Showing posts with label Islamic Banks and Finance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islamic Banks and Finance. Show all posts

Thursday 11 July 2019

Analysis of DG Restructured Sukuk Terms -- Lessons for Other Investors

"دخول الحمام ليس مثل خروجه"

In this post we’ll take a detailed look at DG’s restructured sukuk (the “Nile Delta Sukuk”).
Our primary text is the listing particulars for Nile Delta published on the Irish Stock Exchange last August.   For those who want comparatives, here’s equivalent information for “Dana Gas Sukuk” the previous incarnation.
The DG restructuring saga provided investors some important lessons.  Not only the hapless group that invested in Dubious Gas, but also those considering other “Islamic” investments or doing business in the UAE.
Analytical comments (appearing below in italicized bold face) will be both descriptive and prescriptive.
Descriptive for those who’ve already entered the hammam (investors in the sukuk).  Other than a secondary sale they are “in” for what appears to be a prolonged bath.  As an aside, AA sincerely hopes he is wrong.
Prescriptive for those lucky investors who haven’t yet entered but may be considering so-called “Islamic” investments or dealing with obligors in Sharjah.  AA undertakes this task knowing full well that while repetition is said to be effective in teaching donkeys, history shows that teaching investors is a more difficult task.
Shari’ah Compliance
The self-averred devoutly scrupulous members of DG’s Board and management were mightily troubled that the previous sukuk was no longer Shari’ah compliant due to a change in scholarly interpretation on al-mudarabah transactions.  So much that they felt compelled to reject their contractual obligations.  As part of the proposed restructuring, they offered sukuk holders an opportunity to right that wrong with a Shari’ah compliant instrument.
What was the outcome?
As the Listing Particulars succinctly state on p 48:  “No assurance can be given as to Shari’ah rules.”
While the Shari’ah Advisory Board of Dar Al-Shari'ah has opined that the sukuk is Shari’ah compliant, the LP notes that there are no assurances that it will be deemed so by other Shari’ah scholars and boards.
You may also recall, and if you don’t, AA will remind you that DAS opined that the previous sukuk was Shari’ah compliant.  That’s not to cast aspersions on DAS scholarship or diligence.
It’s a simple fact that there is no central body that gives a definitive pronouncement on Shari’ah compliance.
As well a subsequent change in interpretation decided such transactions were not Shari’ah compliant. Whether this was intended to be retroactive or not was not explicitly stated.
This by itself should give pause to investors contemplating Shari’ah transactions for two reasons.  For the faithful -- compliance with religion.  For those prudent in conducting financial transactions  -- enforcement of issuer obligations.
Simply put if you’re looking for Shari’ah compliant investment opportunities, your best bet is equity.
Legal Enforceability
But there is more here that should increase anxiety.  Prudent investors usually craft legal agreements to protect their rights to enforce the issuer’s obligations in this world.
The learned courts of Sharjah accepted the argument that while Dana Gas Sukuk was Shari’ah compliant at inception a subsequent changed interpretation about the compliance (or in this case non-compliance) of mudarabah transactions made it non-compliant.  No grandfathering was granted to transactions began prior to the change in interpretation.
As the LP wryly notes on page 45:  Investors may have difficulties in enforcing any English court judgments or arbitral awards, which do not satisfy the requirements of UAE laws, against Dana Gas in the courts of Sharjah.”
The history of the Dana Gas sukuk restructuring suggests that “may have” above is more appropriately written as “almost certainly”.   While there is no doctrine of case precedent in the UAE, prudent investors probably would want to avoid these courts.
Investors should pay particular attention to the courts whose acquiescence is required for enforcement.  The LP disclose the various shortcomings in key GCC/MENA legal systems not only regarding enforcement of foreign court judgements but also creation and enforcement of security rights.
But there are more than legal warnings in offering memoranda.  By creating the DIFC, the Ruler of Dubai made an unequivocally unfavorable statement about Dubai and UAE courts.  The DIFC is a partial answer.  But as events in Asia suggest, one would be well advised not to “bank” on “one country two systems”.
Reliance on Complex Structuring
These transactions involve elaborate structuring.
First, to attempt to create the “Islamic” equivalent of a bond.  Much of this involves the use of Abu-Yusuf-y transactions.   Often poorly or incompletely executed in light of legal requirements.
Second, to attempt to mitigate the legal risks of local jurisdictions.  Key transaction documents are made subject to the laws of what are perceived to be more investor friendly jurisdictions.  But as several cases, including DG, have shown ultimately this does not work unless the key local jurisdiction where enforcement will take place plays along.
The result is many “moving parts” which affords desperate issuers opportunities to seek to undermine the structure.
Before we turn to Nile Delta, let’s look at the case of Golden Belt Sukuk discussed in an earlier post on this site.
Investors wanted a bond-like structure with a fixed interest rate.  So clever lawyers created a transaction in which the Trustee on behalf of the investors would lease Maan’s properties in KSA back to him at a fixed rental.  However, for probably imagined to be very good reasons, the transaction did not require that he actually sell and re-register the properties in Trustee’s name.
Investors ignored (but the Offering Circular did not!) that a local KSA court was likely to compare the rental charge due under the sukuk to market rentals for similar properties.  And, if the sukuk rentals were above market rental rates, adjust the sukuk rentals according.  And, for some reason the local law requirement for a “wet” signature to make a document legally binding was missed.  But why quibble? What could possibly go wrong? Quite a great deal.
Back to DG on page 51 (the Nile Delta) Listing Particulars makes the following points about the transfer of the Trust Assets.
  1. While the Purchase Agreement for the Trust Assets is governed by English Law, substantially all of the initial Ijara Assets are located in the Emirate of Sharjah.  
  2. To the extent that the laws of the Emirate of Sharjah and, to the extent applicable in Sharjah, the federal laws of the UAE are applied in relation to any dispute relating to the Purchase Agreement or the transfer of the Ijara Assets, there are doubts whether an ownership interest in certain Ijara Assets can be effectively transferred without registration of the transfer with appropriate authorities. 
  3. Accordingly, no assurance is given that any ownership interest in the Ijara Assets will be effectively transferred to the Trustee.  
  4. Oops – not really a sale and transfer.  
  5. Also note the bit about applicability of UAE federal laws in Sharjah.  One might be advised not to “bank” on UAE federal laws saving one in this transaction, if indeed one imagined they might. And perhaps in other transactions in other Emirates.
But the LP goes on to note potential remedies. 
  1. Dana Gas has agreed in the Purchase Undertaking to indemnify the Issuer for the purposes of redemption in full of the outstanding Certificates in the event that any transfer of the Ijara Assets is found to be ineffective. 
  2. Given the issuer’s past behavior, no doubt a source of great comfort to some investors.
  3. In the event that the Trust Assets are not purchased by Dana Gas for any reason, the Delegate will seek to enforce the above provisions of the Purchase Undertaking.   Seek? Indeed! Achieve? Well, that did not seem to work out so well with the previous incarnation.
  4. It is likely that, in any action heard by them, the courts of Sharjah would review the transaction as a whole and seek to uphold the intention of the parties to treat the arrangements as a financing transaction on the terms agreed, provided that the transaction is not recharacterised as a sale and purchase of assets as described below.   As they did with the previous sukuk?
  5. A Sharjah court may characterise the transactions contemplated by the Transaction Documents as a sale and purchase of assets that is void as a result of the failure to register the transfer of the Ijara Assets as described above and may therefore refuse to enforce the indemnity in the Purchase Undertaking. 
  6. Accordingly, Dana Gas would be required to return the purchase price it received for those assets to investors less any amounts already paid to investors in respect of those assets (i.e. Periodic Distribution Amounts paid under the Certificates). As a result, in this particular situation, investors in the Certificates may not receive back the full amount of their investment. 
  7. This is a familiar argument.  Where have I heard it before? (Purely rhetorical question.) Positioning for October 2020 and another convenient attack of conscience?
  8. Prospective investors should note that, to Dana Gas’ knowledge, this matter has not been considered by the courts of Sharjah, therefore there can be no assurance as to the approach that would be taken by the courts of Sharjah in such circumstances.  Since the legal concept of case precedents does not exist in Sharjah, does it matter whether or not they have?
In summary a highly structured instrument composed of several transactions subject to the laws of more than one jurisdiction with enforcement dependent on the jurisdiction—which just happens to be the one with the least reliable legal system—about whose validity as Shari’ah compliant there is no assurance.
A transaction that is therefore highly fragile.
Providing a borrower in distress the opportunity to seek to undermine the entire structure.
If you’re already in the hammam, you don’t have many options.  Striking when the iron is cold isn’t going to get you much.
If you’re thinking about investing, (فكر في الخروج قبل الدخول ).
It’s very simple.
  1. Do not deal with people you do not trust.
  2. Make sure the contract between you and your counterparty is specific – amounts, dates, rights and responsibilities—and contains a realistic path to enforce your rights.
  3. Never rely on your contract to correct deficiencies in (a) your counterparty’s character and (b) local law. 
  4. No matter how much some clever lawyer tries to persuade you he has "fixed" problems with his brilliant structuring. Be suspicious of transactions that have complex structures.  They often fall apart in times of distress.
  5. Make sure, as much as you can, that if you have to enforce your rights under a contract, you will get a fair shake in the legal system and in certain jurisdictions a fair shaykh. Or in other words, that the law is fair and reasonably predictable.
  6. If any of these elements are missing, take your money and business somewhere else.


Wednesday 12 July 2017

Dana Gas Restructuring: Creditors, What Then Is To Be Done?


As outlined in previous posts, the creditors face two key issues with the restructuring:
  1. Obligor Attitude:  If there are not already serious concerns about the obligor’s integrity and willingness to pay, then there should be.  The situation is similar to that of The Investment Dar Kuwait.  Back when it became evident that TID was headed for a restructuring, if not the shoals, its creditors petitioned the Central Bank of Kuwait to appoint an official “minder” to keep an eye on—or more accurately to “control”— TID’s management.  CBK did not.  By contrast creditors did not ask for one in the Global Investment House (Kuwait) restructuring a similarly uncertain large ticket exercise.  As DG is a commercial company and not a financial institution, there’s not even the extremely slim possibility of CBUAE intervention.  Creditors are “on their own”.  That has important consequences for what they should do.
  2. Obligor Aptitude: Glacially slow collection of receivables and an apparent chronic weakness in operating cashflow indicate that the obligor is unlikely to repay principal and interest within the proposed five-year tenor. Factors largely outside DG’s control.  The path was cast when DG embarked on its business in Iraq and Egypt.  Given these facts, creditors are likely to find themselves in another restructuring “adventure” with DG in five years’ time.  Therefore, minimizing that future exposure should be a key goal. 

Что делать? 

In framing this post, AA looked to inspiration from other authors who wrote similarly titled pieces, though hopefully this post is free from excessive utopianism.  As you'll notice one such author is missing.  I believe he was in heated exchange on call-in program with the Governor of New Jersey when I called.

In any case, here's are potential steps that AA believes creditors need to take based on the assessment that protection of creditor interests requires measures beyond the usual ones in a restructuring. 

  1. Legal steps –recast the deal or elements of the deal to reduce/eliminate exposure to Abu Yusuf-ery legal maneuvering by the obligor.  While this is an important step, it will not be sufficient to protect creditors’ interests.
  2. Collateral – get more and to the extent possible, take possession now rather than relying on the exercise of legal rights to deliver it later when Abu Yusuf may have come up with even more clever arguments.
  3. Amortization – use interim scheduled principal repayments plus a cash sweep to achieve reductions.  With DG’s weak/uncertain cashflow getting dollars now is wiser than waiting five-years as the past ten years unequivocally demonstrate. 
  4. TenorsShorten to keep DG’s and your minds focused on repayment.  A five year bullet moves the payment far enough into the future that focus is lost: repayment is a lower priority, particularly for DG.
Legal
Transaction documents are meant not only to set forth the obligations and rights of both parties so there is no ambiguity, but also to provide protection by providing recourse through court ordered enforcement of the agreement if one party cannot fulfill its contractual obligations or decides not to.  DG’s maneuver in Sharjah and other courts to declare the Sukuk contract “illegal and unenforceable” shows the practical limits of that strategy. 
One response would be to change the form of the replacement contract.  If “Islamic” transactions are uncertain, then a conventional (non-Shari’ah) transaction would seem preferable.  If a starving Muslim may eat a ham sandwich in order to avoid death, then it seems to me that if confronted with an obligor that may not be trustworthy as originally assumed and uncertain protection from the courts, a Muslim creditor could legitimately change the form of contract to a non-halal one.  This is important because as shown with the English and BVI courts actions, non-GCC courts are likely to show deference at least initially to areas beyond their competence, e.g., the Shari’ah.
A less severe approach would be to recast the debt obligation into another form of “Islamic” transaction as discussed below.  Perhaps, the transaction could be split into two?  One tranche for only principal repayments in which case Shari’ah or non-Shari’ah distinctions might not apply. Or in other words, the first tranche would be both.  The second an Islamic structure for "profit" (interest), hopefully limiting opportunities for future Abu Yusuf-ery.  Dealing with default interest could be difficult, but creditors are going to have to make some hard tradeoffs following their initial and unfortunate underwriting decision. The ability to ensure cross default would be another key consideration with this no doubt utopian strategy. 
Other actions would be to ensure that entities critical to the success of repayment were incorporated and active in jurisdictions believed to be more likely to give the creditors a fair shake rather than relying on the uncertain existence of a  fair shakyh in local GCC jurisdictions.  Reducing as much as possible the impact of local law on the transaction would be ideal. 
Alternatively, could the DIFC be the jurisdiction for the restructuring suitably structured as an offshore transaction?
But such steps are unlikely to be definitive, even if they are theoretically possible. 
In particular, Argentina’s or the Arab Bank’s recent unhappy experiences in US courts should suggest more than abundance of caution is warranted with reliance on legal jurisdictions as providing a “fair shake”. 
Collateral
On the theory that the “old” deal is dead, then a new deal needs to be struck.  So the door is potentially open to new terms. 
It’s often said that possession is nine tenths of the law.  This should be a guiding principal for the creditors.
A wise move would be what is in effect a pre-emptive exercise of collateral/security rights. That argues for the creditors getting possession/ownership of collateral now to be returned upon full repayment. Transfers of ownership would take place at the inception of the transaction not after a default occurs and potentially lengthy and uncertain legal proceedings are concluded.
A potential replacement structure is a sale/leaseback with DG responsible for operations, capex, insurance, third party liabilities, etc.    DG would sell these assets (by selling the stock in the companies) to the existing Sukuk holders.  The holders would then lease the assets to DG for an x-year period.  No cash would change hands as the “proceeds” of the sale/leaseback would serve to retire the existing obligation.  Sukuk repayment would come from lease payments where perhaps a fixed profit rate would pose less of a problem if Shari’ah structures were chosen.  Upon its successful retirement of the sale/leaseback transaction, DG would have a bargain purchase option to reacquire the assets.
Additional collateral.   Zora is now free from debt and generating cash. It is perhaps the most saleable of DG’s assets.  More (stale) receivables, assignments of proceeds from arbitral awards, ownership of the holding and operating companies for Egypt and the KRG. But unless Dana Gas Ventures BVI owns shares in Pearl, then the KRG operations are not part of the Trust Assets. 
Creditors can expect a robust reaction from DG based on the Trust Assets (TA) being the only security offered. So obtaining new collateral not related to the original TA will be extremely difficult.
If no new collateral can be obtained, then the creditors should take possession of the Trust Assets as outlined above.  If the lessee fails to pay, then the bargain purchase option would be invalid. The assets could be sold to third parties in whole or part.Or investment “adventure” in Egypt or the KRG. Bon chance!  Of course, DG or its shareholders could be given pre-emptive rights in any asset sales. 
Principal Reduction – Amortization
As indicated in my earlier post, the Company’s cashflow is highly unlikely to enable it to retire the debt over the mooted five-year tenor. Creditors could rely as they have over the past ten years on the Company’s promise for principal payment at the end of the next five-years bolstered by no doubt a rosy projection. 
Or they could more wisely include binding (such as one can bind DG) requirements for principal repayments.
With DG’s uncertain cashflow, it’s hard to come up with repayment scenarios.  But that doesn’t mean that the new deal cannot contain some required interim principal repayments before the final principal balloon payment at maturity.  
A key problem with this approach is that it requires faith in DG’s compliance.  Fool me once shame on you. Fool me thrice – we’ll you know the rest. 
A more prudent option would be to include a cash sweep with the required principal payment structure.  As cash came into a newly established concentration account controlled by the security agent (both account and security agent located in a more reasonable jurisdiction), the cash would be divided by the security agent according to a pre-agreed formula.  This mechanism ensures (subject to there being a cashflow) that creditors are not forgotten. Cashflow for the creditors under the sweep would be directed first to scheduled principal payments and then to prepayments.  That is, the sweep should not be limited to only the scheduled payments, but to as much as can be taken limited only by the outstanding debt amount. The point is get the cash now not later.  Creditors would be wise to eliminate prepayment penalties as debt collection is the key issue they face.   
There is another very real benefit to this arrangement.  Just as taking ownership of collateral at the inception of the deal makes it difficult for DG to frustrate creditor rights so does a cash sweep. Under the cash sweep cash would be given to creditors on an ongoing basis as soon as practical after it were received in the concentration account.  Creditors would immediately apply the cash against principal due.  It should be more difficult for DG to later clawback the cash already “swept” to the creditors compared to making some bogus assertion about the transaction becoming invalid due to changing interpretations and then not paying.  
Shorter Tenor
Restructuring at the same or a longer tenor defers the day of reckoning far into the future, particularly if an inadvisable bullet structure is used.  Far enough so that it’s not a priority for either. To avoid this unhappy outcome the maturity of the debt should be shortened.  The debt could be divided into tranches (cross default protected) with a maturity ladder, i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 years.  Or left as a single amount with 2 or 2.5 year maturity.  This would keep the pressure on DG and hopefully prevent the creditors from lapsing into unwarranted somnolescence. 
The shorter maturities would offer creditors the opportunity to reopen the debt to impose additional terms more frequently as it is highly likely that DG will require more than five years to repay the debt, absent a miracle.  And as AA was once told by a local GCC banker, the only "miracles" in Islam occur in the financial statements of Islamic financiers.

  

Tuesday 11 July 2017

Dana Gas Restructuring: Full Repayment of Sukuk Threatened by Weak Cashflow

Looking for the Flow

In a previous post I looked at DG’s stale Trade Receivables, today let’s take a look at the company’s ability to generate cash. 
If the title hasn’t given away the plot, AA’s analysis is that it is likely to be insufficient to repay the Sukuk within five years absent a non-operating event. 
We’ll base the analysis on the “Consolidated Statement of Cashflows” in DG’s annual reports in lieu of developing a more formal model because the intent is to provide a directional rather than locational result.  
This is historic information.  
Why on earth is AA using past data? 
Well, there's nothing on the horizon to suggest a fundamental change in DG's existing business, collection of receivables, etc.  Zora would have to grow exponentially to make a difference.  If new business with better paying customers could be found in other countries, DG probably would be hard pressed to secure financing for a variety of reasons and such business, if finance were available, would take time to develop.
To set the stage a few words about accounting cashflow statements. 
  1. There are two methods for preparing / presenting a statement of cashflows.  One (the “direct” method) is based on actual cashflows both inflows and outflows.  This provides better information for analysis. 
  2. The second is (the “indirect” method) which begins with reported net income and then makes adjustments for certain non-cash items (e.g., depreciation, allowances for impairment, etc.) producing Gross Cash Flow from Operations (“GCFO” or “GO” in this post).  Then a set of further adjustments for changes in the balances of non-cash current assets and current liabilities, resulting in Net Cash Flow from Operations. (“NCFO” or “NO”).   An increase in a current account is a “use” of cash a decrease a “source” of cash.  It’s the opposite for current liabilities where an increase is a “source” of cash and a decrease is a “use” of cash.   Another issue net changes in account balances are used.  This masks actual cashflows, e.g., for receivables it’s the net of new unpaid billings and cash collections on all outstanding receivables.  It’s important to understand that GCFO does not represent cash collected by the company which it then “spends” to increase current assets (e.g., receivables).  What has happened instead is, for example, that some revenue included in accounting net income has not yet been collected.   
  3. There is a way to refine the information from an indirect cashflow using notes to try and disaggregate the “net” changes in accounts.  I haven’t done that for the reason noted above.  
The chart below shows DG’s cashflow over an eight-year period.  Note the “traditional” approach to presentation has been adapted to fit the margin constraints on the blog.  That is, years are vertical rather than horizontal. 
Dana Gas Cashflow Analysis  -  Amounts USD Millions
GCFO WC + Tax NCFO Invest Finance Net CF NO/GO
2016 145 -63 82 -111 -120 -149 57%
2015 345 -142 203 41 13 257 59%
2014 386 -284 102 -55 -67 -20 26%
2013 358 -233 125 56 -141 40 35%
2012 408 -231 177 -57 -67 53 43%
2011 434 -335 99 -93 -53 -47 23%
2010 285 -154 131 -126 -59 -54 46%
2009 176 -71 105 -31 -78 -4 60%
Total 2,537 -1513 1,024 -376 -572 76 40%
Average 282 -168 114 -42 -64 8 40%
Source:  DG Annual Reports
Some observations on the cashflow. 
  1. Over the period 2009-2016, DG has converted only 40% of its Gross Cashflow from Operations to “cash”.  The main culprit over the period is a USD 847 million increase in Trade Receivables.
  2. If the future is like the past, then NCFO is unlikely to be significantly different than the USD 114 million average over the past eight years.  Note:  NCFO does NOT include finance costs, e.g., "profit rate" (interest).  
  3. So USD 570 million is a reasonable estimate of NCFO over five-years.  That's before investments and finance.  
  4. If DG needs to maintain investment at average levels—USD 42 million per year—that leaves USD 360 million for debt service.    
  5. Assuming annual level principal payments of USD 138 million a year at a 9% p.a. interest rate total payments are some USD 876 million over the five years.  At a 3% interest rate total payments of USD 752 million. 
  6. At 9% the shortfall is USD 516 million (roughly 60% unpaid) and at 3% USD 392 million (52%).   
  7. Full repayment of the USD 690 million in outstanding sukuk principal and interest therefore appears unlikely (first euphemism of this post) absent significant new developments.
  8. One such development would be a fundamental change in cashflow generation from operations, e.g., Zora generating significant cash, Iranian gas sales finally occurring, highly profitable business in a new market.  
  9. Another would be a non-operating event or events that change this unhappy picture.  The KRG and Egypt could pay their past due receivables.  The KRG or IRI might pay DG all or some of the USD billions they owe DG according to arbitral decisions.   DG could sell some of its assets with the proceeds directed to creditors. AA is ruling out—perhaps prematurely—DG purchasing a winning El Gordo ticket given DG’s steadfast self-proclaimed adherence to Shari’ah.  Though I suppose a providential re-interpretation of   الميْسِر  and 2:219 by the Company's modern day Abu Yusuf might occur.  An event perhaps more likely than the others outlined in this paragraph.
With this as backdrop, AA is preparing a “What Then Is to Be Done?” post for the creditors chock full of "sage" advice. 
Because AA suspects that the probability of fundamental changes in operations or the occurrence of a non-operating event is low, AA is reaching out for readers' assistance.. 
Readers who know of an Islamic equivalent to St. Jude Thaddeus Patron Saint of Lost Causes or suitable دُعَاء‎‎ are invited to post details.  All five mathhabs are welcome. 
This could be an important pillar of the creditors’ recovery plan.  It would be shame if it was not included.


Wednesday 5 July 2017

Dana Gas Restructuring: Friendly Fire - Sharjah and the UAE


DG has placed the courts of Sharjah in a difficult place.  But the uncomfortable situation won’t stop there. Creditors are almost certain to appeal any Sharjah ruling in favor of DG in UAE Federal courts. 

The Sharjah courts are in a proverbial “pickle”.  The Sharjah ruler is Honorary Chairman of DG.  His son sits on the Board.  DG is also a “home-town” company.    

Do they rule with these considerations in mind?  Or do they rule in view of the impact on the UAE, “Islamic” finance?  Or do they rule in DG’s favor and kick the can to the Federal level?

Hard to tell.  Perhaps, though, there’s an indication:  the 25 December date for the hearing on the injunction granted earlier this month. 

AA would think that a highly visible case involving a USD 700 million restructuring and touching on the fundamental validity of “Islamic” finance would warrant a higher priority waiting six months. 

Perhaps, Sharjah Courts are occupied with even larger and more significant cases.  Who would have thought?  Not AA.

If local courts including the Federal Courts uphold DG’s assertion, the reputation of these courts and the UAE’s system of law will suffer, though as an Emirati banker once said to AA.  “By creating the DIFC and the DFSA the Government of Dubai have expressed their opinion on the state of our onshore laws and courts.” 

An assessment shared as well by other parties, I might note.  I'd end by noting that DG is not the only UAE entity to have issued Murabaha based Sukuk


Saturday 1 July 2017

Dana Gas Restructuring: Certificate Holders in a Difficult Position

A Clearly Painful Position But Nothing Like the DG Creditors

Sukuk holders are in a weak economic position even though the documents as written give them relatively strong rights.  They are also now into year 10 of their planned 5 year adventure with DG and the obligor would like another 5 years!  But there is little to suggest that another 5 years will be sufficient to repay the debt.

Obligations are repaid by cash not covenants.  DG’s cashflow is uncertain. Creditors may well strike a deal and impose their terms on DG.  But unless there is a sea change in attitude or aptitude of Egypt and the KRG, creditors face a long and uncertain path to full recovery of their funds.  They also find themselves in "bed" with an obligor whose integrity may be questionable.

The simple fact is DG’s cash flow is insufficient to repay the debt as scheduled this October. Creditor huffing and puffing no matter how extensive is not going to change that fact.  The debt needs to be rescheduled.

But how can realistic terms be set?  Given the KRG’s and Egypt’s inability/reluctance to pay and no apparent way to force them to, it is difficult to develop reasonable cashflow forecast scenarios.  How does one design a restructuring when 95% of the obligor’s cashflow is uncertain? 

But sadly there’s more.

Back in 2007, the original Sukuk holders cleverly “signed up” for what was a limited recourse type project, funding it through a bond instead of a loan.  Horses for courses:  a loan probably would have been more appropriate because in general bonds are covenant light. Or in other words:  don't saddle up a cow if you're going "jumping".

The original “security” (such as it was/is truly “security”) consisted of equity (dead last in the legal priority of payments) in companies undertaking what was a new venture for DG.  The Sukuk holders accepted a structure which limited their repayment to the proceeds from these assets (the Trust Assets).  If the “Trust Assets” are insufficient to repay the Sukuk, the creditors have no claim against DG or its other assets.  Contrast that with the security package for the Zora project (described in my last post). Not an identical transaction but instructive for how risks can be better managed. 

They also agreed to a bullet repayment structure.  With a bullet instrument of any size one is generally relying on a refinancing for repayment. If there’s no market for a refinancing from other creditors/investors, then unless collateral is sufficient and legally accessible, the “bullet” is pointed at the heads of the creditors who must reschedule – either directly or via a disguised rescheduling, i.e., a bond exchange.   

With the (first) earlier restructuring, the Sukuk holders improved their position by adding USD 300 million of Egyptian receivables to the “security” package. If we assume a scenario in which the Sukuk holders get ownership of the collateral, what’s likely to happen?  If Egypt isn’t clearing up past due receivables by paying DG, what would be their motive for scrambling to make the creditors whole?  They have an ongoing commercial relationship with DG who generate cash for them.  A relationship with creditors would be a one-sided outflow of precious hard currency.

Similarly, if the Sukuk holders manage to access the KRG receivables by realizing the collateral, i.e., acquiring shares in the operating companies in the KRG, the situation is likely to be the same as with Egypt. And here the relationship between the KRG and DG has been strained by claims and counterclaims. 

One might expect these two obligors to delay even more and perhaps inspired by DG find or invent reasons to challenge the original amounts of the receivables or to reduce them based on asserted failures to provide ongoing contractual services. 

At that point what is DG’s incentive to assist the creditors collect the receivables if it has been shorn of its two "crown" jewels?