Showing posts with label Central Bank of Kuwait. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Central Bank of Kuwait. Show all posts

Tuesday 19 October 2010

Kuwaiti Investment Companies Blame Central Bank for Delay in 2009 Financials


AlQabas reports that unnamed listed Kuwaiti investment companies have launched a sharp attack against the Central Bank claiming that they provided their financials four months ago, responded to requests from the Central Bank for clarifications three months ago and have heard nothing.

Since CBK approval is required to release financial reports and since financial reports are a condition for the holding of the required annual shareholders' meeting, these meetings have not taken place exposing the companies to fines from the MOIC.  

The article also notes that where another company has a significant ownership stake in a "delayed" company its own financials are delayed because the first company's auditors don't have enough information to complete their audit work.

While Al Qabas did not name the companies, according to the KSE, the following companies have been suspended for failure to provide 2009 financials:
  1. The Investment Dar, last financial released 31 December 2008.  It is therefore missing the quarterly reports from 2009 plus FYE 2009 plus the first two quarters of 2010.
  2. International Leasing and Investment, last financial released 30 September 2008.  So it is missing FYE 2008, the first three quarters and FYE for 2009 plus the first two quarters of 2010.
  3. Abraj Holding, last financial released 31 July 2009 so it is missing FYE 2009 (October fiscal year end) and the first two quarters of 2010. (Technically Abraj Holding is not an "investment firm", though it may look like one from its activities).
Perhaps, it's a question of whether they (CBK) believe what they been given.

Footnote:  As if "poor" Abraj didn't have enough problems already, a group of shareholders has reportedly written to the MOIC complaining that in contravention of the law two government employees are member of the board:  one gentleman who works in the general administration of the fire department and the second who works in handicapped citizens affairs.

Tuesday 12 October 2010

International Leasing and Investment Company - Attempt to Stack Board?


Al Qabas has a follow-up to their earlier report of the resignation of 3 directors at ILIC.  See earlier post on that topic here.
  1. The Company has supposedly written to the MOCI requesting that it approve the replacement of Mr. Mohammed Al-Jasser with Mr. Basil Al Mutawa (a relative of Mr. Bassim Al Mutawa one of the major shareholders).  If this is approved then Abraj Holding/Boubyan Bank would not be represented on the Board despite AH's 32.3% share in the Company.  Boubyan has made a loan to Abraj and its representation on ILIC's Board was no doubt a way of looking after its interests in the collateral.
  2. Also the Central Bank is said to have approved ILIC's 2008 financials which reportedly show a loss of US$120 million with the result that shareholders' equity was reduced to US$45 million.  Loans are said to remain at 2007's level:  US$600 million.  The CBK has, it is said, reservations on the financials.  And the auditors are refusing to give an opinion.
  3. The two directors from the Islamic Development Bank are still tendering their resignations given their concern that the actions being taken are not in the interest of rescuing the Company.  Official bodies are reported to have rejected charges levied against the two directors as inventions and levied by parties who want to take control of the Company without involving other shareholders.
  4. When the 2008 financials are released various infractions will be disclosed.  It's said that the auditors have concerns about the use to which loans were put.
  5. The same parties behind the Board machinations are reported to be trying to block Mr. Faisal Al Zamil (Kuwait's representative on the IDB Board) from assuming a position in executive management  in the Company in order to enable them to put in someone who will look after their interests.
  6. Finally creditors are said to be disgusted with the developments at the Company.
As I mentioned earlier, IDB and Abraj Holding, control over 60% of ILIC and should be able to take control of the Board.  If the Central Bank can finalize ILIC's financials, then the MOIC can call for a shareholders' meeting and presumably the majority of shareholders can vote in their own candidates for the Board - at least a majority.

Tuesday 5 October 2010

Department of No Surprises: Leaked Results of Booz Study - One Bank is Strong the Rest at Lower Levels


5 October's  Al Qabas contains a supposed "leak" of the study Booz did for the Central Bank of Kuwait.  The results one bank is strong and the remainder satisfactory and partially satisfactory.

Since no names were given, I suppose it's a big mystery who the one strong bank is.  That is, of course, if you don't know anything about Kuwait and Kuwaiti banking history.  

Al Qabas' sources tell it the report was given to the Central Bank last week and that the CBK is studying Booz's conclusions to determine which banks need to raise additional equity and which can strengthen their balance sheets by issuing bonds.

Sunday 26 September 2010

Central Bank of Kuwait Denies Noor and Gulf Investment House Extension on Treasury Share Purchase


I don't remember seeing this sort of refusal before. But I may have missed it.

In any case today, the Central Bank of Kuwait announced that it had refused to extend its earlier approval to both GIH and Noor to purchase or sell up to 10% of their own stock.   Announcements below.

Also anyone out there who can help with tafsir on the legal references please do.  I don't understand the reference to the Commercial Companies Law.  Article 115 has to do with the issuance of "redeemed shares".  Could this be a reference to Article 114?  Nor am I familiar with Ministerial Order (sometimes Ministerial Resolution) #10 of 1987 nor that of #11 of 1988 which amended it, nor #273 of 1999. 

In any case, it would seem a prudent regulatory move to restrain investment companies from buying treasury shares until their financial conditions had shown robust improvement.  Certainly, at this time companies have better uses for their limited liquidity than punting in their own shares.  You'll note in both cases the two firms asked permission to buy their own shares.

GIH
[9:13:26]  ِ.عدم موافقة المركزي لبيت الاستثمار الخليجي بشراء مالايتجاوز 10% من اسهمها
يعلن سوق الكويت للاوراق المالية بأن بنك الكويت المركزي افاد بعدم الموافقة
على طلب تجديد سريان الموافقة لشركة بيت الاستثمار الخليجي (الخليجي) بشراء ‏
ما لا يتجاوز 10% من اسهمها المصدرة ويمكن للشركة فقط القيام بالبيع من رصيد
الاسهم المشتراة المتوافرة لديها وذلك لمدة ستة اشهر تنتهي في 17-3-2011.‏
حيث ان ذلك الامر يتطلب ضرورة الالتزام بما وضعه البنك المركزي من ضوابط
وشروط في شأن تملك الشركة المساهمة لاسهمها اضافة الى ضرورة الالتزام ‏
بأحكام المادة 115 مكرر من قانون الشركات التجارية واحكام القرار الوزاري
رقم 10 لسنة 1987 وتعديلاته بموجب القرارين الوزاريين رقم 11 لسنة 1988‏
ورقم 273 لسنة 1999.‏
Noor
[8:50:52]  ِ.عدم موافقة المركزي لنور للاستثمار (نور) بشراء مالايتجاوز 10% من اسهمها
يعلن سوق الكويت للاوراق المالية بأن بنك الكويت المركزي افاد بعدم الموافقة
على طلب تجديد سريان الموافقة لشركة نور للاستثمار (نور) بشراء ما لا
يتجاوز 10% من اسهمها المصدرة ويمكن للشركة فقط القيام بالبيع من رصيد
الاسهم المشتراة المتوافرة لديها وذلك لمدة ستة اشهر تنتهي في 28-3-2011.‏
حيث ان ذلك الامر يتطلب ضرورة الالتزام بما وضعه البنك المركزي من ضوابط
وشروط في شأن تملك الشركة المساهمة لاسهمها اضافة الى ضرورة الالتزام ‏
بأحكام المادة 115 مكرر من قانون الشركات التجارية واحكام القرار الوزاري
رقم 10 لسنة 1987 وتعديلاته بموجب القرارين الوزاريين رقم 11 لسنة 1988‏
ورقم 273 لسنة 1999.‏
 

Wednesday 25 August 2010

The Investment Dar - Creditors Committee "Fed Up" or Posturing for the Central Bank?


Today's (25 August) AlWatan and AlQabas carried two quite different articles on the Creditors Committee.  One can consider these straightforward news items.  And perhaps, just perhaps, attempts to influence the Central Bank's decision making process.

Playing the role of good cop is Bader Abdullah Al-Ali, CEO of Gulf Investment House Kuwait, the official spokesman of Creditors' Coordinating Committee ("CCC").  As reported in AlWatan, he noted:
  1. That the Central Bank of Kuwait had played a pivotal role in the rescheduling expending considerable efforts to bring agreement between the concerned parties.
  2. That the CCC believed the rescheduling remained the best means available and offered the ideal reclamation of lenders' rights.
  3. That the fundamental goal of the CCC was the essential role of involving the lenders in crafting the rescheduling according to generally accepted international principles.
  4. That the CCC was confident that the CBK understood the role the CCC played.
  5. That the CCC hoped for the response of the CBK in the shortest time possible.
Or in other less polite words:
  1. You've done your part and we acknowledge your professionalism.  So now it's time to acknowledge ours.
  2. The plan is fine we, the CCC on behalf of the lenders, crafted it according to generally accepted international principles (which should no doubt trump any purely local or regional views that you might have).
  3. So don't tamper with it.  And be sure not to exclude us in the process.
  4. Get off your duffs and approve it.
The bad cop role falls to unknown sources who have provided AlQabas with the background for its article.
  1. TID's application for entry under the FSL has effectively ended the productive work of the CCC.  The Central Bank has the entire file in its hands.  As a result, the CCC is reduced to holding meetings to discuss the latest developments without being able to influence them.
  2. The FSL represents the last chance of the Company.  If entry is rejected, a myriad of lawsuits against the Company and its management will be launched seeking bankruptcy.
  3. Ernst and Young have bluntly told the CCC that they were engaged by the CBK and have no connection with the CCC or the lenders.  Their marching orders come from the CBK alone.
  4. The CCC, mindful of its responsibility to the lenders, are fearful that actions may be taken affecting the Company without their involvement or knowledge.
  5. As a result, they discussed at their last meeting whether or not they should withdraw and resign en masse.
  6. Adding to their rancor from exclusion from the process are several items, some of which have recently emerged.  
  7. Apparently TID has advised the CCC that it had some KD12 to 15 million of  unpaid Zakat arrears which date from before the crisis.  The CCC do not understand why these were not paid as the associated profit has already been distributed.  There was no note of these in information provided.  Nor does there appear to be any fatwa authorising the delay.
  8. There are increases in salary for one of the senior executives as well as a requested bonus.  (No doubt a "performance" bonus.  And, yes, the term "performance" is used in the same sense as in my recent post on GFH's 2Q10 financials).
  9. The Company's failure to present financials for periods after 2008.
  10. The resolution of TID's file is dragging on and may extend to next year.
  11. The dissolution of the CCC would deal a fatal blow to the Company as the CCC is the glue which binds the "alliance" of consenting creditors.
  12. Failure to obtain the protection of the FSL will lead to thousands of lawsuits which will rain down on the Company.
  13. The article closes by noting the frustration of the CCC with TID's public relations firm who are felt to have issued a torrent of meaningless press releases about nothing.  Adding insult to injury, it seems that TID has incurred payables of 7 million (presumably KD) for these services.  This last bit has me questioning my translation as I'd expect there would be some sort of expense controls in place from the CBK appointed manager and/or the CRO.  So I'm inviting comments on my translation - the last sentence in the Al Qabas article.
Certainly, there's a lot of justification for rancor in the CCC and among the lenders.  They've expended a lot of time dealing with the rather slippery management at TID to get this far.  That matters aren't moving more quickly has got to be distressing.  As I am sure are the latest "shenanigans" of the Company - though frankly speaking, the lenders can no doubt expect many many more during the implementation phase of the restructuring.

But as we did above with the good cop's position, let's translate the bad cop's argument into less politically correct speak:
  1. We, the CCC, are the critical guys in the process holding the creditors together. If we walk, TID comes crashing down.
  2. You're ignoring us.
  3. We're fed up by your inaction and by the Company's shenanigans. (Notice, as usual, AA is being highly charitable.  And my zakat in that respect is being paid on time!).
  4. If we don't get what we want, we're going to take our ball and go home.
  5. Then you'll be the culprit as TID collapses.
While no doubt this tactic does put a bit a pressure on the CBK, in the final analysis it's not very credible.  The lenders are not going to walk away from their best hope of recovery:  the rescheduling and the FSL.

If the Central Bank is looking for way out of approving TID's request, then this may be just the entree they're looking for.    That being said, I don't expect that.  My worst case scenario is that the CBK comes back with modifications to the plan - which by that time the parties thereto should be sufficiently exhausted that they will willingly accept what the CBK wants in order to finally close the file and move forward.

Monday 16 August 2010

International Leasing and Investment - The "Fix" is in? Central Bank Trying to Stop?


The 16 August issue of AlQabas has an intriguing article on ILI: "Supervisory Reservations About Return of AlHomoud to International Leasing."  KSE page on ILI here.

The article states that:
  1. The regulatory authorities, among them the Central Bank of Kuwait, have reservations about the return of Fuad AlHomoud to ILI especially after his membership to the Board and appointment as Managing Director.  
  2. One of the largest creditors of ILI has joined in these reservations on the basis that he has been following the company for years and knows its "ins and outs".
  3. PWC who the creditors had engaged  issued a report that accused the previous executive management of taking loans and using them for other than the purposes for which they were obtained.  
  4. And PWC had recommended that court action be taken against previous executive management.  
  5. The article quotes an unnamed source in Munshaat (a Kuwaiti Real Estate company) that Mr. AlHomoud is facing a court case related to the time he was at both Munshaat and ILI.  
  6. After an examination, the Central Bank of Kuwait found that the previous management guilty of a number of violations and excesses and levied a fine of KD200,000.
What's apparently troubling some is the sudden "understanding" between Mr. AlHomoud and Mr. Bassam AlMutawa, the investor who has proposed a plan to save ILI.  The question is whether they have joined forces to save the company or for another reason.

At this point, AlQabas speculates (and note that word) that legal cases relating to ILI could be very uncomfortable for a variety of people and that having  control over the Company's "files" related to such cases could be a powerful motive for some to seek to obtain control over ILI.

ILI is currently suspended from KSE trading due to failure to provide financials.  It has not yet provided its 31 December 2008 financials or any subsequent ones.

And finally, while not stated in the article, I am going to presume that Mr. AlHomoud like a prominent expatriate Kuwaiti  businessman denies all allegations of wrongdoing.

Thursday 12 August 2010

Booz and Company to Assist Central Bank of Kuwait with Bank Stress Tests


AlQabas reports that the CBK has engaged Booz and Company to assist it with stress tests for the banking sector.

The article states that the CBK has taken the stress tests prepared by the banks at face value with no follow-up or consultations.  You might find it suprising but the banks apparently did quite well on their self administered test.  An "A" for all in the middle (or medium) case.  And only a few "remarks" on a bank or two for the worst or severe test.  ! مبروك

Booz and Company will review the banks' financials and the information they provided to the CBK and then design neutral (perhaps a better translation is "unbiased") half yearly and annual tests.   It sounds as though this may be an ongoing program).   Booz's "neutral" (unbiased) test will be a decisive factor in determining whether a bank needs to augment its capital or reserves.

Wednesday 11 August 2010

Burgan Bank - KD6.8 Million Loss for First Six Months 2010

Burgan announced its 1H10 results on the KSE this morning.  Arabic text below.

The headline is the loss of KD6.856 million versus a profit of KD11.748 million in 1H09.   No explanation for the loss.

A couple of other points:
  1. In case you're wondering the KD100 million or so increase in Shareholders' Equity to KD531.28 million is largely accounted for by the KD100.8 million rights offering BB undertook in 2Q10.  
  2. The other bit of information here is that the Central Bank approved Burgan's financials 10 August 10 - which suggests there may have been differences (perhaps "creative") between the CBK and BB over the exact income number to report.
While Burgan participates in the legendary KIPCO Group Shafafiyah program don't hold your breath waiting for a set of quarterly financials.  What you'll get instead is a two-page press release, a large portion of which is occupied by a picture of the Chairman.  By all accounts a splendid looking fellow! Or an investor presentation with a few metrics.  Apparently, the operative theory apparently being that investors in Kuwait can't deal with more than one or two facts which must be presented with lots of colors and pictures.

On that topic, since Burgan's regulator the Central Bank of Kuwait sets the financial reporting "standards" for Kuwaiti banks (I use the term "standards" because AA is always charitable), apparently a view shared by the authorities.



[9:51:28]  بلغت (خسارة) (برقان) (6.8) مليون د.ك لل6 أشهر المنتهية في30-6-10 ‏
يعلن سوق الكويت للأوراق المالية أن مجلس ادارة بنك برقان قد
اعتمد البيانات المالية المرحلية للبنك للفترات المنتهية  في 30-06-2010،
وفقا لما يلي:‏
ِ1) الفترات الحالية:‏
البند      ال3 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-10    ال6 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-10‏
الربح (الخسارة)(د.ك)     (8.730.000)                   (6.856.000)‏
ربحية السهم(فلس كويتي)         (7.4)                                (5.7)‏
اجمالي الموجودات المتداولة      -                          2.572.566.000‏
اجمالي الموجودات               -                         4.056.517.000‏
اجمالي المطلوبات المتداولة       -                       3.392.630.000‏
اجمالي المطلوبات                -                         3.525.269.000‏
اجمالي حقوق المساهمين          -                        531.248.000‏
علما بأن بنك الكويت المركزي قد وافق على هذه البيانات المالية بتاريخ ‏
يوم الثلاثاء  الموافق 10-08-2010.‏
بلغ اجماليى الايرادات من التعاملات مع الاطراف ذات الصلة مبلغ 4.446‏
د.ك .‏
بلغ اجمالي المصروفات من التعاملات مع الاطراف ذات الصلة مبلغ 2.756 د.ك .‏
ِ2) الفترات المقارنة:‏
البند      ال3 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-09    ال6 أشهر المنتهية في 30-06-09‏
الربح(د.ك)               760.000                       11.748.000‏
ربحية السهم(فلس كويتي)     0.7                                      10.9‏
اجمالي الموجودات المتداولة     -                            2.056.457.000‏
اجمالي الموجودات              -                           4.141.082.000‏
اجمالي المطلوبات المتداولة     -                           2.566.220.000‏
اجمالي المطلوبات              -                            3.713.497.000‏
اجمالي حقوق المساهمين       -                            427.585.000‏

Tuesday 10 August 2010

The Investment Dar - Musallam at Today's OGM - The Future is Bright


The following is based on AlAmir Yusri's article in the 10 August AlWatan.

Monday (9 August) TID held an ordinary general shareholders' meeting at the request of the MOCI in the words of Badr AlShamary, the representative of the MOIC, the meeting was called "in consideration for the shareholders, to protect the national economy, and in conformity with the Commercial Companies Law."  The Company will be holding its "own" OGM on 26 August.

Some 64.88% of shareholders were present and so there was a quorum.  AlWatan notes that the meeting was a vindication of sorts for the current management and board as not a single shareholder lodged a formal complaint or objection regarding management's or the board's conduct.  One shareholder did raise an objection about the MOCI's conduct with respect to TID.

During the meeting TID's Chairman and Managing Director, Adnan AlMusallam, made the following points:
  1. TID is not going to be liquidated.
  2. In fact its brightest days are ahead of it, apparently by 2012 if not sooner.
  3. It has no "poisoned" assets but rather its assets are real.
  4. While they were affected by the crisis, they did not die.  Such assets as Bank Bubyan, Aston Martin, Bank al Bilad, Oqyana and Khabaari are solid.
  5. BLOM Bank has joined the restructuring after a conversation with the Company and the CCC - even after winning its court judgment in London.  (There is a critical difference between getting a judgment and getting the cash).
  6. Now 83% of the creditors have agreed the restructuring.
  7. Good progress is being made with Commercial Bank to come to a friendly resolution of the Bank Boubyan shares problem.
  8. The Central Bank of Kuwait handled the crisis -- that's probably the global (small "g") financial crisis -- in the most professional of manners.
  9. A small thing like a lawsuit wouldn't disturb our great relationship with the Central Bank.  (You'll recall that TID sued the CBK over what it claimed was unfair treatment concerning its 2008 financials).
  10. TID has four month extension of the stay on legal claims against it in Kuwait.  You'll recall the Central Bank asked for an additional four months to decide whether to recommend for or against TID's final entry under the Financial Stability Law.
All in all a very optimistic assessment.  As Adnan noted even during the Iraqi invasion he refused to be pessimistic.  And if you've read the Arabic text closely ( ان شاء الله..والله على ما اقول شهيد ) , you'll have noticed that Adnan not only swore by God but also called Him as a witness.  So it's doubly hard not to take his comments at face value.

And no doubt with good reason.

Those persuaded by his performance will have to wait to buy shares as TID remains suspended on the KSE.

Thursday 29 July 2010

The Investment Dar - Central Bank Gets Another Four Months to Ponder


Quoting Reuters, AlQabas reports that the Central Bank of Kuwait applied for an additional four months to determine whether TID should be allowed to enter the FSL process - a step that would give it protection from court actions in the State of Kuwait.  And as well, I suspect, from court actions in most other jurisdictions.

The new period runs from 10 July.

Clearly, the CBK is not as convinced as it would like to be that TID can make the current restructuring plan.  

As noted in an earlier post, it's expected that the CBK will impose some conditions on TID as the condition for an approval.  And perhaps propose some modifications to the restructuring plan itself.

From this distance it's hard to see what the CBK's motive is:
  1. Reluctance to make a decision that may turn out to be wrong?
  2. Hope that if it waits long enough, events will make the decision for it? 
  3. Desire to put pressure on the parties to revise the deal - more to the CBK's liking?
  4. Need for time to figure out what the right additional conditions are? And negotiate with the parties?
  5. Hold TID's feet to the fire a bit longer as a form of punishment?  Though this risks alienating creditors.
The danger with a delay is that those creditors who are pursuing legal cases may win judgments in foreign jurisdictions.  Though I would expect TID to mount a legal defense in such cases that it was partially under the equivalent of Chapter 11 and that foreign proceedings should be stayed until the CBK made its decision, such a defense may prove less effective than TID being finally and formally under the FSL.

A delay does allow the CBK to increase pressure on both TID and the creditors to accept its conditions with minimum negotiation.

    Sunday 25 July 2010

    The Investment Dar - Central Bank to Impose Conditions to Enter FSL

    Muhammad Sha'baan at AlQabas quotes informed sources that the delay in the Central Bank's approval of TID's entry under the protection of the FSL reflects some fundamental concerns and that as a result the CBK is likely to impose conditions and constraints as the price for TID's entry - which they will secure prior to any approval.

    The steps will protect the interests of creditors as well as support the rehabilitation of TID.  And this "workshop" (or perhaps worklist) of effective and swift measures will immediately follow entry under the FSL. 

    The article notes that TID's "file" is complicated (and presumably this is the reason for the CBK's caution):
    1. A significant amount of creditors want nothing to do with the restructuring and are determined to continue legal action.  The concern is that a foreign judgments will be immune from the FSL and thus will disturb the Company and upset the legal protection given.   AA:  There is no real way that the CBK or Kuwaiti authorities can get 100% a priori assurance this will not happen.  The hope is that a foreign jurisdiction will recognize the FSL as being analogous to USA Chapter 11 and stay legal actions in their countries.  This is something the Kuwaiti authorities have to make a leap of faith on once they've decided the larger issue - whether it is better to liquidate or rehabilitate TID.  The USA (State of New York to be precise) has recognized the Administration of TIBC in Bahrain as a fair and reasonable process and has stayed legal actions. One would hope Kuwait could get similar treatment.
    2. The Company has yet to issue any financial reports from 2009 or 2010. The article describes several legal/regulatory issues -- the holding of annual shareholders' meetings, restoration of trading on the KSE --  as well as the determination of the Company's financial situation.  AA:  The regulatory issues are immaterial to the issue of ability to repay creditors.  The major issue is whether it makes sense to liquidate the Company or run it as a going concern (which will have a higher expense level).  Which course provides the highest net payout?   Which course does the least damage to Kuwait? The longer the file is left undecided the more value that will be lost. 
    3. Complete and detailed information and explanation from the Company is lacking.  The Creditors Co-Ordinating Committee failed in obtaining information on some issues - where the answers are still "floating" according to creditors.  AA:  The CBK, CCC and creditors need to determine if the Company is being forthright.  If it is not, then it's time to remove the Board and management and go forward with the restructuring.  Or put the Company in Administration.  If the situation is unclear because of external factors and the Company cannot respond with precision, then the creditors will have to learn to live with ambiguity.  One would have hoped that by now the creditors would have made a decision on this score or decided to accept less than forthright answers.
    4. Some points remain open.  It appears the chief one is shareholder support.  AA:  It seems a mite optimistic to expect shareholders to put more money into TID at this point (as it does for Global) until shareholders seem the direction of the restructuring.  Presumably, any money put in will wind up immediately in the creditors' pockets.  A rather hard sell to shareholders who have probably lost most if not all of their past equity.  Invest money not to build for the future but to pay off loans. Even putting money in to build the business requires a bit of optimism - perhaps irrational - at this stage.
    5. Another major unresolved issue is expense reduction/control including grants, bonuses etc for management.  AA:  Unless this is the typical bankers' myopic focus on pennies in a restructuring, this is a rather disturbing bit of news.  If repayment of TID's mountain of debt depends on reducing relative hillocks of expenses, it may be time to consider Administration.  Unless of course the intent of the plan is a disguised liquidation.  Or there is no alternative to current management and controls are required to avoid dissipation of assets.   
    6. Ernst and Young (who the CBK hired to evaluate TID's financial condition) ran a series of stress tests (to use a term common in the press).  Apparently under some of these TID was unable to repay principal and/or service debt.  That led E&Y to comment on the Company's debt burden and  reliance on two sources of revenue.  The CBK is said to be looking for 100% assurance that TID will be able to service its debt according to the plan.  AA:  Perhaps this is just a flight of rhetoric.  But if the CBK is looking for 100% assurance, it needs "tae think again".   The only thing the CBK can be sure of with that level of precision is that banks under its supervision are likely to make manifestly stupid loans again and get themselves into a serious deteriorated situation.  It cannot be sure that TID will sail through.  What it needs is a reasonable assurance - tempered by a keen understanding of what a bankruptcy this size will mean for Kuwait.   The US Court didn't have 100% assurance when it let General Motors through the gates of reorganisation.  
    There are a couple of other points of note in the article:
    1. Legal experts say that the CBK is not bound by the Special FSL Court's request.  That as the Central Bank it has certain powers beyond and above the FSL.  
    2. The Company is described as being in the position of "one standing on shifting sand" given the decline in asset prices and the problem of coming up with asset values given different and moving prices.
    3. Some local banks (Kuwaiti) have provisioned between 50% to 100%.  In any case by the end of the year according to CBK requirements, provisions will have to be at 100% as for other troubled investment companies.  AA:  Presumably at that point, having taken the pain, banks don't need to accommodate a plan because they have nothing to lose.  The bankers' rule that a recovery on a fully provisioned loan is found (new) money as opposed to recoveries of old lost money.
    Additional conditions and safeguards - while no doubt justified - are unlikely to provide 100% assurance of TID's success.  At some point the CBK will have to make a decision - formed largely by the intersection of approximations of fact and the realities of policy - what is best for Kuwait.   And then prepare itself for criticism that its decision was flawed.  With no doubt a major part of that criticism coming from the "wise and learned" members of the Majlis al Umma.

    Wednesday 21 July 2010

    What Were They Thinking?: Central Bank of Kuwait Approves Burgan Bank Share Buyback


    When I read announcements like the one below (that the CBK has given permission to Burgan Bank to buy back or sell up to 10% of its shares) or the periodic announcements on the UAE exchanges reporting this or that bank's share buyback activity, I've got to wonder "what were they thinking"?  Or maybe "were they thinking at all?"  To be clear, here I'm not just questioning what the bank itself is thinking so much as what its apparently overly friendly or somnolent regulator is.

    Those not suffering from banker's ADD will recall that Burgan Bank had a massive rights issue earlier this year -  April to be specific.  360 million shares.  Equivalent to a 34.57% increase in capital.  A Rights Offering that needed two stages because in the first Burgan managed to only place 85% of the amount.   If you have a banker's memory and don't remember, here's the link.

    While one can never be certain, presumably Burgan raised this massive amount of capital because it needed it.   Perhaps, it was even encouraged by the Central Bank to do so.  To now partially decapitalize the bank seems not to make much sense though I suppose I could have missed the miraculous turnaround in the Kuwaiti economy in the last three months.  The boom in the KSE. The restoration of imagined ruddy health to the investment firm sector.  The disappearance of problem loans.

    Looking southward,  one might also expect that the Central Bank of the UAE would stop or reduce sharebuybacks by local banks on the theory that in these difficult times banks need all the capital they can muster to provide a buffer against  problems. Though again I suppose difficult times may have ended. A dramatic recovery in the UAE.  The start of a new real estate boom.  The concomitant collapse of problem loans.  A new improved "Vision".  At least 20/5 this time!

    It really does pay to pay attention as they say.

    In cases like this where the decision seems contrary to good sense, it makes sense to look for additional motives.  As we all know, regulators are charged with looking out for the health of the banking sector and the economy as a whole - and not just that of this or that bank.

    That suggests the Central Bank of Kuwait's decision is motivated by a higher  and more pressing need: raising Burgan's share price to a more appropriate level -- defined as one that makes its shares worth more in a collateral pledge and which increases the equity and perhaps income of its owners (FVTPL).  And goal so compelling and universal that a regulator "down South" might share a similar view, though of course for different banks.

    As all good bankers know it is a cardinal rule of commercial banking to "have a second way out".  Even given the apparently generous pricing mooted on United Gulf Bank's purchase of 13% of Burgan is it really wise to rely solely on this "auction" to achieve this nationally important economic goal?  Apparently not!

    And finally, yes, Burgan does hold Treasury Shares (some 29.6 million of them if I'm not mistaken) though I rather doubt they sought the CBK's approval because they want to sell them.  And of course, in such a case, the CBK could have limited its approval to a sale only.


    [13:28:52]  ِ.موافقة بنك الكويت المركزي لبنك برقان بشراء ما لا يتجاوز 10% من اسهمها
    يعلن سوق الكويت للاوراق المالية ان بنك الكويت المركزي وافق بتاريخ ‏
    ِ21-7-2010 علي طلب بنك برقان بشراء او بيع مالا يتجاوز 10%‏
    من اسهمه المصدرة لمدة سته اشهر اعتبارا من تاريخ انتهاء الموافقة ‏
    الحالية في 5-8-2010 وذلك مع ضرورة الالتزام بما وضعه البنك المركزي
    من ضوابط وشروط في شأن تملك البنوك لاسهمها اضافة الي ضرورة الالتزام
    باحكام المداة ( 115 ) مكرر من قانون الشركات التجارية واحكام القرار ‏
    الوزاري رقم (10) لسنة 1987 وتعديلاته بموجب القرارين الوزاريين رقم (11) ‏
    لسنة 1988 ورقم ( 273) لسنة 1999

    Thursday 15 July 2010

    The Investment Dar - No Decision from Central Bank


    It's been roughly four months since TID received the preliminary approval of the Special FSL Court to begin the process for the Company to seek protection under the FSL.  Under the law, the Central Bank of Kuwait has four months to review a proposed  restructuring plan, the financial condition of an applicant and make a determination as to whether it believes there is a reasonable chance that the a company will be able to meet its restructured obligations.  Earlier post on details of FSL here.

    At this point the Central Bank of Kuwait has not issued its final conclusive decision.  

    Mohammed Al Itribi at AlQabas reports TID held a consultative meeting yesterday (14 July)  with the Creditors Co-Ordinating Committee to advise them of the lack of a decision by the CBK. 

    The article notes that this can mean that (a) the CBK is about to issue a negative decision or  (b) as allowed under Article 19 of the FSL ask for additional time no to exceed another four months.   The FSL allows only a single four month extension.

    I still think it's unlikely the CBK is going to reject TID's restructuring given the negative fallout on Kuwait.  Perhaps, they're looking to find a way to approve.  And that ties into the E&Y report.   

    The  KD64,000 question is precisely what it said.   Did it support the restructuring plan?

    If not or if the CBK is uneasy,  then a possible alternative would be to change terms of the plan - extend the tenor or re-profile payments to push any perceived problem out far enough so that the possibility of repayment is increased.  The promise of CBK approval for changes in the Plan could be a powerful incentive for banks to go along and agree - as this will provide some closure to the TID file.   Even if it's only a temporary pushing of the problem to the future.

    The article also notes that some alternatives were discussed if the CBK's decision is negative.

    The central issue with alternatives is ways to prevent dissident creditors' lawsuits from threatening the viability of the restructuring plan.   One would expect that dissident creditors would seek Court orders  forbidding the disposal of assets by TID during the course of their legal action.   That cuts off cash flow for repayments under the restructuring.  If the dissident creditor wins, assets could be lost - though no more than the creditor's claim (including legal interest, costs, etc).  

    One strategy is to just tough it out delaying court decisions as much as possible. Seeking court permission to sell assets and place the  amount at dispute (but not the entire proceeds) in escrow pending the court's decision - allowing the remainder of the proceeds to make payments under the restructuring. 

    Or trying to substitute less desirable assets.  Here take my shares in TIDBank and let me have the Bahrain Islamic Bank shares. 

    Following the tough it out strategy requires  the co-operation of the  agreeing creditors to go forward.  And strong discipline in their ranks.  It also depends in the final analysis on the amount of the dissident creditors' exposure and their ability to bring suit in various jurisdictions.     

    Monday 12 July 2010

    The Investment Dar - Restructuring Plan Does Not Incorporate New Central Bank Regulations - So What?


    You've probably seen the articles (Gulf Daily News, AlWatan, and AlQabas) saying that TID, its creditors, Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse met 6 July to discuss the draft restructuring plan and to discuss the fact that the plan does not incorporate the new Central Bank guidelines for investment companies.

    Much is made of the fact that the Central Bank guidelines must be completely implemented by June 2012.

    As you'll recall (and if you do not, look here and here), these impose certain rather strictly drafted ratios:
    1. Leverage of 2:1 (Total Liabilities to Equity)
    2. 10% Liquid Assets Ratio
    3. A cap on foreign borrowing - 50% of total equity.
    Frankly, this seems much ado about nothing.

    Barring a miraculous recovery of asset values, there are two ways that TID can get in compliance with the ratios.
    1. Its shareholders agree to fund a massive increase in capital.
    2. Its creditors, particularly the foreign ones, forgive debt.  Other options would be defeasance.  Or equity conversions.
    Hard to imagine rational investors throwing good money after bad (subscribing for new equity) for the sake of complying with some regulation.

    Impossible to imagine creditors forgiving debt - especially the "Islamic" ones even in light of the clear guidance in 2:280.  

    Defeasance would require sufficient assets in the "trust" to provide a comfort margin.  Given the quality of TID's "core assets", one would expect a very large margin.   That would leave other creditors high and dry.  As well, the hook into the Company by not defeasing provides at least additional theoretical source of repayment. 

    Converting secured debt into equity doesn't seem like a particularly appealing prospect unless the conversion could be into an instrument that was called "equity" but was actually the equivalent of secured debt.

    There's no real motive for a shareholder or creditor to take any of these actions.  Both realize that the Central Bank's options are limited.  It's not going to place TID into Administration (at least not beyond what the restructuring is already doing) for the sake of  enforcing a regulation.

    More likely than not the Central Bank of Kuwait will have to give TID a special exemption from the new rules - an extension beyond the 30 June 2012 "deadline".   Just as it is likely to have to give Global such a pass.

    Monday 5 July 2010

    The Investment Dar - Ernst and Young Delivers "Final" Report on Restructuring Plan


    AlQabas reports that E&Y has delivered its "final fateful" report on TID to the Central Bank of Kuwait.  The report includes a valuation of the Company's assets which is the basis for E&Y's judgment as to whether TID is capable of continuing as a "going concern" and meeting it repayment obligations under the restructuring.

    As well, that the Company held a meeting with E&Y to discuss its analysis.  And that according to sources close to the Head of the Creditors Committee, the CCC held a meeting with Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley and the Company to discuss the latest developments.

    And finally that there are members of the CCC who are ready to propose alternatives should the CBK take an adverse decision on the restructuring plan.

    I'd be rather surprised if the CBK did not approve the plan.  Rather if it has serious concerns, it might seek to amend the plan in one or more areas, though again I don't expect this. 

    Presumably, the development of alternatives is a further demonstration of AA's Law of the Conservation of Due Diligence.  If you fail to do proper due diligence in the underwriting stage, you "catch up" in the restructuring stage.  And then of course the amount of work reflects the impact of time value (present value).  Much more is done.

    As you know, the CBK's approval is required for entry by TID into the safe harbour of the FSL which will protect it - at least in Kuwait and probably in other jurisdictions - from dissident creditors' legal actions.  And recall that the FSL does give the CBK the right to amend the restructuring plan if it feels that such is needed to ensure its implementation.

    Tuesday 29 June 2010

    Markaz Kuwait: Massive Losses in Kuwait Investment Firm Sector


    The fine folks at Markaz have issued a report on the Central Bank of Kuwait's proposed new regulations for the Kuwaiti "Investment" Firm Sector.

    Markaz is generally supportive of the CBK's actions.

    The "headline" story here (and sadly not a surprising one) can be summed up in this quote:
    The sector lost over USD 2 bn in 2009 following a monstrous loss of upwards of USD 3 bn in 2008, and continues to post an aggregate loss of over USD 100 mn in 1Q10 (an annual run rate of USD 400 mn). The losses are tied to impaired assets which companies have been writing-off in an attempt to restore some health to their balance sheets. Liquidity and over-leverage have also been an issue for the sector, whose assets are often comprised of difficult to value and illiquid investments which are then pledged as collateral against further borrowings. These issues were not bothersome during the boom periods; however, when the global financial crisis hit, it exposed the sector’s vulnerabilities resulting in a massive destruction of wealth.
    The report has three main parts:
    1. A discussion of the ratios.  This is well worth a close read.
    2. The CBK's analysis of compliance. (Discussed below)
    3. Markaz's own analysis from a sample of 32 companies.
    I'll let you read Markaz's discussion of the ratios - not much for me to add.

    As to the CBK's analysis,  of the 100 firms in the sector:
    1. 94 meet at least one of the new criteria.
    2. 82 at least two of the new criteria.
    3. 49 all three of the criteria.
    Markaz has done a bit of data gathering and number crunching to come up with a ratio compliance test for 32 firms in the sector for the first two new ratios:  total leverage and liquidity (the latter what Markaz calls the "Acid Ratio").  It's not possible to calculate the third ratio (foreign debt exposure) given the woefully inadequate disclosure of foreign borrowings.

    The detailed results of Markaz's analysis are in Appendix 2.  On an aggregate basis, of the 32 firms in their sample.
    1. 75% met the Leverage Ratio.
    2. 44% the Acid Test (Liquidity Ratio)
    3. 34% both ratios.
    One point I would like to highlight is their focus on fair value reserves.
    The problem arises in the valuation method used in this segment which can be vague at best and completely misrepresentative of “actual” value in the worst case. By misrepresenting the fair value of Assets Available for Sale, a company can inflate its Fair Value Reserve (and therefore Equity figure) by booking Unrealized Gains, which would produce a lower leverage ratio." 
    Earlier post on this topic here.

    Friday 25 June 2010

    The Investment Dar - No Agreement on Draft Budget Expenses


    Citing informed sources, AlQabas reports that the meeting earlier this week between the Creditors Co-ordinating Committee and the Company did not resolve the differences over the level of operating expenses in the proposed five-year budget (which is required under the restructuring).

    At the end of the meeting, the CCC came up with some modifications to the Company's budget which were devised by the Chief Restructuring Officer - who was appointed by both sides as a "neutral" party to review the proposed five year projected financials/budget.

    The Company is expected to reply within the coming week.  If it agrees, then the revised budget will be submitted to the Central Bank for its review.  If not, the dispute will remain open (unresolved).

    As noted in the previous article, the creditors' position is that expenses should be in harmony with the new situation the Company finds itself in.  Meaning probably fairly dramatic cuts in operating expenses.

    The central question is just how deep the cuts are and whether they are really required.  Or if they are a bit of overkill by overzealous bankers.  Without details, there's no sound basis for judging one way or the other.

    Tuesday 15 June 2010

    New Central Bank of Kuwait Regulations on Investment Companies - Practical Difficulties



    Muhammad Shabaan at AlQabas has an article that several investment companies have held urgent meetings with the CBK or are trying to arrange meetings to discuss the new regulations on investment companies which pose difficulties for them - particularly those in distress.

    In particular one firm with a three year rescheduling recently agreed (clearly Global though its name is not mentioned) pointed out that it cannot comply with the regulations and the terms of its rescheduling.

    What's likely to happen is that the CBK will have to give some firms a "pass" on the implementation dates under the argument that they are taking significant steps to improve their financial positions in the spirit (but not the letter) of the regulations.

    Monday 14 June 2010

    The Investment Dar - Update on Financial Stability Law Process


    AlQabas reports that Ernst and Young has presented its preliminary report on TID to the Central Bank of Kuwait.  It's expected that its final report will be presented in July.  The Central Bank will then study both reports to determine if TID is solvent and should be allowed to used the Financial Stability Law to implement its restructuring.  After completing that study, it will make its recommendation to the Special FSL Court.

    The article goes on to note that if the Plan is approved the Central Bank will retain a monitoring role.  If the Company fails to abide by the restructuring, then the Central Bank would recommend whether TID should be given a second chance or should be put into liquidation.

    I suspect that this means that a final decision on TID's entry under the FSL will take place in late July or early August.  A September implementation - as discussed earlier in the Kuwaiti press - might take place.  One potential timing issue could be Ramadan - which is expected to begin somewhere just before mid August.

    Earlier posts on the Financial Stability Law can be accessed using the label "Financial Stability Law".

    Sunday 13 June 2010

    IIF Report Criticizes Central Bank of Kuwait Re Investment Companies

    AlQabas has a summary of a recent Institute of International Finance ("IIF") Research Note on the Kuwait financial sector - June 1 "Financial Sector Strains are Easing". 

    Much of the analysis is familiar.  Banks have been hurt by the slowdown in commercial real estate, the weakness in the Kuwait Stock Market, the problems of Kuwaiti investment companies.  Banks are expected to have another weak year in 2010 as the need for provisions continues.  The IIF also noted the unevenness in the banking sector with some banks having relatively low levels of distressed loans 2% and some much higher at 30%.  IIF is rather sanguine on the banking sector's prospects. 

    What is the most interesting "bit" is reflected in the headline that AlQabas used.  "Report issued by IIF:  Central Bank of Kuwait issued licenses to investment companies but left them without strong supervision/regulation".  And this probably explains in part the recent new tougher regulations the CBK issued.

    English text of the IIF report here - though you need to be a member with a password to access.