you might be inclined to remind AA about the role of risky securities in a well-diversified portfolio. 
AA is well-schooled in how such a portfolio can tolerate some risky securities.  DG paper certainly falls into that category.  The promised return is tempting, particularly in the current low rate environment.  But there are some risks that one shouldn’t take.  Or if one mistakenly takes them, one should exit.  Despite widespread belief to the contrary, finance theory doesn’t magically protect one from unwise investment decisions. 
Some of the "red" flags on this paper.
  1. This company defaulted five years ago. 
  2. Since then, its performance (ROE and ROA) and cash generation are dismal -- clear signs of likely future inability to repay. 
  3. The sukuk is structured as a bullet which is not appropriate for an issuer like DG nor one that operates in squirrely markets (that’s a technical finance term). 
  4. If that weren’t enough, DG is based in a country whose fine legal system motivated the government of one of its constituent emirates to set up an offshore regime, including offshore laws and an offshore court system.  It doesn’t take a law degree to figure out that legal protections for creditors are uncertain (you knew I’d slip a euphemism in somewhere) in DG’s home “court”. 
  5. Exacerbating that factor, the deal is highly structured with cross-jurisdictional legal issues abounding.  The fundamental (“Islamic”) structure is not well tested in courts.  Courts in more “certain” legal jurisdictions are unfamiliar with Shari’ah and likely to defer to local courts, undermining to some extent the benefits cross-jurisdictional legal structuring was designed to confer. 
Just one or two of these factors should disqualify this paper. But all of these? One can surely find other high yield securities with less risk baggage.   
One further point for those who read the FT article cited above.  To get more insight into the KRG settlement take a look at my earlier post. And don't miss the posts in reply.  Despite a comment in the FT article about the settlement removing DG’s “ability to pay” defense, cash is not about to rain down on DG.    

Saturday 5 August 2017

Dana Gas Strategy From Clever Boots to Clever Socks?

DG's New Strategy May Be Actually More Clever Than Depicted Above

As you’ve no doubt heard, following rejection from its creditors, Dana Gas withdrew its imagined generous offer of an exchange bond stripped of the conversion option and at an “attractive” 3% fixed interest rate compared to the 9% the Company paid until its moral principles “forced” it to withhold payment because “evolving” interpretations of Shari’ah voided the “Islamic” character of the sukuk. 
At that time according to press reports (Reuters here), the Company said it would pursue "litigation-driven outcomes". 
An initial assessment might be that Dana Gas has taken further leave of what scant senses it might have had.  Scant because its “clever boots” first strategy seemed an unnecessary provocation to the creditors and unlikely to succeed.  DG has a perfectly viable argument for a restructuring without resorting to what are almost certainly distortions of Shari’ah. 

On that score the uncharitable out there among you might say why should there be a difference between overall management of the business and financial management.  AA who fancies himself a charitable sort would of course never make such a comment. 
According to the report by Bloomberg, DG’s “evolved” strategy is based on successfully litigating one of the two following outcomes: 
  1. Unwind the sukuk transaction from origin, repay the outstanding principal (roughly USD 690 million) but offset the allegedly now non-Shari’ah compliant “profit” (interest) payments made over the life of the sukuk (some USD 635 million over the life of the transaction). 
  2. Convert the sukuk to equity in the Trust Assets (note the potentially fatal limitation agreed by the Sukuk holders in their initial irrational exuberance).  Based on profit earned by the Egyptian assets and the value of these assets now, DG reportedly believes that the sukuk holders owe it USD 150 million.  Details in the Bloomberg article.   
Abu Yusuf certainly has been a busy chap parsing the law.
Some observations. 
At first hearing a litigation-driven strategy sounds like a crackpot idea.
But there have been rulings in the past by UAE courts (Abu Dhabi based) that support such an approach, though AA understands that judicial precedent is not binding in the UAE. Back in the 1980s or thereabouts, UAE banks’ practice of lending on an overdraft basis and capitalizing interest “came a cropper” when borrowers couldn’t or wouldn’t pay.  NBAD took one such borrower to court.  The borrower noted he had recently “seen the light” and as a good Muslim could not pay interest as it would violate Shari’ah.  Producing bank statements he “proved” that on a cash-on-cash basis he had already repaid the original principal amount of his borrowings and more.  The learned judge ruled in his favor.  NBAD had to issue a check to the borrower for some million AED (the “overpayment”) and cancel the balance of his loan on its books.  One would hope that there has been change in judicial thinking in the Emirates since then but one doesn’t always get the “hope and change” wished for.   
As I read DG’s initial announcement, a key point of DG’s strategy is the assertion that evolving interpretation of Shari’ah made the transaction non-compliant. 
One could argue that that means that at some point the transaction was Shari’ah compliant.  If that is the case, then the date the transaction became non-compliant becomes very important in terms of the legality of profit payments.  Those before the new interpretation were perfectly halal.  Those after not. 
One might argue that the date of DG’s announcement of non-compliance is prima facie the date of non-compliance.  If DG were aware of non-compliance before that date but were silent, then should it be subject to paying damages to the sukuk holders perhaps equal to or greater than the profit payments they received between the end of Shari’ah compliance and the date of announcement?  Does Shari’ah impose a greater obligation on a mudarib with respect to rab al maal than a conventional loan arrangement would?
If Shari’ah holds that a change of interpretation is retroactive back to the inception of the transaction—which AA doubts--, then despite their best intentions the parties did not actually agree to a Shari’ah based transaction but instead agreed to conventional (non-Shari’ah) bond.  If so, then shouldn’t the non-Shari’ah terms as negotiated and agreed by the parties bind the parties?  Indeed with this development, might the sukuk holders be entitled to insist on a non-Shari'ah bond?
A telling point could well be if DG has engaged in non-Shari’ah based transactions.  This would establish that they do not only finance on a Shari’ah basis. As to the first point, on page 78 of its 2016 annual report Dana refers to the “Shari’ah tranche” of the Zora financing which clearly means there was at least one non-Shari’ah tranche to this financing.  That indicates to AA that DG’s conversion to “Islamic” principles is of recent date and no doubt feigned. 
As regards Scenario #2, the Bloomberg article contains an assertion ascribed to the Company that the Egyptian assets only generated USD 60 million during the life of the sukuk.  If the Bloomberg report is true, this is a rather shocking admission by DG’s management of failure.  Equity holders may want to take note.
More to the point, sharp-eyed creditors, pardon me, the creditors have demonstrated scant sharp eyes so far so let AA rephrase. The creditors’ advisors will no doubt parse this calculation carefully.  Presumably it does not include “profit” (interest) payments because the determination of profit is before the sharing of profit between mudarib and investors. 
As regards the USD 450 million valuation for the Egyptian assets, Section 3.2 of the offering memorandum refers to the distribution of the “realisation of the net proceeds” the Trust Assets.  AA is no lawyer but that would seem to argue that DG cannot merely give the sukuk holders shares in the Egyptian venture based on its own valuation, but rather that the Egyptian assets have to be sold.  If the proceeds are not enough to repay the sukuk, other of the Trust Assets have to be sold.  Since this is a limited recourse transaction, if all the Trust Assets are sold and the sukuk is not redeemed in full, then the creditors have no further recourse.  Requiring sale of the assets could upend DG’s strategy of claiming funds back from the creditors.  It is not without danger to the creditors given the limited recourse nature of the sukuk.  But since the creditors have a weak hand given that feature of the deal, a credible threat to “wreck” the Company might bring it to its senses.  If not the sukuk holders might take comfort in making DG share their pain. 
That DG has adopted this highly risky second strategy suggests to AA that DG believes it has a good chance of winning the case, plans to beat creditors into submission though interminable court action in the UAE, or has run out of viable alternatives.  That is, this is a desperation play:  the Company sees no other option.  That implies that DG’s management has assessed that DG’s value is minimal.  The rejected four-year deal would have given breathing space for a miracle in the form of the receipt of a substantial arbitral payment, collection of receivables, etc.  With that deal off the table, the state of the emperor’s clothes or lack thereof will become obvious. 
As regards, victory in the courts or prolonging the legal battle, perhaps the “fix” is already in the home town court.  As noted in other posts at SAM, the December hearing date is one indication.  Another is the complex but highly convenient requirements of the Sharjah court to lift its injunction frustrating DG’s ability to comply with the London court’s requirements.
Alternatively, DG may be hoping to drag matters out in the lengthy judicial process in the UAE’s fine courts similar to the roughly six-years of legal to-ing and fro-ing  between the National Bank of Umm al Quwain and Global Investment House Kuwait, hoping that this will wear the creditors down. Some details here on that epic legal battle which was finally “settled” via an out of court settlement. 
AA hopes that Emirati courts and rulers understand the impact a court decision in DG’s favor would have on the legal credibility of the UAE judicial system, local companies’ access to cross-border financing, and more widely on “Islamic” finance beyond the UAE.   
AA notes, however, that “hope” isn't really a basis for investments or for correcting problems with investments.  As to AA's judicial "hope", “change” may as well prove elusive.   

Sunday 30 July 2017

Dana Gas: Three Additional "Things" to Watch Plus "Bonus" Features


The Underwriting Phase is the Best Time for Scrutiny 

Given the company’s weak financial condition and the behavior of management, those with a financial interest in the firm—creditors and equity investors— need all the help they can get in monitoring DG’s performance.  
As always AA has your back.
In addition to keeping an eye on macro financial performance, here are a few relatively quick things that sukuk holders and equity investors can do to make sure they don’t miss problems organized around three topics:  
  • Current performance
  • Receivables collection
  • Financial liabilities 
These aren’t the only indicators. 
They certainly are not replacements for looking at the financials carefully particularly aggregate cashflow, but can be helpful in identifying performance problems.  At times information in the consolidated income statement or statement of condition can be used to trigger a deeper look.  For example, declines in overall net revenue, a sudden large write-off of exploration costs, etc. should send you looking for more information.  You’d expect to find explanations in the various management reviews in annual and interim financial reports. These tools will hopefully help you look deeper.  If management omits to highlight a problem, these tools may help you discover incipient problems as well. 
Current Performance
DG operates in three separate locations.  Looking at aggregate performance obscures what’s happening on the individual level. That could be quite important if the level is a critical "bit" in the overall business.
DG does provide some information on individual operations in its “segment reporting” note (typically note 4).  Here you'll find total assets and liabilities.  Not enough to go on.

Starting in 2013 DG began providing more information on Pearl's balance sheet in the note Interest in Joint Operations (note 15 in 2016 and 13 in 2014) than in note 4.  One can create a rudimentary balance sheet from this information back to 2012.  That still leaves a significant information gap on the balance sheets of Egypt and the UAE.  
But there is another more important problem with DG's segment disclosure.

The Company does not disclose net income and net comprehensive income for the UAE, Egypt, and Iraq.  It only discloses net revenues and gross profit (net revenue – depreciation and operating expenses) with some additional limited disclosure about elements of the income statement.  Sadly this falls short of what would be ideally useful to users of its financial statements.
With this limited additional information, one can try to construct a rudimentary income statement. But more than some assembly is required. Unlike IKEA not all the parts are in the box, so it’s generally hard to determine whether these entities are profitable before allocation of expenses at the holding company (DG) level or the nature of at least two of the three main operating entities' balance sheets.  
In some cases where there is an extraordinary expense, e.g., a substantial write-off of exploration expenses, it’s a bit easier.  For example, in 2009 it’s pretty clear Egypt had a net loss.  As did Zora in 2016.  One doesn’t even need a calculator to see this.   
What’s a quick but not complete fix to this lack of information?  
Tracking the top line for an indication of ability to generate earnings and cashflow and looking at the disclosed expenses is the easiest.  It's also not a bad starting point. But this is an imperfect "fix".

Revenue declines or increases can reflect changes in prices or volumes.  One would expect prices to be largely out of DG’s control.  Volume declines could reflect operating or reserve problems. 

One can also scan the disclosed expenses for surprises.  These should be visible in the consolidated income statement but looking at the segment information note (note 4) will identify which of the three businesses took the "hit". 

Here’s a starting point for the investors out there who hold DG paper.   



DG Top Line Revenues Millions of USD

UAE
Egypt
KRG
Total
2016
23
154
78
255
2015
4
125
142
271
2014
4
225
247
476
2013
5
225
230
460
2012
5
237
258
500
2011
5
290
226
521
2010
4
264
82
350
2009
4
192
42
238

 Source:  Note 4 DG Annual Reports


Trade Receivables (“TR”)

As discussed in earlier posts, collecting TR is key to repayment of the Sukuk and to eventual cash returns to shareholders. (AA is indulging in extremely optimistic fantasies today).  The TR are “whisker-growing” stale.  Cash conversion is glacially slow.  On a present value basis, the value of TR is being eroded when one considers the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate. 

Those with a financial interest in DG’s financial performance should be watching trends in collection or further accumulation of the TR. 

Note to DG’s auditor: Transparent disclosure of just how past due the TR would be helpful. 
Provisions for Surplus Over Entitlements
But there’s something new to watch. 

That is the above mentioned provision which is money that DG owes the KRG.
Why is this important? 
AA suggests you read Note 28 in full, but here is a sentence that caught AA’s eye and summarizes the issue: 

“Furthermore, Pearl has a right under the terms of the Authorisation to offset this Surplus, when payable, against any other outstanding payments due from the KRG.” 
Given its current cashflow generation problems, it’s likely that if the TR are settled, the amounts owed to the KRG will be offset against the TR. The KRG may have a similar right to offset.  But we don't have confirmation of that.

AA would expect that those who depend on collection of the TR for their repayment or dividends would want to track whether this offset is growing and just how fast.  Is this liability threatening to seriously diminish their source of repayment?  
Side comment:  Though none is really needed in AA’s view, perhaps this is another compelling argument that sukuk holders should reject a five-year bullet structure and insist on amortization of the sukuk in the rescheduling negotiations.  As you will recall and if you don’t, AA will repeat his earlier advice.  Principal payment should be in the form of both scheduled repayments and a cash sweep structure to hoover up prepayments if there is excess cash. 
Bonus Indicators
In addition to the operational indicators mentioned above, some "bonus" tips. 
If you missed the reference in DG’s Annual Report 2016 CEO Review, there seems to be a problem of some sort at Zora.
“In the UAE, despite full year average production of 2,744 boepd, total production from the Zora Gas Field has declined throughout the year from production start-up in February.”
This may be a technically solvable problem or it may not. 
Those with a financial interest are likely to have an interest in knowing, though Zora is a rather small fish in DG’s operations.  It clearly is not showing a profit based on DG’s Annual Reports Note 4.
This information may also temper optimism about Zora as additional collateral until the cause of the decline is known. 
For Pearl there are other sources of information (more on that point in a post to come) in the financial reports of three of DG’s partners in the joint operations. 

Here are some examples from MOL Hungary’s 2016 annual report.
  • MOL took provisions equal to its share of 2016 net income in Pearl Petroleum (note 6).
    Given the current economic situation impacting the Group’s associate in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq a provision has been made in 2016 against the Group’s share of profit.”
  • MOL also announced that it has changed its revenue recognition for sales in the KRG from an accrual to a cash basis.  That’s generally not a sign of robust credit standing of the buyers.  (AA’s first understatement of the post). And may be related to the 2016 provisioning against MOL's profit in Pearl.
Note 3:  Having assessed the probability of receiving economic benefits from sales activities in Group’s operations in Kurdistan the management decided to recognise revenue on a cash basis on sales in Kurdistan Region of Iraq.”
  • MOL has also taken some additional steps in the KRG which appear to reflect a serious concern about economic conditions.  You can easily find them by searching MOL’s 2016 annual report using the search term “Iraq”.  Pearl isn’t MOL’s only KRG asset so some of these steps relate to other companies. But the message seems pretty clear.  MOL is concerned about KRG ability to repay. 


AA Rant
If you read this blog on a semi-regular basis, you’re familiar—perhaps more than you’d like—with AA’s frequent complaints about "shortcomings" financial reporting. 
This rant is about the quality of DG’s segmental information. I’ve noted the deficiencies above. In short DG isn't providing enough information to understand it's underlying business.
Why isn’t DG providing more detailed information?
Others do.  The nearest I can find to an “explanation” is in DG’s 2016 annual report notes 2 and 4.  The below quotes basically repeat what they’ve said in previous years.
“Note 2: Operating segments are reported in a manner consistent with the internal reporting provided to the Chief Operating decision-maker.  The Chief Operating decision-maker, who is responsible for allocating resources and assessing performance of the operating segments, has been identified as the Chief Executive Officer who makes strategic decisions.”  
“Note 4:  Management has determined the operating segments based on the reports reviewed by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) that are used to make strategic decisions. The CEO considers the business from a geographic perspective which is divided into three geographical units.  The Group’s financing and investments are managed on a Group basis and not allocated to segment.” 
This might be charitably described as manifest garbage.   
DG’s segments are independent companies that prepare their own financials.
What this means is that DG has this information.

Preparation of the segmental information would be a simple matter of reproducing summaries of the income statement and balance sheet.
AA wonders if the CEO really does not look at these reports or condensed versions of them to make decisions. How can he run the business and make investment decisions if he isn't tracking the profitability of major lines of business based on an allocation--imperfect as it is likely to be--of all expenses?  How does one track risks?
If indeed the CEO is not using a methodology similar to this, then perhaps DG needs a new CEO. 
AA also wonders DG’s auditor’s apparent acceptance of this explanation. Some uncharitable souls might say questions about auditor credulity have already been conclusively answered: the auditor has accepted DG’s decision to carry the Trade Receivables as “current assets”.
When important information is missing from financials or other statements by a firm's management, one should wonder why.  Is it that they don't have the information (which is a troubling question in its own right)?  Or that they don't want to release the information (an  even more troubling question)?  That leads to AA's golden rule of providing capital.  If the firm doesn't trust you with information, why should you trust them with your money?