Showing posts with label India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label India. Show all posts

Friday 5 July 2019

Gulf News Puzzler: How Old is a "Boy" in India?

You are only as young as you feel or as the old timers call you.


The GCC’s newspaper of record, the Gulf News, had an article under the headline “Indian boy who sells snacks cracks difficult GATE exam in first attempt”. 


AA expected to read the inspiring story of a precocious 11 or 12 year –old “boy” who cracked the GATE.

Instead to AA’s surprise, Mr. Shah appears to have completed his undergraduate studies and is ready to move on to graduate school.  Yet, as per the article, he remains a “boy”, “young boy” or “youngster”.
  
Obviously, this must be a cultural thing.

How old does Mr. Shah have to be before he’s called a man? 

Or to stop being called a "young boy" or "youngster"?  

Or perhaps “How many roads must a man walk down before you call him a man?”

Paging R.A. Zimmerman.


Friday 10 March 2017

Indian Banks: Sadly Things are Looking More “Subdued”


It's Not Cricket!


Things are looking mighty “subdued” as careful observers might say.

Some quotes from Bloomberg followed by (AA) comments.

Bloomberg
Stressed assets -- made up of bad loans, restructured debt and advances to companies that can’t meet servicing requirements -- have risen to about 16.6 percent of total loans in India, the highest level among major economies, data compiled by the nation’s Finance Ministry show.

AA is puzzled.  I would think that “advances to companies that can’t meet servicing requirements” would qualify as “bad” loans.  And that restructured debt that was performing, i.e., meeting servicing requirements would not be bad debt.  On the other hand if restructurings were “cosmetic” in nature, then they are indeed bad loans.  If loans aren’t performing, they’re “bad” loans.  If loans are restructured at lower rates perhaps even below market rates but are performing, shouldn’t banks bear this cost? 

Bloomberg

Ratings companies including Fitch Ratings Ltd have come out in favor of setting up a state-backed “bad bank” to tackle India’s ballooning stressed assets problem, a move resisted by Raghuram Rajan, the former governor of the Reserve Bank of India.

Seems to AA if banks’ “bad” loans are ballooning, the country probably already has more than one “bad” bank, particularly when one factors in the comments in the article about “hiding” bad loans, failing to take tough decisions.   

Bloomberg

The RBI completed its audit of the nation’s 50 lenders last year, forcing them to lay bare previously hidden non-performing loans.

That sounds like rather “bad” behavior to AA.

Bloomberg
Banks had been reluctant to offer discounts to offload bad loans even where they are clearly worth much less than their book value because such sales “invite the attention of anti-corruption agencies making bank officials reluctant to sign off on them,” Fitch analysts including Guha wrote in a Feb. 23 note.
AA wonders if the anti-corruption agencies should look earlier in the loan cycle, e.g., at initial underwriting and subsequent “hiding” stages?  Also are bankers looking for the “bad” bank to make “bad” pricing decisions and buy the duff loans at prices higher than their fair value?  Thus, bailing out the banks’ previous bad behavior?  Perhaps this explains former Governor Rajan’s reluctance.

Bloomberg
Bankers selling bad loans to a national bad bank won’t be questioned, as this institution will be empowered by the government to take tough decisions,” said Rajesh Mokashi, managing director at CARE Ratings Ltd. in an interview. A bad bank will also bring to an end to fear of “witch-hunting” of lenders, if any, by anti-graft agencies, he said.

Is this an admission by bankers that they are restricted from taking “tough” decisions?  Or that they are incapable or unwilling to take “tough” decisions?  If either, then a sale to a bad bank does nothing to change this “bad” behavior and is likely to lead to a repeat of bad loan creation by these same banks that can’t or won’t take “tough” decisions.

Bloomberg
With more than $180 billion in stressed assets, the government and regulators have to evaluate all avenues including a bad bank to drive better recovery rates,” said Nikhil Shah, managing director at Alvarez and Marsal, a firm that specializes in turnarounds.
AA wonders how selling duff assets to an asset manager--or “bad” bank, if you prefer--improves recovery rates.  Does this mean that banks are unwilling to take hard decisions or aren’t allowed to?  If so, what guarantee is there that the “bad” bank will?   If the fundamental problem is a slow moving erratic legal process, will the fact that the plaintiff is now a “bad” bank really speed up the legal process?  Or is the idea to buy the duff loans from the banks above market, thus improving their “recovery” rates and stick the “bad” bank with the losses?

All in all not a very pretty picture.  Subdued indeed.
But every situation has both positive and negative possibilities.  As this post about comments from the head of a distinguished bank in a  neighboring country shows, attitude can play a key role

Wednesday 25 January 2017

India: Moody’s and ICRA See “Subdued” Prospects for India’s Banks

Sometimes Even When You See Something Clearly, You Think It Wise to be Indirect

Just when I was recovering from The National Bank of Ukraine’s festival of euphemisms about PrivatBank, along come Moody’s and its Indian affiliate ICRA to once again remind AA that his attempts are easily upstaged. 

In a report released on 9 January, Moody’s and ICRA summarize their conclusions about the country’s banking sector with the phrase “see subdued prospects for India's banks“.
Why is AA “skeptical” and inclined to a stronger term than “subdued”?  Perhaps “dismal”?

Three factors.
First, Indian banks—particularly public sector banks or PSBs—have a reputation for under-reporting NPAs.    Favorite techniques were refusal to recognize NPAs, disguising bad loans via restructuring and/or making new loans to pay interest on past due loans.   Former RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan launched a “crackdown” in 2015 to curb under-reporting of NPAs. 
Performance suffered.  The decline was chiefly due to increased provisioning in 2016 and the related impact on net interest margin.   According to RBI’s Report on Trends and Progress of Banking in India,  Operations and Performance of Scheduled Commercial Banks Table 2.1, banking sector return on assets for 2015/2016  was 31 bp and ROE 3.59% compared to 2014/2015’s ROA of 81 bp and ROE of 10.42%.   Public Sector Banks—some 70% of banking assets--fared even worse with negative ROA and ROE in 2015/2016.  
Second, Indian banks have also traditionally under-reserved their declared NPAs with provisions averaging roughly 40% of total NPAs.   According to RBI Handbook of Statistics of the Indian Economy Table 65, 2015 reserving levels were at 46%.   Unreserved NPAs were some 20% of 2015 capital (Table 64). 
It’s hard to tell what happened in 2016.  Much higher provisions were taken, but more loans were recognized as NPAs and restructured loans are now to be included in that figure.  What’s the net effect?   
Sadly, RBI data on NPAs is available with a roughly 12 month lag.   See Table 65 in the RBI’s “Handbook of Statistics”.  Latest figures are from September 2016.  Other RBI reporting has detailed bank-by-bank analysis but the latest data appears to be March 2016. 
Without RBI statistics on both NPAs and provisions, it’s not possible to determine if the provision coverage has increased because both NPAs and provisions have increased.  
Third, low provisioning levels are particularly important because NPA recovery is traditionally very low in India.  According to RBI’s Report on Trends and Progress of Banking in India,  Operations and Performance of Scheduled Commercial Banks, Table 2.2,  in 2016 Indian banks recovered roughly 10% of NPAs versus 12% for the previous year.  
What this means is that recoveries are unlikely to make up provisioning shortfalls to any meaningful extent.   Provisions then are more critical than in jurisdictions where average recoveries are in the 40 to 50% range. 
It’s hard for AA to imagine that during 2016 Indian banks cured decades of bad practice and bad underwriting.  Trump Tower like Rome wasn’t built in a day, though it is by some Twitter accounts better.  And banking sector cleanups generally take more than a single year. 
Moody’s/ ICRA seem to agree. In their press release, they project single digit ROE for 2017 and 2018 and note large capital needs particularly among PSBs. 
A case of JPMorgan “Jakarta” fever?  Or euphemism?  
And finally a tip of AA’s enormous tarbush to ICRA SVP Karthik Srinivasan for combining “dent” with “profitability matrices”.  See link to Moody’s / ICRA press release. Shabash!

Thursday 17 December 2009

Ride Into the Future: TED Sixth Sense

Incredible India!



Ride Into the Past: The Glorious Past Indeed!




And made like a gun so the slogan goes.  

Ride into the past.