Showing posts with label Qatar Islamic Bank. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Qatar Islamic Bank. Show all posts

Thursday 22 December 2016

KHCB Strategic "Fit" with GFH - Historical Context

At the End of a Wild Ride One Winds Up Where One Started 

For the discussion about KHCB’s strategic fit with GFH, a bit of context by way of historical data, though as I noted in my 1 December post, the success of GFHFG’s strategy depends on future performance not past.
Some introductory comments.
Since my earlier analysis, I’ve introduced two comparable, Bahrain Islamic Bank (BIsB) and Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB) and provide data for two periods:  the last ten and five years. 
Definitions:
  1. GFH includes income from KHCB.  
  2. GFH X KHCB does not.
  3. Amounts are in millions of US dollars (GFH's base currency).
  4. BD and QR have been translated to US dollars using respective official peg rates. 
  5. As before, STDVP = Standard Deviation of the Population and STDVS = Standard Deviation of the Sample.
Let’s start with the long view – ten years financial data.
Net Income Statistical Analysis 2006-2015

Mean
STDVP
STDVS
GFH
-$22.87
299.36
315.55
KHCB
$15.41
31.34
33.04
GFH X KHCB
-$30.04
293.96
309.86
BIsB
-$6.82
59.71
62.94
QIB
$386.18
68.55
72.26

Over the ten-year period, KHCB generated some $154 million equivalent in net profit.  But this was largely due to two fat years—2007 and 2008—whose net profit of $128 million (note that’s 83% of the ten year’s total) was driven by investment banking fees (revenue not net profit) of $128 million.  Revenue that has not recurred and is likely to in the future. As that indicates, the commercial banking business by itself has not been wildly successful (first euphemism of this post) over the period.  
That being said, KHCB increased GFH’s net income by about $71.7—GFH’s share of the $154 million—but really didn’t “move the needle” much (AA’s corporate buzzword of the post).  The mean improved slightly, but volatility barely moved.
The ratio of STDP and STDS to mean for GFH, KHCB, and BIsB indicates the high volatility of results.  These metrics are definitely not indicators of “stable or recurring” income or profitability.  The negative means and rather “modest” (second euphemism) positive mean is another indication of weakness.
The story is much different at QIB.  There the STD is a fraction of a rather healthy mean.  In the case of QIB, we’d predict positive earnings as the most likely outcome using the above data.  Not so with the others.
Now for a five year view.
Net Income Statistical Analysis 2011-2015

Mean
STDVP
STDVS
GFH
$0.44
11.55
12.91
KHCB
-$4.17
24.27
27.13
GFH X KHCB
$2.42
9.21
10.29
BIsB
-$14.32
49.23
55.04
QIB
$411.87
70.45
78.77

During this five year period, two things are clear about KHCB’s performance: 
  1. It was more volatile than GFH’s. 
  2. KHCB had a net loss over the period driven by credit problems. GFH did not, but just barely.     
In this period, GFH would have been better off without KHCB as net income would have been higher by some $10 million and volatility lower.  But GFH’s earnings would still not be stable.  Thus, with or without KHCB GFH did not achieve stable earnings.  It doesn’t require sophisticated math or even a calculator to figure out that ROE was dismal.  My earlier post has comparative ROE figures. As well, net income over the period did not rise even to “hobby” levels on an absolute basis.  
Based on a historical analysis, there is little to support KHCB as a pillar of GFH’s new strategy. 
What GFH needs is for KHCB to deliver not only a stable income but also much larger quantum of positive net income.  Neither of which KHCB has shown any ability to deliver.
But things change.

Blackberry was once the leading provider of business cell phones.   At  that point no one had ever heard of an IPhone.     
We’ll turn our attention to that issue in coming posts.