Showing posts with label Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank. Show all posts

Friday 4 November 2016

UAE Banking: Storm Signals in ADCB's 3Q2016 Financials


AA Has the Full Range of Flags, If Needed

As promised earlier, further thoughts on ADCB’s 3Q16 financial report plus an added bonus--a typical AA “get off my lawn” rant on financial reporting and regulatory environment.  The latter in a separate section at the end.
Introductory Comments
If you know your nautical flags, you will immediately see that the “storm signals” warning is at a modest level. In other words, I am not predicting an imminent serious crisis for ADCB.
The bank has reasonably robust stand-alone financials, though note the reporting  “lapses” discussed below. 
If by some low probability event, the bank were to develop life-threatening problems, it would almost certainly receive official support as it and other UAE banks have in the past, e.g., after the Great Financial Crisis of 2008.    The Abu Dhabi Government owns more than 60% of ADCB’s equity and has a special “incentive” to step up and has the resources to do so.  ADCB is a systemically important bank. Thus, the Central Bank is also likely to provide support.
If there is no imminent danger of collapse, why this analysis and why the use of the term “storm signals”? 
Free float is generally low in GCC equities (ADCB somewhere around 30%) and generally this free float is primarily in the hands of retail and not institutional investors, the latter presumed to be less susceptible to market panic.  Note I said “less susceptible” not “not susceptible”.  
In such “markets”, the price impact of investor actions—sales or purchases--is outsized relative to other markets.  A change in market sentiment and one’s return on ADCB stock could decline.  A large enough market decline and one might lose some of the initial investment, depending on one’s entry price. 
These characteristics increase risk.  If risk is higher, then the utility of a warning is greater.  
In addition as is the case here, when an issuer’s financials are deliberately opaque, the utility of a warning increases.   
“Storm signals” like the picture of the flag above provide warnings about potential problems. 
If there is a gale force typhoon in progress, one hopefully doesn’t need to see a flag to decide to keep one’s boat in port.  But if the storm is not yet fully apparent, a warning flag can prevent the sailing of boat, a change in its planned course, or alert the crew to be on the watch for the storm if they decide to leave port on the original course. 
Financial storm signals serve the same function for investors.  Warnings can be used to trigger action to prevent losses or in some cases to gain profit. 
One final note:  warnings about potential problems are not infallible.  Sometimes no storm appears. Sometimes the storm is much different from that predicted. 
Some Technical “Notes”
I used NBAD and FGB to provide some comparisons to ADCB’s financial reporting.  NBAD’s business is different from ADCB’s in many respects so I acknowledge there are limitations to that comparison.  
Abbreviations:   3Q16 = Third Quarter 2016.  FYE15 = Fiscal Year End 31 December 2015.
Financials: 
  1. ADCB:  3Q16, 2Q16, 1Q16, FYE15  
Summary
During my review of ADCB’s 3Q16 financials I noticed two significant developments which occurred primarily in a single quarter—3Q16— and which may be signs of distress in the loan portfolio. 
  1. Accrued Interest Receivable (AIR) jumped some 50% from FYE15 (31 December 2015) with more than 70% of the increase during 3Q16. 
  2. Overdrafts increased some 84% from FYE15 with all the change occurring in 3Q16.    
My concerns were exacerbated by a major deficiency in ADCB’s financials – a failure to report renegotiated loans.  The absence of this rather critical piece of information prevents a deeper analysis of the bank’s condition and raises questions why it isn’t provided.      
Are these 2016 “developments” and the reporting deficiency signs of problems in the loan portfolio?  Does the failure to disclose renegotiated loans indicate that the bank is “actively managing” (AA euphemism of the post) non-performing loans (NPLs)?   That is, hiding problems?  Or are there other more “innocent” explanations?  
There isn’t enough information to make a conclusive call.  On the one hand, it’s hard to build a case for a trend based on a single data point (3Q16 financials).  But the failure (which predates 2016) to disclose required information, the significant “divergence” from past financials, and the fact that these apparently occurred in a single quarter suggest that not everything is “right”.
We won’t get more financial information until FYE16 financials are released and more likely than not the same reporting or non-reporting standards will be used.  A lot can happen until then.
ADCB isn’t “going down” but its share price can.  That’s important for equity investors because by their nature share prices are more volatile than debt prices.  The limited free float and the composition of the investor base for ADCB stock exacerbate that natural characteristic for this stock.
Accrued Interest Receivable (AIR)
Problems in the loan portfolio often show up in increases in AIR before NPLs are formally acknowledged in the financials.  AIR on NPLs often turns out to be as substantial as the air we breathe.
ADCB’s AIR (included in Other Assets) was AED 1.6 billion at 3Q16, AED 1.2 billion at 2Q16, AED 1.3 billion at 1Q16, AED 1.1 billion at FYE15, and AED 1 billion at FYE14.
A couple of things jump out of those numbers.
  1. The increase from FYE15 to 3Q16 was approximately 50%.  That’s larger than the 11% growth in loans. 
  2. More than 70% the increase from FYE15 occurred in a single quarter--the third quarter. 
If ADCB is accruing interest on a time proportion basis, then it would seem that increase would be gradual unless loans ballooned between 2Q16 and 3Q16. 
That doesn’t appear to be the case. Net loan outstandings were AED 162 billion (3Q16), AED 155 billion (2Q16), AED 157 billion (1Q16) and AED 146 billion (FYE15).  An increase of only 11% since the beginning of the year.
If volume isn’t driving the increase, then it could be pricing.  A higher rate on newly extended loan(s) in 3Q16.  If we assume rates were higher just on the AED 7 billion increase in loans between 2Q16 and 3Q16, the rate would have to be around 23%.  That doesn’t seem likely.
It might also be an overall rate increase on the total portfolio or at least an increase on those loans that reprice quarterly. In such a case, it’s more likely that an increase of this sort would come from an increase in the base rate not an overall increase in credit margins. 
Assuming that were the case, an approximate 1% increase on the entire portfolio for three months would be required to boost AIR by AED 0.4 billion. Looking at FYE 15 Financials Note 44 “Interest Rate Risk, some 70% of ADCB’s loans are priced off base interest rates three months or less.  That would make the required base rate increase about 1.45%, assuming that the other 30% could not be repriced.   According to CBUAE data, EIBOR has not risen by that amount during this period. 
But we don’t have to look at external rates.  We can look at ADCB’s financials where an increase in the rate on loans would have to show up in gross interest revenue.  A back of the envelope analysis of quarterly interest revenue on loans to customers divided by the average of the total balance of customer loans and advances (computed using beginning and end of the period totals divided by two) shows an average 4.3% annualized yield on the loan portfolio for the three quarters of 2016 roughly consistent with full year 2015's annualized yield, though on an individual quarter basis the yield is declining:  4.44% (1Q16), 4.27% (2Q16) and 4.22% (3Q16).  2016 gross interest income on customer loans is roughly AED 1.9 billion a quarter which would put it AED 0.4 billion over 2015 but for the entire year.  However, if interest repayments are quarterly as argued above, AIR shouldn’t increase this much because clients should be paying roughly quarterly.   
A cursory inspection of other components of interest income doesn’t show any other asset types likely to be responsible for the increase –these are much more modest in amount and are fairly consistent across 2016 and comparable to the 2015 total performance (divided by four).   
So it seems an interest rate increase is unlikely for the AIR jump as well.
What are other explanations? 
  1. A “catch-up” accrual – correcting a mistake(s) made earlier in 2016.  Would have been a whale of a mistake, though as we know “whales” are not that uncommon even in the Thames.  
  2. A write back of previously “uncollectable” interest.  Both 1 and 2 should appear in the financials.  I didn’t see anything to indicate this. 
  3. A failure by a borrower or borrowers to make an interest payment.  As noted above, Note 44 states that more than 70% of the bank’s loans were priced off interest rates three months or less at FYE15.  This probably hasn’t changed much in 2016, though we won’t know until FYE16 financials are released and then we’ll only have end of period information. Standard banking convention would be that interest is due at each repricing.  So it is possible (but not conclusively proven) that non-payment could explain a spike in the AIR.  If you’re wondering, details like those in Note 44 are not mandatory for interim financials.
Overdrafts
Increases in overdrafts are often a sign of problems. 
[AA side comment:  Another reason for looking here is historical not necessarily analytical.  Those who know their UAE banking history know that the UAE banking system floundered on “perpetual” overdrafts with capitalization of interest (to add insult to injury). ADCB was formed from the wreckage of Emirates Commercial, Federal Commercial, and Khalij Commercial Banks back some 30 or so years ago.]
At 3Q16 OD’s stood at AED 8.3 billion compared to AED 4.5 billion (FYE15) and AED 3.7 billion (FYE14), roughly an 84% increase since FYE15 and 124% since FYE14.  Note that even with the increase ODs are roughly 5% of the loan portfolio, not a large amount unless you compare them to total equity at 30 September 2016.  In that case the figure is 28%. 
OD’s increased rather dramatically in 3Q.  ODs were AED 8.3 billion (3Q16), AED 4.5 billion (2Q16), and AED 5.0 billion (1Q16).  Like AIR, the increase was concentrated in 3Q16.  Unlike AIR, the entire increase took place in the third quarter.   
By contrast NBAD’s comparative figures are AED 10 billion (3Q16), AED 12 billion (FYE15), and AED 14 billion (FYE14).   A 17% decrease since FYE15 and 29% since FYE14.   
FGB doesn’t provide this information, probably based on “materiality” compared to the aggregate amount of the loan portfolio.  ODs at both NBAD and ADCB were about 5% of total loans well under the traditional 10% materiality standard.  A similar level is likely at FGB.
So why is AA making a “federal” case (pun intended) on this issue? 
ODs are one of the trickier forms of credit for banks to manage. 
When extending loans with a defined drawdown period and defined repayments (triggered off the end of that drawdown period and specified by date and amount), banks perform a detailed analysis or should. Monitoring of the status of the loan has well defined milestones in the form of amount and date certain contractual repayments. 
Overdrafts don’t have the same clearly defined signposts as these other loans do.  Typically, the test for non-performance of an OD is an absence of adequate turnover (drawdown and repayment transactions) which has led to a persistent level of debt.  This test is based on the concept that ODs are revolving facilities that should track the borrower’s business/cashflow cycle, increasing when expenditures exceed cash collections and then reversing as collections exceed expenditures. 
This test makes monitoring more difficult and allows more discretion in the timing of classifying a loan as non-performing.  What is an adequate “turnover” of transactions in the account?  What time period should be used to determine that a persistent level of debt has been reached? Does a slowdown in economic activity justify new norms and how should these be calibrated?  Beyond conceptual issues like these, there is also the practical matter of conducting effective monitoring, keeping one’s eye on the ball.
Non-Disclosure of Renegotiated Loans
ADCB does NOT disclose data on renegotiated loans.
AA understands that IFRS #7 (I believe paras 36 and 44, though I am not a hafiz of IFRS) require that this information be disclosed.  Both FGB and NBAD disclose this information. NBAD takes the prize for disclosure.  Let’s hope the merged entity follows NBAD reporting standards. 
NBAD’s FYE 2015 Annual Report Note 4a provides aggregate totals and a reconciliation of the movement in renegotiated loans.  As per that information, during 2015 NBAD’s renegotiated loans doubled to AED 2.6 billion.
By contrast ADCB has a “bland”  “philosophical rumination” defining renegotiated loans but no numbers.  Not really of much analytic utility.  
But it could be worse, here’s a quote from ENBD’s 2015 Annual Report.

Loans with renegotiated terms are loans, the repayment plan of which have been revised as part of ongoing customer relationship to align with the changed cash flows of the borrower with no other concessions by way of reduction in the amount or interest, but in some instances with improved security. These loans are treated as standard loans and continue to be reported as normal loans.

ADCB almost certainly has renegotiated loans.  See the Fitch quote below. 
The bank also has a concentrated portfolio with large individual and aggregate exposures to government related enterprises (GREs) and “private” companies connected to the shaykhly but hopefully not shaky elite.  By some estimates (see Fitch report linked to below) the latter is twice the GRE related exposure.  Ample “opportunities” for problem loans.   
Failure to disclose renegotiated loan data--amounts and other IFRS required information--indicate to AA  that the bank thinks it needs to hide this information.  Why?  Presumably not because it has so few but rather because it has so many.  IFRS-required disclosures would enable a reader to determine when renegotiation took place –giving an indication of whether NPL problems were increasing or decreasing.  That is precisely one of the reasons that IFRS #7 imposes this requirement.
What could be another reason for not reporting this information?
Renegotiating loans typically gives the borrower less onerous terms – lower interest rates, a revised repayment schedule, a longer average life of the loan.  In some cases payments can be reprofiled to push substantial amounts of principal payments well into the future – “ballooning” as one banker I know calls it. 
Take an extreme example: a loan maturity is extended from 5 to 20 years with 80% of principal due during the last three years.  For the first 17 years of the renegotiated loan period, maintaining a “performing” status is much easier than if the loan were extended for a shorter tenor with equal semi-annual principal installments.    
If a bank takes pre-emptive action (before a loan has missed a payment) it can avoid declaring the loan non-performing, thus, “hiding” NPLs and making the bank’s loan portfolio look more robust than it actually is.   If it doesn’t report renegotiated loan data, pre-emptive NPL management might not be noticed by the market.
However, there is no evidence in ADCB’s financials of a massive increase in loan maturity as per Note 45 “Liquidity Risk” in FYE15 financials.  The relative percentages in less than one year and the other two maturity “buckets” for 2015 are almost spot on with 2014. 
But the bank’s reporting is also opaque here as well.  
ADCB uses a maximum maturity “bucket” of “over three years”.  FGB and NBAD use maximum maturity “buckets” of periods of “over five years”.    ADCB therefore has more room to maneuver. If a loan with a three year maturity were extended two years, this would not show up in the Maturity Risk note at ADCB.  It would at FGB or NBAD.    
Dramatically lengthening maturities is one but not the only way to avoid NPL status.  One could back end principal payments (making later repayments higher than nearer repayments) with much shorter extensions of maturity.  If a bank were pro-actively managing problem loans to prevent the appearance of NPLs and did not disclose renegotiations, it could use future renegotiations to manage the problem on a rolling basis. 
But we can’t tell from ADCB’s financials what , if anything, might be going on.
With no evidence in the financials, let’s turn to a quote from Fitch’s August 2016 ratings report (which by the way confirmed an A+ rating for the bank).  Boldface courtesy of AA.
ADCB does not disclose the volume of renegotiated loans, but Fitch understands that it has done a lot of corporate loan renegotiations since the crisis and has reclassified most of these exposures back to performing over this time as they demonstrated normal performance.  ADCB renegotiated some of its 20 largest exposures during 2015.  Fitch understands that these loans would be overdue if they had not been renegotiated.
We don’t know for certain if ADCB is pre-emptively renegotiating troubled loans to avoid having to declare them non-performing, but that’s clearly one way to read the Fitch quote.  Non-disclosure of renegotiated loan information certainly provides cover for such activities, if they are occurring.  AA can’t think of a single “benign” reason why ADCB would withhold this information. One final comment on the Fitch quote: if the terms of the renegotiated loan are generous enough, the bar for “normal performance” may be set low indeed.
AA was also troubled by ADCB’s new external auditor signing off on the financials as being in compliance with IFRS.   As AA understands it, IFRS compliance is all or nothing.  One can’t be partially compliant.
Troubled as well by the CBUAE’s apparent acquiescence.  That being said, though there is both historic precedent elsewhere in the GCC, what wags refer to as IRS (Investcorp Reporting Standards), and closer to home and time, CBUAE “Dubai Inc” renegotiated loan treatment rules.   

Another Warning But This Time About Something That Definitely Will Happen

Accounting and Regulatory “Rant”
Cashflow Statements: 
Accrued but uncollected interest is not a “use of funds” that “increases” Other Assets as seems to be common reporting practice for ADCB, FGB, and NBAD.  Until interest is paid by the borrower, it is uncollected revenue and not cash. 
There are two consequences. 
  1. Since it wasn't collected, it is properly a deduction from net income on the cashflow statement. 
  2. Since it isn't cash, it can't be used to fund an increase in Other Assets. 
If one insists on treating AIR as a “use” of funds, then the statement issuer and its auditor have the duty to disclose the components of Other Assets so that financial statement users can determine what is happening with collection of AIR.  Financial statement users should not have to wait for annual reports to get this information.
Investors/Creditors: 

When issuers shy away from disclosure, it’s usually because they have or think they have something to hide. 
  1. Lack of disclosure limits an investor’s ability to monitor and thus protect its investment. 
  2. More importantly it offers an important insight into the business ethics of an issuer. 
Should you invest with an issuer that withholds basic information from you? And may be withholding that information so it can “manage” its financials?  

Standard financial theory holds that when risk is higher, investors should demand a higher risk premium.  But a key wrinkle to the successful implementation of this theory is that realized returns are often much lower than earlier anticipated or promised returns.  A problem more acute with equity than debt because with equity there are no contractual “promises” and equity prices are more volatile.  


Wednesday 26 October 2016

Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 3Q2016 Results: A Tale of Two Newspapers

Where Would We Be Without Ambition?

On 23 October Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank issued its interim unaudited financial statements. 
  1. Net profit for the first nine months of the year was AED 3.2 billion versus AED 3.7 billion for the comparable period last year (a decline of 14%). 
  2. Net profit for 3Q16 was AED 1.0 billion versus AED 1.2 billion for 3Q16 (a decline of roughly 17%). 
  3. The major factor impacting net income was impairment provisions which increased from AED 391 million in the first nine months of 2015  to AED 1.083 for the first nine months of 2016 (an increase of 77% percent) and from AED 66 million in 3Q15 to AED 380 million for 3Q16 (an increase of 475%).
How did UAE’s two flagship English language newspapers cover this story?
The National’s 23 October headline was ADCB Net Profit Falls 17% in Third Quarter

Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank said its third-quarter profit slid by 17 per cent as provisions for bad loans jumped almost six-fold.
Net profit declined to Dh1 billion in the three months to the end of September versus Dh1.2bn in the same period last year, the bank said. Impairment allowances shot up to Dh380 million from Dh66m in the third quarter last year

Two days later Dubai’s Gulf News took a slightly more optimistic view:  ADCB Reports Dh999m in Q3 Profits Figure brings profit for first nine months to Dh3.14 billion.


Abu Dhabi: Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (ADCB) continued to register growth in net loans and customer deposits in the first nine months of this year despite increased challenges in the banking industry.

“The bank delivered strong financial results for the nine month period of 2016, reporting a net profit Dh3.153 billion and an industry leading return on equity of 16 per cent.   
While the challenging operating environment and the turbulent markets have impacted the industry, our underlying performance and fundamentals remain strong and we continue to grow our businesses. Our balance sheet remains resilient and registered a healthy growth in net loans and customer deposits year to date, 10 per cent and 7 per cent respectively,” said Alaa Eraiqat, ADCB’s group chief executive officer.

In a statement, the CEO reiterated his confidence in the long-term growth of the UAE’s economy, stressing the bank’s strong fundamentals and outlook of delivering value to shareholders.

In the first nine months of this year, the bank’s assets grew 12 per cent to Dh255 billion, while net loans and advances to customers increased 10 per cent to Dh162 billion compared to December 31, 2015.”

Technical notes: 
  1. AA’s calculations are based on net change not simply a division of this year’s results divided by last year’s. 
  2. Gulf News appears to be using net income attributable to controlling equity holders in the bank not total net income.
What a difference a point of view makes. 

One comes away with two very different conclusions from reading these two articles.
  1. Everything sounds just fine from the account in Gulf News. 
  2. The National the “hometown” newspaper of ADCB with perhaps more at stake to  paint a rosy picture does not.  In AA’s view it presents a more accurate picture by providing comparatives to prior periods and discussing negatives as well as positives.
Another post to follow soon with comments on things to watch in ADCB's financials. 

Here's a link to the earlier promised post.


Friday 22 October 2010

More on Awal Bank Chapter 11 Filing

Updated for comments on Chapter 11.

Here are some additional details on Awal's filing.
  1. The case number assigned by the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of Manhattan is 10-15518-alg.  Awal's previous Chapter 15 filing has case number 09-15923alg.
  2. As indicated by the "alg" at the end of the case number, Justice Allan L. Gropper has been assigned this case.
  3. The Bank is being represented by Brown Rudnick LLP who filed the Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy under Chapter 11.
  4. The filing was authorized by Awal's Administrator, Charles Russell, LLP.  Presumably before proceeding CR obtained the no objection of the Central Bank of Bahrain who appointed them.  I think this is a pretty strong indication that the CBB has decided to proceed with the liquidation of the Bank.  Note:  A Chapter 11 proceeding is of course a reorganization not a liquidation.  The latter is Chapter 7.  Chapter 11 allows the debtor to propose a plan for dealing with its existing obligations - either payment in full, in part, conversion to equity, etc.  Post implementation the debtor continues as a going entity (e.g., Continental Airlines).  So what I mean here is that the CBB has decided to proceed knowing it will cause the lenders some pain.  That in turn means the situation is beyond repair.  And that the Bahraini authorities have decided to "bite the bullet" and take the reputational damage that will come from such action. 
As part of its filing, Awal Bank made the following statements:
  1. After the payment of various expenses including that of administration, there will be no funds available for distribution to unsecured creditors.
  2. Estimated creditors are between 50 and 99. 
  3. US assets are above US$50 million up to and including US$100 million.
  4. Estimated debts (worldwide) are over US $1 billion.  (This is the largest amount provided on the Bankruptcy Filing Form).
As required on the Filing Form, the debtor lists its top twenty unsecured creditors.  No amounts are provided though.
Here they are in the order of appearance on the Form:
  1. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, Abu Dhabi
  2. Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Abu Dhabi
  3. AlGosaibi Money Exchange, Saudi Arabia
  4. Bank of Montreal, Canada
  5. Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank, United Kingdom (London Branch)
  6. Bayerische Landesbank/Bayern LB Germany
  7. Boubyan Bank, Kuwait
  8. Calyon Corporate and Investment Bank, United Kingdom
  9. Commercial Bank of Kuwait, Kuwait
  10. Commercial Bank of Qatar, Qatar
  11. Commerzbank Global Equities AG (formerly Dresdner Bank) Germany
  12. Commonwealth Bank of Australia, United Kingdom (London Branch)
  13. Fortis Bank, Belgium
  14. Gulf International Bank, Bahrain
  15. HSBC, Australia
  16. HSBC, United States (NY Branch)
  17. HSH Nordbank AG, German
  18. JP Morgan, United Kingdom (London Branch)
  19. Kuwait Finance House (Liquidity Management House), Kuwait
  20. The International Banking Corporation, Bahrain
If you're wondering about TIBC (which also filed under Chapter 15 in 2009) taking a similar action, a  court hearing is scheduled under their case next week Tuesday (26 October).  Stay tuned.

    Thursday 16 September 2010

    Dubai: More Pain to Come


    Tom Arnold over at The National has an article on the pain likely to come from Nakheel and Dubai Holding restructurings.

    As well as a few quotes from the ratings downgrade of ADCB.  Sounds like Brother Eiraqat already needs more than two 1000 mg Dolgit.

    Sunday 1 August 2010

    Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank - AED 306 Million Loss for 1H10


    By now you've probably seen the press articles on ADCB's 1H10 results and perhaps as well it's press release and the financials themselves.  The loss was due to the Bank taking an AED1.035 billion provision for its AED6.6 exposure to Dubai World. 

    Here are some points that caught my eye.

    First, the Financials.
    1. Customer Deposits have grown from AED86.3 billion at 31 December 2009 to AED96.8 billion at 30 June 2010.  AED90.1 billion at 31 March 2010.  Unfortunately, there's no note for Customer Deposits so it's not possible to see where the increase primarily came from - government, corporate or retail clients.   Anyone out there with any information, please post.  As well, if  anyone knows, if ADCB is paying above market for funds.
    2. Note 2: Bank Deposits - While there is a non trivial AED1.0 billion decrease, the major story here is the shift.  Deposits with banks in the UAE is now 44% versus 33% at 31 December 2009.   A greater proportion of AED deposits?  Helping provide FX funding in the local market.  BTW you'll note that balances with the UAE Central Bank increased by AED700 million roughly the decline in interbanks.
    3. Note11:  Interest receivable has increased roughly AED230 million (of which AED147 million was in 1Q10) to AED837 million - some 37.8% over Fiscal Year End 2009's AED607 million.  Looking at Note 14, you'll notice that Interest Payable actually declined 4.0% to AED952 million from AED992 million at FYE09.   Unclear if this is timing differences.  Longer interest periods on loans than the deposits funding them.  Or a sign of some distress.  Something to keep an eye on.
    Second, Press Release.
    1. Loan to Deposits Ratio.   Yes, the ratio has come down from 135% to 123%.  You'll note it was 151% (! ?) in March 2009.  That's the right trend.  But, sorry to be impolite but a loan to deposits ratio over 100% is not sound banking practice.  In fact it should be lower.
    2. "We have taken a more disciplined approach to pricing risk and have significantly enhanced our capabilities in risk management and strengthened controls across the business. As a result of the current economic environment, both corporate and consumer segments continue to experience high levels of stress and therefore we have had to take significant impairments in the first half of 2010.”  And would seem to have some more miles to go.  To be fair it does take time to turn around a big ship.  And changing a corporate culture perhaps even longer.
    3. Dubai World Provision - I had understood that the Central Bank of the UAE had asked banks to refrain from provisioning until the restructuring was finalized and they had a chance to study the implications.  Is ADCB pulling a Citibank here?  If you know your banking history (and who doesn't devote lots of time to that interesting topic?),  that question will remind you of the action taken by Citibank to provision for duff sovereign loans in the 1980's.  In effect setting a "standard" for other US banks all of whom (including Citi) had heretofore been pretending that those loans - particularly those to Latin borrowers - were "as good as gold".  Is ADCB getting out in front of the pack so that when other lenders do take the provisions, that Quarter ADCB will be able to report a profit amid a sea of red ink at its competitors?  Or does it have more major pain of its own to take and is trying to spread it out in more manageable chunks?
    4. Non Performing Loans:  Increased some AED491 million and the NPL ratio (NPLs to Total Loans) from 5.2% at FYE 09 to 5.4% at 1H10.  That looks good until one notices that the Total Loan portfolio has increased from AED116.6 to AED118.8 billion.  Hopefully, we can assume that none of that AED2.2 billion increase has gone bad yet.  Using total loans at FYE09,  the NPL ratio is 5.8%.  That I think is fairer measure.  
    5. Provision Coverage:  ADCB's press release notes that its Provisions to NPLs ratio is 76.7% as of 1H10 versus 67.8% as of FYE09.  That looks good until one notices that the AED1.035 billion provision for Dubai World in included in the Provision total but none of the DW exposure as NPLs.  The latter presumably because DW is not past due on payment.  If we strip the DW provision out, ADCB's Provision Coverage is 61.3% a decrease from FYE09.  It's hard to understand the logic behind ADCB's calculation unless of course it considers the DW exposure "as good as gold".
    6. Collateral:  AED2.8 billion at 1H10 versus AED5.5 billion at FYE09.  No explanation for the 50.9% decline.  Valuation changes?  Realisation of collateral to repay loans?  Clients repaid and collateral was returned to them?  All bits of information that would help assess the credit health of ADCB.  The note does mention that much of the collateral for NPLs is real property.  Is that the hint to the reason - further mark downs of property?
    As indicated above, some trends to watch on the credit front, though the Bank's main shareholder has supported ADCB from its birth to today whenever it needed funds.  And has the resources to do so again. 

    Wednesday 28 July 2010

    AlGosaibi v Maan AlSanea - English Court Rules Saad to Pay ADCB US$33.1 Million


    Asa Fitch over at The National reports that an English Court has ruled in favor of ADCB ordering Saad Trading Contracting and Financial Services to pay ADCB US$33.1 million for a defaulted foreign exchange swap.  The default was triggered by a decline (withdrawal) of STFCS' rating last year June.

    Saad does have the right of appeal.

    And of course obtaining a court decision in one's favor and obtaining the cash are two different things. 

    Tuesday 20 July 2010

    AlGosaibi v Maan AlSanea - Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank Sues Saad for US$32 Million

    Asa Fitch over at The National reports that ADCB has filed suit in London against Saad Trading and Contracting over a default on a currency swap of US$32 million.

    There's really not much to add on top of what's in the article.

    Thursday 11 March 2010

    Dubai World to Meet With Local Creditors - No or Low Interest Repayment Option?


    The National reports that DW is planning meetings with local creditors - Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and Emirates National Bank.  These meetings follow ones held earlier this week in London with "international" banks.

    The goal of this series of meetings is probably twofold.

    First to test some restructuring ideas with these major banks to get feedback.   Second as a way of managing the process - trying to influence future negotiations by framing the bankers' expectations.  

    One of the options that apparently is being considered is a low or no interest repayment of 100% of the principal over some extended period.

    Let's look at some examples to see what sort of discounts one can achieve through this device.
    1. A bullet repayment 10 years from now of 100% of principal equals a present value of 61% of face at a 5% annual discount rate.  Changing just the repayment to 5 years from now raises the present value to 78%.
    2. Using the same two scenarios above but applying a 10% discount rate, the 10 year bullet has a present value of 39% of face and the 5 year bullet is worth 62%.
    3. Amortizing the loan in 5 equal yearly installments gives present value of 87% at 5% and 76% at 10%.
    4. If there is unequal amortization of 0%, 10%, 15%, 25%, and 50%, then the present value of at 5% discount rate is 82% and 68% with a 10% discount rate.
    What's the bottom line?  One can achieve quite a hefty "haircut" through this tool.

    The Nation suggests that banks might want the zero interest or low interest option as a way of avoiding taking the "hit" to income up front.  I think it is highly likely that any reputable accounting firm is going to let a client who uses IFRS as the basis for financial reporting "get away" with carrying the loan at its nominal value.  This is clearly a restructured loan. 

    The relevant Chapter and Verse are IAS #39 Paragraphs 58 and 59 which deal with impairments in value.  Haircuts, no interest or below market interest rates,  tenor extensions, other concessions that a lender would not normally agree to along with several other items are cited as evidence of  potential "impairment" in Paragraph 59.  

    Paragraphs 63-65 deal with calculating impairments for assets held "at cost".   Present value the projected cash flows at the original interest rate on the instrument.  Any shortfall between original cost and present value is an impairment loss which must be taken immediately to the income statement.

    Paragraph 66 deals with impairments on assets "held as available for sale".  There the discount rate is the "market" rate for that asset at present. Since this is an impairment not a fair value adjustment, it also goes through the income statement.